

PAKISTAN RESPONSE TOWARDS TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY OF
MUSHARRAF REGIME

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A thesis Submitted to the University of Birmingham

For the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science
and International Studies
The University of Birmingham
May 2010

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ABSTRACT

The ranging course of terrorism banishing peace and security prospects of today's Pakistan is seen as a domestic effluent of its own flawed policies, bad governance, and lack of social justice and rule of law in society and widening gulf of trust between the rulers and the ruled. The study focused on policies and performance of the Musharraf government since assuming the mantle of front ranking ally of the United States in its so called 'war on terror'. The causes of reversal of pre nine-eleven position on Afghanistan and support of its Taliban's rulers are examined in the light of the geo-strategic compulsions of that crucial time and the structural weakness of military rule that needed external props for legitimacy. The flaws of the response to the terrorist challenges are traced to its total dependence on the hard option to the total neglect of the human factor from which the thesis develops its argument for a holistic approach to security in which the people occupy a central position. Thesis approach is also shown to hold the solutions for eliminating the causes of extremism on which terrorism feeds and grows. In sum the study deconstructs Musharraf's regime's response to terrorism by examining the conceptual mould of the strategic players in the country and postulates a holistic and integrated security framework to deal with terrorism on a pro-active and sustainable basis. An approach such as this would logically entail the redefining of the role of the state vis-à-vis its people as the fulcrum and medium of ensuring traditional and non traditional security of the country.

Contents

Acknowledgements

CHAPTER 1: Introduction 1 - 19

1.1) Research Contributions

1.2) Aims and Structure

CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 20 - 42

Key studies on Pakistan's experience with Violence and terrorism

Gaps in existing literature on National Security, Terrorism and Pakistan

CHAPTER 3: Theoretical Framework 43 – 76

Part One: The wider debate around the concept of “security”

Traditionalist / Positivist Perspective on Security

Non-Traditionalist / Post-Positivist Perspective on Security

Part Two: Proposed Framework to Understand and Critique Pakistan's Response to Terror

Expanded Conception of Security: An Integrated Framework for Pakistan's Response to Terrorism

A. Barry Buzan - A Holistic View of Security

B. Mahbub-ul-Haq's Human Security Framework

C. Buzan's concept of „Regional Security Complex’

D. Concept of “Subaltern Realism”

Operationalising integrated Framework

CHAPTER 4: Historical Background of Terrorism in Pakistan 77 – 128

Introduction

Part One: Genesis of Extremism and Political Violence in Pakistan

4.1) Islam as Strategic Tool in State Policy

4.2) Jinnah's Idea of Pakistan Vs Reality

4.3) General Zia's Islamaization program

4.4) Genesis of Pakistan's Involvement in Afghanistan after Soviet Occupation of Kabul in 1979

4.5) „Jihad' in Kashmir since 1989

Part Two:

4.6) Security Implications of Pakistan's Involvement in Afghanistan and Kashmir

4.7) Harkat- ul - Mujahidin (HUM)

4.8) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)

4.9) Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LT)

4.10) Musharraf - Pre 9/11 Phase

Conclusion

CHAPTER 5: Military Response towards Terrorism: Home Front?

129 - 182

Pakistan as US Partner in the War on Terror (WOT) – Post 9/11 Phase

Introduction

Part one:

5.1) Why Musharraf Regime joined the War on Terror vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda?

Part Two:

Goals Versus Challenges: Mishmash of Pakistan's Internal and External Security Dimensions.

5.2) Secure Pakistan's strategic assets

5.2.1) To safeguard the cause of Kashmir

5.2.2) Peaceful and stable Afghanistan and deal with home-grown religious militancy

Part Three:

Pakistan as Front-line US Partner in the WOT – Musharraf Regime

5.3) Provision of Air Bases and Air fields

5.4) Sharing of Intelligence and Joint Anti-Terrorism Cooperation

5.5) Logistic Support to ISAF/NATO in Afghanistan

Apprehending Al-Qaeda Terrorists

Conclusion

CHAPTER 6: Military Response towards Terrorism: Home Front? 183 - 240

Introduction

Part One:

FATA – A Unique Entity!

Part Two:

Military Actions – 2002 - 2010

6.2) Operation Al Mizan 2002–06

6.3) Shikai Agreement – April 2004

6.4) Sra Rogah Peace Deal – February 2005

6.5) Military Action and Peace Agreements in North Waziristan – 2006

6.6) Military Actions, inactions, peace overtures and reactions in FATA;

6.7) Swat: Operation Rah-e-Haq in late November 2007 and July 2008

6.8) Operation Silence on Jamia Hafsa and Red Mosque, 3-10 July 2007, Islamabad

6.9) Operation Zalzala in South Waziristan - 2008

6.10) Operation Sher Dil in Bajaur - 2008

Part Three:

Impact of Military actions

Conclusion

CHAPTER 7: Musharraf Reform based Approach to Terrorism in Pakistan 241 -291

Part One

7.1) Challenge of Reforming Education System in Pakistan

Part Two

7.2) Legal and Institutional Measures to Counter Terrorism

7.2) Police Reforms under Musharraf

Part Three

7.3.1) Musharraf's Political and Social Measures in the name of counter Extremism in Pakistan

7.3.2) Concept of Enlightened Moderation

7.3.3) Promoting „Soft Image’ of Pakistan

7.3.4) Musharraf's Media Measures: Freedom versus Repression

7.3.5) Human Resource Development as part of Enlightened Moderation under Musharraf

Conclusion

CHAPTER 8: Conclusion	292 – 315
Bibliography	316- 341
Appendices	i-xxxxxviii

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS, AIMS AND STRUCTURE

“For some time Pakistan has been the main contender for the title of most dangerous country on earth,”¹ warned *The Economist* while the Musharraf regime was still in power. Pakistan’s approach to the War on Terror remains enigmatic not only for the US-led international community but also for the people of Pakistan. On the eve of 9/11 Pakistan perceived an immediate military threat from the United States if it chose not to side with the US in its war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. When General Musharraf led Pakistan into the US camp in its war against terror, his decision to side with the US-led NATO forces in their attack on Afghanistan was seen as a U-turn of Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan. Thereafter, Pakistan became the “most allied ally” of the US in its war against terror. But despite public declarations of the strength of US-Pakistan relationship during General Musharraf’s rule, there existed deep-rooted suspicions on both sides.

Within the US there was a sense that Pakistan continued to distinguish between “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban”, and that General Musharraf was running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. The peace deals concluded between General Musharraf’s government and tribal militant groups (later to join hands under the banner of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan) irked the US and was seen as evidence of the policy of duplicity being pursued by General Musharraf in relation to the US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal belt. Pakistan-US differences over strategies and tactics to be employed in fighting

¹ The Economist, 5th January, 2008.

the war on terror have only grown overtime. After a decade of US war in Afghanistan wherein Pakistan continues to function as a formal ally, the mutual suspicion in US-Pakistan relationship is at an all time high.

While the US administration has continued to push Pakistan to “do more”, policy makers within the US have been openly debating a range of options from direct military strikes within Pakistan’s tribal areas to military and economic sanctions against Pakistan to protect what is seen as US interest in the war raging across Afghanistan and within Pakistan’s tribal areas. On the other hand, there has been an entrenched perception within Pakistan that despite being an ally of the coalition forces fighting against Al-Qaeda and Taliban, Pakistan remains under direct external military threat due to US presence in Afghanistan.² Notwithstanding the worst case scenarios under contemplation in the US and Pakistan, Pakistan-US relationship has been tense and tenuous due to differences over Pakistan’s commitment and approach toward fighting terrorism.

Within Pakistan over the last decade there has been an intense debate on whether the war on terror is Pakistan’s war or if Pakistan is acting as a mercenary to promote US security interests. One school of thought argues that US presence and its war in Afghanistan has destabilized Pakistan and has resulted in proliferation of violence and terrorism in the country. Cited as evidence are the post 9-11 military operations with Pakistan’s tribal areas, the simultaneous break-down of traditional structures of governance within these areas, and the advent and escalation of suicide bombings within Pakistan against citizens and security agencies. The adherents of this argument have held that the decision to engage Pakistan with the US war on terror has imported and spread

² According to a poll conducted by Gallup in June 2008, 4 in 10 Pakistanis (40%) thought US military presence in Afghanistan posed a direct threat to Pakistan. (<http://www.gallup.com/poll/110926/Few-Pakistanis-Perceive-Benefits-From-Alliance-US.aspx>)

terrorism within Pakistan, and terrorism within this region and inside Pakistan will not subside until Pakistan disassociates from the US war on terror and US troops leave Afghanistan.

On the other side is a school of thought that believes that it is Pakistani state policies and priorities and essentially indigenous factors that explain the growth of terrorism and violence in Pakistan. While Pakistan's involvement with the US war on terror in Afghanistan might have been a contributory factor, Pakistan's problem of terrorism will not end with US departure from Afghanistan. The argument is that non-state infrastructure of violence already existed in Pakistan as a consequence of Pakistan's traditional national security policy and Pakistan's changed foreign policy in response to 9/11 only pitted part of this infrastructure against the Pakistani state and triggered incidents of violence and terror across Pakistan. Thus, even if the US war in Afghanistan comes to a halt Pakistan's interface with terrorism will not end till such time that the state's policies and priorities change and non-state actors are no longer rationalized as strategic assets within Pakistan's national security mindset.

Notwithstanding which school of thought seems more persuasive, there is general agreement that the choices Pakistan has made in response to 9-11 have cost it dearly. Pakistan has lost over 35,000 civilians and soldiers to militancy and violence and may more have been injured. The economic loss inflicted upon Pakistan due to its involvement with the war on terror is estimated to be more than \$70 billion. There are also intangible costs: greater religious polarization, emergence of militant groups, and disintegration of traditional social and political governance structures within the tribal areas and mass internal dislocations and creation of refugees due to internal military

operations. Coupled with a crumbling system of governance, limited financial and material resources, these external and internal security challenges have transformed terrorism into an existential crisis for the Pakistani state.

Before 9/11, Pakistan did not have a well-defined counter terrorism strategy and had scarcely felt the need to develop one. The post-9/11 Musharraf government was required, for the first time in the country's history, to devise measures to counter the evolving menace that was threatening national security, destroying both economic development and domestic law and order. While Pakistan had witnessed its fair share of internal violence and the 1990's saw growth of sectarian and ethnic violence to such extent that the state was forced to initiate military-led enforcement actions against militants, causes of internal insecurity and external insecurity could be placed in separate compartments and it was arguable that the state had succeeded in retaining a firewall between them. In the aftermath of 9/11 this firewall collapsed as a consequence of the US war on terror, the changing geo-strategic realities of the region and Pakistan's own response to terrorism. This research postulates that terrorism is a complex phenomenon cannot be dealt with by piecemeal steps and needs a holistic, multi-dimensional and proactive/sustainable counter-terrorism policy that may entail redefining the role of the state as facilitator of both traditional and non-traditional security concerns of the people of Pakistan.

This study aims to assess Pakistan's response to terrorism under the military-led regime headed by General Musharraf from 2001 to 2008 in both a descriptive and an analytically. The central question this study aims to answer is, –How did the Musharraf government respond to terrorism in post 9/11 Pakistan, and did its response amount to the

continuity of or a change in the country's traditional national security policy?" Several questions stem from this larger inquiry: Why did Pakistan evolve as a national security state with religion playing a predominant part its policies? What are the primary aims of Pakistan's national security doctrine and has the threat of terrorism over the last decade changed them? Why did Pakistan ally itself with the US in its war on terror, and is this alliance a continuation of Pakistan's traditional national security doctrine and interests? What security, political, social, economic and cultural reforms were introduced by the Musharraf regime as part of his internal security policy and reform agenda? Was there congruence between Pakistan's external security policy and internal security policy contrived to fight the threat of terrorism? What specific steps did the Musharraf government take to ensure citizen security, to combat terrorism within the state, and to remodel foreign policy? In efforts to counter terrorism, did the Musharraf government create new state policies and bring about institutional reform or did it continue with traditional institutions and policies? What is Pakistan's traditional national security doctrine, how did it evolve during the first 50 years of the country's existence and what policies and strategies were pursued by the state to give it effect? And finally, did 9/11 and the emergence of threats to international peace perceived by the international order from non-state actors inform and change Pakistan's traditional national security doctrine? The security referent throughout this study remains the "state" around which the successes and failures of various practical measures devised to interpret policy have been mapped.

An abundance of academic inquiries have already been made into the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies created and enacted during the Musharraf

years. Studies have typically viewed these through two lenses—considering either their ramifications on American politics,³ or tracing them to be the direct consequence of American politics.⁴ The Musharraf government's counter-terrorism policies have been frequently critiqued on various grounds. Within Pakistan, they have come under fire for being too pro-American.⁵ Externally, they have long been considered duplicitous, with Musharraf accused of playing both sides with the hounds⁶. Other analyses have dismissed the Musharraf government's counter-terrorism efforts as being knee-jerk reactions.⁷ Critics have also accused General Musharraf for using the war on terror to leverage the longevity and legitimacy of his own coup-induced government, following the precedent set by military dictators before him.⁸

While much has been written on the Musharraf regime's response to terrorism, a majority of the indigenous comment comprises event-based narration of Pakistan's response to the US war on terror and its consequences within Pakistan. Non-Pakistani analysts have largely attempted to determine how Pakistan figures within the US world-view and whether or not it promotes the US-crafted security goals of the West. Given that 9/11 is a contemporary event, no scholarly effort has yet been made to study and describe

³See for example, Ashley J. Tellis, "Pakistan's Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 6 (2008) pp: 7-32.

⁴ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, USA: Penguin Group, 2008.

⁵ See for example, Charles H. Kennedy, "Pakistan in 2004: Running Very Fast to Stay in the Same Place," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan-Feb 2005) pp:105-111; Also See; Somini Sengupta, "Pakistan's Leader Faces Increasing Political Challenges," *The New York Times*, 18 August, 2006. (<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/world/asia/18musharraf.html?pagewanted=all>)

⁶See for example, Ashley J. Tellis, "Pakistan's Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 6 (2008) pp: 7-32; Eben Kaplan, "The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 19 October, 2007 <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11644/>.

⁷S.K. Saini, "Storming of Lal Masjid in Pakistan: An Analysis", Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. 26 September, 2008. http://www.idsa.in/event/lalmasjid_sksaini_260908.

⁸See Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism*, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005; Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan between Mosque and Military*, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005.

Pakistan's external and internal security policies, nor its socio-political, economic and institutional initiatives over the decade of General Musharraf's rule. Certainly, no study has yet analysed the first half-century of the country's policies to determine whether 9/11 was an epochal event for Pakistan that changed the state's outlook to security in general. Thus, despite the abundance of literature and the continuing debate on Pakistan's role in countering terrorism within and without, a critical gap in the discussion of Pakistan's post-9/11 response to terrorism exists the absence of an indigenous, holistic vision of security from which to rethink policymaking in Pakistan. The present study aims to fill this gap by deconstructing and analyzing the actual steps taken by the Musharraf regime to combat the evolving menace of terrorism. In doing this, it aims to provide a vantage for assessing and planning future policy on countering terrorism.

This study draws on the (on-record) interviews of one hundred and twenty four personnel involved in policy making during the post 9/11 Musharraf years. These include a broad cross section of interviewees, among whom were General Musharraf himself, and his close aides (including Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz), security advisers, personal friends, politicians (both belonging to Musharraf government and his opposition), key ministers, academicians, media analysts, religious clerics, members of the legal fraternity, serving and retired bureaucrats, intelligence officials, community and youth activists. These interviews allow insight into the linkages and information flow between and within policy-making communities during the Musharraf years and they also reveal crucial missing links in Pakistan's counter-terrorism policies. Consequently, this study adds to the existing body of literature on the government policy making process by giving a broadened and practical understanding of the subject based on ground realities.

Like any other research work the present study cannot be free from certain weaknesses, particularly given its dependence partly on human sources of information and the strong likelihood of subjectivity involved in a human source. The circumspection of the interviewees and their deliberate ambiguity in view of their being part of the Musharraf regime was given due consideration and all along an effort was made to rectify this weakness by employing the historiographic lens and using the medium of the primary and secondary sources available on the subject. In other words, an effort was made to tap all primary sources all individuals who over the decade had a significant role in either crafting Pakistan's response to 9/11 and the scourge of terrorism or analyzing it and corroborate them against information available through secondary sources in order to diminish inconsistencies and address the problem of lack of verifiable information that can impair the study of contemporary events. As a result the thesis fills in the gaps in the published accounts of the Musharraf government on the issue of terrorism. That is, the present study not only deconstructs the Musharraf narrative but also evaluates the usefulness of employing a holistic framework of security in Pakistan.

The key themes that surround the exploration of the central and ancillary research questions raised by this research are as follows:

- a. What is the state's concept of security? Security and insecurity come from within.

The state remains an essential player in the realm of security decision-making with the focus on the people comprising the state. That is, for a stable, moderate and prosperous Pakistan all dimensions of national power military, economic, political, and human need to be strengthened equally. This study explores the

- extent to which the security policies created and enacted under the Musharraf regime have placed citizen security concurrent with national security.
- b. Was the immediate response to the post-9/11 attacks a departure from previous national security policies or was it a continuation of the state's traditional security policy? The Musharraf government's reaction to 9/11 has been widely accused of being a military driven approach based on reactionary or short-term fixes. This paper studies whether the state's immediate short-term reactionary response actually departed from its traditional security policy or whether it was a continuation of the same old policy.
 - c. To what extent has the changing geo-strategic environment of the state created a corresponding change in its national security policies? Given the dramatic ways in which 9/11 altered both Pakistan's geo-strategic worth in the eyes of its powerful ally and the entire landscape of US-Pakistan relations, this study examines whether a long-term shift in Pakistan's national security policy has, in fact, occurred as a consequence. This research elucidates the Musharraf government's reform efforts since 9/11 including legal, social, political, and Madrassa reforms to study their lasting value in contributing to a shift in national policy in general and their effects on security in particular.
 - d. What was the nature of terrorism in Pakistan that the Musharraf regime aimed to confront? Does terrorism pose an existential threat to the state? The study explores whether Pakistan can, in fact, survive the nature of terrorism that have rocked its streets and cities in the post 9/11 era. Recognizing that terrorism is a phenomenon of many dimensions, this paper aims to query the traditional concept

of terrorism as defined by the United Nations, i.e. “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public for unjustifiable political purposes, whatever the consideration of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.”⁹

This study does not attempt to redefine the term “terrorism”, while appreciating that the problem of defining it has been examined extensively.¹⁰ Jeffrey Simon has highlighted at least 212 different definitions of terrorism being used around the world.¹¹ Others such as Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirst-Hoefler have made extensive analyses of existing definitions to craft their own.¹² And thus a debate rages on whether the terrorism that we witness in the contemporary world is an inherently new phenomenon with new characteristics in comparison to the old concept of terrorism as used and understood in the last century.¹³ Niall Ferguson appreciates the similarities between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism such as the political aspects of their religious ideologies, their transnational character and also

⁹ See for example, H.H.A Cooper, “Terrorism – The Problem of Defining Revisited”, *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 44, No. 6 (2001), pp: 881-893; Alex P. Schmid, “Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 16, No. 2, (2004), pp. 197-221; Boaz Ganor, “Defining terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” *Police Practice and Research*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2002), pp: 287-304.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Jeffrey D. Simon, *The Terrorist Trap*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p: 29.

¹² Alex P. Schmid & Albert J Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature*, (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 28; and Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur & Simon Hirsch-Hoefler, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 16, No. 4, (2004), p: 786.

¹³ See for example, Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini & Brian M. Jenkins, *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999); Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 5, (1996), pp: 24-36; Stephen M. Aubery, *The New Dimension of International Terrorism*, (Zurich: Vdf Hochschulverlag, 2004)

compares the Sudanese revolt of the Mahdi against the British Empire in the 1880s with Osama bin Laden's fight against the US.¹⁴

While not oblivious to this debate over the definition and characteristics of terrorism in the 21st century, its evolution as a predominant threat to state security in the international arena and consequent impact on interstate relations, this study does not set out to reassess the role of terrorism or argue that the nature of terrorism confronting ought to be treated differently because of its unique characteristics. As Pakistan remains the unit of analysis for this research, it is not the aim of this thesis to reconsider the fundamental tenets of the realism or Westphalian state sovereignty and nation-state system in view of the growing preeminence of terrorism in international relations. However, the debate surrounding the role and character of such terrorism is duly considered in forming an estimate of the evolving geo-strategic realities and how they affect the region surrounding Pakistan as well as the impact of global focus on terrorism in pulling down the erstwhile divide between domestic terrorism and cross-border terrorism and thus compounding the grave threat terrorism constitutes for the Pakistani state and society.

This study explores the extent to which terrorists who are active in Pakistan pose an existential threat to the state since, as is now widely thought, their aim is to acquire control over the organs of the government and establish their rule through religious parties and groups who see no hope of coming to power through electoral politics, and who nurture this hope on the strength of the precedent of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan and the defeat of the Soviet Union a superpower of its day at the hands of the Mujahedin. The problem of terrorism in Pakistan is more serious than the terror tactics of some group

¹⁴ Niall Ferguson, "Clashing Civilization or Mad Mullahs: The United States between Formal and Informal Empire", in Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chand (eds.), *The Age of Terror: America and the World after September 11*, (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp: 115-141.

trying to attract attention to its cause. Keeping this in view, the study purports to explore the gravity of terrorism as a threat to the very viability and cohesiveness of Pakistan in future and pose questions for further analysis: Given the reach and depth of extremism, does Pakistan not need a comprehensive plan to weed out terrorism to secure and safeguard its own future? Would such aim not call for a re-orientation of Pakistan's national priorities and a move from its present defense-based approach to national security to a multidimensional policy focused on the citizens and encompassing all facets of national life? Until this is achieved in practice, will terrorists not continue to use Pakistan as a base and a sanctuary, and challenge the vulnerable state apparatus that lacks sustained features of democratic governance and broad public support?

The conceptual framework proposed by this study is based on the critical analysis of the existing literature on the subject of security at the international, regional and national levels, while staying within the Westphalian system of Weberian states. Thus, state remains the unit of analysis and referent object of security, and in starting out to understand the behavior of the Pakistani state it is assumed that threats are conceived in state-centric military terms and that the independence and territorial integrity of the state, as a legally sovereign and equal entity in interstate relations, remains a rational object of the national security policy. Further, while remaining cognizant of the 'failing state' debate, this study does not rest on the assumption that terrorism in weak states fundamentally changes how states think about and deal with the concepts of security and insecurity or poses a serious analytical challenge to the theory of realism or the Westphalian concept of nation-state sovereignty and security.

But while relying on realism and the Westphalian model of sovereignty to understand and explain how Pakistan continues to conceive national security policy and strategies, this study conceives an integrated framework of security with an added emphasis on the citizen as the prime consumer and beneficiary of the state's national security framework not only to critique Pakistan's traditional national security policy but also to consider whether reliance on such framework might help bridge the growing gap between state security and citizen security and result in conception of a comprehensive policy to confront the threat of terrorism. It has been argued that no singular theoretical discourse (as discussed in detail in the part comprising literature review) can wholly evaluate Musharraf regime's response to the issue of terrorism. Hence a systemic framework of analysis is proposed charting the west-dominated security discourse at the global level since the end of the Cold War, drawing its linkage to the security analysis of the developing states, and finally dwelling on the utility of specific works on security in order to explain Pakistan's present security challenges – primarily, terrorism and the state's response to it.

In this context the following has been examined: whether Musharraf government's response towards terrorism was in fact ~~holistic~~”; whether there was any substantive change during Musharraf's time in the mindset about ‘security’ perceived in terms other than military and external; whether Musharraf regime had the capacity and political will to liquidate the terrorist networks; and what were the implications of his policy on terrorism at the domestic, regional and international levels. This last aspect is given particular attention as General Musharraf's decision to align with the United States gave a critical twist to Pakistan's security policy and cultivated the impression the

country's earlier policy toward Afghanistan had been altered. More specifically, this decision galvanized the gap in perceptions of what constituted national interest in the eyes of the state and the extremist elements at home. The sub-state organizations or networks that had been nurtured and tolerated by the state for more than three decades as low-cost tools of its external security both in Kashmir and Afghanistan emerged as a formidable challenge to its very survival. As General Musharraf himself claimed, "threats to state security are more of internal nature than external...extremists need to be cleared... the aim is to have a moderate, progressive, and dynamic Pakistan."¹⁵

The research methodology of the present study is a mix of empirical analysis with historical, critical, and qualitative research signposts. Applying an open-ended and flexible research methodology, the thesis uncovers the complex folds of government policymaking and highlights the contextual, personal and institutional role on the security front. The thesis is essentially a qualitative analysis of the primary and secondary sources relating to the central research question. The research techniques employed in the present study followed a multi-track research strategy as follows:

- Data gathering by conducting interviews across the broad spectrum of stakeholders affected and involved (directly or indirectly) in the state's policymaking, implementation and evaluation process. The interviews varied from structured and semi-structured pattern depending upon the respondent's position and his/her preference of the mode of communication while keeping a focus on making the study more meaningful.

¹⁵ President General Pervez Musharraf's speech available at <http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/Sep-2003/main/top 5.asp>.

- Numerous participatory and interpretive research initiatives undertaken by the researcher through field trips, seminars, dialogue, and roundtable discussions with panels of intellectuals, media persons, students, civil society organizations, researchers, religious scholars and political groups from time to time. The inferences obtained from these initiatives helped to understand the complexity of the terrorism threat.
- A flexible approach to the interpretation of evidence was applied to offset the limitations of the empirical data, such as limited access to primary (particularly, official) sources of information on grounds of ‘confidentiality and secrecy’. This required recourse to a broadened and integrated research methodology in view of the complexity of the threat and the response, which helped in yielding multiple conclusions from the research query.
- Critical appreciation of historical and contemporary (primary and secondary) sources of information such as government reports, policy statements, laws and ordinances promulgated, national, regional and international think tanks briefs, assessments, opinion surveys, and documentary evidence, in addition to statistical data both from the public and private or semi-public sources that informed the methodological framework.

The aim of employing this open-ended research methodology was to underscore the relative nature of the problem that needs in-depth appreciation of the subject from multi-dimensional standpoints. The study is divided into four parts and composed of seven chapters that attempt to draw a realistic picture of Pakistan’s complex interaction with terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, to determine whether this interaction amounts to a

continuity of or change in Pakistan's national security doctrine and finally, to propose a framework to critique the response to terrorism and what it says about Pakistan's national security policy.

Part One of the thesis entails the literature review and theoretical framework and forms Chapters Two and Three of the thesis. Chapter Two surveys the key empirical and historical accounts of Pakistan's experience with violence/terrorism, locates the study in the biographical history of General Musharraf's rule and the main studies of his tenure, identifies the historiographical schools and gaps in the existing literature, and shows how the present study addresses these gaps. Chapter Three describes why the delineated theoretical framework has been construed and used to analyze Pakistan's response to terrorism in comparison to alternative approaches to addressing the central research question. The limitations and the possible shortcomings of the adopted approach are also discussed side by side.

Chapter four examines the historical background to the problem of terrorism and reflects upon the multiple variables and factors that contributed to the origins and growth of a militant mindset and infrastructure within Pakistan. The chapter details how state policies at the domestic and bilateral level have contributed to the infrastructure of violence in the country, what are the bases, strategic outlook, character and behavior of multiple variables of violence operating within and beyond the country, while sketching the contextual parameters of General Musharraf's October 1999 coup and discussing the security outlook of Pakistan versus Afghanistan, India and the western world. The analyses is based on the thesis proposition that security and insecurity comes from within and that security perceived in holistic terms can decisively reshape the fragmented

character of the nation in Pakistan and ensure the viability of its statehood. It further argues that the cost of non-investment in human capital does sow the seeds of extremism and radical behavior.

Part Two of the thesis focuses on General Musharraf's internationally appreciated U-turn on Afghanistan to embrace the role of US ally in the War on Terror (WOT) that began with the Operation Enduring Freedom operation against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in November 2001. This section comprises two chapters of the study. Chapter Five undertakes the discourse analysis to trace the reasons stated or otherwise to be on the side of the US against the Taliban government in Afghanistan. It also examines the nature of support that Islamabad extended to the US in this regard and the implications of this decision on Pakistan's domestic security. This chapter considers how Pakistan's internal security and external security and foreign policy are entwined and how policies crafted in relation to one may lead to a positive or negative outcome that can complicate the management of the other.

Chapter Six of the thesis looks into the Musharraf regime's employment of military and coercive means at the domestic level, particularly in Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), in an attempt to enforce the writ of the government. Statistical data in relation to the peace deals struck by the Musharraf Government with militant groups in FATA derived from military sources and printed materials informs this chapter to a great extent. The gaps and implications of these military operations on the rest of the country are also highlighted. The chapter brings forth the role of the state as the prime regulator of security policy and the minimum role of the individual citizen as a referent or

beneficiary/casualty of security on this plane. The institutional and constitutional ambiguities that have led to this state of affairs are also discussed.

Part Three of the thesis comprises the critical analysis of the Musharraf regime's counterterrorism strategy through reforms. Chapter Seven looks into the proposed reform measures introduced by the Musharraf regime within the realms of education, law, politics, culture, economics, and institutional design. Here, the human security lens is employed to assess the achievements and failures of the state. The gap between General Musharraf's rhetoric of reform and his debilitated policy implementation is documented and analyzed.

Events and Developments such as Lal Masjid fiasco, the continuous rise of terror related incidents across the country, a shaky economy, the surge in Baluchistan insurgency, the institutional differences primarily between the judiciary and the executive, the widening distrust between US and Pakistan, have been described and analyzed to determine how General Musharraf's strategy to cling onto power and sell himself as the best option to rein in the growing threat of terrorism within and beyond Pakistan influenced Pakistani state's policies. This chapter explores whether regimes confronted with lack of political legitimacy end up projecting the rulers' personal interests as vital national interests, and whether in such milieu the state itself becomes a source of insecurity to its people.

Finally, chapter eight summarizes and synthesizes the main findings of the thesis. It highlights the utility of following an integrated and holistic vision of security in Pakistan and suggests that the roles of the state and the citizens both ought to be treated as critical referents of national security. And it further argues that the state's response to

terrorism can only be meaningful if it driven by a sustained, proactive, and multi-dimensional strategic outlook. In short, the thesis describes, explains and analyzes Pakistan's response to terrorism and the national security doctrine it stems from while proposing that an effective counterterrorism policy would not only need to be the product of a comprehensive conception of security with primary focus on the citizen, but that a prerequisite for such policy is the reorientation of Pakistan's national security doctrine and mindset.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Pakistan's experience with violence and terrorism can be understood by analyzing linkages between history, changing domestic and international political environment and intervening factors such as religion, and conceptions of national security and terrorism. All these factors help understand state behavior in terms of strategic preferences and actions. An attempt has been made in this chapter to review the available literature that identifies and analyzes the various concepts and components that help understand and analyze the juggernaut of terrorism and how it impacts Pakistan, its policies and responses. To undertake an analysis of threats clouding the security environs of Pakistan, the key empirical and historical studies of Pakistan's experience with violence and terrorism have been discussed. And an attempt has been made to locate this study in the biographical literature on Musharraf and the main studies on his years in power.

There is abundance of literature published in and over Pakistan's response towards terrorism in the post 9/11-scenario. This literature largely reflects on events that took place during Musharraf regime in the aftermath of 9/11 incidents, followed by the Zardari government and developments in his era. Some writers like Zahid Hussain¹, Ahmad Rashid² and others preferred to confine their work in the light of post 9/11 developments. Others such as Hussain Haqqani³ and Hassan Abbas⁴ have rooted their analysis in history narrated noteworthy events and policies since the independence of Pakistan. Still others have focused on Jihadi

¹ Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*, Lahore: Vanguard, 2007.

² Ahmed Rashid *Descent into Chaos*, USA: Penguin Group, 2008.

³ Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan Between Mosque and Military*, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005.

⁴ Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism*, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005.

organizations, their infrastructure and role they played to polarize Pakistani society, as well as the role of religion, the trends amplifying extremist mindsets and the social construct of the State contributing to and explaining the incidence of violence and terror⁵. Though all these works are important and shed light on major developments in Pakistan and in the Pakistani context, they lack a holistic framework of analysis that the present study follows.

The following review covers the broad canvas of concepts, actors and events, and the state's response to them.

Farzana Shaikh, in *Making Sense of Pakistan* (2009), analyzes the origin of Pakistan's problems and identifies the nation's identity crisis as the root of all the ills facing Pakistan.⁶ She identifies that Pakistan is struggling constantly to forge a consensus about the role of Islam in Pakistan and what it means to be a Pakistani. She addresses the political, economic and strategic implications of Pakistan's uncertain national identity. According to her, these uncertainties have deepened the country's divisions and discouraged plural definitions of the Pakistani. In her opinion, the country's problematic relationship with Islam has most decisively frustrated its quest for a coherent national identity and for stability as a nation state capable of absorbing the challenges of its rich and diverse society. According to her, this fundamental confusion and uncertainty has hindered the process of integration and progress, kept the masses confused, enabled the ruling elite to exploit the religious sentiments of people, and make self-serving choices and policies in disregard of the people and their needs and wishes.

She explains that the aspired role of Islam in the new country created confusions regarding what role it should play. This confusion was further heightened with the demise of

⁵ See for example Muhammad Amir Rana. *Jihad aur Jihadi*. Lahore: Mashaal Books. 2003; Amir Mir. *A to Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan*. Lahore: Marshal Books Publisher. 2001; and Syed Saleem Shahzad. *Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11*. London: Pluto Press. 2011.

⁶ Farzana Sheikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

founding father Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. In addition, these confusions delayed the process of constitution making in the country, which further delayed the process of resolving this core issue. In the mean time, divisions became more apparent while religious parties pressed for Islam to have a greater role in the state's affairs, while the secular class wanted religion to be part of the national culture, which had nothing to do with state's affairs. While it took ten long years for the first constitution to be promulgated while the core issue remained unresolved, that army merely took three years after its promulgation to openly step in and assume state control. This development introduced a cycle of military and civilian governments in Pakistan each trying to use Islam for their own objectives. Islam became a slogan in the hands of the power elite, whether civilian or military, to be exploited.

She narrates the debates regarding the identity issue during different regimes in power and highlights the policies adopted by them according to their perceptions over the issue. While military's position was dominant due to its influence, it forged alliance with the Islamists for its own domestic and regional needs and objectives. But this approach proved disastrous as it emboldened religious forces. These state policies fomented sectarianism in Pakistan and radicalized the society as evident by the fact that Pakistan army is now engaged in a fierce battle against the militant forces it helped create. But despite such critical analysis, the author tries to find a silver lining in dwelling upon the future of Pakistan due to recent trends and societal changes i.e. an emancipated media, a newly galvanized legal fraternity, a vibrant artist community and human rights activists who are ready to raise their voices to be more receptive to new ways of imagining their country's identity.

Stephen Philip Cohen, in *The Idea of Pakistan* (2004), reflects on the dilemmas faced by the Pakistan today.⁷ The book unfolds the conceptual and theoretical debate focusing on the very basis of Pakistan's creation in 1947 on the name of Islam and knits this idea with the historical account of political and socio-economic developments and the role of military and civil bureaucracies from 1947-2004. It combines the historical analysis with the empirical data to dispel the worst case scenarios conceived about Pakistan's future in India and the West. Cohen thus puts together a realistic picture of Pakistan, as an indigenous state with its own identity, logic and future.

The Idea of Pakistan is a panoramic view of an extremely complex country that continues to balance its multi-based identities and aspirations with the ever-changing needs of the international and regional politics. Cohen's analysis is a well-balanced effort to acquaint the reader with the extremely complex themes, each of which can (and have) consumed a multiple analyses of their own. In this endeavor, Cohen skillfully puts together a fairly complete picture of Pakistan's past, present and future trends in one go.

While travelling through the various facets of Pakistan's evolution both as an idea and the state development since its inception, Cohen poses and analyses the key questions such as: how the Two Nation Theory (that formed the basis of Pakistan's creation) was conceived and shaped through the events dating back from the early arrival of Muslims in the sub-continent through the periods of the Muslim rule and British Raj, and finally the emergence of Pakistan); what are the ideological and organizational moorings and imperatives of Pakistan's major social and political structures; why economic, educational and demographic prospects of Pakistan are far from being stable and require sustained and comprehensive efforts on part of government as well as major

⁷ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

powers primarily the United States; and against the backdrop of challenges, capabilities, and constraints, what can be the various plausible “futures” for Pakistan? The final chapter closes with the policy advice for the United States.

Cohen argues that while Pakistan is inundated with problems and challenges it can still be redeemed, and advises the US policymakers to stay engaged with Pakistan given its strategic position, capabilities and uncertainties. Thus his work is equally relevant for Pakistan’s leadership (political, military, and Islamists), intellectuals and civil-society actors should they wish to make the dream and idea of its founding fathers come true. To resurrect the state institutions, political, economic, educational and social fabric of an extremely complex and multi-dimensional Pakistan, as a moderate Islamic state, at peace with itself and beyond is definitely an uphill task, but not an impossible one.

In short, *The Idea of Pakistan* should be read as both an analytical effort and historical account meant to sensitize the reader with the challenges and opportunities that needs to be tapped for making the ideal or dream of Pakistan come true. In this well-balanced, informative and insightful tale about a “dangerously flawed but not failed state”, the delicate linkage between the present internal and external dynamics imperatives is well sketched.

The historical analysis of D.Reetz outlines four major strands of Islamic view and activity in British India that together formed the Islamic tradition as part of the political culture of Pakistan in its early phase: “Mass agitation such as the Khilafat movement and Hijrat movement (1920- 24); institutions of Islamic learning such as at Deoband, Breilly and Lucknow, provided a

framework for the Muslim self-statement about classical values and norms of Islam and the contemporary response of Muslim societies to Western domination.”⁸

In analyzing the role of religion in Pakistan, Mohammad Waseem, observes: Islam in Pakistan has represented all four trends represented by street agitation, anti-Western intellectual discourse, religious scholarship of madrassas and the potential for a xenophobic tribal rebellion in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), respectively.⁹ Pakistan’s decision makers’ world view characterized by “an Indo-centric foreign policy, suspicions of the West, and a world of Islam perspective” was shared by a whole new generation of mujahedeen graduating from the mushrooming madrassas in Pakistan who were to rid Kashmir of Hindu rule.¹⁰

Waseem explains this in the following words:

The involvement of Islamic militants in the wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir contributed to privatization of foreign policy and militarization of Islamic activists. The international Islamic networks finally provided a global agenda for the movement in terms of endemic anti-Americanism...State policies, regional instability and non-resolution of conflicts involving Muslims in the region and in the world at large are the leading determinants of the nature and direction of Islamic organizations in Pakistan.¹¹

In his interesting work entitled *Pakistan: Social and Cultural Transformation in a Muslim World*, Mohammad Ayub A Qadeer presents an overview of social and cultural transformation in Pakistan since independence¹². This narrative explains how tradition and family life continue to contribute long term stability to the society and examines the areas where

⁸ D. Reetz, “Muslim Concepts of Local Power and Resistance: Islamic Militants in the Indian Frontier Province before Independence” paper presented at the Fourteenth European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies, Copenhagen, 21 – 24 August 1996, p: 2. Available at: <http://www.zmo.de/dietrich/Reetz%201998.pdf>.

⁹ M Waseem, Professor of Political Science at LUMS (Lahore University of Management Sciences) Author’s Interview, 4 May 2006, Lahore.

¹⁰ Mohammed Waseem, “Sectarian conflict in Pakistan,” op.cit, pp: 55-59.

¹¹ Mohammad Waseem, “Origins and Growth Patterns of Islamic Organizations in Pakistan”, op.cit, p: 33.

¹² Mohammad Ayub A Qadeer, *Pakistan: Social and Cultural Transformation in a Muslim Nation*, USA: Routledge, 2006.

very rapid changes are taking place: large population increase, urbanization, economic development, and the nature of civil society and the state. It offers an insightful view into Pakistan, exploring the wide range of ethnic groups, the countryside, religion and community, and popular culture and national identity. Qadeer's analysis is most useful for he tracks the role of religion as the *raison d'être* of Pakistan's creation, the interaction between elites and religion during the life of Pakistan, and how modernity, societal influences, power-elites, and the identity of actors who emerged as the vanguard of religion and Pakistan's ideology influenced the role that Islam has come to play in Pakistan. According to him:

“The Islamic discourse lays claim to its own form of modernity. It locates the origins of human rights, social justice and even scientific progress in Islam and the civilization it spawned. The conflation of westernization and modernization in Islamic critiques of modernity allows Islamists to play on Pakistan nationalism and cultural pride. From the early days, Islamic political parties, Ulama (Islamic scholars) and Mullahs have claimed ownership of the ideology. Getting the Ahmadis declared as non-Muslims in 1974 laid a legislative path for turning rival sects into minorities. By the 1990's they had come to form a fearsome group in Pakistan society. Splinted into small groups, Islamic militants and Jihadis operated from, different platforms outside the political arena.”¹³

Mariam Abu Zahab makes a similar point about the politicization of religion analyzing sectarianism in Jhang when she contends that, “a conflict which was largely due to socio-economic factors was given a religious twist by politico-religious Sunni entrepreneurs, and encouraged by the Zia regime, to counter Shias' new assertiveness.”¹⁴

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Mariam Abu Zahab, “Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: Local Roots and Global Connections”, Institute of Regional Studies, *Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Countermeasures*, Islamabad: IRS, 2006, pp: 383 – 396.

The role of Islam in legal system of Pakistan, by Martin Lau is an effort to describe interpretation of religion in legal system.¹⁵ Starting in 1947, it examines the way Pakistani judges have dealt with the controversial issue of Islam in the past 50 years. The book's focus on reported case-law offers a new perspective on the Islamization of Pakistan's legal system in which Islam emerges as more than just a challenge to Western conceptions of human rights.

The authors Eamon Murphy & Ahmad Rashid Malik explain the historical linkages of Jihad in Pakistan since the 1980's. They go back to the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union from 1978-88, backed by the United States, and its social, political and economic fallout that paved the way for extremism, militancy and terrorism in Pakistan. They further claim that authoritarianism and the political and social decay in the 1980s and 1990s played its part in the growth of fanatical outfits prone to violence.¹⁶

There is also some literature critical of Pakistan military's role as the most powerful state institution that continues to play a predominant role in shaping the country's policies and priorities.

The book *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, by Ayesha Siddiqua is a distinct effort that analyzes the multipronged institutional interests of Pakistan army and how protecting such self-defined interest encourages the armed forces to interfere with and influence almost all aspects of national policy¹⁷.

Brian Cloughley book *A history of the Pakistan army: Wars and Insurrections* is a welcome addition to the literature on Pakistan Army.¹⁸ The book explains the history of Pakistan itself, which illustrates how deeply involved the military has been over the past 50 years in

¹⁵ Martin Lau , *The role of Islam in legal system of Pakistan*, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, NV, 2006.

¹⁶ Eamon Murphy & Ahmad Rashid Malik, "Pakistan Jihad: The Making of Religious Terrorism," Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Journal IX, no.2, Summer 2009.

¹⁷ Ayesha Siddiqua. *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, London: Pluto Press, 2007.

¹⁸ Brian Cloughley, *A history of the Pakistan army: Wars and Insurrections*, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006.

matters of State. Cloughley discusses in detail the wars fought by the Pakistan army, the tactics it evolved in the process and the result that ensued. He particularly mentions the 1965 and 1971 wars, delving into the circumstances that led to them, their outcome and the effects that lingered in the aftermath. The author elucidates the initial history of the Pakistan Army; however is given a broad brush treatment and the British Indian Colonial social and military legacy is totally ignored.

Crossed Swords by Shuja Nawaz is a profound, multi-layered historical analysis of the nature and role of the Pakistan army in the country's polity as well as its turbulent relationship with the United States. Nawaz examines the army and Pakistan in both peace and war. Using many unpublished materials from the archives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army, as well as interviews with key military and political figures in Pakistan and the United States, he sheds light not only on the Pakistan Army and its US connections but also on Pakistan as a key Muslim country in one of the world's toughest neighborhoods. This groundbreaking work offers unique insights into Pakistan's most important and powerful institution.¹⁹

In the book *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan*,²⁰ taking an explicitly comparative theoretical approach, Saeed Shafqat presents a comprehensive exploration of civil-military relations in Pakistan. He begins by describing the history of military hegemony in this volatile South Asian country and then examines the breakdown of military control, assessing the rise of the Pakistan People's Party and the changing configuration of party-military relations. The author explains the checkerboard concept of choices and options between democratic or military rule in Pakistan.

¹⁹ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, Oxford University Press, 2008.

²⁰ Saeed Shafqat, *Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*, United States of America: Western view Press, 1997.

The book *Military Control* on Pakistan, by Mazhar Aziz examines the role of the military, the most influential actor in Pakistan, and challenges conventional wisdom on the causes of political instability in this geographically important nuclear state. It rejects views that ethnic and religious cleavages and perceived economic or political mismanagement by civilian governments triggers military intervention in Pakistan.²¹ The study argues instead that the military intervenes to remove civilian governments where the latter are perceived to be undermining the military? The author discussed that the Pakistani military has become a parallel state, and given the extent of its influence, will continue to define the nature of governance within the polity. *Military Control* in Pakistan highlights the need to refocus attention on the problem of an influential military and its potential to adversely impact democratic norms, political representation and civilian-military relations.

It has been argued that Pakistan military has also played a significant role by imposing religious notions in policy and practice. According to Suroosh Irfani, “inevitably, the alliance of Zia’s military dictatorship with the Deobandi stirred up primordial passions and empowered the semi-literate mullahs as commissars of the state and distributors of its largesse through zakat (wealth tax) funds to the poor.”²² And that the government’s decision to provide zakat funds to madrassas led to their mushrooming growth and the government accommodated (these madrassa students and members of religious political parties) as functionaries of the various government-funded institutions.²³

²¹ Ibid.

²² Suroosh Irfani, “Pakistan’s Sectarian Violence: Between the “Arabist Shift” and Indo-Persian Culture”, in Satu P Limaye, Robert G. Wirsing, Mohan Malik, edit, *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia*, op.cit, pp: 147 – 169.

²³ Suroosh Irfani, op.cit, pp: 155-161.

The book by Hassan Askari Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan*²⁴ offers a comprehensive study of the dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan. It asks how and why the Pakistan military has acquired such a salience in the polity and how it continues to influence decision-making on foreign and security policies and key domestic political, social and economic issues. It also examines the changes within the military, the impact of these changes on its disposition towards the state and society, and the implications for peace and security in nuclearized South Asia.

The book *Contemporary Pakistan*²⁵ by Veena Kukreja, an Indian author gives a distant observer view on Pakistan political discourse and its impact on state behavior. This book broadly discusses the political processes in contemporary Pakistan with the aim to understand the crises the country is confronted with. The author provides insights into Pakistan's traumatic political history - one that exemplifies a long-drawn battle between authoritarianism and constitutionalism and an enduring ideological conflict between Islamic nationalism, regionalism and elite pluralism.

Muhammad Amir Rana, in *The Seeds of Terrorism* (2005), narrates the events from the Afghan jihad started in 1979 upon Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which caused the alliance between the CIA and ISI to defeat Communism²⁶. This alliance needed irregular forces to fight against Soviet forces and, therefore, US and Saudi-funded jihad infrastructure was created in Pakistan. According to him, the success against the Soviet forces provided new agenda to the militants to free Muslims from their perceived American, Israeli and Indian oppressors. He highlights the Pakistan's Taliban policy and argues that the Taliban were created by the ISI and that the CIA was equally involved in this affair. He also covers important developments in

²⁴ Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.

²⁵ Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan, India : Sage Publications, 2003*

²⁶ Muhammad Amir Rana, *The Seeds of Terrorism*, London: New Millennium, 2005

Pakistan and Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. The focus of his work is on various militant organizations operating in Pakistan. He highlights the jihadist infrastructure in Pakistan, its links to Pakistan's ISI, and religious political parties and transnational links with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

According to him, post 9/11 policy of General Musharraf was a transformation from pre 9/11 policies of tolerating militant groups. In his views, this policy shift was perceived as occurring under international pressure which caused resentment among the religious political parties and militants towards the state of Pakistan.

In terms of analyzing the roots of terrorism in Pakistan, Vali Raza Nasr (a leading expert on the sectarian groups of Pakistan) elucidates causes and happenings between sectarian groups. He claims that for groups such as Sipah-e-Sihaba Pakistan (SSP), murdering Shias was pure Jihad and overtime it forged ties with the drug traders and local criminals to do the "needful". This reproduced relationships between the militant groups and drug traffickers that had already evolved in Afghanistan.²⁷

Hussain Haqqani, in *Pakistan between Mosque and Military* (2005), provides an overview of important events taking place in Pakistan since independence²⁸. The subject of his work is the alliance between Islamists and the military in Pakistan and he identifies these two important institutions empowered to shape the events in Pakistan throughout its history. Haqqani highlights the traditional concept of national security of Pakistan military which led to the certain choices, including the use of religion as a sole source of cohesion in a multiethnic society like Pakistan, which empowered the religious parties and role of clergy in the society. According to

²⁷ S.V.R. Nasr, "Islam, the State, and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan", in Christophe Jaffrelot, ed., *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* p: 95.

him, “emphasis on Islamic unity was seen as barrier against the political tide of ethnic nationalism.”²⁹

While over viewing the history of Mosque-Military alliance since independence, Haqqani identifies the exploitation of religious sentiments of people by the Pakistani leaders as an instrument of strengthening Pakistan’s identity. Similarly, according to him, “Islam, hostility to India and Urdu language were identified as the cornerstone of the new national identity.”³⁰ Emphasis on Islam empowered Islamists on the one hand and created nexus among them and military establishment, civilian bureaucracy and intelligence apparatus on the other hand. Hostility to India led to maintain large army, which in turn resulted in a strong and dominant military in the country. He also claims that, “Islamist groups have been sponsored by the state machinery at different times to influence domestic politics and to support the military’s political dominance.”³¹ He further analyzes how those policies adopted by the different regimes, at different times led the country into chaos while concluding that the main cause of the problem in Pakistan is the alliance between the Mullah and the military.

Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, by Hassan Abbas (2005), provides insightful information about the important events that took place in Pakistan throughout its history. The author thoroughly analyzes the formation of Pakistan in the early years of independence. He discusses the anti-communist bias of Pakistani leadership, and the country’s security and economic needs as important factors for Pakistan’s alignment with the US. This convergence of interest between US and Pakistan meant that the “army became the major recipient of US financial aid.”³² Similarly, he counts the failure of Pakistani politicians and Kashmir conflict as

²⁹ Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan Between Mosque and Military*, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005, p: 15.

³⁰ Ibid, p:15

³¹ Ibid, p: 3.

³² Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*” New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005, p: 9.

two important factors for the army to assert its influence in the country. According to him, “as the army grew in strength, it frequently took over the task of governance...and weakened all the other institutions including judiciary and political parties.”³³ He also highlights the factors which contributed to the strength of religious parties and their collaboration with military establishment in Pakistan.

In the context of extremism, his examination of how religious extremism emerged in Pakistan, how it took the militant form, and for what purposes were they sponsored by local, regional and an international patron is enlightening. He, like other writers on Pakistan, acknowledges the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as a watershed development for Pakistan. According to him, Pakistan’s policy of that time led to the emergence of jihadist groups and strengthening of ties between Jihadi groups and the country’s intelligence agencies and radicalization of state institutions and society. Similarly, religious extremism flourished in the era of 1980s.

Abbas gives the details of the developments associated with Pakistan that took place with the events of 9/11, how Musharraf’s decision to join US WOT fomented anti-US and anti-Musharraf demonstrations across the country and how military operations against Al-Qaeda operators in Waziristan initiated a terror campaign against Pakistan military itself. With reference to success or failure of Musharraf, Abbas contends that, “Musharraf slid rapidly into the mold of his military predecessors who had stepped in to save their country.”³⁴ He notes that, “Musharraf failed to establish a mechanism to monitor the progress of implementation of his directives, so that all he decrees...[were] bereft of benefits that ought to follow.”³⁵

³³ Ibid, p: 10.

³⁴ Ibid.p:200.

³⁵ Ibid. p: 236.

Zahid Hussain, in *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam* (2007), analyzes the difficult situation emerged for Pakistan, right after the 9/11 attacks. He explains how the incidents that took place in New York and Washington directed tremendous pressure towards Pakistan and how the difficult decisions that were reached by the then president of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf. According to Hussain, “the dramatic turn of events in the aftermath of 9/11 pushed Pakistan into a new spotlight. From being an international outcast for its longstanding support of the Taliban and militant cross-border insurgents in Kashmir, Pakistan became the key strategic partner of America’s WOT.”³⁶ Pakistan became indispensable for America’s War on Terror and Pakistan’s policy shift from supporting Taliban and militant organizations to abandonment of them under US pressure caused intense domestic pressure and severe backlash from militant and extremist forces.

While discussing the factors that added to the strengthening of the ISI as an intelligence organization, Hussain highlights the ties between militant jihadist organizations and country’s intelligence agencies. Similarly, he talks about the role of *madrasas* in the generation of extremism in the country and throws light on the origin of sectarian conflict in Pakistan. While discussing the longstanding issue of Kashmir in the post 9/11 period, he gives details of American pressure on Pakistan to sever ties with militant groups operating in Kashmir and initiate a peace process with India, which Pakistan eventually did. Hussain reports that many Islamist leaders described the peace process as the beginning of the end of Kashmir jihad³⁷ and perceived the shift in policy as a betrayal to Kashmir cause.

Hussain analyzes how Taliban and Al-Qaeda fugitives crossed border and escaped American attacks in Afghanistan, explained Pakistan’s limitations to stop that movement due to

³⁶ Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*, Lahore: Vanguard, 2007, preface, p: vii.

³⁷ Ibid, p: 103.

absence of any framework to administer the remote tribal regions. Hussain contends that fugitives from Afghanistan found safe heavens in tribal areas which led to the American reconnaissance operations in adjacent tribal areas to Afghanistan. Things became worse in the following years and as these fugitives and local militants caused havoc in the tribal region, finally in 2004, Musharraf, under US pressure, ordered the biggest offensive against Al-Qaeda fugitives in Waziristan. And by doing this he moved a step further “to a full-scale military conflict.”³⁸ According to Zahid Hussain, Musharraf’s government failed to deliver on pledges to contain the growth of jihadist network and “religious extremism in Pakistan continued to pose a threat to domestic, regional and international security.”³⁹

Ahmed Rashid, in *Descent into Chaos* (2008), criticizes the American policies towards South and Central Asia.⁴⁰ According to the author, these policies caused the rise of extremism in both the regions. His analysis highlights that sponsorship of authoritarian and ostracized regimes in the regions by United States has estranged the liberal segment of society and as a consequence militants got more room to operate. At the same time, he criticizes Pakistan’s Afghan policy, which according to him caused establishment of unholy alliance between the state, religion and non-state actors which exploit religion for their cause.

Owen Bennett Jones, in *Pakistan: The Eye of the Storm* (2002), highlights the nature of problems Pakistan is facing and provides firsthand knowledge of many events that took place during the period of 1998 to 2000.⁴¹ He begins with Musharraf’s challenges and subsequently, throws light on various issues confronted by Pakistan. He highlights the history of Kashmir dispute, problems of sub-nationalism in ethnically diverse Pakistan, covers the crisis of East

³⁸ Ibid, p:140.

³⁹ Ibid,p:147.

⁴⁰ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos* USA: Penguin Books, 2009.

⁴¹ Owen-Bennet Jones. *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

Pakistan, the three wars with India, the nuclear tests in 1998, the fragile democracy, the role of the army in the state and its policy making, and its changing role from supporting the Taliban to chasing them out. He also presents the drastic division in the perceptions of the modernist and fundamentalists in Pakistan as two conflicting worldviews.

Jones narrates the events of 9/11 and the US approach to Pakistan for its assistance against Taliban regime, followed by Pakistan's acceptance of US demands. In the first chapter he highlights the challenges faced by Musharraf in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. According to him, Musharraf's decision to join America's WOT was well calculated. While he was aware that his decision to join the US war would provoke a furious reaction from religious circles, he was also aware that throughout Pakistan's history no religious leader had been able to lead a mass-based Islamic revolutionary movement into reality.

Jones observes that being a modernist, Musharraf tried to modernize Pakistan. He confronted religious extremism but he feared that "Pakistan state institutions could not survive a confrontation with the militant elements of Pakistani society."⁴² He tried to reform the Blasphemy Law in early 2000 but backed down upon the opposition of religious parties. He tried to sensitize the religious clerics about the Pakistani image due to militancy and subsequently, made an effort to control sectarian violence in the country by banning various sectarian outfits even prior to 9/11. Post 9/11, according to Jones, Musharraf found himself in a better position to impose his agenda to modernize Pakistan and strike against radicals, but that Kashmir remained an obstacle in the way. In face of tremendous Indian pressure over the Indian parliament attack in December 2001, Musharraf banned two Pakistan based militant groups operating in Kashmir, and announced that, "from now on, no organization will be able to carry out terrorism on the

⁴² Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan eye of the Storm*, Lahore: Vanguard, 2002, p: 20

pretext of Kashmir.”⁴³ By analyzing Musharraf policies till 2002, Jones observes that, “despite all his bold pronouncements, [Musharraf] failed to convince many that he will prove any more capable than his military predecessors of leading the country to a higher level.”⁴⁴

Benazir Bhutto, *Reconciliation* offers a counter narrative to the „Radical Islam”⁴⁵ discourse. That is, dialogue at all level between Muslim and the Western world is a way forward for lasting peace. Reflecting on Musharraf-ruled Pakistan, Bhutto stresses that, “extremism thrives under dictatorship and is fueled by poverty, ignorance, and hopelessness.” Consequently Benazir Bhutto stressed that, “Only a democratic Pakistan can eradicate the forces of extremism, militancy and terrorism.”⁴⁶ Commenting on the International community support to the Musharraf „guided democracy’ in the post 9/11 phase, Bhutto chides that, “depending on military regime backed by hardliners is like banking on an arsonist to put out the fire.”⁴⁷

The book by Pervaiz Musharraf in his memoir, *In the Line of Fire* (2006), gives details of his personal and professional life. This book is an important source of information because it was written by the then sitting president of Pakistan, who accepted the role of front line state for his country in the War against Terrorism. Musharraf highlights the circumstances in which he took over. He presents himself as an ambitious leader who wanted to put things right for Pakistan. He draws attention to the domestic problems Pakistan was facing at the time he took over and stressed his seven point agenda to solve those problems. According to him, “the events of 9/11 and its aftermath came to distract us from these issues. I was forced to pursue security ahead of restructuring.”⁴⁸ He also highlights the political challenges Pakistan faced during the East

⁴³ Ibid, p: 30.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p: 280.

⁴⁵ Benazir Bhutto, *Reconciliation*, London: Simon & Sucusor, 2008.p:29.

⁴⁶ Iqbal Narejo, *Whither Pakistan: Dictatorship or Democracy*, Lahore: Al-Hamd Publication, May 2007.p:249.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, New York: Free Press, 2006, p: 151.

Pakistan crisis. He contends that “a brief political history of Pakistan shows how we have failed to create a true democracy.”⁴⁹ He rightly identifies that “our main political parties have in reality been no more than family cults.”⁵⁰

He addresses the “War on Terror” and documents his firsthand experiences related to War on Terror. He narrates the subsequent developments in Pakistan, in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, and acknowledges the significant American pressure to collaborate with US and abandon Taliban. But he is of the view that his decision was well calculated and was in the best interest of Pakistan. He states that the “US was not the only casualty of 9/11, the attacks hit Pakistan differently, but with equally savage force.”⁵¹ He gives details of militant’s response to Pakistan’s altered Afghan policy, and the consequent initiation of a terrorist campaign against Pakistan in 2002.

He examines the geographic landscape of Pakistan’s tribal areas, Pakistan’s geopolitical compulsions in terms of its proximity to Afghanistan, and its role in the WOT. He also gives details of early military operations in tribal areas, the hardships Pakistan army faced there and to overcome those hardships, the subsequent collaboration of US and Pakistan forces in the area.

He stresses more than once that, “despite our best efforts, we were not given timely access to modern technology for intelligence gathering, surveillance, and target acquisition. Our army operations remain dependent on technical intelligence provided through US resources.”⁵² He also counters the accusation that Pakistan is not doing enough in the WOT by giving details of Pakistan’s efforts in the WOT and sacrifices made by its people and forces, thus rejecting such notion. Lawrence Ziring, in *Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History* (2003), provides an excellent

⁴⁹ Ibid, p:156

⁵⁰ Ibid, p: 164.

⁵¹ Ibid, p:222

⁵² Ibid, p: 271.

account on the history of Pakistan from its origin to War on Terror. He discusses the events and developments in pre-independence India that led to the emergence of Pakistan movement and origin of the idea of Pakistan. According to him, “Pakistan was an idea, or, more accurately, an experience,” while the Muslim League as a parent party and contender of this idea “failed to outline the structure or character of the new entity.”⁵³ Thus, this lack of future plan for the new country coupled with other contributory factors led to the confusion and true parliamentary system could not be accomplished. He finds that Pakistan has been in search of political stability since the beginning and, due to ongoing political instability, the “army assumed the primary responsibility for country’s preservation.”⁵⁴ He also discusses the causes which culminated in the alliance between civil and military bureaucracy and finally derailed the constitutional roadmap for the state.

While providing an insightful overview of the history of Pakistan and analyzing the policies of different regimes in power he contends that, “democracy is nothing more than a sham in Pakistan.”⁵⁵ Upon Musharraf’s military coup he states that, “since independence ... Pakistan was still in search of a political framework to contain its errant society.”⁵⁶ He analyzes the reforms of Musharraf’s regime in various sectors in order to counter terrorism and to transform the society from extremism to modernity. With reference to the War on Terror and Pakistan’s role in it, he highlights the domestic challenges to Musharraf’s regime and geo-political compulsions for Pakistan.

After giving a detail account of Pakistan’s history, its search for identity and for genuine political system to deliver Ziring argues that, “politicians, bureaucrats, and soldiers all failed to

⁵³Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History*, USA: One World Publications, p: 51.

⁵⁴ Ibid. p: 70.

⁵⁵Ibid, p:249.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p:259.

deliver on their promises.⁵⁷ He finds a lack of national unity in the country and is also of the view that national identity remained elusive for Pakistan at the beginning of the new millennium. Thus, according to him, Pakistan still finds itself at the crossroads of history, not sure which way to choose while keeping in views the historic challenges and failures.

Gaps in existing literature on National Security, Terrorism and Pakistan:

Despite the scholarly literature that largely aims to delineate the differences and similarities between terrorism and organized crime, there are few empirical studies available on the subject. The foremost gap in the existing literature is that while different studies identify and analyze the individual components that contribute to the infrastructure of violence and how the Pakistani state conceptualizes and responds to such components, there isn't a single study that explains how a weak state, a military-dominated state-centric national security doctrine, the role of religion in radicalizing and polarizing the society, and international and regional security challenges confronting a distraught, largely poor, uneducated and economically ravaged polity create a toxic mix that further weakens the ability of the state to protect itself and its people, and in turn comes to be perceived as a source of international insecurity. This study thus attempts to identify the various state, societal, regional and international factors and influences that contribute to the problem of violence and terror in Pakistan and weaves together the story of how Pakistan responds to it and why. The second obvious limitation of the existing literature on terrorism in the post-9/11 phase of world history and Pakistan's response to it is that given the contemporary nature of the events being analyzed, the existing narratives are descriptive and journalistic as opposed to being analytical and scholarly. While the various treatises, monographs, journal articles and public debates document the evolution of Pakistan's national security doctrine from a historical perspective on the one hand and analyze Musharraf regime's

⁵⁷ Ibid, p: 287.

response to 9/11 and the US war on terror on the other, they do so in a piecemeal fashion. The scholarly studies are limited to an analysis of Pakistan's traditional national security doctrine, how it evolved and why. And the post-9/11 literature is focused on what was Musharraf's response to 9/11 and how it amounted to a sudden U-turn on Pakistan's Afghan policy. There is not a single study that identifies that identifies the contours of Pakistan's traditional national security doctrine and its foreign policy components, and then locates Pakistan's response to 9/11 under Musharraf within this framework to determine whether such response was geared to realize the key goals of Pakistan's traditional national security doctrine or if it marked a fundamental change in Pakistan's perception of its national security and the threats to it. And in this sense, this study compares Pakistan's national security doctrine as evolved and implemented during the first five decades of its existence with the manner in which it has been perceived and defended over the last crucial decade. And this is how the present study addresses questions about how terrorism and Pakistan's response to it fits within the country's security paradigm, that have not been raised or answered before in a scholarly study.

1. In most of the works on Pakistan's response towards terrorism the Human security lens is used to explain the factors such as poverty, unemployment, poor governance that provide basis for young minds turning to political violence within and beyond. The indirect linkage between terrorism and human security is often recognized but the need to revisit the very concept of security at the policymaking level is ignored.

2. The key question of how people as a parallel referent of security have not been deliberated upon. The historical (both of western and non western) accounts trace how state used people as "low cost" tool in furthering its national security objectives beyond its frontiers. The impact analysis of such privatization of security on the domestic plane is not undertaken in most

of the western and non-western accounts on Pakistan. The present study attempts to highlight how militants and non-state actors deemed agents of national security became a threat to the social cohesiveness of the society itself. This study fills in this vacuum by discussing the evolution and structures of major militant groups and tracing the links between the domestic and international terrorist groupings.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter discusses the theoretical framework of the study, using analytical concepts developed by Western scholars in combination with indigenous thinking to deconstruct Pakistan's response to terrorism. The fractured and fragmented nature of global, regional and national security discourse focusing on traditional and non-traditional issues offers multiple lenses to explain Islamabad's response to terrorism. The unresolved debate on security – in terms of its object, referent and means – provides an opportunity to understand Pakistan's security predicament as a weak and developing state and Musharraf's counterterrorism policy after 9/11.

In order to construe a framework that enables us to understand Pakistan's response to terrorism while also endowing us with the tools to critique it, an effort has been made here to first review relevant theoretical literature to highlight the various theses that can be utilized to approach the subject matter of this study in Part one of this chapter. This is followed by Part two, which identifies the specific theoretical models that are explained, assessed and proposed to be synthesized in order to develop a framework of analysis to understand and critique Pakistan's response to terrorism.

Part One: The Wider Debate around the Concept of "Security"

The theoretical and conceptual discourse on the key question as to what security means and implies and how it figures in international politics continues to grow. Notionally, it remains a contested concept between the perspectives of traditionalists and non-traditionalists¹ or

¹ John Baylis, "International Security in the post-Cold War Era", in John Baylis and Steve Smith, edit., *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp: 193-211.

positivists and post-positivists.² “Positivist Perspectives, realism/neo-realism, peace studies, policy-oriented studies and some forms of feminism are empirically based and specify the referent of security in the analysis. In contrast, Post-Positivist Perspectives represent post-positivist feminism, post-modernism, critical theory and constructivism and emphasize methodology over the empirical identification of the specific referent to be secured.”³

The theoretical approaches as to definitions and analysis at the micro and macro levels are multiple. The diversity of perspectives in fact fragments and broadens the parameters of academic enquiry focusing on what is security, what is to be secured against whom, and through what means? Interestingly, the competing narratives do not dispute the validity of security as a concept, but question the specifications and referents of security. Hence, there is need to look more deeply into the fundamental question of the security referent in the diverse approaches and find a composite responsive answer. In the words of Arnold Wolfers, “Security is the absence of threats to the acquired values.”⁴ The security referent can be categorized according to its target, whether it is against the state, the individual, the society or the environment.

Similarly, the context of analysis or the structure of focus can vary from national, local, and regional to international. The means to achieve security can be from coercive measures like use of force or war to use of conciliatory strategies like negotiation and cooption etc., that indirectly reflect the complex nature of security as a concept and state policy in the present day world.

² Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James, and Patrick Morgan, *Security Studies Today*, UK: Polity Press, 2003, pp: 169-189.

³ Ibid. pp: 170-180.

⁴ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962, p: 150.

Traditionalist / Positivist Perspective on Security

Traditionalists or positivist perspectives are state-centric in assumptions about security and world politics. Security is perceived solely in military terms and ensuring territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence from external threats remains a prime driver of national security.

In the words of Steven E. Miller,

The end of the Cold War meant the close of an era in the world and in the field, but the new era with its ongoing blight of political violence...War and violence remain with us. The intentional use of organized force for political ends remains a common phenomenon, one with large political, social, human, and economic costs and consequences.⁵

The dominant perspective on security, Realism/Neo-Realism is “the one that can [be] said to hold the high ground, focuses on state as the unit to be secured and on issues relating to the threat, use and management of force and coercion in world politics. The other perspectives either expand on or directly challenge this traditional understanding of security.”⁶ It is critical to note that there is no single “theory of realism” and realism *per se* cannot be tested, confirmed, or refuted.⁷ Realism is a research program that contains a core set of assumptions from which a variety of theories and explanations can be developed.⁸ The key assumptions are: the international system is anarchic and there is no central authority to control state behavior; states are central actors on the world stage; although states are rational, there will always be room for miscalculation; uncertainty, leading to lack of trust inherent in the international system, and, as a result, development of offensive military capabilities, where survival becomes a basic force

⁵Steven E. Miller, “International Security at Twenty-five: From One World to Another”, *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), p: 32.

⁶Terriff, Croft, James, and Morgan, *Security Studies Today*, op.cit, p: 169.

⁷Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War”, *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp: 49-88.

⁸*Ibid.*

driving the state's behavior.⁹ In short, statism, survival and self-help define the international security landscape.

Several variants of the traditional approach have emerged over the past decade or so namely, the theories of hegemonic competition. The first is balance-of-power theory developed most explicitly by Kenneth Waltz¹⁰ and second is the balance-of-threat theory developed by Stephen Walt;¹¹ the “clash of civilization” thesis by Samuel Huntington;¹² the “Democratic Peace” theory associated with the writings of Michael Doyle¹³ and Bruce Russett;¹⁴ the “complex interdependence” argument by Keohane and Nye;¹⁵ and the “Collective Security” approach led by Charles and Clifford Kupchan.¹⁶

Kenneth Waltz argues that “states seek to balance power, and thus the preponderance of power in the hands of a single state (i.e. the United States) will stimulate the rise of new great powers, and possibly coalition of powers, determined to balance the dominant state.”¹⁷ Another analyst, Christopher Layne, writes: “In Uni-polar systems, states do indeed balance against the hegemon's unchecked power.”¹⁸ Carrying this theme forward with some variance, Stephen Walt suggests that “Power and threat overlap, but are not identical... Geographic proximity, offensive

⁹ Baylis, “International Security in the post-Cold War Era”, op.cit, p: 196.

¹⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2, (Fall 1993), pp: 44-79.

¹¹ Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp: 211-239.

¹² Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3(Summer 1993), pp: 22-49.

¹³ Michael Doyle, “On the Democratic Peace”, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp: 180-184.

¹⁴ Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a post-Cold War World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.

¹⁵ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.pp:329-349

¹⁶ Quoted in, Baylis, “International Security in the post-Cold War Era”, op.cit, pp: 207-208.

¹⁷ Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, op.cit. pp: 53-60.

¹⁸ Christopher Layne, “Unipolar Illusion: Why Great Powers Will Rise”, *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, (Spring 1993), pp: 5-51.

capability, and aggressive intentions are also relevant considerations... States that are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them.”¹⁹

Michael Mastanduno, analyzing both the balance-of-power and balance-of-threat theories of Waltz and Walt respectively against the US security policy behavior in the post-Cold war phase concludes that, “evidence neither fully supports nor fully refutes either one... Eventually power will check power... Balance-of-threat theory reminds us to appreciate the classical realist insight that statecraft matters.”²⁰ Taken together, traditionalists or positivist perspectives are state-centric in assumptions about security and world politics. In Mearsheimer’s words, “security competition among states always continues with war, like rain, always a possibility... Cooperation can and does occur between states but has its limits.”²¹

At this juncture, the two main divisions within the discourse of Positivist security, termed as bounded state-centric and unbounded state-centric²² based on what the state as security referent is to be protected from are critical to note. Bounded state-centric perspectives (that is, Realists/Neo-Realist, Neo-Liberalism/Neo-Institutionalism – the early variants of peace studies) define security in terms of the state and threat in military terms of another state. That is, it is external aggression or its threat that the state needs to counter. However, Neo-Liberals within this group believe in the capacity of institutions to moderate the anarchic character of international politics.

In contrast, unbounded state-centric approaches, led by Barry Buzan and others, see the state as the central referent of security to be protected, but expand on the nature of threats other than military to be guarded against. Buzan bases security of a state on military, political,

¹⁹Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies”, op.cit.pp:220-223.

²⁰Michael Mastanduno, op.cit. pp: 63-70.

²¹John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 Winter 1994/5. pp: 5-49

²²This terminology is used in, Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James, Patrick M. Morgan, op.cit, pp: 174-176.

economic, social and environmental factors. Threats to state security may arise from interaction between the various dimensions of security, that is, military as well as non military. The threats to state security cannot always be externally generated; they may be the product of its internal dimensions. With regard to the generation of threats and the locus of violence, unbounded state-centric perspectives ranging from environmental, economic, migratory to transnational criminal agree that security challenges can arise at both domestic and international levels at the same time. Likewise, along with the state, the security referent can be individual, societal and environmental as well, and the state's security is affected by these parameters too. In sum, the security of the state can be at stake if its individuals, groups, or environment becomes a threat to its very survival. Thus, the security referent requires focusing on the internal as well as the external dynamics of the state in world politics. In other words, the Positivist view of the security debate is broadened in its analytical scope and policy discussion.

Samuel Huntington in his "Clash of Civilization" thesis predicts international politics dominated by conflicts of power between the contending civilizations will be more acute than between states. Huntington argues that future conflicts and schisms will have a cultural orientation and be less state-centric in nature. Ethno-nationalists and civilizations, he argues, "can be just as ruthless in pursuing their survival as sovereign states, even if their physical boundaries are less precise."²³ Another "liberal" approach to international security, the Democratic Peace Theory, developed by Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett emerged in the 1980s. The key argument was that democracy would lead to greater international security and war between democracies was less likely. This argument continues to generate debate among scholars. Steve Chan in his work assembled data from 1816 to 1980 to demonstrate that

²³Samuel Huntington, op.cit.pp:30-39.

democracies have been associated with more, not less, interstate conflicts.²⁴ Similarly, Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, in a work that analyzes linkage between regime form and international security from 1816 to 1976, conclude: “Even though democratic states have never gone to war with one another, they are neither more nor less prone to conflict than nondemocratic states.”²⁵ In contrast to the above arguments, John Baylis observes:

Democratic Peace Theory is based on a Kantian logic - emphasizing three elements republican democratic representation; an ideological commitment to human rights; and transnational interdependence... Supporters of democratic peace ideas do not reject the insights of realism, but they reject realism’s preoccupation with the idea of war of all against all. They argue that internal norms and institutions matter.²⁶

Parallel to this, proponents of Interdependence and Collective Thought argue that states are becoming more inter-connected with one another through the forces of globalization add to the greater prospects of stability and security in an anarchical world. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane argue that through complex interdependence, traditional maxims of self-help and relative gains as the basis of state behavior can be managed.²⁷ Collective security theorists add “ideas” as another key element in the international security calculus along with power and real politics. They contend that, at present, states have the capabilities to broaden their national interests and aim for collective good of the international community, creating a more benign international system.

²⁴Steve Chan, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall : Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1984), pp: 614-48.

²⁵Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, “Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816 - 1976”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 1989), pp:3-35.

²⁶John Baylis, “International Security in the Post-Cold War Era”, op.cit. pp: 202-203.

²⁷Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, “Transnational Relations and World Politics,” op.cit.pp:335-345.

Non-Traditionalist proponents of the “globalist society” school of thought argue that the traditional focus on national security (and sovereignty) no longer reflect the radical changes which are taking place. What is required, according to this argument, is a new politics of global responsibility, designed to address issues of global inequality, poverty, and environmental stress, as well as human rights, minority rights, democracy, and individual and group security which cut across the dominant interests on the world scale as well as within just every state.²⁸ In the words of John Baylis: “The result of this fracture of statehood has been a movement away from conflicts between the great powers to new forms of insecurity caused by nationalistic, ethnic, and religious rivalries within states, and across boundaries.”²⁹ Thus, the more the international security perspective gets complicated, the hazier becomes the traditional lens of locating the security referent.

Non-Traditionalist / Post-Positivist Perspective on Security

Post-Positivist or Non-Traditional Approaches, that include perspectives ranging from post-modernists, and critical theories, refrain from choosing a single referent of security (that is, the state) at the expense of ignoring other referents such as the individual, the society, and environment. Instead, the post-positivists argue that knowledge of the world is a social construction and all referents are equally important to this process. The state is conceptualized as part of society and its institutions are woven into an ever-changing societal fabric. The Post-positivists maintain that the positivist emphasis on objective reality “obscures social and power relationships that form structures of inclusion and exclusion... and privileging of the state has obscured such structures.”³⁰ Instead, the post-positivist writers focus on the hidden or silent structures that configure multiple levels of analysis. Thus, in some of the approaches, the level

²⁸ John Baylis, op.cit.pp:211-214.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James, Patrick M. Morgan, *Security Studies Today*, ibid, pp: 182-184.

of analysis or object of security is the individual as in domestic analysis and their interaction with other levels results in structures that need to be explored.

The last few decades have seen the emergence of writings grouped under Post-Modernist views on international security that question the ability of Realism to explain security as an objective truth and term it as a dangerous discourse, which is the main obstacle in establishing a new and more peaceful hegemonic discourse.³¹ Post-modernists³² have argued that there can be no single interpretation of global reality. Knowledge is subjective in nature. Ideas and discourse as put forth by experts and academics can transform language and discourse about international politics. This argument aims at replacing the debate of realism with a “communitarian discourse which emphasizes peace and harmony.”³³ By focusing on the key role of individuals that are termed “epistemic communities,”³⁴ the nature of international politics can be altered and non-military security issues long ignored by traditionalists can be addressed effectively. Peter Haas defines the epistemic community as:

A network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area. Although an epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have a shared set of normative and principled beliefs...shared causal beliefs...shared notions of validity...and a common policy enterprise.³⁵

³¹John Baylis, op.cit.pp:215-218.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Note: Peter Haas reintroduced the concept of ‘epistemic community’ in early nineties that was previously introduced by authors such as Holzner (1968), Foucault (1970) and Ruggie (1972). You need to provide the complete citations for these works.

³⁵ M Haas, P, “Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination”, *International Organization*, Vol: 46, No.1, 1992, pp:1-35.

Haas maintains that in a crisis situation or new policy arena where uncertainty is high, policymakers frequently seek information and advice from other sources.³⁶ Thus to understand policy decisions one has to look into the complex web of relationships between an epistemic community and the policy makers at the multiple levels of policy thinking, crafting and implementing. Colin Hay³⁷ observes “postmodernism’s principal contribution is to challenge the stated and, above all, unstated assumptions of conventional international relations theory (realist, idealist or constructivist).”³⁸ Calling all knowledge claims as partial and power-serving, postmodernists³⁹ stress the usefulness of discourse analysis, deconstruction and celebration of diversity and plurality as key to understanding an ever-changing world.

Realists counter the post-modernists views on knowledge as subjective in nature, calling this enterprise as meaningless. In the words of John Mearsheimer,

whereas realists see a fixed and knowable world, post-modernists see the possibility of endless interpretations of the world around them...there are no constants, no secure grounds, no profound secrets, no final structures or limits of history...there is only interpretations imposed...History itself is grasped as a series of interpretations imposed upon interpretations none primary, all arbitrary.⁴⁰

Likewise, Colin Hay points out the following missing elements marking the postmodernist’s arguments:

Tendency towards nihilism, fatalism and passivity
an abstention from judgment; is not
postmodernism’s normative respect for ‘difference’
in the end self-defeating precluding the taking of
action to protect difference? Are its implications not

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Colin Hay, *Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction*, UK: Palgrave, 2002.p:22.

³⁸ Ibid, p: 23.

³⁹ For detailed discussion of postmodernism see seminal works of: David Campbell’s *writing Security* (1992); R. J. Walker’s *Inside/Outside* (1993), and; Cynthia Weber’s *Simulating Sovereignty* (1995).

⁴⁰ John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Relations”, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994/5. pp: 5-49

profoundly conservative deconstruction without the possibility of the reconstruction of an alternative? Internal contradictions is not postmodernism itself the meta-narrative to end all meta-narratives and hence a contradiction in terms, tends towards pure descriptive narrative as opposed to political analysis.⁴¹

Similarly, another group of theories under the school of thought known as Critical Theory object to the post-modernists idea of using analysis to advance normative aims, terming it a conservative social movement.⁴² Critical Theory, encompassing diverse perspectives on security, probes the basis of power relationships to understand the concept of security, seen as holistic in nature. Critical⁴³ Theory points out that key structure of international politics are social rather than essentially material, and by changing the way we think about international relations can fundamentally enhance international security. In his study, *Anarchy is what States make of it*, Alexander Wendt argues: “security dilemmas and wars are the result of self-fulfilling prophecies... policies of reassurance can also help to bring about a structure of shared knowledge which can help to move states towards a more peaceful security community.”⁴⁴ Thus the departure point of critical theorists enfolded within the broad spectrum of post-positivists is grounded in “emancipation” by adopting an all-inclusive approach to security.

Keith Krause’s six foundational claims form the basis of critical theorizing in security studies: First, the principal actors (subjects) in world politics – whether these are states or not are social constructs, and products of complex historical processes; second, “these subjects are constituted (and reconstituted) through political practices that create shared social understanding;

⁴¹ Colin Hay, op.cit, p: 27.

⁴² Quoted in, Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James, Patrick M. Morgan, op.cit, p: 184.

⁴³ On social constructivism, see A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it”, *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, (1992); F. Kratochwill, *Rules, Norms, and Decision*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, and; N. Onuf, *A World of or Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.

⁴⁴ Alexander Wendt, Ibid, pp: 391-425.

this process of constitution endows the subjects with identities and interests (which are not “given” or unchanging); third, “world politics is not static or unchanging, and its “structures” are not determining, since they are socially constructed; fourth, “our knowledge of the subjects, structures and practices of world politics is not “objective”; fifth, “the appropriate methodology of social sciences is not that of natural sciences. Interpretive methods that attempt to uncover actors’ understandings of the organization (and possibilities) of their social world are the central focus of research; and finally, “the purpose of theory is not prediction (control) of the construction of trans-historical, generalize casual claims; contextual understanding and practical knowledge is the appropriate goal.”⁴⁵

Thus, the stream of perspectives on how to approach the notion of security in international politics continues to flow since the end of the Cold War. This is not to say that perceptions of threat, state, and interests have become irrelevant, but parallel questions are how these threats and interests are constructed, how the actors involved are constituted, and the process may change.⁴⁶ Against this backdrop, a number of scholars have called for a more comprehensive and systematic approach to security, beyond the narrow preoccupation with the state and examine more general threats to human existence and ways to overcome them.⁴⁷ These approaches have refined the concept of human security⁴⁸, predating the Cold War era.

⁴⁵ Keith Krause, “Critical Theory and Security Studies”, *YCISS Occasional Paper*, No 33, 1996, pp: 5 – 10.

⁴⁶ Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, edit., *Critical Security Studies: Concept and Cases*, UK: UCL Press, 1997, pp: 33-59.

⁴⁷ Among the most notable are Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983; Colin S. Grey, *Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment*, London: Aldwych, 1982; Edward Kolodziej, “What is Security and Security Studies? Lessons from the Cold War”, *Arms Control*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1992), pp: 1-31; and Krause and Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, UK: UCL Press, 1997.

⁴⁸ Human Security specialists defines security as related to, “the needs of people, for many of them security symbolizes protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards” - United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*, New York: 1994, pp: 22. Also interesting accounts on the subject are, Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, *Millennium 10*, Vol. 10, No.2 (Summer 1982), pp: 126-155; Johann Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 8, No.1 (1971), pp: 81-117, and; Jorge Neff, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability*, Toronto: IDRC, 1995.

At this juncture, the plausible question is how one can locate and analyze Pakistan's security and insecurity imperatives within the western dominated security landscape. And what one can infer from the key empirical and historical works on Pakistan's experience with terrorism? To dwell more deeply into the complexity of the challenge of terrorism confronting Pakistan the following discussion is critically needed.

Part II: Proposed Framework to Understand and Critique Pakistan's Response to Terror

To conceptualize and critique Pakistan's response to terrorism in the post- 9/11 period, this study proposes an integrated framework based on three different theoretical models of security propounded by Barry Buzan – the integrated and holistic perspective on security – involving socio-economic as well as internal and external dimension of security; Buzan and Weaver's Regional Security Complex theory (RSCT) underscoring divergence of perception on external threat to regional security;⁴⁹ Mahbub-ul Haq's human security approach focusing on people's security⁵⁰ and Mohammed Ayoob's subaltern realism emphasizing constraints on a weak state.⁵¹

The end of the Cold War between the US and former USSR, marked an end to the international security discourse being seen through the lens of super-powers rivalry only. This stimulated debate on very basic questions about the security both in military and non-military realms. The earlier dormant views of constructivists about widening the horizons of security

⁴⁹ Barry Buzan, *People States & Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, UK : Wheat sheaf Books Ltd, 1983.

⁵⁰ Late Dr Mahbub ul Haq was the chief architect of UNDP Human Development Program and principal author of the concept of "Human Security" "widely adopted by global and regional forums as well as national governments. Mahbub ul Haq passionately advocated for 'security of people, not just territory; security of individuals, not just nations; security through development, not through arms; and security of all people everywhere – in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, in their environment', quoted in , Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Center, *Human Development in South Asia 2005: Human Security in South Asia*, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2006, p: 7.

⁵¹ Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*, Bolder, Colo: Lynne Reiner, 1995.pp:57-112.

framework, gained renewed emphasis to understand the changing nature of security threats in the post-Cold War area, especially in case of the developing world. As a corollary, the literature on security gave up its Eurocentric focus and became “more concerned about the rise of Asia both as a pivotal arena in world affairs and as region in which serious security problems are most likely to emerge.”⁵²

This study tried to explore alternative theoretical paradigms in the field of security that gained prominence at the end of Cold War, so as to assess their relevance for Islamabad’s response to terrorism after 9/11. These included assumptions of “critical theory” and in particular the “constructivist” approach but found both inadequate in explaining Musharraf’s response to terrorism. The main assumptions of critical theory are that “actors are inherently social, that their identities and interests are socially constructed, the product of inter-subjective social structures.”⁵³ Thereby, the critical theorists called for interpretive modes of understanding, in tune with the unquantifiable nature of many social phenomena and inherent subjectivity of all observation.⁵⁴ Normatively, they condemned the notion of value neutral theorizing, arguing all knowledge flows from the interests and that theorists should be explicitly committed to exposing and dismantling structures of domination and oppression.

Tested against Musharraf’s counterterrorism response, it appears that he was not inherently a social actor; rather his interests, decisions and actions stemmed from his perception of his individual interest to stay in power as well as the traditional security paradigm that the state of Pakistan followed throughout its post-independence life, driven largely by the threat perceived from India, which in turn stemmed from the perceived weakness of the state Pakistan.

⁵² See Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War”, *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp: 34-77; and Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multi polar Asia”, *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp: 5-33.

⁵³ Christian Reus-Smit, *Constructivism*, in Scot Burchill, p:194.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

Thus, normatively, a subjective appreciation and analysis of the phenomenon of terrorism as conceived in Pakistan (and largely ignored in the West) is of limited utility in explaining General Musharraf's response to terrorism post 9/11 in comparison to the nature of Pakistani state, its perceived national security interests and the long standing tradition of military rule in Pakistan where issue of legitimacy of the military ruler and sustenance of military rule are at the heart of actions taken by actor in power.

Similarly, constructivist approach was explored to examine alternate explanatory perspective on Musharraf's response to terrorism after 9/11. As an extension of the critical theory, the main theoretical premise of constructivism is that humans are "socially embedded, communicatively constituted and culturally empowered."⁵⁵ The three major propositions forwarded by constructivists are:

One, "normative or ideational structures are just as important as material structures." Constructivists argue that "systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values also have structural characteristics, and that they exert a powerful influence on social and political action." They stress on the importance of "normative and ideational structures because these are thought to shape the social identities of political actors."⁵⁶

Two, constructivists contend that understanding how non-material structures condition actors' identities is important because identities inform interests and, in turn, actions.'

Third, constructivists argue that, "agents and structures are *mutually constituted*. Normative and ideational structures may well condition the identities and interests of actors, but those structures would not exist if it were not for the knowledgeable practices of those actors."⁵⁷ Thus, institutionalized norms and ideas define the meaning and identity of the individual actor

⁵⁵ Christian Reus-Smit, Constructivism, in Scot Burchill.p.195.

⁵⁶ Ibid .p:196.

⁵⁷ Ibid .p:197.

and the patterns of appropriate economic, political, and cultural activity engaged in by those individuals and it is through interaction with the social structures that identities and interests get defined. Further, constructivists see “normative and ideational structures” as “shaping actors” identities and interests through three mechanisms: imagination, communication and constraint.

In the 1990s, three different forms of constructivism evolved: systematic, unit level and holistic constructivism. The systemic constructivism like realist “third image perspective” focuses on interaction between unitary state actors as to how states relate to one another in the external or international domain. Wendt’s argues that identity of the state informs its interests and in turn, its actions. He draws distinction between social and corporate identities of the state. The social identity refers to the status, role or personality that international society ascribes to a state while corporate identity refers to internal human, material, ideological or cultural factors that make a state what it is. The unit level constructivism on the other hand, concentrates on the “relationship between domestic social, legal norms and the identities and interests of states.” This enables explanation of variations of identity, interest and actions across states that systemic constructivism tends to ignore. Finally, “holistic constructivism” tried to bridge the gap between the international and domestic domains. To subsume the entire range of factors conditioning the identities and interests of states, they brought in the corporate and social together into a unified analytical perspective that treats domestic and the international as two faces of a single social and political order.⁵⁸ The holistic constructivism has the ability to explain the development of the normative and ideational structures of the present international system, as well as the social identities they have engendered.⁵⁹ Besides, Constructivism calls for more interpretive, discursive and historical modes of analysis.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p: 201.

⁵⁹Ibid, p: 201.

The constructivist approach, however, has its own limitations when it comes to explaining Pakistan response to terrorism after 9/11. The core assumptions of constructivism emphasize normative or ideational structures having powerful influence on social and political action of political actors. In case of Musharraf as a political actor, the normative and ideational structures played a far less important role in his political actions regarding war on terrorism, instead he tried to use the ideational structures to advance his own personal interest which was in fact legitimizing and perpetuating his rule. So “agents and structures” as constructivists argue were not *mutually constituted* but were rather mutually exclusive. Thereby, ideational structures neither shaped his social identity nor defined his interest. Further regarding three forms of systematic, unit level and holistic constructivism have their own inherent weaknesses. The systemic constructivism emphasizes social and corporate identities of the state. In case of Pakistani state as an actor the disconnect between the social identity that “international society” ascribed to the Pakistani state and its material identity created a perception gap between Pakistan and the West which led to great misunderstanding about Pakistan’s response to terrorism in the West. The unit level constructivism is equally inadequate to explain Pakistan’s actions on terrorism, as the relationship between Pakistan’s domestic social, legal norms and the identities and interests of state was subservient to Musharraf’s personal will and interests. He was wearing two hats and controlled the state in his capacity as a Chief of Army Staff and President of Pakistan. And finally, “holistic constructivism” which attempt to bridge the gap between the systemic and unit level constructivism becomes less relevant as these two levels had inherent weaknesses in explaining Musharraf’s actions in their own right.

Expanded Conception of Security: An Integrated Framework for Pakistan's Response to Terrorism

Having explored different theoretical precepts to analyze the Pakistan's unique case, this study proposes a theoretical framework based on expanded conception of national security of Pakistan that shaped Musharraf's response to terrorism in the wake of 9/11. The integrated framework draws on Buzan's conception of holistic perspective on national security; Buzan and Weaver's Regional Security Complex theory (RSCT); Mahbub-ul Haq's notion of human security Mohammed Ayoob's subaltern realism of a weak state. It attempts to incorporate the internal and external dimension of the Pakistan's national security in the South Asian security complex where state is the primary referent of security and a weaker state where processes of state building are incomplete is even more susceptible to follow the traditional security approach. The traditional view seemingly gets even more exaggerated when the survival of the regime in charge is projected as imperative for the security of the state, thus leading to total marginalization of the citizens of the state. This in turn has grave consequences especially when it comes to dealing with non-traditional threats like that of terrorism. Thus interface with human security approach is essential to understand and simultaneously be able to critique Musharraf's policy towards terrorism. Here, Mehboobul Haq's human security dimension that covers terrorism is most relevant in describing how absence of the citizen as the referent of national security created a disconnect between the state and the citizen giving rise to fundamental contradictions within Musharraf's response to terrorism.

Barry Buzan's work on security offers critical insights as one tries to forge a nexus with the security imperatives of the states in South Asia, particularly Pakistan, within the classification of international system. Buzan argues that security challenges to the state can be

both external and internal in nature and can be understood by talking of other dimensions of security like economic, social and environmental along with the military concerns. This is paralleled by the arguments of experts that regard “individual” as the primary focus of security instead of the state, to achieve ultimate world peace. This implies that once we remove the state from the center of security thinking, and begin to think of people instead, the whole notion of security becomes open to change.

The centerpiece of this shift was the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme. Finally, there is the stream of literature authored by the third world specialists who point to the varied meanings of terms like “state” and “threats” etc. as conceived within the realm of the developing world, in sharp contrast to what these terms imply in the developed western world. Thus, to understand security dynamics of the developing states,

Mohammed Ayoob maintains,

Substantial differences define the state in the developing world such as „search of legitimacy’ for itself and what is defined as „national security’ may be the perception of the regime in power than the people of the state as whole.⁶⁰

We will discuss the integrated conceptual framework of Pakistan’s national security one by one to deconstruct the central research question: How to explain Musharraf regime’s response towards terrorism?

A: Barry Buzan - A Holistic View of Security

To understand security challenges of the South Asian states in general and Pakistan in particular, Buzan’s work offers a very useful conceptual tool box, giving insights to the inter-connected nature of security imperatives of Pakistan. By adopting a holistic and integrated

⁶⁰Mohammed Ayoob, op.cit.pp:112-130

approach toward security, one can note the three levels of analysis – individual, state, and international – and underscore the contradictions that prevail there, at the same time. This leads to analysis of security problems from a broader perspective and add depth to the understanding of the subject.

Buzan defines national security as systemic enquiry encompassing the military and non-military dimensions, with the state, individual and international system not as three distinct categories but as inter-connected and interdependent tiers of the same enterprise. He argues:

Major security phenomenon like terrorism and deterrence, cannot be understood properly without the full appreciation of their sources, effects and dynamics at and among all the three levels. Only when all the three levels are in play can the contradictions which connect them be exposed sufficiently to be brought into analysis...From this reintegrated, holistic perspective the three levels appear more useful as viewing platforms from which we can observe the problem from different angles, than they appear as self-contained areas for policy or analysis...Systemic security carries the requisite sense of parts, and the relationship among them, forming an analytical whole.⁶¹

The notion of national security as a multi-layered concept is particularly relevant in case of Pakistan. Terrorism is a systemic challenge threatening the state, as well as individual security within and beyond Pakistan. To understand Islamabad's response towards terrorism the nexus between the internal and external dynamics of security predicament must be understood. That is, Pakistan, driven by the threat it perceived from India and consequent sense of insecurity, invested minimum in the internal sources of security such as education, health and development. National security became excessively militarized and externalized resulting in the piling up of domestic areas of insecurity: poverty, radicalization, terrorism, ethnicity, sectarianism, drugs,

⁶¹ Barry Buzan, op.cit, pp: 247 – 248.

smuggling, weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, energy shortfalls and so on. As a result, the state is both a provider of individual security as well as the source of insecurity to its citizens simultaneously. This results in exposing the contradictory role of state in creating and sustaining the roots of terrorism on the one hand and struggling to be a part of its solution on the other by discharging its law and order functions. Musharraf regime's counterterrorism policy also exhibits the same contradictory pattern marked by reactionary measures and short-term goals accompanied with some pro-active steps.

By focusing on the individual level of analysis in Pakistan, one can understand the mind frame, support structure and context that have resulted in turning human capital as threat to the state as well as regional and international security. However, unless the nature of interaction between the people, government, regional and international level is probed the understanding of Musharraf's regime policy versus terrorism remains shallow. By adopting the notion of „holistic security' one can fully grasp the complexity of the Musharraf's government policymaking as “heavily politicized activity, bounded by numerous pressures and restrictions.”⁶² This line of thinking injects empirical value to this research study.

Another critical input of Buzan's contribution to the debate on security has been the division of the security agenda of a state into five sectors. The state can face threats from each of these sectors that are military, political, societal, economic, and ecological.⁶³ At times, the military threat can overwhelm threats from other sectors, through the application of violent force. Similarly, political threats can range from pressure for political change to attempts to secede from the state, or even foment a revolution.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, op.cit, pp: 73-88.

Closely tied to the political threats is what Buzan calls „societal threats’; those threats that threaten the cohesion of a society, even if the organizational integrity of the state itself is not a risk. The lines of distinction between the societal and political threats to the state are very fuzzy and overlap between them and other sectors do exist in practice. Economic threats according to Buzan can threaten the integrity of the state and should be considered problems of security. The final sector in Buzan’s analysis is what he terms as „ecological’ i.e. threats from the degradation of environment, threats which can affect their organization stability, legitimacy and economic security.

In case of Pakistan, terrorism is a multi-dimensional threat resulting in the political, social, economic, military and environmental insecurity. It is important to note that the focus of Buzan’s concern is still the security of the state and his contribution to the security debate is to broaden the agenda, rather than change it fundamentally.

B: Mehboob-ul-Haq’s Human Security Framework

The term, “human security,” is most often associated with the 1994 United Nations *Human Development Report* on Human Security drafted by Mahbub-ul-Haq. To probe more deeply, why societal insecurity exists and how to provide security for the people of the state, human security proponents stress the need to focus on the “people” rather than the “state”, as referent of security studies. The report broadening the security debate observed:

The concept of security has far too long been interpreted narrowly, as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. It has related more to nation-states than to people...Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social

conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.⁶⁴

This signified that narrow definition of security where state is primary referent is not sufficient to understand the conception of national security. The report postulated the concept of “human security” by highlighting its essential elements: human security is a universal concern; it is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor; the components of human security are interdependent; human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention; it is less costly to meet these threats upstream than downstream; human security is people-centered; it is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace.⁶⁵ Further, the twin concept of “Freedom from fear” and “Freedom from want” formed the critical premises of the UNDP 1994 report. The seven dimensions of human security included: personal, environmental, economic, political, community, health, and food security.⁶⁶

This report articulated the broadened notion of security, setting in the debate of how to rethink conception of security within the parameters of the existing international system. The trilateral argument of defining individuals as “rights-bearing persons, as citizens or members of society, or as members of a transcendent global community (humanity), challenges the concept of state sovereignty as held by neo-realists.”⁶⁷ It raises the question: why and in what ways are individuals responsible for each other and how are these responsibilities institutionally expressed? To explore such central concerns one is again drawn into the problematic realm of

⁶⁴United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*, New York: 1994, p: 22.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p: 23.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies”, in Keith Krause and Michael C, Williams, edit, *Critical Security Studies*, op.cit, pp: 44-45.

the contract theory, leading one to look into the role of states. And further raises a plausible question how is this wide-ranging and maximalist form of human security to be realized? And, what is the role of state as a provider of security particularly in case of South Asia?

South Asian security experts like Rajesh Basrur regard “state role” as the critical building bloc of human security in the region.⁶⁸ Stressing the co-equality between the state security and the individual security, Mahbub-ul-Haq observed:

State security cannot be achieved without ensuring the security of people...Without human security, territorial security becomes ineffective and ultimately self-defeating...National security is still paramount, but its attainment is linked more and more with human security. It is widely recognized that national security cannot be achieved in a situation where people starve but arms accumulate; where social expenditure falls and military expenditure rises.⁶⁹

This clearly establishes that an imbalance between state and peoples’ security would undermine the national security of a state. Similarly, Kanti Bajpai underlines the existence of coeval relationship between the individual and state security in a highly complex security milieu. He argues:

There are threats to individual security that go beyond the capacity of the state to manage. These threats may be transnational or internal. Thus, the state may be safe from other states, but may be gradually “hollowed out” from within as individual security declines. Transnational forces or actors may so threaten individuals that the state gradually weakens from within.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Rajesh M. Basrur, edit, *Security in the New Millennium: Views from South Asia*, Colombo: Regional Center for Strategic Studies, 2001, pp: 167-200.

⁶⁹ Quoted in Human Development in South Asia,, op.cit .pp: 7- 25.

⁷⁰ Kanti Bajpai, *Human Security: Concept and Measurement*, Center for Peace and Development Studies, 2007.pp:25-45.

At this juncture, it would be useful to reflect upon the utility of using the „human security’ lens to understand Pakistan’s security imperatives in the post-9/11 phase. This reasoning will be useful in deconstructing the contextual parameters- physical as well as non-physical- of the strategic landscape of the country. Equating individual security with national security exposes the vulnerabilities, gaps and contradictions at the policymaking and policy implementation levels. This approach helps one to understand the strategic mindset of General Musharraf and his cohorts in keeping the system as it is, which suits the vested interests of personal and institutional stakeholders and explains why they segregate the internal and external threats in the security arena.

The human security approach also infuses optimism in the present research study by reinforcing the „faith in human goodness’. That is, no body is born a terrorist; it’s the environment that shapes an individual and society at large. Here, the state has a critical role in reframing national security as an inclusive process by investing in across the board sustainable human development and progress of the people. This line of thinking brings out the negative cost of using citizens as a „strategic tool’ versus external adversaries and erecting an artificial firewall between the internal and external security dynamics. It is to be understood that security cannot be compartmentalized into insular „internal’ and „external’ threats that are interdependent. Excessive focus on external factors often generates a „denial mode’ about the indigenous sources of terrorism resulting in reactionary and short-term policy outputs. The Musharraf regime also exhibited this trend in framing its response towards terrorism.

The human security framework enables an analytical evaluation of the terrorism threat, its causal factors and suggest the need to redistribute responsibilities To understand why states like Pakistan allocate minimum resources for human development while continuing to spend a

major portion of budgetary resources on defense (35 % in case of Pakistan), one needs to understand the dominance of the “state-centric” mindset at the policymaking end. In other words, blending the human security concept within the holistic conception of security narrative enables us to highlight the vulnerabilities of society that policy makers have been ignoring for long.

The human security approach aids in critical analysis of the reforms Musharraf introduced for the development of the social, legal and institutional sectors as part of his proactive counterterrorism package. By using this perspective, the study unpacks the complexity of the terrorism challenge that calls for a proactive counter terrorism strategy at the societal level. The missing links in the Musharraf counterterrorism scheme such as “credibility deficit of the state” at the popular level, lack of consensus building and engagement through dialogue are also highlighted alongside. In short, the human security perspective allows discussing the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to Pakistan’s security defined in a holistic manner.

Having discussed the viability of the “holistic and human security” approach in assessing the Musharraf government’s response to terrorism, the present research explores regional security complexities that helps understand the divergence of security perceptions prevalent in the region encompassing the issue of terrorism. This resulted in Musharraf’s securitization of the threat of terrorism, which consequently dominated his policy actions against terrorism.

Buzan’s concept of ‘Regional Security Complex’

To understand the contextual parameters, Buzan’s concept of ‘regional security complex’ offers a useful tool by focusing on “local sets of states.... whose major security perceptions and concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security perceptions cannot be considered apart from one another.”⁷¹ Taking this theme forward, laid in the work titled,

⁷¹ Barry Buzan, “A Framework for Regional Security Analysis” in Barry Buzan and Gohar Rizvi, ed., *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers*, London: Croom Helm, 1986, p:8.

Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Buzan and Weaver in their study, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*,⁷² explain „regional security complex theory (RSCT)’ to understand the regional level of security, “that has become more autonomous and more prominent in international politics, and that the ending of the Cold War accelerated this process...Without superpower rivalry intruding obsessively into all regions, local powers have more room for maneuver.”⁷³ This highlighted the importance of local security dynamics in each region which play important role in shaping the security policies of the regional states.

Is this the case in South Asia after the US launched the “Global war on Terror” focusing on Afghanistan in October 2001? And how did Regional Security Complex shape Musharraf’s response to US campaign against terrorism in the region? Musharraf joined American war on terrorism and hence Pakistan became a key ally of the United States. As a result, the US has become actively involved in South Asia as a broker between India and Pakistan.⁷⁴ RSCT blending the materialist (neorealist) and constructivist (that focus on the political processes by which security gets constituted) approaches to security, explain the ideas of ‘bounded territoriality’ and distribution of power and patterns of amity and enmity as key to behavior of states, interacting within the changing international security dynamics. Buzan and Weaver argue:

Security complexes may well be extensively penetrated by the global powers, but their regional dynamics nonetheless have a substantial degree of autonomy from the patterns set by the global powers...One needs to understand both of these levels independently, as well as the interaction between them.⁷⁵

⁷²Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp: 3-124; 443-483.

⁷³Ibid, p: 3.

⁷⁴Ibid, p: 127.

⁷⁵Ibid, p: 4-5.

However, the RSCT argument is not only restricted to the focus on regional and global level only, but at the same time emphasizes the domestic (state level) and the inter-regional levels. That is:

In Cold War South Asia was a standard complex with a bipolar essential structure rooted in mutual securitizations between India and Pakistan...All of the states in the region can be classified to some degree as weak states, though India's robust democracy pushed it towards the middle of the weak-strong state spectrum...there is strong interplay between domestic and regional levels in South Asian insecurity.⁷⁶

This pattern of domestic-regional linkage, complemented with the inter-regional and global influences, continues to define Islamabad's counterterrorism policy behavior. Buzan's concept of „securitization' is of critical value while analyzing Musharraf's views and actions on terrorism. Securitization refers to the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue as either a special kind of politics or as something above politics. That is:

In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) to politicized (meaning the issue is a part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure).⁷⁷

⁷⁶Ibid, p: 104.

⁷⁷Ibid, pp: 23-24.

Following a discourse analysis using the „securitization’ lens this study unravels how President Musharraf securitized the issue of terrorism as threat to Pakistan’s national security as well as to the regional and international peace. Security is, therefore, a self-referential practice and the best way to study securitization is to study the discourse and political constellations. Thus, by probing the securitization of a particular issue, one can gain an insight into, “who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what result, and, not least, under what condition.”⁷⁸ Applying it to the Pakistan situation, it becomes quite obvious that Musharraf securitized the threat of terrorism by treating state as the primary referent of security. This was done essentially to get US support for legitimizing his regime that resulted in duplicity in his actions against terrorism.

The discussion of RSCT is intrinsically rooted in the nature of weak state of Pakistan that influences its threat perception vis-à-vis stronger neighbour in the region as well as its internal security. This became a critical factor in influencing Musharraf government’s response to terrorism. This is well explained by Ayoob’s concept of “Subaltern Realism”⁷⁹ that elucidates the transitory, immature and weak nature of „state’ in the developing world, and most aptly for Pakistan.

D: Concept of “Subaltern Realism”

This perspective brings out the stark differences in the nature of security problematic of the developed and the less developed world respectively. Mohammed Ayoob argues that the very notion of „state as a unitary actor’ as in case of the developed world is open to debate in South Asia. The problem of security in South Asia is multi-dimensional and multi-faceted in its nature

⁷⁸Ibid, p: 32.

⁷⁹“Subaltern Realism” is a combination that denotes primarily political and state-centric character and its sensitivity for the concerns of the large majority of states - the less powerful and therefore, of „inferior rank’. For details see, Mohammed Ayoob, “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective”, in Keith Krause and Michael C. William, eds., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, op.cit, pp: 121-146.

and outlook. In contrast with the developed world where the „state’ has gone through and completed the legitimacy and state-making process, whereas most of the developing states are in the process of state-making and the question of legitimacy remains unresolved.

Following the similar line of argument, Barry Buzan introduces a division between weak and strong states.⁸⁰ He contends that „weak’ and „strong’ do not refer to the amount of power a state has, but rather how stable and coherent its political institutions and society are. Essentially, „strong states’ are the ones in the north and the west, coherent states that are not fundamentally challenged and whose legitimacy is sound. „Weak states’ are generally found in the third world, where there is substantial conflict over the control of the state, where the legitimacy of the state is a subject for political contest.⁸¹ Musharraf’s phase fits well within this conception of „weak state’ that had limited capacity to reign in terrorism and whose basis of legitimacy remained highly questionable.

Amitav Acharya, another expert of the Third World security contends:

A notion of security rooted firmly within the realist tradition, and developed as an abstraction from the Eurocentric states system. It does not provide an adequate conceptual framework for understanding the security problematic of those states that entered the system at a later stage. A framework that captures the significantly broader range of issues...internal as well as external, can contribute to a greater integration of Third World security issues into international security studies.⁸²

Thus, while analyzing the security problems of the developing states like, Pakistan an analyst should be mindful of the fact that in majority of the Third World developing states, the

⁸⁰Barry Buzan, *People, State and Fear*, op.cit. pp: 65-69.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸² Amitav Acharya, “The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and Security Studies”, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, op.cit, pp: 299-327.

survival of regime may be equated with the security or national interests of the state. “The people who are opposed to the regime in control are seen as „threat’ to the state.”⁸³ In other words, it must be recognized that „security and insecurity’ in case of Third World is defined “in relation to vulnerabilities, both internal and external, that threaten to, or have the potential to, bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and regimes.”⁸⁴ Pakistan as a state has been facing similar situation where regime stability was equated with state security and became a critical factor in Musharraf’s counterterrorism policy.

Within this context, the twin concept of “security software and security hardware”⁸⁵ in the hands of state becomes very relevant as Musharraf regime tried to use it as a means of control and assertion of his power. The variables such as legitimacy, stage of integration at the societal level, fall under the purview of the „security software’, while the coercive capacity of the state expressed through military, police, etc is referred to as „security hardware’. Such classification of the concept of security adds richness and depth to the policy analysis as well as delimits the scope of the term, thus making it “intellectually manageable and analytically useful.”⁸⁶ This line of reasoning is extremely helpful in explaining the fuzzy and piece-meal approach of the Musharraf regime versus the challenge of extremism brewing inside Pakistan. Through this perspective, the particular weaknesses of the Pakistani state – ranging from legitimacy crises, political instability, societal cohesion, and territorial disputes – are knitted into the research study. In addition, the imbalance in the nature of civil-military relationship that has always tilted in favor of army vis-à-vis security policymaking is also factored in the analysis.

⁸³ M Ayoob, op.cit.pp:135-157.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵ Edward E Azar and Chung-in Moon, “Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The „Software’ Side of Third World National Security,” in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, eds., *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats*, College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 1988, pp: 77 – 101.

⁸⁶ M Ayoob, op.cit, p: 131.

Ayoob's definition of security in political terms and the state being a central referent of security is quite explicit in the Musharraf era. Why? Because it is the state that is engaged in the authoritative allocation of social values within territorially defined political and administrative units. This categorization of security as politically charged phenomenon explains Musharraf's rhetoric and policy to confront terror or extremism within and beyond Pakistan. One of the key uses of 'subaltern realism' lies in explaining the underlying motives of Musharraf's policy during his nearly decade long rule such as legitimizing and perpetuating his grip on power, marginalizing political opponents, winning international support for himself in the garb of his counterterrorism policy.

Ayoob argues that issues whether military or non-military become securitized and identified as 'threats' when they threaten state boundaries, political institutions, or governing regimes. They may have immediate political consequences or become a part of the state's security calculus. In sum, the perspectives of third world scholars call for fresh thinking to understand and analyze the black-box of 'state' and understand its policy underscoring the differences that distinguish the state in the developing world from the developed world. This also helps in understanding the perception and policy gaps between the US/West and Pakistan on the contours of counter-terrorism strategy which continues to be central in Pakistan-US policy differences on the issue of fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistan and in the region, especially vis-à-vis India.

Operationalising the integrated framework

The study is conceptually anchored in the 'integrated framework' based on the 'holistic' notion of security, 'human security' combined with conception of regional security complex, and 'subaltern realism' that allows an in-depth analysis of the Musharraf's regime response towards

terrorism. The conceptual models incorporated in the theoretical framework attempt to analyze Musharraf's response to terrorism in an integrative manner. It would examine Musharraf's policy and actions in terms of Pakistan's specific nature of the state as developing and weak state where conception of national security is not peoples-centric but state-centric with territorial state as primary referent of national security and regime legitimacy at stake; more so when a military regime is in power.

Provided at the end here is a chart summarizing the key assumptions of the four theoretical models comprising the proposed integrated framework and contrasting them with Musharraf regime's counterterrorism policy in post-9/11 Pakistan. This has been done to project in tabular form a model that (i) identifies the various components of security for the concept to be relevant and useful for the people of the state and thus conceives the concept of security in a holistic manner, (ii) identifies and explains Musharraf regime's response to terrorism in the context of the key assumptions of the theoretical models comprising the integrated framework proposed by this study, and (iii) by contrasting the key assumptions of each theoretical position and the practice of Pakistan under the Musharraf regime, provides a basis not only to understand Pakistan's response to terrorism but simultaneously critique it as well.

As the primary research question that this study seeks to address requires a description of Pakistan's response to terrorism post-9/11, while comparing it with Pakistan's traditional national security policy to determine whether Musharraf's counterterrorism policy amounted to continuity or change, the proposed framework weaves together theoretical models that can support a narrative that is primarily descriptive but not without being analytical. The expanded notion of security, represented by the figure below, is therefore a snapshot of the proposed theoretical model that provides a descriptive summary of Musharraf's counterterrorism policy,

while highlighting the limitation of such approach to security and terrorism. Thus, it not only helps address the questions that this study sets out to address, but in exposing the limits of Musharraf's approach to terrorism also identifies areas for further research.

Expanded Conception of National Security:

An Integrated Framework for Understanding Musharraf's Response to Counterterrorism

Theorists	Model/Main assumptions	Musharraf's Response
Barry Buzan	Integrated, holistic perspective on security: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) inclusive security b) multidimensional-economic, social, political, ecological-levels of security-individual, state, regional & global 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Used holistic security i.e., three-tiered Strategy-military, political & socio-economic to fight terrorism. b) Disconnect between peoples needs & the State action continued-regional & state level dominated individual security.
Mehboobul Haq	Human Security: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) peoples as referent of security b) six dimensions of human security as bench mark 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) State continued to be referent of security. b) Absence of human security bred more terrorism.
Buzan & Weaver	Regional Security Complexes Theory <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) relevance of local security dynamic in each region b) who securitizes, for what reasons and for whom 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) RSCT dominated Musharraf's policy actions b) securitization of terrorism as a threat
Mohammad Ayooob	Subaltern Realism: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) weak state-state making process incomplete b) legitimacy of the state subject of political contest 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Weak state constraints were used to legitimize and perpetuate rule b) survival of the regime dominated Musharraf's policy actions

CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN

Introduction

This chapter discusses the complex nature of terrorism in Pakistan as a historical construct. It is divided into two broad sections. The first part goes into the factors that have resulted in Pakistan being in western perceptions as a “potential base of Islamic Radicalism.”¹ It also attempts to explain the evolution over the years of these extremist networks and how these are organized and what is their operational methodology. An effort has been made to explore the role of the state and external influences in the growth of these organizations and their possible employment by the former in the conduct of its security policy.

The second part of the chapter dwells on the pre 9/11 situation in Pakistan with regard to the level of political violence and terrorism and analyses of General Musharraf’s take on the issue. The regime’s security misgivings and policies versus India and Afghanistan are discussed in the backdrop of terrorism seen as a „home grown affair’ nurtured by sections in Pakistan’s society, government policies of appeasement and external influences.

The chapter argues terrorism² per se has been a significant challenge to Pakistan even before the events of September 11, 2001. It can certainly be called as a “home grown” reality with dozens of groups that despite the so-called crackdowns on their activities by the state continued to function and flourish while a state of denial and lack of

¹ Stephen Philip Cohen, “The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan”, *The Washington Quarterly*, summer 2003, pp: 7 – 25.

² Terrorism is defined “as an act or threat of violence against non-combatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating or otherwise influencing an audience” For a detailed analysis, see Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp: 11 – 30.

political will allowed security issues to reach their present critical stage. This raises the question: Has the state been a threat to the individual or have individuals been a threat to the state?³ Pakistan like other developing states is a “weak” state, unable to seek legitimacy through commitment of its energies to nation building.⁴ Human development is essential for stability and peace at home and abroad.⁵ Late Dr Mahbub-ul-Haq⁶ recognizing the critical value of human development observed, “Human investment is likely to give us a political and economic pay-off which no other investment can promise at present”⁷ The same line of argument has been expressed by Pakistan’s former Army Chief, General (retd) Jahangir Karamat, in the following words:

The strongest motivation for peace through negotiations stems from the state of the economy and the imperative need to divert resources for human development. Military competition, if replaced by economic co-operation, can give hope to millions of South Asians for a better future.⁸

Hence, what Pakistan needs is a „comprehensive approach”⁹ to security. A noted Pakistani defense and security analyst Ikram Sehgal argues, “national security must be evaluated more in terms of human, economic and cultural terms than in the securing of

³ Barry Buzan, *People, State and Fear*, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983. Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*, London: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp:21-33.

⁴ M Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*, Boulder, Colo: Lynne Reiner, 1995, pp:132-145.

⁵ Note: The Concept of Human Security implies protecting the needs of the people as the key focus of security, both as a concept and policy of nation states.

United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report, 1994*, New York: 1994.

⁶ Dr Mahbub Ul Haq (1934 – 1998, Pakistan) was a leading architect of the concept of Human Development adopted by the UNDP in early 1990s. These reports established a new index, called ‘Human Development Index’, which measures development by the wellbeing of the people rather than by income alone. In short, “Human development is about putting people at the centre of development. It is about people realizing their potential, increasing their choices and enjoying the freedom to lead lives they value”, UNDP: *Human Development Report*, 2010.

⁷ Mahbub Ul Haq, “A National Agenda: Critical Choices for Pakistan’s Future”, 1993.

⁸ General Jahangir Karamat, “Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan”, Henry L. Stimson Center Asian Security Luncheon Series, April 12, 1999.

⁹ The Idea of Comprehensive Security implies an infusion of non-traditional (political, economic, social, environmental, human security) security issues into the national security policy (originally focusing on traditional that is territorial integrity) of the state.

territorial space by the military.”¹⁰ Similarly, Ahmad Faruqi¹¹ calls for thorough revision and rethinking of Pakistan’s national security policies as the prudent way out of the present security dilemmas. He contends:

One cannot rely on hard military assets to prevail in a strategic conflict; the soft assets pertaining to political, social, economic factors may in fact be the decisive ones...An integrated approach involving social cohesion, political strength, economic development, diplomatic support and military readiness offers an alternative national security perspective.¹²

Here, it may be asked if Pakistan has been following a holistic, comprehensive and an integrated security approach (as suggested by this study). And why has the state been unable to balance its resources with the strategic perceptions? To have an understanding of this, the evolution of the non-state violent actors has been traced. They were initially regarded as “low-cost strategic tool” of state security policy in a hostile neighborhood. Parallel to this, the negative impact of militancy on the domestic landscape is discussed.

Part One: Genesis of Extremism and Political Violence in Pakistan

1.1: Islam as Strategic Tool in State Policy

How did the state itself create conditions that were conducive to the rise of religion as a “strategic asset” remains a subject of inquiry both for the policymakers and policy analysts alike? Here, one cannot overlook the evolution of Pakistan’s “strategic culture” that conditions the policymakers’ worldview and adoption of security policies

¹⁰ Ikram Sehgal, “Concept of National Security”, *The News*, November 13, 2008.

¹¹ Ahmad Faruqi specializes in South Asian defense and energy issues and has widely published on these topics in *RUSI Journal* (February 2002, April 2000), *Asian Affairs* (Oct 2001), *Defense Journal* (August 2001), *Strategic Review* (Winter 2001), *Asia Pacific Military Balance* (2000/2001), *Asian Profile*, *The Asian Times*, *The Friday Times* (Lahore), *The News* (Karachi).

¹² Ahmad Faruqi, *Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia*, (UK: Ash gate Publishing Ltd, 2002), pp: 113 – 117.

overtime. Rizvi, defines strategic culture as: “A perceptual framework of orientations, values, and beliefs that serves as a screen through which the policymakers observe the dynamics of the external security environment, interpret the available information and decide about the policy options in a given situation.”¹³

In this scenario, the official Islam focused on the “two-nation theory” and later Pakistan ideology as sources of state legitimacy and profile of national destiny.¹⁴ In other words, Islam has been one of the critical elements of Pakistan’s strategic culture. To quote Rizvi again the following attributes of Pakistan’s strategic culture shaped Pakistan’s foreign and security policy options:

An acute insecurity developed in the early years of independence due to troubled relations with India and problems with Afghanistan; A strong distrust of India and a history of acrimonious Indo-Pakistani relations reinforced by the historical narratives of the pre independence period and the troubled bilateral interaction in the post-independence period; aversion to an India-dominated regional power arrangement for South Asia; an active search for security to maintain its independence in deciding about foreign policy options and domestic policies; a close nexus between Islam and strategic thinking, leading to connections between Islamic militancy and foreign policy.¹⁵

To translate the preceding strategic underpinning into the foreign and security policy options, successive governments in Pakistan relied on diplomacy and partnerships specifically with the United States, Western Europe, and with China aiming at strengthening its position in the region. This also resulted in the excessive allocation of resources to defense, weapon procurement from technologically advanced nations and

¹³ Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi, interview with the Author, 26 August, 2008, Islamabad.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi, interview with the Author, 26 August, 2008, Islamabad.

finally acquiring the overt nuclear status.¹⁶ Pakistan's national security was conceived, in short, in external terms only. The critical referent of the security remained the "state's territorial integrity" with minimum investment into economic, political, social, cultural, educational and technological advancement of the people of the country. Interestingly, human capital assumed the role of "low-cost strategic tool" for ensuring the country's strategic aims versus Afghanistan and India respectively. But these strategies have not yielded the expected results. Pakistan's former foreign secretary, Najmuddin A Sheikh debunking the so called "strategic depth" says:

Support for the Taliban...led to large swathes of our tribal areas and cities like Chaman into strongholds of the Pak-Afghan Taliban where the government's writ did not run. The support for the freedom struggle in Kashmir with or without official support –gave fresh impetus to forces based in Pakistan that boasted an agenda for overthrowing all secular or moderate regimes in the Muslim countries.¹⁷

1.2: Jinnah's Idea of Pakistan Vs Reality

The reliance on religion as an instrument of security policy of the state policy was in sharp contrast to the country's founder, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah's "idea and vision of Pakistan" spelled in his address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August, 1947:

If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his color, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of the state with equal rights, privileges and obligations there will be no end to the progress you will

¹⁶ From 1947 to 1970, Pakistan's defense spending averaged around 3 percent of GDP. After the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, the ratio of defense expenditure to GDP doubled to 6 percent. During the 1970s, it averaged 6.5 percent. It went up to 7.5 percent during 1980s. In 1990s it averaged 6 percent. In the last decade its recorded in between 3 to 4 percent of GDP. At the same time, health and education spending has stagnated at 1 percent and 2 percent of GDP. For details see, Ahmad Faruqi, op.cit, p: 153.

¹⁷ Najmuddin A. Sheikh, "Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan's Foreign Policy", *Margalla Papers*, Islamabad: National Defense College, 2004, pp: 1-12.

make...We are starting with this fundamental principle that we all are citizens and equal citizens of one State.¹⁸

In line with this, Jinnah envisioned Pakistan's foreign policy to be based on peaceful co-existence, honesty and fair-play within and beyond. Particularly, his ideas on the role of Islam in the state, continue to be debated between the “modernists and the radicals.”¹⁹ **Successive** governments and competing power contenders' have cited Jinnah's different statements, often out of context, to legitimize their particular security policy decisions from time to time.

The fact that Jinnah relied on Islamic identity as the basis of the demand for a separate homeland and as key element to forge unity among the Indian Muslims, has been debated over the decades among sundry sections of secular modernists and religious conservatives. Pakistan's creation was based on the „two-nation theory’²⁰ which Jinnah explained at a mass meeting in Lahore on March 23, 1940:

The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures...Their aspects on life and of life are different...Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap.²¹

Was Pakistan simply a state for the Muslims to live in or was it, in fact, an Islamic state? This question remains a key dividing line between the liberals and radicals within

¹⁸ *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements as Governor General of Pakistan 1947 – 1948*, Islamabad, 1989, p: 46.

¹⁹ Note: **Modernists** connotes diverse group of policymakers, politicians, intellectuals, civil society actors that recognize Islam as source of unity in diversity, and as the basis of Democratic system and scientific learning and advancement. On the other hand, **Radicals** constitute plethora of the extreme religious organizations, political groupings and, sectarian bands that advocate a return to a medieval-style theocracy.

²⁰ Note: „Two-Nation Theory’ is based on the distinctiveness of Muslims from Hindus (and from other religions) with regard to all aspects of personal, social, religious, and political life. It evolved through the various stages of intellectual discourse within the British subcontinent. Various leading Muslim thinkers concerned about the backwardness and discrimination in British India tried to mobilize Muslim population by stressing their unique religious outlook. Three key figures are: Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817- 98); Allama Iqbal, and; Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

²¹ Quoted in Latif Ahmed Sherwani, *Partition Schemes Leading to the Pakistan Resolution*, Islamabad: Quaid-I-Azam Academy, 1990, p: 10.

Pakistan to date. Farzana Shaikh in her recent research study, *Making Sense of Pakistan*, explores the history of the creation of Pakistan to examine why and how Islam was used as a medium of mobilization and unification to achieve a nation-state for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent. However, after the establishment of Pakistan, the religious slogan sank in the background since Muslim League, the party which led the Pakistan movement under Jinnah's leadership, was not a religious party. In fact the major religious parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Jamiate Ulema Islam had opposed the creation of Pakistan on the ground that it would divide the Indian Muslim community. But once Pakistan had become a reality the very same religious groups jumped on the bandwagon and reinvented themselves as champions of Islam claiming Pakistan was created for the implementation of „shariah’, the Islamic law. However in the earlier years this campaign did not carry much weight with the general public and could not transform itself into electoral strength over the decades till the Musharraf years when, in order to divide the mainstream political parties the regime helped create the Mutahida Majlis-e- Amla (MMA), a united alliance of the religious parties. Yet, aside from the religious parties, Islam was used to achieve, remove, sustain, and legalize regimes and governments of civilian and military rulers. This resulted in the growth of sectarianism even as demands for *shariatization* of law kept gaining strength over time. Paradoxically, Islam, which was to forge unity among the Muslims became a source of division and discord among the different sects. Sheikh argues: “It is the country’s problematic and contested relationship with Islam that has most decisively frustrated its quest for a coherent national identity and for stability as a nation state capable of absorbing the challenges of its rich and diverse society.”²²

²² Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, p: 209.

This view is also shared by a majority of liberal observers of Pakistan's history who believe that Jinnah favored what has come to be described as „moderate Islam' and his aim was to create a „nation' within this state that was above all religious differences and establish a system based on justice and toleration which are key elements of an Islamic society. In sharp contrast, radicals refer to various remarks of Jinnah as evidence that the country was always intended to be an Islamic state. A leading cleric, Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Osmani, addressing the Constituent Assembly in 1949 maintained:

Islam has never accepted the view that religion is a private matter between man and his creator and as such has no bearing on the social or political relations of human beings...The late Quaid-I-Azam marked in his letter to Gandhi in August 1944: The Quran is a complete code of life. It provides for all matters, religious or social, civil or criminal, military or penal, economic or commercial.²³

As earlier mentioned, Pakistan's creation was opposed by some key Islamic groups and parties led by Jamiat Ulema Hind (JUH). Later on, some of these groups assumed the role of in-built religiously grounded pressure groups within the post-independence state system. Radicals argue that Pakistan represents an incomplete dream of its founder, Jinnah and thinker Iqbal, who envisioned a “state for the Muslims to practice their faith (that is, Islam) without fear – on the basis of two-nation theory.” The radicals interpret this in terms of an Islamic state based on “Shariah.”²⁴

Akbar S Ahmed argues that Jinnah's vision of Pakistan lies in between the two extremes that is a secular state versus an Islamic (theocratic) state. He advocated a “more compassionate and tolerant form of Islam, one in accordance with the most scholarly thinking within the religion yet embracing all humanity, nor a rigid Islam in confrontation

²³ Quoted in, Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p: 100.

²⁴ Stephen Philip Cohen, op.cit, p: 19.

with the other religions.”²⁵ What is worth noting here is how opportunist leaders (both civilian as well as military) belonging to liberal and religious parties or groupings have manipulated Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan and Islam for political expediency and power seeking in the country.

In this tug of war between the conservative and liberal sides of Pakistan’s politics the vision of Pakistan’s founder to create a just, moderate, and democratic state has been lost. This apparently ideological tussle has actually a very mundane and ulterior core. The “Islamic card” has been used by the establishment to counter the demands for provincial autonomy which the „strong center’ has all along resisted. Under successive parliamentary governments (1947 - 58) followed by General Ayub’s military – and later presidential – rule (1958 – 69), the ruling elite adopted various strategies to control and co-opt Islamist elements to bolster the centrist power structure. In 1962, General Ayub accepted the demand of the religious parties to change the name of the country from “Republic of Pakistan” to “Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”²⁶ The 1970 elections under another military government headed by General Yahya Khan (1969 –70) have been described by analysts as an era of political Islam in Pakistan. General Yahya backed Islamist elements in both wings of the country to stem the tide of anti-establishment trends. To quote Hussain Haqqani:

The well-funded Islamists confronted the PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) in West Pakistan and Awami League in the eastern wing and, judging by their visibility in the media, were quite powerful. Their attacks on the PPP focused on the “un-Islamic lifestyle” of the party’s popular leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto...The Awami League was accused of

²⁵ Akbar S Ahmed; Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies, American University, Washington DC, Author’s interview, UK, 7 May2005.

²⁶ Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, Lahore: Vanguard Books, p: 25.

close ties with Bengali Hindus, and it was alleged that the party was funded by India.²⁷

Similarly, on the security front, the military portrayed the growing conflict in East Pakistan as „Hindu versus Muslim’ war and troops were “presented as mujahideen fighting the enemies of Islam.”²⁸ Islamists belonging to Jamaat-e-Islami were raised as a *razakaar* (volunteer) force called *Al-Badr* (the moon) and *Al-Shams* (the Sun). “*Al-Badr* composed of well-educated students from colleges and madrasas and were trained to undertake “Specialized Operations”, while the remainder was grouped under *Al-Shams*, which was responsible for the protection of bridges, vital points and other areas.”²⁹ In a nutshell, the role of religiously motivated civilians as “low-cost strategic tool” became a part of national security policy. The secession of East Bengal with the Indian military assistance solidified the political and strategic value of Islam plus the institutional (that is, military) distrust of Hindu India in Pakistan

Likewise, in 1974 Z. A. Bhutto obliged Islamists by declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslim,³⁰ and continued using Islamic ideology and military advancement as the basis of security within and beyond. The 1973 constitution³¹ declared Islam to be the state religion (Article 2), provided that all existing laws were to be brought into conformity with the injunctions of Islam (Article 227) and said that it would take steps to teach *Islamiat* and Quran in schools (Article 31). The Council of Islamic Ideology was tasked

²⁷ Ibid. p: 55.

²⁸ Ibid, P: 76.

²⁹ Ibid. p: 79.

³⁰ Ahmadi faith is linked with the Mirza Ghulam Ahmed (1835 – 1908), who in 1857 claimed to be prophet and Messiah without book after Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) who was the seal of the prophets. According to a great majority of Muslims, Mirza Ghulam Ahmed’s declarations were contrary to the basic tenets of Islam. In 1953, anti-Ahmadi riots broke in Lahore leading to the imposition of first Martial law in the country. For more details see, Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 2005, p: 10.

³¹ “Text of 1973 Constitution”, Library of National Assembly, Islamabad.

to identify laws repugnant to Islam and make recommendations to bring these laws in conformity with the Islamic injunctions (Articles 228-31). Here, the political dynamics also played a critical role in Bhutto's adoption of an "Islamic face." That is, some of the actions to "Islamize" the state were essentially legitimacy gimmicks by Bhutto to gain political clout and reclaim popular support in the face of allegations of massive electoral rigging. Such moves amounted to "opening a Pandora's box for the genie of divisiveness to crawl out and afflict a people whose very fate depended on unity."³² Bhutto's demise was a product of political mismanagement, mass agitation led by religious parties (Islamist groups) paving the way for another stretch of military rule. Thus, when General Zia seized power in a military coup d'état against Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977, Islamism was readily available as the best means to secure legitimacy of his regime. Zia used the "Islamic card" and religious political groupings as his tools to legitimize his rule while the Islamic political actors (as in the past) used the military as the means to secure dominant role in the political set up of the country.

To have a clearer understanding of the evolutionary process of Islamic militancy, the role of the state in the late 1970s at the domestic and external front is critical to note. The circumstances which led to Pakistan's slide into sectarian violence, the emergence of extremist networks with the global "Jihad" agenda may be seen as the upshot of several intertwining factors, including domestic politics, regional upheavals and the Cold War.

1.3: General Zia's Islamization program

Analysts across the board agree that it was General Zia's Islamization program that sowed the seeds of sectarian terrorism at home and prepared the ground for setting

³² Hassan Abbas, op.cit.pp: 23-29.

up “seminaries” that ultimately turned into training camps for a whole generation of radicals with a “jihadist mindset”. A noted analyst Zahid Hussain reflects on General

Zia’s fusing of security and religion in the following words:

Previously, the military was seen as the ultimate guarantor of the country’s territorial integrity and internal security. But Zia expanded its role as the defender of Pakistan’s ideological frontiers as well... Preservation of the country’s Islamic character was seen to be as important as the security of the country’s geographical frontiers.³³

General Zia castigated democracy as an importation from the West and used Islam as a source of legitimacy. In 1984, he held a referendum in which the choice placed before the Pakistani electorate was: Do you want Islam? Those who voted yes would be deemed to have simultaneously endorsed also Zia’s Islamization. Predictably, the result was overwhelmingly in Zia’s favor. The official results showed that out of the 62 per cent who had voted, 97.7 per cent had voted in favor of Zia. This was described by the Opposition – the MRD or Movement for the Restoration of Democracy as “an unprecedented fraud,” maintaining that only between 5 and 10 per cent of the voters had expressed their choice.³⁴

The major Islamic parties Jamat-i-Islami joined the military government’s Islamization agenda in line with the Deobandi³⁵ perception of an Islamic state. This was

³³ Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2007, p: 18.

³⁴ Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, *Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq*. San Francisco: Oxford, 1991. p:172

³⁵ Deobandi represent literate orthodoxy and form about 15 percent of Pakistan’s Sunni Muslims They seek revolutionary change in the Muslim world, the toppling of the un-Islamic governments, the reconstruction of a purist Islamic state, the gathering of Muslim economic and military power to defend this unitary and - in time – expansionist state. Deoband movement should not be seen as monolithic, but rather as a loose network of „madrassas’ and „clerics’ united by a particular reformist impulse within orthodox Islam, and related to each other by linked generations of teachers and students leading back to the *Dar-ul-uloom* at Deoband. This sect has produced several organizations: JUH in the 1920s, Ahrars and Majlis Tahaffuz Khatm-e-Nubawat (MTKN) in the 1940s and its leading party in Pakistan JUI (Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam). For

against the humanist traditions of Sufism followed by Brelvis³⁶ and shared by majority of the Sunni population in Pakistan. As a result, the socially destructive, divisive process of sectarianism along the lines of minority (Shia) and majority sects, and further fragmentation within the majority (that is Sunnis) into mutually hostile factions of their own, was set in motion.

Inevitably, the alliance of Zia's military dictatorship with the Deobandi stirred up "primordial passions and empowered the semi-literate mullahs as commissars of the state and distributors of its largesse through zakat (wealth tax) funds to the poor."³⁷ Moreover, in rural areas the mullahs became collectors of the ushr (farming tax) and this changed their status by turning them into instruments of local government.³⁸ Furthermore, the government's decision to provide zakat funds to madrassas led to their mushrooming growth, even as their graduates became cadres of the religio-political parties and functionaries of the various government-funded institutions.³⁹

In-depth analyses of the Islamic policies introduced by General Zia reveal that it exerted a negative influence on the two communities. The Sunni religious parties led by JUI and JUP became active against the Shia minority, and demanded the establishment of

more details see, Mohammad Waseem, "Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan", in K. M. de Silva, ed., *Conflict and Violence in South Asia*, Kandy, 2000, pp: 71 – 74.

³⁶ Brelvis have a moderate and tolerant interpretation of Islam. They trace their origins to pre-partition town of Bareilly, where a leading Muslim scholar Mullah Ahmad Raza Khan Barelvi, developed a large following. Jamiat Ulema Pakistan (JUP) is the leading Barelvi party. JUP has generally kept a low profile, except during the 1977 anti-Bhutto movement. As an offshoot of JUP in Karachi, the Sunni Tehrik represents a diehard approach to the Sunni agenda.

³⁷ Suroosh Irfani, "Pakistan's Sectarian Violence: Between the "Arabist Shift" and Indo-Persian Culture", in Satu P Limaye, Robert G. Wirsing, Mohan Malik, edit, *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia*, op.cit, pp: 147 – 169.

³⁸ Abbas Rashid, "The Politics and Dynamics of Violent Sectarianism", in Zia Mian and Iftikhar Ahmed, eds., *Making Enemies, Creating Conflict: Pakistan's Crisis of State and Society*, Lahore: Mashal Books, 1997, pp: 36 – 37.

³⁹ Suroosh Irfani, op.cit, pp:155-161.

a “Sunni Islamic State” on the pattern of the Shiite Islamic state in Iran --which the Shia feared. This made Shias defensive and in 1979 the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-Fiqh-Jafriya (TNFJ) was formed as a political organization to protect their rights. This was in response to the ‘Zakat Ordinance’ that had made the deduction of zakat (a charity tax that all Muslims must pay as a religious duty) compulsory through banks. The law provided for a 2.5 per cent annual deduction from the money resting in someone’s (Pakistan’s Muslims) bank account on the first day of Ramadan. This was objected to by the Shia minority sect of the country that considers payment of Zakat obligatory for all Muslims but not through state enforcement.⁴⁰ They believed the enforcement repugnant to Islam and opposed the measure through massive protest demonstrations in Islamabad, led by TNFJ. This forced the government to compromise with the Shia sect on this issue. Accordingly, Shias could hand in a declaration to the bank stating their sect and get exemption from the compulsory zakat deduction.

Likewise a number of other laws introduced under the so-called Islamic drive were found discriminatory to the minority communities and further aided the country’s slide into extremism. One such law, notorious for being “open to malicious abuse and arbitrary enforcement”⁴¹ was the Blasphemy Law⁴², which carried a mandatory sentence of death for anyone using derogatory remarks against the sacred person of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). It is reported that this law has been misused on a number of occasions against the Christian (minority) and Ahmadi communities. In 2000, General

⁴⁰ For details of General Zia’s Islamization policies see, Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*, op.cit, pp: 89 – 132.

⁴¹ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, New York: St. Marin’s Press, 1998, p: 282.

⁴² During General Zia rule, series of anti-blasphemy related offences were inducted in Chapter XV of the Pakistan Penal Code 1857. In 1986, the Blasphemy law, PPC 295-C, was passed For more details see: Minority Rights Group International, *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Pakistan : Overview*, 2007, Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4954ce652.html>

Musharraf proposed to reform the procedural aspects of the Blasphemy Law but backed down in the face of threat of street agitation by the religious parties. Another law against minorities was aimed specifically against the Ahmadi community. In April 1984 Zia inserted sections 298-B and 298-C into the Pakistan Penal Code, which made it a criminal offence for Ahmedi's to "pose" as Muslims, to "preach or propagate" their faith, or to use Islamic terminology or Muslim practices of worship.⁴³ The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) records 4,000 people who were accused under the Blasphemy law and 560 formally charged between 1997 and 2004. They were mostly Ahmadis and Christians.⁴⁴

External events such as the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Iran-Iraq war and *Iran-Saudi* rivalry for the leadership of the Muslim world intersected with what was going on in Pakistan and fuelled the fires of sectarian conflict in the country and promoted the forces of extremism. But the external factor that could be called the main driving force and central reason that opened the flood gates of extremism and violence in the country was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1990). To quote Professor Muhammad Waseem: "A historical root of sectarianism notwithstanding, the sectarian conflict in a contemporary Muslim society such as Pakistan has to be understood in terms of power politics in the locality, the constellation of powers at the state level, and the regional and international politics."⁴⁵

⁴³ 1984 Anti-Ahmadi Ordinance XX that added Sections 298-B and 298-C in the Pakistan criminal code. Ahmadis were then forbidden to pray openly, to spread their beliefs and to call Azan or use any Islamic expressions.

⁴⁴ Quoted in International Crises Group Report, ICG, 2005, p: 26.

⁴⁵ Mohammad Waseem, "Sectarian conflict in Pakistan", K. M. De Silva, ed *Conflict and Violence in South Asia*, Sri Lanka: ICES, 2001, pp: 19 – 89.

Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan SSP's founder, demanded the Pakistan government to declare the Shias as non-Muslims and asserted that Pakistan, with its majority Sunni population, be declared a Sunni State, as Iran was a Shia state with its Shia majority. Reflecting on the meshing of internal and external fault lines in this case, Hassan Abbas observes:

The 1979 Iranian revolution emboldened Pakistani Shias, who in turn became politicized and started asserting their rights. Iranian emissaries started financing their organization Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jafaria (TNFJ) and providing scholarships for Pakistani students to study in Iranian religious seminaries... this clashed with Zia's attempts to impose the Hanafi Islam (a branch of Sunni sect) ... For Saudi Arabia, the Iranian revolution was quite scary, for its ideals conflicted with that of a Wahhabi monarchy... Saudi Arabia was concerned about the expansion of Shia activism in any Muslim country. Hence, it was more than willing to curb such trends in Pakistan by making a financial investment to bolster its Wahhabi agenda... The flow of these funds was primarily routed through the Pakistan military and the ISI.⁴⁶

Thus, the policies pursued by Zia's military regime in the name of Islamization aggravated the sectarian divide leading to use of violence to secure sectarian agendas. Pakistan began increasingly to be called an „ideological state'- that in practice put “bigotry and intolerance at a premium. Not only did it divide the country along the lines of minority and majority sects, it divided the majority into mutually hostile factions of their own.”⁴⁷ But General Zia's ideological bogey could not have lasted long and would have been exposed but for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which helped him to project his „Islamization at home and Jihad across borders' to legitimize and extend his tenure. Pakistan's entanglement in the Afghan jihad combined with the insurgency that erupted in Indian-held Kashmir changed the sectarian issue into a supra national conflict.

⁴⁶ Hassan Abbas, op.cit, pp: 204 – 205.

⁴⁷ Hassan Abbas, op.cit, p: 103.

Gradually, the relationships between religious parties, sectarian and militant outfits, religious seminaries and jihadis operating across frontiers began to evolve into a complex web giving more muscle to the radicalized sections of society in Pakistan.

Three developments that need further explanation are: Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan; Jihad in Kashmir, and the impact of Islamabad's Afghan and Kashmir policy on the cohesion and stability of the country. Each one will be discussed to understand how the external policy led to repercussions on the internal front – making the state's integrity and solidarity shaky.

4.4: Genesis of Pakistan's Involvement in Afghanistan after Soviet Occupation of Kabul in 1979

The Afghanistan crises that began with the Soviet's occupation of Kabul in 1979 came as a blessing for General Zia. It **provided** a shortcut to legitimacy and recognition on the international front. Pakistan opted to become a tool of the United States in its proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. By playing the card of "Islamic solidarity." Pakistan became a front-line state against the Soviets who were dubbed as "infidels" at that time. The Western states were not upset with this terminology, as they were infinitely more concerned with **frustrating** the Soviets in Afghanistan. As a result, General Zia was dubbed as "a knight in shining armour at the forefront of a war in defense of freedom and democracy".⁴⁸ The resistance fighters called Mujahedeen were trained, sheltered and launched from border areas adjacent to Afghanistan. The state intelligence agency ISI in nexus with its American counterpart CIA, coined slogans like "Islam in Danger" and

⁴⁸Ibid, p: 109.

“Holy War” as apt motivation for the Afghan resistance against a godless foe that was Soviet Union.

By committing to become a front-line state versus the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Pakistan military warded off an external security threat posed by the Soviet presence in its neighborhood. The age-old Russian desire for access to the “warm waters of the Arabian sea” had become a very “real” possibility. The policy also lay to rest the long-held Pathan irredentist claim to Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province (called Pakhtunistan) where the Pathans form the largest ethnic group. Ijaz Khan observes that Islamabad’s pro-Taliban Afghan policy has been tailored,

To counter Secular Nationalist Pashtun historically allied with Indian National Congress and an Afghanistan that refused to accept Durand Line and was friendly with India and Soviet Union. A Shia Iran could be countered by a Sunni Afghanistan ... This was a continuation of Pakistan’s earlier Afghan Policy with increased effectiveness in the wake of western withdrawal from Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal and collapse.⁴⁹

To recall the events of mid- 1973, when Sardar Daud, had **overthrown his cousin** King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, Pak-Afghan relations took a **turn to the worse**. Daud was a Moscow man, as pro-India as he was anti-Pakistan. He immediately revived the dormant „Pakhtunistan issue”⁵⁰, started to aid the rebels in Baluchistan, and refused to accept the Pak-Afghan border (the Durand Line) as drawn by the British. Concurrently with all this, he arranged for large quantities of arms to be smuggled from Afghanistan into Pakistan in addition to the bomb blasts that took place in NWFP.⁵¹ Islamabad’s

⁴⁹ Author’s interview with the Ijaz Khan - Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, The University of Peshawar, 19 February 2006, Islamabad.

⁵⁰ For details of the „Pukhtunistan Issue’ see, Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, Islamabad: Vanguard Books, 2005. pp: 159 – 198.

⁵¹ Ibid, pp: 111 – 113.

response to Afghan belligerence was to organize an anti-Daud resistance around religious groups opposed to the anti-communist secular government in Kabul. To quote an Islamabad based strategic analyst Salma Malik:

Islamabad did this first by backing the fundamentalist warlord Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, both before and during the Soviet occupation; and thereafter by supporting the Taliban. Pakistan remains keen to prevent Afghanistan breaking up along ethnic lines. Such a development would generate pressures for a new pan-Pathan state.⁵²

Thus General Zia's military regime aided (financially) by the United States and other Western states and Saudi Arabia against the Soviets took ideological politics into its militant mode. This led to the internationalization of the Afghan jihad turning Pakistan into a frontline state and center of what Iqbal Ahmed has aptly termed as "Jihad International Inc"⁵³. The Islamic parties particularly Jamat-i-Islami (JI) and also Jamat-i-Ulma Islam (JUI)⁵⁴ with its base among the tribal Pathan population close to Afghan border grew in terms of manpower, institutional set-up and financial resources. They gained international exposure and got hold of lethal weapons in large quantities. The Afghan jihad favored the Wahhabi Sunni parties of people like Gulbuddin Hikmatyar Hizb-e-Islami over others; the idea was to marginalize Iran (a Shia state) in a post-Soviet

⁵² Salma Malik, "Post Taliban Afghanistan and Regional Security", *Margalla Papers 2001*, Islamabad: National Defence College, 2001, pp: 90 – 110.

⁵³ Quoted in, Suroosh Irfani, op.cit, p: 15.

⁵⁴ Note: It is important to note that despite the spread of Islamic Parties influence during and after the Afghan War, these parties progressively lost electoral space in Pakistan. Their combined vote came down from 21.5 percent in 1970 to 6.7 percent in 1993. In 1997, all Islamic parties put together got two out of 207 National Assembly seats. In October 2002 elections, the anti-American sentiment in the wake of U.S. led military campaign against the Afghanistan provided a rallying ground for the Islamic parties. This resulted in MMA (a grand alliance of religious parties) forming of government in NWFP and a coalition partner in Baluchistan (2002-2007).

Afghanistan that was to be dominated by forces friendly to their U.S.-Saudi-Pakistani benefactors.⁵⁵

All these trends externalized the agenda of Pakistan's radical Islamic groups from not only the narrow confines of electoral politics but also the territorial limits of the state. In the words of eminent scholar, Iftikhar H. Malik, local and regional patronization of the madrassas and jihadi training camps "and support for groups like Taliban and al-Qaeda by elements of the Pakistani state and society were crucial in transforming the Shia-Sunni conflict in to a parallel supra national, supra ethnic sectarian conflict."⁵⁶ This remained the trend for eleven years after the Afghan resistance movement, which finally led to Soviet retreat from Afghanistan in early 1989. The eclipse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War resulted in sweeping changes in the global political system. Pakistan was "politically isolated as it was no longer required as a conduit of US supplies to Mujahideen." ⁵⁷

Despite the departure of General Zia, Pakistani politics (in the wake of his death on 17 August 1988), remained tied to the concept of "strategic depth" versus India. ⁵⁸ Former Chief of Pakistan's Intelligence Agency Lt. General (retd) Hameed Gul terms the "strategic depth" policy of the establishment versus Afghanistan as "strategic necessity" as "we cannot afford two-war fronts on our eastern and western borders at the same

⁵⁵ Suroosh Irfani, "Pakistan's Sectarian Violence: Between the "Arabist Shift" and Indo-Persian Culture", op.cit, p: 161.

⁵⁶ Iftikhar H. Malik, *Islam, Nationalism and the West: Issues of Identity in Pakistan*, London: Macmillan, 1999, p: 119.

⁵⁷ Uma Singh, "Afghanistan Factor in Central and South Asian Politics", 20 January 2002. Available at: <http://www.kashmir.com/afghanistan/usingh.html>.

⁵⁸ Note: Pakistan's strategic circles adopted the idea of 'strategic depth' in 1970s aiming to have a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul that will not be used by its adversaries primarily India and former Soviet Union against its soil. The ultimate aim was to provide Pakistan with fall back theatre (or safe haven) in case of hostilities with India – thus compensating for the lack of width of its own territory.

time.”⁵⁹ As a result, with the departure of the common foe (the Soviet Union), “the religious war cries could not conceal the complexity of the Afghan situation – the shifting rivalries and coalitions among the Afghan groups, between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns, between Shias and Sunnis, and within the Pashtuns themselves, between Durrani and Ghilzais; the whole witches’ brew was further stirred up by regional tensions involving Iran and Saudi Arabia and, later, some of the Central Asian republics. The continued fighting was not even a regular civil war between two clearly identifiable sides but a many-sided contest for advantage, turf, and spoils, as well as a proxy war for external interests.”⁶⁰

Pakistan’s state agencies, primarily ISI, remained a guiding force for the conduct of pro-Islamabad and pro-Saudi-Arabian Afghan elements for another decade or so. The Taliban government in Kabul was hailed as a victory of the Sunni-Islamic element that was supposed to serve Islamabad’s strategic aims in the region. To quote again Hameed Gul:

During Jihad in Afghanistan we were supporting religious elements. Taliban government though traditional in approach never attacked us. Our border was peaceful...This was a soft border and Taliban were helping us in Kashmir (Indian occupied part) against Indian hegemony.⁶¹

However, the facts on ground also point to the limited nature of Islamabad’s influence on the Taliban regime in Kabul. Most pertinent examples were Islamabad’s growing frustration with the Taliban in not being able to deter them from destroying the

⁵⁹ Interview with the Former ISI Chief, General Gul Hameed, 12 March 2007, Islamabad.

⁶⁰ Iqbal Akhund, *Trial and Error: The Advent and Eclipse of Benazir Bhutto*, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp: 152 – 153.

⁶¹ Interview with the Former ISI Chief, General Gul Hameed, 12 March 2007, Islamabad .

Bamiyan Buddhas and failing in its efforts for extradition of „Lashkar-I-Jhangvi’ (a banned militant outfit) fugitives who were wanted for targeted killings in Pakistan.⁶²

Thus, General Zia’s domestic policy of Islamization stretched to Afghanistan in the name of Jihad against the Soviets for almost a decade and laid the foundation of the Jihadi culture within Pakistan. The boundary lines between the religious organizations, political parties, sectarian groups, and Jihadist elements and state security planners became increasingly blurred. Moscow’s defeat at the hands of the Afghan jihad gave birth to a new doctrine of „proxy war’ or „low-intensity war’ to be waged by non-state actors in the name of „Jihad’.

1.5: ‘Jihad’ in Kashmir since 1989

Pakistan’s decision makers’ world view characterized by “an Indo-centric foreign policy, suspicions of the West, and a world of Islam perspective” was shared by a whole new generation of mujahedeen graduating from the mushrooming madrassas in Pakistan who were to rid Kashmir of Hindu rule.⁶³ Thus successive governments after Zia, whether democratic or military, remained committed to pro-Taliban policy in Afghanistan and pro-mujahedeen policy in Kashmir.

In 1989, the long-standing Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan took a new turn with the outbreak of an indigenous Kashmiri uprising against India which was sparked by blatant election rigging in the 1987. Most of the analysts including Indian writers describe it as an indigenous revolt with generational, political, economic and religious roots. In its first phase, the insurgency was largely in the hands of Kashmiris;

⁶² Author’s Interview with the former Federal Interior Minister, Gen (retd) Moinuddin Haider, 23 March 2007, Karachi .

⁶³ Dr Mohammed Waseem, “Sectarian conflict in Pakistan,” op.cit, pp: 55-59.

Sumantra Bose calls this period of the Kashmir struggle as the “*intifada* phase.” This freedom or independence (*azadi*) movement was a conflict between state power and the popular insurrection: in January 1990, Bose notes that “massive demonstrations calling for Kashmir’s *azadi* from India erupted in Srinagar and other towns in the valley.” The Indian response was to unleash their paramilitary forces on the unarmed demonstrators; three days of protests left 300 demonstrators dead in Srinagar.⁶⁴ On 24 January 1990 JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front) gunmen responded to the Srinagar massacre by killing four unarmed Indian air force officers on the outskirts of the city. Thereafter, „the Valley was caught up in an escalating spiral of violence and reprisal.”⁶⁵

To quote Cohen,

Kashmir is both cause and consequence of the India-Pakistan conundrum. It is primarily a dispute about justice and people, although its territorial dimensions are complicated enough. Like many intractable problems, it is hard to tell where domestic policies end and foreign policy begins and the dispute has become firmly wedged in the internal politics of both countries.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003, pp: 108 – 109. The precise number of those killed is uncertain. Others give lower figures, say 100 killed. More partisan accounts do not mention the shootings at all: Sumit Ganguly, *The Crises in Kashmir: Prospects of War, Hopes of Peace*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Series, 1997, p: 106, talks only of the shooting of three protestors crossing the Line of Control (LoC), while emphasizing ‘the insurgency’ and ‘level of violence in the state’.

⁶⁵ Sumantra Bose, *Ibid*, p: 112.

Note: The JKLF was founded in 1964 and was committed to ‘one fully independent and truly democratic state’ of Jammu and Kashmir with the borders as prior to 1947. It advocated ‘equal political, economic, religious and social rights’ for all citizens of the proposed state, ‘irrespective of race, religion, culture and sex’. Yoginder Sikand, *Muslims in India since 1947. Islamic Perspectives on Inter-Faith Relations*, London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004, p: 195.

⁶⁶ Stephen P Cohen is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington D. C and a leading critic and authority on South Asian security.

For detail account of India-Pakistan relations see, Stephan P Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.

To date, India - Pakistan relations remain hostage to the unresolved nature of the Kashmir dispute⁶⁷ and military establishments on both sides of the border insist that control over Kashmir is critical to the defense of their respective countries. Pakistan's choice of proxy war tactics since 1980s is dictated as much by the political hope of a Kashmiri uprising as it is the result of military necessity.⁶⁸ Add to that the image of „Kashmir' in the minds of politicians, strategists, and scholars -- a place where national and sub-national identities are ranged against each other.⁶⁹ Thus conflict in Kashmir is as much a clash between competing ideas and strategies, as it is a conflict over territory, resources and peoples. The images of the self and the other have given rise to policies that are diametrically opposed to each other.

Pakistan maintains that violence in Indian-held Kashmir is an indigenous “freedom struggle for right of self-determination” of the Kashmiri Muslims in response to “state-terrorism” of the Indian forces. Thus, it is a justified cause and Pakistan remains a party to an un-resolved “Kashmir dispute” (as stipulated in the United Nations resolutions on Kashmir)⁷⁰ and is committed to extending moral, diplomatic and humanitarian support to its Kashmiri brethren. The Pakistan government has raised the Kashmir issue at all possible international forums like the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) which

⁶⁷ For an excellent survey of the Kashmir problem see Jonah Blank, “Kashmir Fundamentalism Takes Root”, *Foreign Affairs*, November – December 1999 and Summit Ganguly, *The Crises in Kashmir: Portents of War and Hopes of Peace*, New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1997.

⁶⁸ Stephen P Cohen, “Kashmir – Territory and People: An American Perspective”, *IPRI Journal*, Vol 1, Number 1, Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2001, pp: 18 – 27.

⁶⁹ Navnita Chanda-Behera, “J&K (& L & D G): Making and Unmaking Identities”, *Himal South Asia*, Nov-Dec, 1996, pp: 26 – 33.

⁷⁰ Kashmir remains an oldest item on UN agenda. The state of Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory. This disputed status is acknowledged in the UN Security Council resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, to which both Pakistan and India are a party. These resolution stresses that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.

has adopted resolutions and called for the resolution of Kashmir issue in accordance with the principle of “self-determination” as envisioned in the UN resolutions on this issue.⁷¹ Similarly, Islamabad has repeatedly called for international mediation as an „effective tool’ to convince India to a negotiated settlement of Kashmir issue.⁷²

However successive Indian governments insist on seeing the Kashmir conflict differently as entirely of Pakistan’s making and accuse it of “cross-border terrorism.”⁷³

According to Cohen, Indians argue that:

Pakistan, a state defined and driven by its religion, is given to irredentist aspirations in Kashmir because it is unwilling to accept the fact of a secular India...Indians also point out to Bangladesh as proof that Jinnah’s call for a separate religion-based homeland for the Sub-continent’s Muslims was untenable. In contrast, India’s secularism, strengthened by the presence of a Muslim-majority state of Kashmir within India, proves that religion alone does not make a nation.⁷⁴

While the never-ending story of Pakistan and India’s conflicting claims and contradictory interpretations of the genesis of conflict in Kashmir continues to date, the fact is that, since the uprising in 1989, the situation in Kashmir has become a bloody stalemate. The region has seen three full-scale wars between India and Pakistan (1948; 1965; and 1971) and countless border skirmishes. The current Indo-Pak thaw in relations holds little promise of a long lasting peace in Kashmir. At best it should be seen as the

⁷¹ The Special Declarations on Jammu and Kashmir were adopted by the 7th and 10th Sessions of the Islamic Summit Conference and the extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit held in Casablanca in 1994 and Islamabad in 1997. For details see: <http://www.oic-oic.org>.

⁷² For the Pakistani perspective on Kashmir Conflict, see Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan, India, and Kashmir: A Historical Review”, in Raju G. C. Thomas, edit, *Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia*, Boulder: West view Press, 1992.

⁷³ For an extensive review of the Indian position see, Ash tosh Varnshney, “Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir has been a Problem”, in Raju G. C. Thomas, Ibid.

⁷⁴ Stephan Philip Cohen, “Kashmir – Territory and People: An American Perspective”, op.cit, pp: 19 – 20.

beginning of the long over-due normalization process between the two sides which if sustained can materialize into a durable resolution of Kashmir conflict.

The hard reality is that, “while Indian officials claim a decline in militancy”, international human rights groups and independent observers report little change, and within Kashmir the death toll mounts. Most of the Kashmiri population remains alienated, whether they are the Pandits (many of whom have fled their homes), or the Valley Muslims, bitterly divided and increasingly terrorized by the radical Islamic groups.”⁷⁵

Thus, the role and influence of radical Islamic groups known as “Jihadi groups” operating in Kashmir with their bases across the Line of Control (LOC) is another critical element of the infrastructure of terrorism within the country. These are the undeclared or unofficial elements of the state’s Kashmir policy dubbed as “strategic tools”⁷⁶ since 1989. The extent of Islamabad’s influence and control over these elements remains quite vague and undocumented at the official level. Reading between the lines, President Musharraf’s promise in 2003 to the United States that “Pakistan will assure that in future no cross – border infiltration takes place through LOC..., is an indirect admittance of the state’s involvement and knowledge versus the Jihadi groups presently active in the Kashmir theatre.”⁷⁷ Thus, the role and support of Jihadi groups (that involve indoctrination, logistic and material help) became critical in the calculus of national security imperatives.⁷⁸ The positive outcome for the strategists in Islamabad of aiding non-state elements in Kashmir has been:

⁷⁵ Ibid, p: 24.

⁷⁶ Author’s off- the record conversation with the officials of the sensitive security organization..

⁷⁷ Author’s off the record interview, Jan 2004.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

The Jihadi groups enabled Islamabad to fight a proxy war inside Kashmir, tie up perhaps quarter of a million Indian troops and paramilitary police (a low estimate), and signal New Delhi that any settlement of the dispute could not be entirely on India's terms.⁷⁹

However, it is pertinent to note, that Pakistan's role was not the decisive factor in starting the uprising; rather it has been a critical factor in sustaining it.

Pro-Pakistan groups like *Lashkar-I-Taiba* and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen became as prominent in the Kashmir jihad as the largely Kashmiri Hezb-ul-Mujahideen. These groups became part of the network of Jihadi organizations operating outside the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands and using the camps in Paktia and Nangarhar in Afghanistan to train their guerrilla fighters. Kashmir became a new focus of the international jihad, where Pakistanis, Afghans, Arabs, Bangladeshis, and Indian Muslims fought alongside Kashmiris.⁸⁰

A friendly Afghanistan could provide a base where Kashmiri militants could be trained. "We support the jihad in Kashmir", commented Mullah Omar in 1998.⁸¹ The extent of Pakistan's control and influence on the jihadis was proved by their withdrawal from Kargil, which took place days after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, made an appeal to them. For instance, Islamists were at the forefront during the Kargil crises of May-July 1999, while the Pakistani troops, despite official denials were operationally supporting the Islamist fighters.⁸²

The combination of these factors caused the overlap between sectarian and jihadi organizations to grow around their common „world view' (discussed in the earlier part of the chapter). Admitting this, Naveed Ahmed, an activist of Sipah Sahaba, Jhang, said:

⁷⁹ Philip E. Jones, op.cit, pp: 94 – 95.

⁸⁰ Philip E. Jones, op.cit, pp: 94 – 95.

⁸¹ Rizwan Zeb, "War Against Terror: Lessons for Pakistan", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXV, No. 3, Spring 2002, p:57.

⁸² M. Ehsan Ahrari, "Transnational Terrorism and old Friends: Pakistan and the U.S", *Strategic Review*, winter 2001. Vol xxix, no 1, United State Strategic Institute, p: 13.

While Jihadi organizations are fighting against infidels on our borders we are putting an end to them in Pakistan. Both are jihad but we cannot bring our mutual connections to common knowledge due to certain constraints.⁸³

The key point to stress here is the meshing of internal and external security dimensions as a result of Islamabad's policies in Afghanistan (1979 onwards) and Indian administered Kashmir respectively. To quote Barry Buzan:

By committing itself to the Saudi-backed Sunni cause in Afghanistan and by tolerating violence against its own Shia minority, Pakistan has made a strategic error of potentially the same gravity as that which lost it Bangladesh...Pakistan has been steadily dissipating the political resources that gained it independence in 1947...Its army dominated political life whether in or out of government, in the process contributing to the degradation of democracy...India-Pakistan is still largely a story of securitizations about military power, weapons, and political status...South Asia is clearly in the zone of conflict, where the traditional power-politics rules of international relations still prevail.⁸⁴

The pertinent question is: How Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan and Kashmir (Indian administered part) affected its security environment at the domestic and international level?

Part Two

2.1: Security Implications of Pakistan's Involvement in Afghanistan and Kashmir

Pakistan was instrumental in the retreat of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and later on played a critical role in installing the Taliban regime in Kabul in mid 1990s – all this was achieved at the cost of the shearing of its domestic social fabric by the extremist networks and their vision of “military struggle termed as Holy Jihad” at home and

⁸³ Quoted in, M Amir Rana, op.cit, pp: 146 – 147.

⁸⁴ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The structures of International Security*, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp: 101 – 127.

abroad. By the end of 2000, Pakistan was home to fifty-eight religious parties and twenty-four armed religious militias,⁸⁵ the latter category also popularly known as “Jihadi groups.” The term “Jihad” deserves a brief introduction as it signifies a sacred Islamic concept that today stands distorted and tarnished. A noted authority on Islam, Professor Javed Ahmed Ghamidi observes:

Jihad literally means to strive for a cause and there are many kinds of Jihad and role of individual varies accordingly. The directive of using force is given to Muslims in their collective responsibility. All verses of the Quran which mention this directive do not address Muslims in their individual capacity. Thus, no person or group among them has the right to take a step on its own in this regard on behalf of the Muslims... It's only the state that has the right to declare „Jihad’... Al-Qaeda and Taliban are misusing our territory (that is, Pakistan) for so-called Jihad. They have no right to lead us or fight in our name.⁸⁶

More so, according to the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad (PBUH), “The best Jihad is speaking of a word of justice to a tyrannical ruler.”⁸⁷ However, modern-day religious extremists interpret Jihad primarily in terms of the use of force to impose their version of Islam on others and to fight the “infidels” in order to conquer the world. That is,

They invoke Jihad to help Muslims who are in distress around the world, though their agendas are more political than religious. In their view, even killing of innocent civilians for their higher cause is justified, though this is in clear violation of the established laws of Islamic warfare... Today's jihadi, however, is least concerned about such Islamic traditions. Furthermore, it is not only Hindus, Jews, and Christians who are their perceived enemies, but even Muslims having views different from theirs are considered heretics and hence worth eliminating.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Saeed Shafqat, “From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e-Taiba”, in *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation*, ed. Christophe Jeffrelot, London: Zed Books, 2002, p: 133.

⁸⁶ Professor Javed Ahmad Ghamdi, interview with the Author, 11 March, 2009, Lahore.

⁸⁷ Abu Dawad, *Sunan Abi Dawud*, and Cairo: Daral- Misriyya al-Lubananiya, 1988, p: 43-44.

⁸⁸ Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism*, New York: M.E.Sharpe, Inc., 2005, p: 201- 202.

In case of Pakistan, the notion of „Jihad’ has been used as a medium of communication by the radicalized factions to forge nexus between the “so-called grieved and exploited Muslims” versus exploitative forces at the micro and macro level. The „military jihad’ is considered as „farz-e-ain’ (that is, primary duty, compulsory) to quote Jamaat ul Dawa (JD) head Hafiz M Saeed:

Muslims throughout the world have a bond of Kalma. From Lahore to Srinagar, Kabul to Baghdad, Basra to Chechnya, they are fighting under this Kalma, but the infidel world does not like it and describe it as terrorism⁸⁹

Why do we engage in jihad?’ Darul Anddalas, the department of media and publication of Jammat ul Dawa, published a booklet with this title in May 1999. It says that Lashkare Taiba is involved in jihad for the following reasons that have been taken from the Quran:

While there is evil, it [is] the duty of Muslims to fight it; It is the duty of Muslims to fight till the Faith of Allah is supreme in the whole world; Until the governments of infidels in the world are not defeated and do not start paying Jazai(sic) (tax paid by non-Muslims to the Muslim rulers) it is [the] duty to fight them; While there are people being oppressed in any part of the world it is a duty to fight for their liberation; If an infidel kills a Muslim, revenge is a duty; If any nation breaks an agreement with Muslims, fighting them is a duty; If any nation attacks Muslims, fighting in defense is a duty; If any infidels occupy a land belonging to Muslims, it is a duty to throw them out and restore Muslim occupation.⁹⁰

The point to be noted here is that militants within and outside Pakistan with their dichotomous world view interpret the concept of “Jihad” to legitimize violent means. At times these groups received state patronage, particularly during General Zia’s eleven

⁸⁹ Hafiz M Saeed, quoted at: [Http: //www.jihadwatch.org/archives/000827](http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/000827) .

⁹⁰ Ibid, pp: 299 – 301.

years' military rule, and, external assistance from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Western States (during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan). Thus, "Jihad is a mindset. It developed over many years during the Afghan war. The mindset cannot be changed in twenty-four hours."⁹¹ The critical role of state and its policies versus its neighbors (as discussed earlier) at the cost of non-investment in the human development cannot be ignored. Riaz M Khan, a former foreign secretary contends, "Foreign and security policy cannot compensate for the internal weaknesses. Policy should be inclusive in nature."⁹²

Most of the analysts and policy makers even prior to 9/11 WTC incidents were highly critical of the positive value of Pakistan's pro-Taliban policy. The negative security implications for Pakistan found expression in the following statement of a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Sardar Asif Ali:

We are proud of our contribution to the Afghan Jihad. We must remember that today's unipolar world; in no small measure is the result of the Afghan war. And yet in the aftermath of the victory of the Afghan Jihad, [we] were left not with the sweet dish of victory, but the gifts of drug trafficking, Kalashnikov culture, colossal environment damage, social tensions and a host of other painful legacies that flowed from the free use of our territory for the fight against Soviet occupation forces.⁹³

Generally, it can be said that Pakistan's support to Afghans for more than a decade against the Soviet occupation and acceptance of millions of refugees, has had critical implications for the country. The complex web of militant infrastructure remained operative even after the Soviet's retreat from Afghanistan. This had serious implications

⁹¹ Jessica Stern, "Pakistan Jihad Culture", op.cit, p:13.

⁹² Raiz M Khan, interview with the author, 29 May, 2008, Islamabad.

⁹³ Quoted in, Muqaddam Khan, "Impact of Afghan Civil War on Pakistan", *The Muslim*, 23 August 1996.

for the terrorism as some of the military training camps and religious seminaries in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan became the breeding grounds for ethnic and sectarian violence. The fact was well recognized by the government circles. Naseerullah Khan Baber, the then Interior Minister, identified the fallout on Pakistan from hosting the Afghan refugees as “drugs, terrorism and weapons... Afghanistan had become a training ground for terrorism that was being imported into Pakistan and other parts of the world.”⁹⁴

Thus, Pakistan’s role as the frontline state in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979 – 1989) solidified the basis of violence and militancy within the country. The nexus between the Islamist outfits and the state secret agencies, primarily ISI, became well entrenched. This had critical security implications both at the internal and external levels.

From 1989 onwards, sectarianism within Pakistan was no longer a matter of domestic security alone, it became a regional phenomenon. The major sectarian groups in Pakistan were the virulently anti-Shia *Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP)*, *Harkut-ul-Ansar* and *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ)* and the pro-Shia *Sipah-Muhammad (SM)*. The SM aimed at a revolution of an Iranian type, while SSP and its brother groups would accept nothing less than the declaration of Pakistan as an orthodox Sunni state.⁹⁵ The LJ was targeting Shia civil servants and killed government officers, particularly in Punjab.⁹⁶

For the SSP leadership, murdering Shias was pure Jihad and overtime it forged ties with the drug traders, local criminals to do the “needful”. This reproduced relationships between the militant groups and drug traffickers that had already evolved in

⁹⁴ Quoted in, U.S. Department of State, *Pakistan: A Country Study*, Washington D.C. April 1988, p: 287.

⁹⁵ Jessica Stern, “Pakistan Jihad Culture”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 6, November/December 2000, p: 124.

⁹⁶ Adnan Adil, “SSP Targets Shia Officers”, *The Friday Times, Lahore*, 31 October 13, 1996.

Afghanistan.⁹⁷ The financial sources of these groups were no longer indigenous. Saudi Arabia started pouring money in too. For Saudi Arabia, the Iranian revolution and subsequent rise in Shia activism in Muslim countries like Pakistan was seen as a negative trend to its version of universal Sunni Islam. According to Vali Raza Nasr, a leading expert on the sectarian groups of Pakistan, the flow of these funds was primarily routed through the Pakistan military and ISI.⁹⁸ In 1990 the murder of Sadiq Ganji, the Iranian consul-general in Lahore changed the course of Shia-Sunni confrontation for the worse. A twenty-three year old SSP activist, Riaz Basra who accomplished this task became a hero among the party sympathizers, was encouraged to repeat the performance. He was arrested in 1992 but escaped from custody in 1994 and found safe refuge in Afghanistan. In 1995-96, Basra was leading the SSP splinter radical group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi, hereafter called Lashkar) a terrorist group with the base camp in Afghanistan.

According to Hassan Abbas:

Lashkar distinguished itself as the most violent sectarian force in Pakistan... It also started operating in Indian-controlled Kashmir but, keeping in line with its philosophy, it embarked on this journey by starting to murder Kashmiri Shia leaders before targeting the Indian forces... Lashkar also attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on January 3, 1999... Lashkar activists were using Afghanistan as a sanctuary courtesy of the Taliban... Riaz Basra developed a close working relationship with Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.⁹⁹

Parallel to these developments, Iranian funding to Shia organizations also increased, making Pakistan a battleground for Saudi Arabia and Iran to settle their scores. No effective measures were taken by the Pakistan government to halt this slide into

⁹⁷ S.V.R. Nasr, "Islam, the State, and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan", in Christophe Jaffrelot, ed., *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* p: 95.

⁹⁸ Ibid, p: 92.

⁹⁹ Hassan Abbas, op.cit, pp: 204 – 210.

chaos. The Iranian government in the wake of killing of nine Iranian diplomats in August 1998 by Taliban forces in Mazar-I Sharif, held Pakistan partly responsible for this event. Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khomeini demanded that Pakistan drop its support of the Taliban.¹⁰⁰ This Iranian demand was brushed aside by the Islamabad terming it counter productive to its strategic interests in the region. In fact, according to Samina Ahmed, "the army used the instability caused by sectarian violence to pressure the democratic governments."¹⁰¹ The following tables give the breakdown of the incidents of sectarian terrorism in Pakistan from 1987 till 2002 in terms of venue and human loss:

Incidents of Sectarian Terrorism

Table 1: (1987 – March 2002)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total Incidents</i>	<i>Injured</i>	<i>Dead</i>
1987	25	153	11
1988	10	10	1
1989	67	67	10
1990	274	274	32
1991	180	263	53
1992	135	119	58
1993	90	247	39
1994	162	316	73
1995	88	180	59

¹⁰⁰ Note: The Taliban massacred hundreds of Shia Hazaras in 1998, enlarging the sectarian confrontation in the region. Also see, "Tensions Mount between Iran, Afghanistan's Taliban", CNN, September 14, 1998. Available at: <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9809/14/iran.afghan.border>.

¹⁰¹ Samina Ahmed, "Centralization, Authoritarianism, and the Mismanagement of Ethnic Relations in Pakistan", in *Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific*, ed., Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, pp: 107 –127.

1996	71	210	83
1997	97	175	200
1998	36	80	132
1999	21	45	53
2000	24	90	37
2001	54	180	154
2002	10	39	21
Total	1342	2450	1016

Table 2: Shias and Sunnis Killed in Sectarian Terrorism

(1990 – March 2002)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total Dead</i>	<i>Shia</i>	<i>Sunni</i>	Police/Workers of other Law Enforcing Agencies/Others
1990	30	13	14	5
1991	53	29	23	1
1992	58	22	16	7
1993	39	17	11	1
1994	73	39	23	7
1995	59	36	22	1
1996	83	56	34	
1997	200	105	90	5
1998	132	109	23	

1999	53	68	36	
2000	37	4	26	7
2001	154	80	64	10
2002	21	15	6	
Total	994	593	388	44

Table 3: Incidents of Sectarian Terrorism

(1990 – March 2002)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Punjab</i>	<i>Sindh</i>	<i>NWFP</i>	<i>Baluchistan</i>	<i>Islamabad</i>
1990	159	39	23	3	1
1991	110	35	12	1	
1992	39	42	19		
1993	34	21	19	4	1
1994	88	39	17		
1995	34	18	5	2	
1996	23	12	7	1	
1997	23	14		2	
1998	47	10	18		5
1999	21	16	8		
2000	11	10	3		
2001	18	10	5	3	
2002	3		7		

Source: M Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*, Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004, pp: 586 – 587.

The key trend in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in late 1980s was the increased activity of the militant networks within Pakistan and beyond.

The Afghan war (1979 – 1989) was understood as a Jihad within a traditional paradigm (of Deobandi Sunni sub-sect), part local, part national, part tribal, part ethnic. The Taliban rule in Kabul was seen as a model to be replicated in case of Pakistan by the radical Islamists. Some leading Deobandi clerics, such as Sami ul Haq from the famous Haqqaniya madrassa at Akhora Khattak in NWFP, have freely admitted that whenever the Taliban put out a call for fighters they closed down their schools and sent their students to Afghanistan.¹⁰² Similarly, in December 1998, Deobandis began a campaign to purge the Baluchistan capital Quetta of video rental shops, video recorders and televisions. The campaign has continued periodically ever since.

In late 2000, a number of such campaigns were reported in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. “This is an ongoing process”, said one radical activist, “We will continue to burn TV sets, VCRs and other similar things to spread the message that their misuse is threatening our religion, society and family life”.¹⁰³ The establishment was unable to stem this tide of radicalization, and extremist Islamic groups continued to operate from Peshawar as before. In 2001 Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider during a visit to Afghanistan carried a list of 60 terrorists believed to be involved in sectarian killings in Pakistan who had taken refuge in Afghanistan. The Taliban government refused to sign an extradition treaty with Pakistan.

¹⁰² Quoted in, Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, op.cit, pp: 9 – 10.

¹⁰³ Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Islamic Jirga sets TV and VCRs on Fire in Mardan”, *The News*, 19 February 2001.

In short, the minister's empty-handed return established the linkage that existed between the thrust of the Taliban and sectarian killings in Pakistan.¹⁰⁴

The reality of highly galvanized radical sections of society in Pakistan resonates in the following words of Brigadier (Retd) A R Siddiqui:

Whether bonafide Afghans or Pakistani activists involved in the Afghanistan Jihad. Pakistan simply bristles with armed, battle-tested activists (call them terrorists, if you will) on the lookout for operational vistas and new battle grounds. Pakistan remains their sanctuary, their safe haven and ethnic base.¹⁰⁵

From the Islamists' perspective (reportedly also shared by Pakistani establishment) the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet superpower was an enormous boost for the Ulema and, for many, a confirmation of the efficacy of the „Jihad model'. The missing element in this perspective of „universal jihad' is the critical role of western assistance in terms of armaments, finances, Pakistan's role as essential link between the Mujahedeen and western world and above all the Cold War international milieu that legitimized Jihad against the Soviets.

Waseem explains this in the following words:

The involvement of Islamic militants in the wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir contributed to privatization of foreign policy and militarization of Islamic activists. The international Islamic networks finally provided a global agenda for the movement in terms of endemic anti-Americanism... State policies, regional instability and non-resolution of conflicts involving Muslims in the region and in the world at large are the leading determinants of the nature and direction of Islamic organizations in Pakistan.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Ghazi Salahuddin, "Life with the Taliban", *The News*, 13 February 2001.

¹⁰⁵ Brig (Retd) A R Siddiqui, "Pak-Afghanistan: Are We Back to Bad Days", *The Frontier Post*, 14 July 1996.

¹⁰⁶ Mohammad Waseem, "Origins and Growth Patterns of Islamic Organizations in Pakistan", op.cit, p: 33.

Against this backdrop, we will briefly sketch the contours of the most prominent jihadi organizations presently active in Kashmir – and supposed to be banned and no longer active on the Pakistan side of the Line of Control: Harkat ul Majahideen (HUM); Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT); Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM). The key point to note is that there exist cross linkages and overlap between the Islamists or jihadis belonging to sectarian groups, religious parties, and those active in Kashmir and elsewhere and the element of the state being a nurturer or silent spectator of these trends cannot be overlooked.

2.2: Harkat- ul - Mujahidin (HUM)

Named as Jamiat ul-Ansar; Party of the Volunteers; Movement of Holy Warriors; formerly called Harkat –ul- Ansar. HUM is a Pakistan-based Deobandi jihadi militant organization that seeks reuniting Kashmir across LoC and creates an Islamic state in Pakistan. It was banned by America in October 2001 for its militant activities in Kashmir and Afghanistan. It emerged as an offshoot of Arcata Jihadul Islami in 1984 founded by Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, to fight the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. According to Harkat records, important operations in Indian part of Kashmir include; “the siege of Hazrat Bal, occupation of Charar Sharif, Zangli Camp encounter and operation to destroy a bridge in the Indian province of Assam.”¹⁰⁷In December 1999, HUM hijacked an Indian airliner that resulted in the release of Maulana Masood Azhar, who had been imprisoned by India since 1994 for association with HUM attacks.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ For the details of these Harkatul Mujahideen activities see, Mohammad Amir Rana, op.cit, pp: 244 – 262.

¹⁰⁸ Dan Rotham, “In the Spotlight: Harkat ul Mujaheddin (HUM)”, Center for Defence Information, updated July 8, 2002. Accessed at: [Http: //www.cdi.org/terrorism/harkat.cfm](http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/harkat.cfm), July 15, 2003.

After his release, Azhar broke up with the HUM and formed the new Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), taking many HUM members with him. In 2001, after the HUM was banned by President Pervez Musharraf; Khalil renamed the group Jamiat ul-Ansar.

At the moment there are around ten offices of Harkatul Mujahideen functioning in Azad Kashmir only. It used to have forty-eight offices in Pakistan of which twenty-four are working now countrywide. The Islamabad, Karachi and Muzaffargarh offices have achieved central status after the crack down on jihadi organizations and are controlling the entire management. Earlier, HUM used to have four training camps in Afghanistan, and one each in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. With the end of the Taliban regime, the camps in Afghanistan were closed down. They were at Barhi, Ghund, and Kabul. The camp at Mansehra in Pakistan was closed temporarily while the one at Muzaffargarh in Azad Kashmir is still working.¹⁰⁹

Despite signing Osama bin Laden's 1998 declaration against the United States, the group has not been known to target U.S. interests primarily. HUM remains focused against India in occupied Kashmir and Jammu. However, in 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested three members of an HUM subgroup, the al-Almi faction, which admitted to the June 14, 2002, bombing of the U.S. Consulate in Karachi that killed 11 people.¹¹⁰ HUM was also reported to be involved in a coup attempt, code-named Operation Khilafat, against the government of Benazir Bhutto.¹¹¹ Pakistani and U.S. intelligence agencies are now convinced that Harkatul Mujahideen retains an active liaison with the Taliban remnants and al-Qaeda operatives hiding in Pakistan.¹¹² According to CIA reports the

¹⁰⁹ M Amir Rana, op.cit, p: 250 – 251.

¹¹⁰ Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations", *CRS Report for Congress*, February 6, 2004.

¹¹¹ Amir Mir, "Terror's Allies", *Herald (Pakistan)*, August 2004, pp: 58 – 61.

¹¹² Ibid.

volunteers are recruited in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. HUM trains an international network of fighters to defend the rights of Muslims all over the world. It extended its activities to Jammu and Kashmir, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Myanmar and the Philippines. HUM's Burma branch, located in the Arakans¹¹³, trains local Muslims in weapon handling and guerrilla warfare. In Tajikistan, HUM members have served with and trained Tajik resistance elements.

The financial sources of Harkatul Mujahideen range from sympathizers not only in Pakistan and Kashmir, but also in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. The group allegedly also raises funds among Pakistani and Kashmiri expatriates in Europe, primarily Britain.¹¹⁴ It's fund raising in Pakistan though curtailed comes from jihadi funds from mosques, sale of skins of sacrificial animals and medicines, plus private donations. In sum, HUM represents a convergence of a local, territorially- based agenda aimed at Jammu and Kashmir with a global, anti-American, "international jihad" focus.

2.3: Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)

Named as Army of Mohammed or Khaddam ul-Islam, JEM is an important jihadi organization of the Deobandi sect based in Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan banned it on January 12, 2002. In spite of the ban, Jaish-e-Mohammed is operating freely in Azad Kashmir and many areas of Pakistan. JEM aims to end Indian rule in disputed Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), expel Indian security forces from the region, and unite J& K with Pakistan. Maulana Masood Azhar, its founder used the following words to describe the manifesto of JEM in the June 2001 issue of the fortnightly „Jaish e Mohammed”:

Jaish-e-Mohammed (PBUH) is an international Islamic movement created at this time on the principles of

¹¹³ Rizwan Zeb, op.cit, p: 64.

¹¹⁴ Dan Rotham, op.cit,p:45.

Shariah...This movement is doing jihad against the enemies of the faith on the one hand and working to bring back the Muslims to the door of Islam on the other...What more can a Muslim want than being a claimant to Faith, a fighter in its cause prepared to offer all sacrifices? And the most important thing is having a heart enlightened with the yearning for Martyrdom.¹¹⁵

JEM was established by Maulana Masood Azhar in March 2000 after being released from prison in December 1999 in exchange for 155 hostages aboard the Indian plane that had been hijacked by HUM militants. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Masood Azhar and Umar Saeed Sheikh went to Afghanistan after being released. They met with Osama bin Laden who financed them to launch Jaish-e-Muhammed.¹¹⁶

The JEM has targeted Indian officials, government buildings and soldiers as well as non-Muslim civilians in Pakistan and J&K.¹¹⁷ The JEM is suspected of executing a suicide bomb attack outside the J&K state assembly on October 1, 2001, killing up to 38 people. The group initially claimed credit for the attack, but later denied involvement. The Indian government also accused the JEM, in conjunction with Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, of carrying out a deadly attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001.¹¹⁸

After President Musharraf outlawed the group in January 2002, JEM's leader and founder, Azhar, was placed under house arrest, but then he was released in December 2002.¹¹⁹ Experts describe JEM strategies and attacks as *fidayeen* (suicide) in nature. The JEM uses a variety of firearms, including light and heavy machine guns, and assault

¹¹⁵ Quoted in Muhammad M Rana, op.cit, pp: 224 – 225.

¹¹⁶ Quoted in Rizwan Zeb, op.cit, p: 65.

¹¹⁷ "Terrorism Database", Periscope, USNI Database.
Available at: <http://www.periscope1.com>.

¹¹⁸ Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations", op.cit, p: 40 – 43.

¹¹⁹ Hussain Haqqani, "Pakistan Frees Terrorist Leaders", *Asian Wall Street Journal*, January 7, 2003.

rifles. JEM assailants have also used mortars, improvised explosive devices, and rocket grenades. According to Jaish sources, it conducted thirty-five fidayeen attacks in Occupied Kashmir in 2001 during which only twenty-three Mujahideen were martyred while India lost 250 officers and soldiers.

The JEM was implicated in the February 2002 kidnapping and execution of journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Pearl, 38, worked as the South Asia Bureau Chief for the *Wall Street Journal*. He was on assignment in Karachi to interview members of militant groups and trace their possible links with alleged shoe-bomber Richard Reid.¹²⁰ Similarly, according to the investigations of the December 25 twin suicide attacks on President Musharraf's life in Rawalpindi, the suicide bombers were identified as Muhammad Jameel, a Jaish-e-Mohammad activist from Azad Kashmir and Hazir Sultan, a Harkat al-Jihad al-Islami operative from Afghanistan.

The Jaish led by Maulana Masood Azhar and Harkat headed by Qari Saifullah Akhtar, are components of a five-member "Brigade 313" (equivalent to the number of companions with Prophet Muhammad PBUH at the Battle of Badr), launched in 2001 after the US-led Allied Forces attacked Afghanistan. Three other Brigade components included Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Harkatul Mujahideen al-Almi. The Brigade leadership had pledged to target key Pakistani leaders who in their opinion were damaging the cause of jihad to further the American agenda in Pakistan. Experts believe that despite the ban, JEM's financial sources have not dried up yet and its network is spread over 78 districts in Pakistan. The manpower and infrastructure of the Jaish remains very much intact and has serious threat potential for internal stability of Pakistan, peace prospects with India and safety of American citizens and interests.

¹²⁰ Paul Haven, "A Year after Pearl Abduction, Questions Remain", *Associated Press*, January 22, 2003.

2.3: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)

Known as “Army of the Righteous/Pure”, Jamaat al-Dawat, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) is a radical Islamic group in Pakistan that seeks to establish Islamic rule throughout South Asia. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the militant outfit formed in 1990, is a subsidiary of major Ahle-Hadees organization, Markaz Dawat-ul-Irshad (MDI – Center for Religious Learning and Propagation; also called Jamaat al-Dawa), which was founded in 1987 by Mr Zafar Iqbal, Hafiz M Saeed, and Abdullah Azzam. MDI aspires to develop a jihadi culture by imparting Islamic education in a modern setting and at the same time providing military training to its activists. Since 1993, LT has become one of the largest and best-organized groups fighting in Kashmir against India.¹²¹ The Indian government accused LT of involvement in the December 2001 bombing of the Indian Parliament and charged the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) with supporting the group. President Musharraf banned the LT in January 2002, and the LT renamed itself Jamaat al-Dawat. The LT’s leader, Hafiz M Saeed, was arrested in Pakistan in January 2002 but then released in December 2002.¹²²

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba was the first to introduce the concept of *Fedayeen (suicide)* missions in Occupied Kashmir. The group has used various types of firearms, machine guns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades. LT is not known to have conducted attacks against American citizens or American interests. A major accusation against LT has been the promotion of sectarianism and promoting the Ahle Hadees school of thought within Pakistan. To quote an analyst:

The rise of Ahle Hadith and Deobandi Islam through the militias fighting in Kashmir is gradually transforming

¹²¹ U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, 2002, p: 113.

¹²² Hussain Haqqani, “Pakistan Frees Terrorist Leaders”, op.cit.

Pakistani society. It is becoming more puritanical and less tolerant of practices it thinks are in violation of Islam.¹²³

In March 2002, senior Al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah was captured in the LT safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, indicating that the group may be helping Al Qaeda members to move through Pakistan.¹²⁴ There are also reports that members of LT have participated in conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, and the Philippines, suggesting that the group may have links to various other radical Islamic organizations.

Financial strength has been a major factor behind LT expansion. In terms of funding, it receives grants from around the world, mostly from well-to-do Ahle-Hadith/Wahhabi sympathizers, though their primary source has been contributions from Saudi Arabia.¹²⁵ Regular fund-raising in local mosques as well as in Islamic centers in North America and Europe also takes place in the name of jihad for supporting Muslims who are victims in conflict zones worldwide.

The proliferation of militant jihadi groups and the emergence of powerful Islamist movements like the HUM, LT and JEM can be described as the wages Pakistan has been collecting for assuming a “front-line state role” in the US-led campaign against the former Soviet Union in the Afghan Jihad of 1970s. These organizations eye Pakistan as the country which they can turn into an orthodox theocratic Islamic State to serve as the base for their violent missions abroad.¹²⁶ This front-line phase also registered manifold increase in the number of religious seminaries with the funds flowing from the United

¹²³ Rizwan Zeb, op.cit, p: 64.

¹²⁴ Dan Rothem, “CDI Fact Sheet: Lashkar-e- Taiba,” Center for Defence Information, updated August 12, 2002.

¹²⁵ Jessica Stern, *Terror in the name of God*, p: 107.

¹²⁶ C. Christine Fair, “Military recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al- Qaeda and other organizations,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27 No. 6, July 2007. p: 491.

States, Saudi Arabia, China, Egypt and so on to train and indoctrinate „mujahidin’ to fight „the Godless communists’. For instance, in 1971 there were only 900 *Madaris* in Pakistan but by the end of the Zia era, there were as many as 8,000 registered and as many as 25,000 unregistered *Madaris*.¹²⁷ Reportedly, more than 25 million US dollars were spent by CIA in printing and distributing literature glorifying jihad and encouraging Afghan refugees in Pakistan to join political organizations promoting jihad.¹²⁸ This helped raise a cadre of homegrown „jihadis’ to serve the Muslim cause in distant lands and whom the state could also use for its policies in Indian administered Kashmir.

Following the end of the Cold War in 1989 when the Western alliance conveniently walked out of the theatre, Islamabad as if unaware of the radicalism the Afghan jihad had unleashed made no effort to bring it under control. At this juncture, the analysis of General Musharraf’s pre-9/11 security outlook and policies at the domestic and international level requires deliberation.

2.4: Musharraf - Pre 9/11 Phase

General Musharraf came to power on October 12, 1999 overthrowing the popularly elected Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1997-99). He managed to topple the government which had retired him as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) a few hours earlier. Pervez Musharraf announced a seven-point agenda, on October 17, 1999 which included:

Rebuild national confidence and morale; Strengthen the federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony and restore national cohesion; Devolution of power to the grass roots level; Revive the economy and restore investor confidence;

¹²⁷ Rashid, *Taliban: Military Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. p:89.

¹²⁸ Fazal Ur Rahim Marwat, *From Mujahir to Mujahid: The Politics of war through Aid: a case study of the Afghan Refugees in the NWFP*, Parvez Khan Toru (ed.), Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 2005.

Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice;
Depoliticize state institutions; and, Ensure swift and across
the board accountability.¹²⁹

The military take-over was initially greatly welcomed by the civil society leaders and leading politicians like Benazir Bhutto and Imran Khan. At a press conference in London on October 19 Bhutto acknowledged that she had made contact with the army after the coup, seeking safe passage to return to Pakistan. Justifying the coup, she said: “Nawaz Sharif created conditions for the military take over.”¹³⁰

The hopes were that Pakistan under the military ruler’s seven-point reforms will be able to stabilize the economy, control rising sectarianism and put a check on mis-governance. The public disillusioned by the civil government’s corruption and mismanagement welcomed military rule. Musharraf was seen as a transitional authority to a more stable and secular democracy. “He was the messiah they'd been waiting for” says Ayaz Amir, a columnist with the Dawn newspaper, Pakistan's largest English-language daily.

However, on the international front General Musharraf’s military coup on October 12, 1999 added to the country’s diplomatic isolation: additional American sanctions were imposed and Pakistan was suspended from the Commonwealth. In effect, Islamabad had only two important allies left: China and Saudi Arabia.¹³¹ In external

¹²⁹ General Pervez Musharraf address to the nation, 17 October, 1999, *The News*, 18 October, 1999

¹³⁰ The Guardian, 20 October 1999.

¹³¹ Note: Prior to 9/11, Pakistan was subjected to four types of US sanctions: President Bush (Senior), under Section 620-E of Foreign Assistance Act or Pressler Amendment, suspended economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan in October 1990. Following the nuclear tests by Pakistan in 1998, another set of military and economic sanctions was imposed on Pakistan under the Arms Export Control Act. After the military takeover of Pakistan by General Musharraf on October 12, 1999, the U.S. imposed another set of sanctions under the democracy law. In November 2000, the US imposed two-year sanctions on Pakistan’s Ministry of Defense and Pakistan’s Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Organization on receiving missile technology and equipment from China. . They also suspended all loans to Pakistan totaling \$231

affairs the old policy on Kashmir and Afghanistan, always an army domain, continued together with its close working relationship with the Taliban which remained unaffected even by the Taliban's rejection of Pakistan's efforts to save the pre-Islamic Bamiyan Buddhas and refusal to hand over the Lashkhar-i-Jhangvi fugitives operating from Afghan sanctuaries. This was the threat of what came to be known as „Talibanization'¹³² that Islamabad ignored despite its knowledge of the close working relations the Lashkar had developed with Al- Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Lt. General (retd) Asad Durrani believes that Islamabad's influence on Taliban regime in Kabul was limited in reality. He contends that the “Taliban in Afghanistan used our logistics but hardly followed our orders.”¹³³

Yet because of the singular nature of relationship Pakistan had with Kabul, Islamabad faced constant international diplomatic pressure to seek Taliban's compliance with demands for closing terrorist camps and handing over Osama bin Laden to the US authorities. Musharraf sought refuge in his pet argument of “geo strategic compulsions” those days that critics of his pro-Taliban stance at home and abroad did not accept. He argued that “If we had broken with them, that would have created a new enemy on our western border, or a vacuum of power there into which might have stepped the Northern Alliance, comprising anti-Pakistan elements. The Northern Alliance was supported by

million in 1997, and cancelled grant aid of approximately \$55 million. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) credit and the parallel World Bank loan adjustment were also blocked following the U.S. and other shareholders coalition against Islamabad.

¹³² Note: „Talibanization' is used in this study as a metaphor to describe a set of measures or maneuvers that were favored on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border by the Taliban regime in Kabul and religious right groups in North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan respectively. Talibanization is not simply an explanation of events in Afghanistan. It consists of the following perception: Hegemony of a majority Sunni (Deobandi) sect of Muslims as the basis of political unity and control in a multi-sectarian and ethnically diverse societies. A fundamentalist version of Islam as the basis of legitimacy in a nation that is overwhelmingly Muslim. Use of coercion and force is justified to eliminate dissent where Islam and ethnic dominance have failed to do so.

¹³³ General (retd) Asad Durrani, interview with the author, 8 May, 2007, Islamabad.

Russia, India and Iran.”¹³⁴ He was of the view that only through engagement the Taliban could be reformed.

On the domestic front General Musharraf undertook a number of measures to put the house in order. In his very first address to the nation, he asserted: “Islam teaches tolerance not hatred... We must curb elements which are exploiting religion for vested interest and bring bad name to our faith.”¹³⁵ President Musharraf publicly condemned Islamic extremism well before 9/11 and envisaged Pakistan as a moderate Muslim state that would resemble Turkey rather than Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Addressing a gathering of religious leaders on June 5, 2001, President Musharraf warned that, “... our conduct internally and externally had led the world to regard us as terrorists.”¹³⁶

To rein in the rising tide of sectarianism and restore law and order on 14 August 2001, Musharraf banned *Lashkar-i-Jhangvi* (LJ) – Sunni radical outfit and *Sipah-e-Mohammed* – Shia radical group, respectively. Similarly, on June 18, 2001 the ‘Pakistan Madrassa Education Board Ordinance 2001’ was promulgated. According to this Ordinance, over 10,000 religious seminaries – Madaris were to be brought into the public education system through registration, curriculum reform and financial audit. This never materialized. President Musharraf himself admitted that his Madrassa reforms are being implemented slowly:

There are about 10,000 of them (Madrassas) and there are about 1 million poor students getting free boarding and lodging. These madrassas are doing a welfare service to the poor. The negative side is that most of them are teaching

¹³⁴ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*, London: Simon and Schuster UK Ltd, 2006, pp: 202-203.

¹³⁵ “General Pervez Musharraf address to the nation, 17 October, 1999”, *The News*, 18 October, 1999.

¹³⁶ Quoted in Najmuddin A. Shaikh, “Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in the Changed Global Environment”, *Margalla Papers 2004*, Islamabad: National Defense College, 2004, pp:1-12.

religion, so my belief is that we need to carry out reforms to reinforce their strengths and eliminate their weaknesses.¹³⁷

Similarly, General Musharraf backtracked on procedural changes he had made under the Blasphemy Law 295-C observing that “As it was the unanimous demand of the Ulema, Mashaikh and the people, therefore, I have decided to do away with the procedural change in the registration of FIR under the Blasphemy Law.”¹³⁸ The Musharraf government also undertook several measures to put the economy back on track including 5 per cent cut in defense budget as part of his economic recovery plan.¹³⁹ This paved the way for the Club of Paris to sign an agreement to reschedule Pakistan’s external public debt on January 22, 2001.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ President Musharraf quoted in, *Financial Times*, March 6, 2001.

¹³⁸ General Pervez Musharraf, press conference, 16 May 2000, Islamabad.

¹³⁹ Quoted in, Syed Rifaat Hussain, op.cit, pp: 243-244.

¹⁴⁰ Christophe Jaffrelot, op.cit, p: 264.

Conclusion:

The process of evolution of the militant infrastructure in Pakistan has been a multi dimensional phenomenon. In this process successive governments both military and civilian, have contributed to infusing religion into the strategic policy of the state and using **people as strategic** tools to ensure territorial integrity and stability. The focus on human security has remained rhetoric and this neglect has seriously damaged the cohesiveness of society. Too much focus on the traditional aspects of security has resulted in strengthening the military as the **sole driver of** Pakistan's security policy particularly in respect **to** Afghanistan and India. The state being a prime referent of security has thus become a prime source of „insecurity' for the people. The military has become the major crafter of the state's foreign and security policies particularly where the big powers (like United States) and the neighbors are concerned. The regime's survival has often been equated with the national security imperatives.

The security threats have been mostly externalized and the sources of insecurity within the state have remained unaddressed. As a result, the state has failed to take stock of the complex nature of the security threats encompassing both the traditional (that is military) and the non-traditional (that is, economic, social, ethnic, political, environmental, etc) factors.

To quote Barry Buzan:

The simple view that military power is positively correlated with national security is revealed as being of limited application, and several times of inverse correlations is made obvious. Conversely, the equally simplistic view that weapons are the prime elements in the national security problem is also revealed as deficient...National security problem defines itself as much in economic, political, and social terms as in military terms. Domestic, as well as

foreign factors loom large in the matter and the military aspect of security is seen to be merely part of a bigger picture.¹⁴¹

In the pre- 9/11 phase, Pakistan was faced with the unattended consequences of its role in the Afghan Jihad at the domestic level. Former ambassador Maleeha Lodhi observes:

The explosive legacy of the Afghan jihad included militancy and violent extremism, millions of Afghan refugees, and the exponential growth of Madrassas, narcotics, and proliferation of arms. The most dangerous aspect of this legacy was that some 40,000 Islamic radicals were imported from across the Arab world to fight alongside the Afghan mujahedeen. They later became the core of al Qaeda.¹⁴²

The World Trade Center 9/11 **attacks** and events that followed began a new chapter in Pakistan's security policymaking necessitating a re-think on its earlier postures at home and abroad. Pakistan's decision to side with the US-led „War on Terrorism' began a critical phase in its security framework, blurring and meshing of external and internal security dynamics. This leads us to the next part of the study that explores: why a shift occurred in Pakistan's security strategy from being pro-Taliban to pro-US and anti-Taliban; and what are the critical elements and challenges during this transition?

¹⁴¹ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, UK: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1983, p: 253.

¹⁴² Author's interview with Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi, August 10, 2008, Islamabad.

PART TWO: Pakistan as Major US Ally in US led War on Terror (WOT)

Chapter Four: Why Islamabad joined the WOT and what it Meant?

Chapter Five: Military Response towards Terrorism: Home Front?

CHAPTER FIVE

PAKISTAN AS US PARTNER IN THE WAR ON TERROR (WOT) – POST 9/11

PHASE

Introduction

The most controversial of the decisions the Musharraf regime took was his agreement to make Pakistan the “front-line” state in the US-led “War on Terror” in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks. How and why the Musharraf regime agreed to offer “un-stinted” cooperation to the United States; what this decision meant and what was its impact on Pakistan’s domestic and external security are the interlocked issues that this chapter would attempt to explore.

The argument here is: Islamabad’s decision to join the US-led “War on Terror” heralded a critical turning point in its approach towards security and drove the country into initiating a counter-terrorism policy at the national, regional and international levels. Theoretically, this decision reaffirms Barry Buzan’s argument that security is an essential mix of external and internal variables and decisions on one end register their impact on the other end, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Ayoob puts it differently when he says that developing states due to their political, societal, institutional and economic shortcomings are vulnerable to the developed state’s (here, the US) influence, demands and pressure. That is, Islamabad’s decision to follow the US lead is essentially the response of an unequal or weak partner that must make the best of the worst circumstances.

The chapter is divided into three broad parts: the first part deals with the genesis of Islamabad’s decision to join the US-led “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) as a mish-

mash of realism, idealism and opportunism given the changed international politics; the second part of the chapter underscores the impact on Pakistan's security of Musharraf regime's decision to be US ally against Afghanistan; the third part dwells on the nature of support that Islamabad extended to the USA in the so-called 'War on Terror'.

Part one:

5.1: Why Musharraf Regime joined the War on Terror vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda?

The empirical data and the published accounts analyzing General Musharraf's decision to board the US-led international campaign against terrorism that centered on Afghanistan and Al Qaeda follow diametrically opposite viewpoints. On the one end of the spectrum are government exponents that label this decision as a rational, realistic and pragmatic response in view of the changed global scenario. On the other end is opinion that terms this decision as essentially personal and opportunistic contrary to the national interests of the country.

The key point that is stressed in the following analyses is that there is no black and white explanation and the reality lies somewhere in between these two often conflicting and opposite lines of thinking. The Musharraf regime's decision was the product of multiple stresses and strains that Islamabad faced in the aftermath of the 9/11 World Trade Center (WTC) incident. These ranged from the threatening posture of the United States to the possibility of India assuming a lead role in Afghanistan and changing the geo-politics of the region. This line of reasoning fused well with General Musharraf's pre -9/11 reformist agenda based on the realization that Pakistan had been a victim, target, recruiting zone, safe-haven and transit-zone for the terrorists' groupings within

and beyond the national frontiers. The key finding of the research study is that Pakistan's decision began a new chapter in its security framework, blurring and meshing external and internal security dynamics. As a result, the need to have an integrated, sustainable and comprehensive national security policy became more critical. It was essentially a tactical decision based on rational calculation of the country's strategic priorities.

Here the question that may well be asked is with regard to the factors that conditioned General Musharraf's response as events unfolded and the situation in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 developed. To begin with, US deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage told Pakistan's ISI head General Mehmood: "You are either 100 % with us or 100 % against us. There is no grey area."¹ Maleeha Lodhi who was at that time serving as Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States conveyed Washington's message to Islamabad and got an affirmative answer from General Musharraf asking officials to let Washington know that it would get "what it wanted."² Terming the decision to be a key US ally as "dispassionate"³ the former President of Pakistan maintains:

The decision was fairly easy. Technically it's government job to frame counter-terrorism policy...My case was different as I wore multiple hats at that time. That is, being Army Chief, President and Chief Executive, I had influence over bureaucracy both military and civil, political arenas, academic and intellectual community, civil society...all segments that I briefed and consulted on the decision. The decision was in the best interest of the country.⁴

¹ Quoted in Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the storm*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p: 2. General Musharraf claimed in his Memoir, *In the Line of Fire*, Armitage told the director general "not only that we had to decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age" p:201.

² Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi interview with the author, 10 August, 2008, Islamabad.

³ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*, London: Simon & Schuster, 2006, p: 201.

⁴ General Musharraf interview with the author, 6 January, 2010, London.

The key inference here is, Islamabad's U-turn versus Taliban regime in Kabul was not an institutional and consensual based decision, rather it was essentially a 'personal and individual' decision of a military General in command. Ambassador Shamshad Ahmad's following observation echoes the same point of view:

No matter how necessary or justified the policy turnaround was, it only showed the ad hoc and arbitrary nature of the decision-making process in Pakistan on national security and foreign policy issues during the days following 9/11. This was also reminiscent of many earlier policy decisions, including the one of "inventing" and then recognizing and supporting the Taliban regime.⁵

To quote one of the key ex-military aides of Musharraf:

The decision was taken earlier and then corps commanders, National Security Council members, and hand-picked political advisers were consulted...In doing so, General Musharraf missed the complexity of the issues involved...He should have drawn the line or limits of support to the United States.⁶

So, what were the United States demands that General Musharraf readily agreed to? The US gave Pakistan a list of the following 'non-negotiable' demands:

1. Stop Al-Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan, and end all logistical support for Osama bin Laden;
2. Give blanket over-flight and landing rights to U.S. aircraft;
3. Give the US access to Pakistani naval and air bases and to the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan;
4. Turn over all intelligence and immigration information;

⁵ Shamshad Ahmed, "Foreign Policy of Pakistan and Policy Making Process", Moonis Ahmer, edit, *Foreign Policy Making: A Case Study of Pakistan*, Karachi, Department of International Relations, 2009, p: 63.

⁶ Musharraf's ex- senior military officer's interview with the author, February 6, 2010, Rawalpindi.

5. Condemn the September 11 attacks and curb all domestic expressions of support for terrorism;
6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban, and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban;
7. Note that, should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan, and should the Taliban continue to harbor him and his accomplices, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, end support for the Taliban, and assist the U.S. in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama and his network.”⁷

Was Islamabad’s assurance of “unstinted cooperation” to Washington a tactical maneuver or a qualitative shift in its earlier Afghanistan (pro-Taliban) policy? General Pervez Musharraf in a public address to the nation on 19 September, 2001 proffered five reasons for choosing to offer unstinted co-operation to the US in its war against terrorism. The five reasons for choosing this course of action were:

1. Secure Pakistan’s strategic assets,
2. Safeguard the cause of Kashmir,
3. Prevent Pakistan from being declared a terrorist state,
4. Prevent an anti-Pakistani government from coming to power in Kabul,
5. Have Pakistan re-emerge politically as a responsible and dignified Nation.⁸

The decision marked a U-turn in Pakistan’s decades’ long security policy with respect to Afghanistan and set in motion the redefinition of its strategic priorities

⁷ Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 2005, p: 217.

⁸ Quoted in Ahmed Farauqi, *Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan*, UK: Ash gate Publishing Ltd, 2003, pp.xviii-xix.

accompanied by the immense challenges on the home front. Terming the decision as matter of national survival, President Musharraf, in his nation-wide televised address on 19 September, 2001, said —. at this juncture I am worried about Pakistan only...I give top priority to the defense of Pakistan. Defense of any other country comes later.”⁹ This clearly signaled Afghanistan under Taliban as more of a strategic liability than an asset for Pakistan in the post-9/11 strategic milieu. It’s a documented fact that Islamabad prior to 9/11 faced international pressure to seek the Taliban’s compliance with international demands. Specifically, the closure of militants training camps and the handing over of Osama Bin Laden. An eminent security analyst Syed Rifaat Hussain contends, the qualitative shift in Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy was based on several key considerations:

Come out on the right side of history; avoid American retribution; prevent the emergence of an Indo-US axis against Pakistan with dire consequences for country’s survival; clear sense of gains: get sanctions lifted, put Pak-US ties back on track, gain international legitimacy for his military regime and most importantly create political and social space for Pakistan to deal with the ‘blow-back effects’ of the Taliban controlled Afghanistan on Pakistani society.¹⁰

A critical point to be noted here is that though Islamabad abandoned its earlier pro-Taliban posture, it didn’t amount to de-recognizing “India” as a major security threat in its national security perspective. In fact, the Indian threat was quoted as one of the key reasons to justify Islamabad’s pro-US role in the war in Afghanistan. The unofficial reports of Indian offers to the United States, allowing the use of its military bases situated

⁹ “President General Pervez Musharraf Address to the Nation”, 19 September, 2001. *The News*, 20 September, 2001.

¹⁰ Syed Rifaat Hussain, Chairman - Defense & Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-I-Azam University, interview with the author, November 10, 2006, Islamabad.

at Avantipur in India-controlled Kashmir, Adampur in the northwest state of Punjab and Jamnagar in Gujarat bordering Pakistan,”¹¹ critically informed Islamabad’s reading of its geo-strategic environment. That is, no real shift occurred in the ‘strategic mind box’ of the Musharraf regime and Islamabad’s threat perception with regard to Indian role in the region became more expansive. According to General Musharraf’s key security aide:

Indian offer was motivated by a desire to ensure that Pakistan does not gain through an Indian default...Staging ground troops in India could pose a challenge, however, because India and Afghanistan do not share a border. Any troops based in India likely would have to be transported by air over Pakistan.¹²

Shireen Mazari over heading the Islamabad Institute of Strategic Studies also articulated this line of reasoning observing:

India’s increasing presence in Afghanistan directly aggravates Pakistan’s security concerns – especially in terms of low intensity conflict (LIC) in the provinces of Baluchistan and the NWFP. India has established two air bases in Tajikistan and for Pakistan there is now the possibility of a two-front multiple level threat from India.¹³

Thus, General Musharraf’s pro-US tilt in Afghanistan can be termed as a tactical move to end Pakistan’s pre-9/11 problems relating to a faltering economy, diplomatic isolation and reining in the tide of political violence in the country, in addition to denying India strategic leverage and dominant role in the US led military campaign in Afghanistan. The decision was sold to public as a “strategic necessity” driven by the need to reclaim Pakistan as a moderate Muslim state and safeguard its national integrity. This

¹¹ “India Offers Three Air Basis for US Aircraft”, *People’s Daily*, September 19, 2001.

¹² Director General ISPR, General Shaukat Sultan, interview with the author, 6 September 2006, Rawalpindi.

¹³ Dr Shireen Mazari, former Director General of Islamabad Institute of Strategic Studies, interview with the author, 7 August 2006, Islamabad.

narrative strengthened Musharraf's military rule and fitted well with his declarations of reforms prior to 9/11.

General Musharraf had publicly stated economic revival of the country as one of the top priorities of his regime way back in 2000. He asserted:

The economy is the key priority. Only with a viable economy will the security of Pakistan be guaranteed. Economic revival is the key to everything. Out of a nation of 150 million people, only 1 percent pays income tax. Our debt burden is \$38 billion, and we have got to prioritize reducing it. My program, simply put, is to concentrate on reducing our fiscal deficit, improving our trade balance, and broadening our tax base. We also have to privatize our assets, which are being mismanaged, and revive our moribund industries.¹⁴

Following Pakistan's decision to join the international coalition against terrorism, Pakistan was successful in altering its earlier most sanctioned status and internationally isolated, economically fragile image. Pak-US relations once again registered a high point. On the sanctions front, U.S. President Bush in two separate orders on 22 September, 2001, and on 27 October, 2001 respectively, removed nuclear test related economic sanctions, democracy related sanctions on Pakistan and debt rescheduling through 2003. This removal of sanctions allowed Islamabad to receive \$600 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) from the US. In 2002, Pakistan received an estimated \$624.5 million in development assistance and ESF.¹⁵

¹⁴ General Pervez Musharraf interview quoted in Mary Ann Weaver, *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002, p: 23.

¹⁵ In 2000, Pakistan's fiscal deficit was 5.3 percent of GDP, against a desired level of 4.0 percent. The total debt including external and internal debt stood at 92 p% of GDP. Source: Federal Ministry of Finance, Islamabad.

The preceding discussion leads to the second part of the chapter which examines how professed goals of Islamabad (post- 9/11 U-turn on Afghanistan) turned into internal and external security challenges.

Part Two: Goals Versus Challenges: Mishmash of Pakistan's Internal and External Security Dimensions.

General Musharraf decision to join the US camp set in motion a challenging phase of rethinking and recasting the national strategy on nuclear safety and security, Kashmir, and Afghanistan. Each of the stated policy objectives entailed a complex process of redefinition that had implications at the national, bi-lateral, regional and international levels.

5.2: Secure Pakistan's strategic assets

General Musharraf rationalized his decision as critical to the security of national strategic assets. He argued that had Pakistan not joined US it would have amounted to providing ~~an~~ opportunity (to Americans) of an invasion to destroy such weapons. And India, needless to say, would have loved to assist the United States to the hilt.”¹⁶ President Musharraf reportedly ordered Pakistan's nuclear arsenal be redeployed to ~~at~~ least six secret new locations.”¹⁷ This action came at a time of uncertainty about the future of the region, including the direction of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Islamabad's leadership was not certain that the United States would not target Pakistan's nuclear assets if the government did not assist the United States against the Taliban.¹⁸

¹⁶ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*, op.cit, p: 202.

¹⁷ Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, ~~“Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons – Musharraf Says Arsenal is Now Secure”~~, *The Washington Post*, November 11, 2001.

¹⁸ Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, *Pakistan Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Security Issues*, Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, 23 February , 2010.pp :10-15.

Was this perception of threat to the national strategic assets real or merely a justification for the decision that was taken at a critical juncture? This question has been debated at length. Most of the security analysts argue that chances of India taking an advantage of Pakistan's vulnerabilities can never be dismissed. Indian eagerness to join the 'War on Terror' was an alarming condition that Pakistan could not have overlooked. At the same time, Musharraf's rationale of 'threat to national strategic assets' led to more uncertainties being cast (primarily by the USA) at its nuclear safety and security infrastructure. An eminent security expert Naeem Salik terms Musharraf's citing of 'threat to nuclear assets' a big misadventure, that exposed its nuclear establishment to undue suspicion and criticism of the international community. He asserts:

This was not a sensible argument to make since it created a perception of vulnerability of Pakistan's nuclear assets which has refused to go away and has allowed a persistent assault by the US media on the issue of vulnerability of Pakistani nukes to a takeover by Taliban/Al-Qaida types. The argument used by Musharraf was probably aimed at exploiting the sensitivity of Pakistani people towards their nuclear assets to enlist their support for the policy to side with the US in GWOT and to ditch the Taliban. Apparently it was hoped that the Pakistani public would be willing to sacrifice anything in order to ensure the security of their crown jewels. In fact, this argument reflected his lack of wisdom and self confidence worthy of a nuclear weapons power. It seems that the deterrence value of nuclear weapons was not taken into account.¹⁹

Islamabad's apprehensions about India and Israel concerning the security of its nuclear assets, however, are not unfounded. A former high ranking official of the Strategic Plans Division (Islamabad), Brig (retd) Feroz Hassan Khan notes:

In 1986, Pakistani intelligence learned that India had conceived plans to strike at Pakistan's nuclear enrichment

¹⁹ Brig (retd) Naeem Salik, interview with the author, January 9, 2008, Islamabad

facility at Kahuta in an apparent attempt to emulate Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear plant at Osirak...Two years later, India planned a major operation code-named Brass-tacks...Once again, India contemplated executing plans to strike at Pakistan's nuclear installation. In 1990, the Kashmir crisis once again brought Pakistan and India close to war. By this time, the prospects of nuclear deployment were perceived to be real, prompting a mission by U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates to the region.²⁰

At this juncture, one must discuss the nature of concerns expressed by the western states, primarily the United States, regarding the safety and security of Pakistan's strategic assets. The fact is, for decades Pakistan's quest for acquisition of nuclear capability to match the threat from India was always a thorn in U.S.-Pakistan relations.²¹ The Western press particularly, *Guardian*²², *Financial Times*²³, *Washington Post*²⁴ and *Associated Press*²⁵ pointed out Al-Qaeda's intentions to procure weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through Pakistan as a matter of time. This line of thinking relied heavily on evidence produced by US forces in the aftermath of military intervention in Afghanistan that confirmed that, Al-Qaeda had been investigating the possibilities of nuclear, radiological and biological attacks in its training camps and research facilities,

²⁰ Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan, "Pakistan's Nuclear Future", Michael R. Chambers, edit., *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, November 2002, pp: 162.

²¹ Brig (retd) Feroz Hassan Khan, "The United States, Pakistan and the War on Terrorism: Enduring Allies or Uncertain Partners?" Institute of Regional Studies, edit., *Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Countermeasures*, Islamabad: IRS, 2006, pp: 357 – 382.

²² Julian Borger, "Al-Qaeda videos show poison gas tests", *The Guardian*, 20 August 2002, p: 11.

²³ Haig Simonian and Mark Huband, "Risk of al-Qaeda strike has reached new dimension", *Financial Times*, 6 November 2002, p: 8.

²⁴ Barton Gellman, "Al-Qaeda near Biological, Chemical Arms Production", *Washington Post*, 23 March 2003, p:2. Available at:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060900918.html>.

²⁵ Edith M Lederer, "UN Report Warns of Al-Qaeda WMD Risk", *Associated Press*, 15 November 2003. Also see: Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, "Al-Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?" U.S.A: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2010, pp: 5-11. Available at: <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf>.

and might have had links to individuals who had been involved in the Pakistani nuclear-weapon programme.”²⁶ As a consequence, the United States reportedly offered nuclear security assistance to Pakistan soon after September 11, 2001.

Zulfiqar Khan senior Analyst, at Pakistan Ministry of Defense states that:

The international community's assistance to Pakistan in bolstering security around its nuclear facilities would go a long way towards strengthening its safety and security apparatus and non-proliferation mechanisms. Since 2001, the United States and Pakistan reportedly have been cooperating with each other on nuclear (and biological) safety and security, including the provision of US support in the form of equipment and training.²⁷

However, another critical happening on the nuclear security front badly tarnished the image of Pakistan. In December 2004, US intelligence officials and the IAEA said:

Iranian officials disclosed that Pakistani's were among middlemen who the Iranian said had aided Iran's nuclear program. US intelligence officials also said they believed that Pakistan had traded nuclear technology to North Korea in exchange for missile technology. The US further said that Pakistan was the source for designs of centrifuges used by Libya's in its recently disclosed nuclear program.²⁸

Islamabad's official investigations identified the corruption of individuals (Qadeer Khan – Pakistan's nuclear hero – publicly accepted these charges) and venality as the motivation of such action.²⁹ The Qadeer saga finally ended when the “national hero” was

²⁶ John Simpson and Jez Littlewood, “A Framework for Assessing UK Responses to CBRN Terrorism”, *British International Studies Association 28th Annual Conference*, 17 December 2003, The University of Birmingham, UK, p: 3.

²⁷ Zulfiqar Khan, “Pakistan's Non-Proliferation Policy”, *The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Islamization of Pakistan, 1979-2009*, p: 53.

²⁸ Quoted in *China Daily*, 19 January, 2004. K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options”, A Report for Congress (CRS) Order Code RL32745. May 24, 2005.

²⁹ *The News, The Nation, Dawn*, 19 January, 2004.

pardoned by President Musharraf, acting in the best interest of Pakistan. Granting pardon to Abdul Qadeer Khan for his proliferation activities, President Musharraf categorically stated:

There will be no roll-back of Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs...The international community should take note of the underworld and Pakistan cannot be singled out for being involved in the issue. This underworld has a network in European and Asian countries and a number of countries have relied on developing their programs on this underworld... As President of Pakistan I have decided to pardon Dr A. Q. Khan, who is our hero but has committed mistakes that I regret...It is incumbent on all Pakistanis to keep Pakistan foremost and ahead of all considerations when it comes to critical national interests.³⁰

Though Musharraf government tried hard to dub A.Q. Khan's proliferation acts as 'personal acts of corruption', Pakistan's credentials as responsible nuclear state became questionable. Commenting on what all this means for Pakistan's security challenges, an analyst observes:

For the future, the countries like Pakistan will be dragged into the Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD issue. For Pakistan, the issue is critical because this pretext could be a means of trying to target Pakistan's nuclear programme that sits uneasily with the US. And since WMD remains one of the rationalizations for the US pre-emptive doctrine, the present framing of the WMD issue impacts and aggravates Pakistan's security concerns.³¹

Here one must take stock of the growth of Pakistan's national regulatory means in the nuclear field. The National Command Authority (NCA) was created in 2000 with the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) as its secretariat.³² Prior to this, a de facto nuclear command and control arrangement existed as part of the national military command

³⁰ President Musharraf quoted in, *Pakistan Times*, February 6, 2004.

³¹ Shireen M. Mazari, "Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan", *Margalla Papers*, 2004, op.cit, p.23.

³² "Pakistan Announces Nuclear Command and Control Mechanism", *Associated Press of Pakistan*, 3 February 2000.

structure, which had provided and continues to provide guidance over conventional military operations. Tasked with the operational and development aspects of the nuclear capability, SPD also deals with the internal regulations of exports over and above clearance certification from the commerce Ministry. The organizational diagram of the NCA appears in the following graphic illustration:



Source: Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Rawalpindi.

According to the present and former officials of the nuclear security establishment, a stringent code of conduct is ensured to ward off any threat from non-state radical elements within and around Pakistan as well as possible convergence between insiders and these terrorist elements.”³³ The history of Pakistan’s nuclear safety goes back to early 1950s. Pakistan has consistently striven to fulfill its obligations under the diverse elements of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, including specifically with respect to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540,

³³ Brig (retd) Naeem Salik, interview with the author, 9 January, 2008, Islamabad.

Note: For the detailed analysis of evolution of Pakistan’s safety and security regime see, Naeem Salik, *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan’s Perspective*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009.

issued on 28 April , 2004. Consonant with UNSCR Resolution 1540, Pakistan instituted a host of non-proliferation legislation/measures.³⁴

The preceding discussion underscores Barry Buzan's conception of security as 'relational phenomenon'.³⁵ That is, the internal and external dimensions of national security in Pakistan are fuzzy. Thus, action on one front, either internal or external, often leads to reaction on other fronts. Musharraf's citing of 'threat to strategic assets' was aimed at creating and instituting a firewall between Pakistan's role in the 'War on Terror' and its nuclear policy. The events that followed (as discussed earlier) showed the non-existence of such firewall in reality. The decision to join the 'War on Terror' exposed the need to enhance and institute more stringent 'safety and security measures' related to the nuclear assets both at the internal and external levels. To quote M Ayoob:

Security in the Third World countries (that includes Pakistan as well) is state centered in character – in terms of both its territory and institutions – and to the security of those who profess to represent the state territorially and institutionally. In other words, security–insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities –both internal and external–that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes.³⁶

By declaring publicly that Pakistan's nuclear weapons and the Kashmir remain top priorities in the national security policy (in the post 9/11 phase), Musharraf aimed at defusing anti-regime currents on the home front and preventing the U.S. and others (such

³⁴ Zulfiqar Khan, "Strengthened Export Controls: Pakistan's Export Control Experience, Current and Future Challenges and Options Safeguards against Illicit Transfers: Pakistan's Institutional Response" in *International Conference Report*, London: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute: 2006. p: 2. Available at: <http://www.sassi.org/pdfs/Brussels%20conference%20on%20illicit%20transfers%20-%20November%202006.pdf>

³⁵ Barry Buzan, op.cit, pp: 36-44.

³⁶ Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, p: 9.

as India) from meddling into these aspects of Pakistan's security policy. Was that achieved? The result was mixed: Aims transformed into challenges given the state vulnerabilities and changed the regional and international context.

5.2.1: To Safeguard the cause of Kashmir

Support to the Kashmir cause remains a key national security imperative dating back to Pakistan's creation on 14 August 1947. All governments whether civilian, military or mix have used the "Kashmir issue"³⁷ to enhance national unity, patriotism, and support for the government at the national and international levels. General Musharraf aimed at insulating Pakistan's strategic support to the "Kashmir cause" from its key role in the US-led campaign in Afghanistan. He stressed the need to differentiate the "right of self-determination"³⁸ of the Kashmiris from terrorism. Musharraf observed: "the just struggles of a people for self-determination and liberation from colonial or foreign occupation" cannot be outlawed in the name of terrorism".³⁹ He professed: "... the Kashmiri cause is in our blood. And Pakistan will continue to support the cause morally, diplomatically, and politically."⁴⁰ Pakistan also argued that India is perpetrating

³⁷ For a detailed study of the genesis and evolution of the Kashmir dispute, see Robert G Wirsing, *India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute*, New York: St Martin Press, 1994; Josef Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954; Mushtaqur Rahman, *Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri Problems*, London: Lynne Reiner, 1996; Summit Ganguly, *The Crises in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace*, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Sumantra Bose, *The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determinations and Just Peace*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997.

³⁸ Note: The principle of self-determination is a basic principle of customary international law and is enshrined as one of the principles of the United Nations, stipulated in the Article 1: 2 of its Charter. Self-determination is seen within the context of people fighting against colonialism, foreign occupation and to enforce international commitments made to them by the United Nations. The United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution on April 21, 1948 calling for Plebiscite to resolve Kashmir dispute. This resolution stated: "... Both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite".

³⁹ Masood Haider & Anwer Iqbal, "Kashmir a threat to peace, warns Musharraf: world help sought for Indo-Pak talks", *Dawn*, 13 September 2002.

⁴⁰ Quoted in, Christophe Jaffrelot, edit., *A History of Pakistan And Its Origin*, London: Anthem Press,

‘state terrorism’ in Indian held Kashmir (IHK) in the name of counter-insurgency operations.

How far Pakistan in the post 9/11 phase succeeded in achieving the stated objectives on the Kashmir front? Or how 9/11 affected the Kashmir conflict and Pakistan’s policy on this front? General Musharraf strived to disconnect Pakistan’s support for the Kashmir cause from the changed posture on Afghanistan. Terming support for Kashmiris as “Jihad-e-Hurriyat”⁴¹ and labeling Al-Qaeda related militants as “terrorists”, created contradiction and confusion in the policymaking circles as well as public at large. Musharraf in an interview with *The Washington Post* in 2002 made a distinction between various elements of Pakistan’s militant problem and stressed that the militants fighting in Kashmir were freedom fighters. Musharraf said:

There are three elements of terrorism that the world is concerned about, Number one, the Al-Qaeda factor. Number two is what (the Indians) are calling cross-border terrorism and we are calling the freedom struggle in Kashmir. Number three is the sectarian (Sunni vs. Shia) extremism and sectarian terrorism in Pakistan...The third one is more our concern, and unfortunately, the world is not bothered about that. We are very much bothered about that because that is destabilizing us internally.⁴²

This amounted to the regime’s denial of the complex web of relationships that had been nurtured in the past decade or so between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani sectarian and militant elements who were trained in the military camps in Afghanistan for jihad in Kashmir, and its refusal to accept that the indigenous militant infrastructure

2002. p: 273.

⁴¹ Professor Javed Ahmed Gamdhi, pre-eminent scholar on Islam recalls General Musharraf using this terminology numerous times. Professor Gamdhi mentioned this in the conversation with the author, 20 August 2009, Lahore.

⁴² General Musharraf’s interview, *The Washington Post*, 28 March, 2002.

nurtured in the name of ‘Kashmir Jihad’ had negative implications for internal cohesion and relations with the neighbors to a great extent.

To quote an eminent expert on South Asia, Samina Ahmed:

Musharraf’s so-called strategic re-orientation is superficial in nature. That is, change in rhetoric only, very little operational change on ground. This continues to date. There are no clear divisions between Al-Qaeda, Sectarian and Jihadi groupings. Unless state acts on sectarian, jihadi groups simultaneously the chain of violence and terrorism within and outside Pakistan cannot be broken.⁴³

Shaheen Akhtar another seasoned researcher at the Institute of Regional Studies (Islamabad) observes:

The War on Terror has certainly put pressure on the armed struggle in Kashmir which was already facing pressures from different corners. India questioned Pakistan’s credentials in becoming partner in US counter-terrorism strategy while being a “source”, “hub” or “epicenter” of terrorism and offered unconditionally to the US, all material and operational support for its military campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan. India further hardened its position on Kashmir.⁴⁴

As events proved, “firewall instituted between the Kashmir and post 9/11 Afghanistan policy became diffused and permeable overtime.”⁴⁵ Following the 1 October, 2001 attack on the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly in Srinagar⁴⁶, and the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, Indo-Pak relations reached very

⁴³ Samina Ahmed, (International Crises Group – ICG) interview with the author, 27 April 2007, Islamabad.

⁴⁴ Shaheen Akhtar, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Regional Studies, interview with the author, 12 May 2008, Islamabad.

⁴⁵ President General (retd) Musharraf interview with the Author, 6 January 2010, London.

⁴⁶ Note: The attack was reportedly carried out by the militants belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammed (Pakistan based Militant outfit) using a car bomb and three suicide bombers. 38 people and three fidayeen were killed in this attack. For more details see: “Militants attack Kashmir assembly”, *BBC*, 2001-10-01 ; “Bombing at Kashmir assembly kills at least 29”, *CNN*, 2001-10-01; “World Briefing | Asia: India: Kashmir Mourns 38 Attack Victims”, *The New York Times*, 2001-10-01.

low ebb. The 2001 Indian Parliament attack was a high-profile attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed (both militant/Jihadi organizations based in Pakistan) against the building housing the Parliament of India in New Delhi. The attack led to the death of a dozen people (five terrorists, six police and one civilian) and to increased tensions between India and Pakistan.⁴⁷ This resulted in the year-long military standoff between the two sides, with the break out of full-scale hostilities becoming a very real possibility. The Indian government held Islamabad responsible for ‘cross border terrorism’ in Indian held Kashmir despite Pakistan’s strong and swift condemnation of such incidents. All this resulted in Washington playing a key role in diffusing the tensions between India and Pakistan with the aim of avoiding any conflict, since such a conflict could result in forcing Pakistan to withdraw its troops from the Afghan border and thus affecting the military campaign in Afghanistan adversely. The US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, visited India and Pakistan in June 2002 as part of US peace diplomacy between the two sides. The visit of US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to Islamabad and Delhi followed this visit. Reflecting on the US crises management role in the Indo-Pak military standoff, US Senator Richard Lugar observed that ‘war was averted, barely thanks to intense, discreet diplomacy by the United States.’⁴⁸

Diplomatic, air and road links, and economic relations remained suspended throughout this phase of strained Indo-Pak relations. President Musharraf, responding to India’s rising war threats and Washington’s pressure, announced on 12 January 2002, tough measures against extremists within Pakistan. He said:

⁴⁷ For more details see: *The News, Dawn, The Hindu, New York Times*, 14 December 2001.

⁴⁸ Quoted in, Rizwan Zeb, ‘US Interests in South Asia in Post 9/11 Era: Effects on Pakistan’, *Margalla Papers 2004*, Islamabad: National Defense College, 2004, pp: 73-89.

Sectarian terrorism has been going on for years...The day of reckoning has come. Do we want Pakistan to be a theocratic state? Do we believe that religious education alone is enough for governance or do we want Pakistan to emerge as a progressive and dynamic welfare state...Today Pakistan is not facing any threat from outside But the real threats are posed from within...I would request that we should stop interfering with the affairs of others.⁴⁹

The speech reflected understanding of the intricate relationship between terrorism as an internal threat to Pakistan's security with the external concerns, primarily managing relations with India, Afghanistan, and USA. This fact explains the measures Musharraf announced on 12 January 2002: all Madrassas had to register with the authorities by 23 March, just as foreign students were obliged to; speedy trial courts to punish those suspected of terrorist acts; above all, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Tehrik-i- Jafria Pakistan and Tanzim Nifaz-i- Shari'ah-i- Mohammadi were banned. Following this announcement, militant members of these movements were immediately targeted. Pakistan's Interior Ministry maintained that 1,900 activists were arrested and 600 organizational headquarters were closed down in four days.⁵⁰ However, most of them were freed thereafter. Of these six banned extremist Islamic groups, two, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and Jaish-e- Mohammed, were also designated as terrorist groups by the US State Department in January 2003.⁵¹

⁴⁹ –President Musharraf's Speech", quoted in, Christophe Jaffrelot, op.cit, p: 273.

⁵⁰ Ministry of Interior, Islamabad.

⁵¹ Note: In the late 1990s the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen was designated as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and has remained on the US blacklist ever since. Following the attacks on the Indian Parliament and the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in 2001, the US banned the Lashkar-e-Tayyba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was named as FTO by the US State department in January 2003. This group is believed to be responsible for the January 2002 abduction and murder of the *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Plus Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was also held responsible for the March 2002 Karachi bus bombing that killed 15 people, including 11 French technicians. The LJ is also reported to have links with the Al-Qaeda.

Reportedly, leaders of these organizations were not only released but appeared in public processions calling for jihad. One of the foremost jihadi leaders, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, released in November 2002 on the order of the Lahore High Court, embarked on a countrywide tour to motivate people for jihad in various cities of Pakistan. On one occasion he claimed to have recruited 7000 volunteers for jihad during a six-month period in 2003.⁵² Like Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, Masood Azhar, leader of banned Jaish-e-Mohammad was also released in 2002, on the basis of lack of sufficient evidence by the Lahore High Court. Consequently, he resumed his jihad campaign under the banner of Tehrik-e-Khudam-ul-Islam a new name for Jaish-e-Mohammad.⁵³ Similarly, Fazlur-Rehman Khalil (the leader of Harkat-ul-Mujahedin) and Qari Saifullah Akhtar (the leader of Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami), were released in 2004 by the Pakistan authorities.⁵⁴ Alongside these measures, the National Kashmir Committee was set up by Islamabad under the presidency of the moderate Mohammed Abdul Qayyum Khan, former President of Azad Kashmir. The objective of this Kashmir committee was to continue the Kashmir movement by ‘new means’. All this illustrates the significance of Kashmir as the basic security issue and challenge that affects security both within and outside the country.

⁵² Mir, A., ‘Foreword’, in Rana, M. A., *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*, Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004, p:58.

⁵³ LHC released Masood Azhar, *The News* (Karachi), 15 December 2002.

⁵⁴ HUM leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil was taken into custody on the charges of recruiting, training and sending militants to Afghanistan (2003-2004). Qari Saifullah Akhtar (the leader of Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami) was charged for his involvement in number of terrorism related incidents inside Pakistan. According to Hassan, S. S., ‘Under wraps’, *Herald* (Karachi), July 2005: “Qari Saifullah Akhtar was allegedly linked with the attempted coup by some Islamist officers in 1995 against the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. While the army officers involved in the coup attempt were court-martialed, Akhtar was freed. He was arrested in a Gulf state after the government began pursuing Islamist militants after Sep. 2001”.

Musharraf government's policy remained a mix of deliberate obfuscation and restraint. General Musharraf also proposed a number of "out of box" solutions to India for the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir conflict. Signifying a remarkable shift from Islamabad's stated stand on Kashmir, President Pervez Musharraf publicly said on 17 December 2003 that even though "we are for United Nations Security resolutions...now we have left that aside."⁵⁵ Similarly, on 6 January 2004, following the conclusion of the SAARC summit, India-Pakistan Joint Statement said: "the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir."⁵⁶

On 24 October 2004, General Musharraf suggested a three-phased formula along the ethnic and geographic lines. In December 2005, he suggested a four point formula that involved soft borders, demilitarization, self-governance and joint supervision mechanism for Kashmir. President Musharraf suggested the determination of seven zones of the disputed territory (Kashmir) based on linguistic, ethnic, religious, geographic, and political basis, followed by their demilitarization. The detailed map of General Musharraf's "Seven Region Peace Proposal" is at Appendix One (of the present study). President Gen. Pervez Musharraf identified the following seven regions for this purpose. Two regions - Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas - are under the control of Pakistan whereas five regions are under Indian control. The first part comprises Jammu, Sambha and Katwa where Hindus are in majority. The second part also comprises Jammu but the areas include Dodha, Phirkuch and Rajawri where Muslim population is in majority which includes Gujars, Sidhans and Rajas who are also associated with Azad Kashmir.

⁵⁵ President Pervez Musharraf's statement, *Dawn*, 14 December, 2003.

⁵⁶ "Pakistan, India Joint statement", *Dawn*, 7 January 2004.

The third part is the area of Kashmir Valley which also has Muslim majority. The fourth part is Kargil which has Shia and Balti population in majority and the fifth area is Ladakh and adjoining areas where Buddhists live.⁵⁷

Syed Rifaat Hussain terms the above mentioned gestures of General Musharraf as an attempt ~~to~~ create much-needed political space for New Delhi to substantively engage itself with Islamabad for finding a workable solution to the festering Kashmir dispute.”⁵⁸

However, President Musharraf’s initiatives were dismissed by India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh addressing the Indian Parliament said during his meeting with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf in New York in September, 2004 they had agreed that "possible options for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the J and K issue should be explored in a sincere spirit and a purposeful manner.”⁵⁹

Likewise on the home front, General Musharraf’s bold rhetoric on Kashmir evoked mixed reaction. The religious right political parties led by Jamaat-i-Islami termed his initiatives as a ~~one~~ “one man show” and ~~roll-back~~ “roll-back” of Pakistan’s principled stance on Kashmir. Yehya Mujahid, spokesman of the Jamaat-e-Dawa Pakistan, formerly known as the Lashkar-i-Taiba, remarked:

Musharraf bowed down to the US-Indian nexus, but the jihadis will continue their jihad...We will remain committed to the Kashmir cause. The government has slipped from its long-standing position on Kashmir. Musharraf has taken a U-turn on the Kashmir policy of the state.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Syed Rifaat Hussain, ~~Proposals~~ “Proposals for Resolving the Kashmir Dispute”, *PILDAT: Briefing Paper No: 19*, Islamabad: PILDAT, 2005.

⁵⁸ Syed Rifaat Hussain, Chairmen of Defense and Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-i-Azam University, interview with the author, 16 May 2008, Islamabad.

⁵⁹ Quoted in, Syed Rifaat Hussain, *op.cit*, p: 34.

⁶⁰ Aijazz Ahmed, ~~Musharraf~~ “Musharraf braced for jihadi backlash”, *Asia Times Online*, August 20, 2002.

Similarly, a former activist of the LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) termed Musharraf's policy of restraint in Kashmir as a ~~temporary~~ measure in the changed scenario... Jihadis are strategic assets of the state having an essential role to play in the past, present, and future.⁶¹

It is worth mentioning here that back-channel diplomacy or Track-II linkages were used excessively in Musharraf's pragmatic approach on Kashmir conflict. Defending this line of action, Lt General (retd) Rashid Qureshi, former spokesperson of ISPR, maintains: ~~Musharraf~~ "Musharraf wanted Pakistan to be meeting point of Western and Islamic world... Musharraf came to the conclusion that Kashmir conflict cannot be solved by force. Hence, backdoor diplomacy was promoted".⁶² Pakistan's foreign minister, Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri, claimed in April 2007 that both countries were extremely close to reaching a settlement to the Kashmir dispute. Reportedly, New Delhi and Islamabad had reached a broad agreement on five elements of this settlement. The agreed points stipulated:

No change in the territorial layout of Kashmir currently divided into Pakistani and Indian areas; the creation of a softer border' across LoC; greater autonomy and self-governance within both Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of the state; a cross-Line of Control LoC consultative mechanism; and the demilitarization of Kashmir at a pace determined by the decline in cross border terrorism.⁶³

Here, one can argue that Islamabad's changed rhetoric on Kashmir front reflected an understanding of the limitations imposed by the changing geo-politics of the region following 9/11 WTC attacks. That is, Pakistan's weak economic indicators, the need to

⁶¹ Author's conversation with the senior member of the LeT, December 2009, Islamabad.

⁶² Lt General (retd) Rashid Qureshi interview with the author, 10 October 2009, Islamabad.

⁶³ Quoted in, Dr Syed Rifaat Hussain, ~~Pakistan's~~ "Pakistan's Changing Outlook on Kashmir", *South Asian Survey*, 2007. p:195.

behave as a responsible nuclear state, US pressure to abandon its forward policy in Indian held Kashmir and minimize the ‘blowback’ effects of Kashmir Jihad on the home front – all culminated in the tactical reversal of the long held Kashmir policy. However, all this did not amount to abandoning the ‘strategic tools (militant elements)’ of Kashmir Jihad on ground, and in fact the purposefully created ambiguity as well that the changed rules of the game dictated. This thinking also resonates with the views of the strategic players:

Duality was essential and productive‘ in the post 9/11 phase. The double game was General Musharraf strength: The Kashmir cause is an article of our faith. We are on the right path. It (Kashmir) was denied to us. Our policy on Kashmir brought down Indian forces morale.⁶⁴

Another keen observer of South Asian security issues, Lt General (retd) Talat

Masood says:

Delhi after 9/11 has exploited the transformed global situation to project the Kashmir problem essentially as terrorist related...This policy may have found resonance in Western capitals and was an expedient measure to keep pressure on Islamabad to stop supporting the Kashmir cause, but has not worked. This is because it fails to address the root cause for the deep alienation of the people, especially those living in the Valley and in Muslim majority districts of Jammu.⁶⁵

A critical inference from the preceding discussion is that General Musharraf’s professed changed outlook on Kashmir did not amount to change of ‘military or establishment mindset’ vis-à-vis India. The organic links between the jihad in Kashmir against India and the jihad of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban against the United States and the

⁶⁴ Author’s off-record conversation with the Ex-military General of the Musharraf era, 6 January 2010, Islamabad.

⁶⁵ General (retd) Talat Masood, interview with the author, 10 March 2007, Islamabad. Also see: Lt General Talat Masood, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy”, *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Volume 4, No. 4 (2006) p: 45-49.

West were persistently denied.⁶⁶ Most of the state officials continued to believe that banned Jihadi groups (active in Indian held Kashmir) like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) have not been involved in terrorism inside Pakistan but instead has been driving people and raising funds for ‘jihad’ in Kashmir. The group has been banned only ~~because~~ because of pressure from the US, which in turn is influenced by India’s allegations that it is involved in terrorist attacks inside India and Indian-administered Kashmir.”⁶⁷ Najam Sethi, a leading journalist based in Lahore, calls Musharraf’s mentioning of ‘safeguarding the Kashmir cause’ in his 19 September, 2001 televised address to the nation, as purely a tactical maneuver. That is:

Musharraf defense of the liberation struggle in Kashmir was aimed not so much at warning India as it was at ensuring that the Kashmiris would not be demoralized by Pakistan’s impending policy shift. And his demand for an implicit quid pro quo from India was aimed at the international community that has underpinned his policy retreat: de-escalation of Indian troops along the Pakistan border; reduction in India-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir; and initiation of a dialogue with a view to finding a just solution to Kashmir.⁶⁸

This leads us to the analysis of another stated aim of General Musharraf’s switch of support from Taliban regime to the US-led international forces in the Afghanistan theatre.

⁶⁶ Author’s conversations with the ex and present officials of the institutions concerned with the Pakistan’s Kashmir policy.

⁶⁷ Mansoor Khan, ‘Ban Undone’, *Herald*, December 2009.

⁶⁸ Najam Sethi, *The Friday Times*, Lahore, Pakistan, May 31-June 6, 2002.

5.2.2 : A Peaceful and stable Afghanistan and deal with home-grown religious militancy

For Pakistan 9/11 has been a watershed, not only because it enabled Islamabad to be readmitted into the international community, but it also forced Pakistan to rethink its earlier Afghanistan and Kashmir policies respectively. To quote Senator Mushahid Hussain:

Pakistan's policymakers realized that the 'Jihad Triangle' that had emerged since 1980s, with Pakistani volunteers training in Afghanistan to fight in other conflicts like Kashmir, Chechnya, Xinjiang, Uzbekistan or Tajikistan, was no longer sustainable.⁶⁹

President Musharraf, as mentioned earlier, had said in a televised address that —. . . at this juncture I am worried about Pakistan only... I give top priority to the defense of Pakistan. Defense of any other country comes later.”⁷⁰ Apparently, this meant that Afghanistan under Taliban rule was more of a strategic liability than an asset for Pakistan in the post-9/11 strategic milieu. In practice, the long-held tri-lateral strands of the army's concept of national security based on —resisting Indian hegemony in the region and promoting the Kashmir cause; protecting and developing the nuclear program; and promoting a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan continued.”⁷¹

To achieve a friendly and stable Afghanistan, Islamabad initially tried to convince the US not to let the Northern Alliance⁷² emerge as a final victor in Kabul following the

⁶⁹ Mushahid Hussain, *Gulf News*, January 7, 2004 .Available at: <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/general/mushahid-hussain-apt-finale-to-a-year-of-foreign-policy-turns-1.310294>. Also See, Joshua White, *Pakistan's Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan's North-West Frontier*, Center on Faith & International Affairs (CFIA), 2008. pp:23-46.

⁷⁰ —President General Pervez Musharraf Address to the Nation”, September 19, 2001.

⁷¹ Ahmed Rashid interview with the author, December 22, 2009, Lahore.

⁷² Northern Alliance represented a wide mix of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and opposed Taliban version of Islamic order in Afghanistan. While, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates supported Taliban,

fall of Taliban regime in November 2001. General Musharraf argued that the *Northern Alliance* composing of Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks did not represent the Pushtun majority in Afghanistan. And given its history of anti-Pakistan posture backed by India, Iran and Russia throughout the 1980s and 1990s, its coming to power meant another ‘non-friendly’ government in Kabul. As events unfolded, General Musharraf’s concerns were not accommodated and Islamabad was pushed to embrace the US-backed interim government led by President Karzai in Kabul. This led to the stated goal of preventing an anti-Islamabad or pro-India government in Kabul from being transformed into a persistent security challenge for Islamabad. This goal has not changed. The policy that was adopted thereafter can be classified as ‘double-dealing or two-track’⁷³ or the one aimed to protect ‘our own national interest.’⁷⁴ Reflecting on the positive contributions of Pakistan since 9/11 towards Afghanistan, Ambassador M Sadiq observes:

Since 2001, Pakistan has also played an active, but unpublicized, role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and providing humanitarian assistance. Pakistan has committed US\$330 million for reconstruction and assistance projects in Afghanistan. Some 52,000 Afghans crossed border with Pakistan everyday in 2009 for business, jobs, medical treatment, and education and to visit relatives...Pakistan is the largest trading partner of Afghanistan while Afghanistan is Pakistan's third largest export market...To enhance Kabul’s connectivity to the world, Pakistan plans to improve its road links and develop rail connections with Afghanistan...A peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s national interest while war and instability in Afghanistan is detrimental to our prosperity and stability. Contrary hypothesis promoted so assiduously by certain quarters is disingenuous.⁷⁵

Northern alliance was supported by Iran, India, and Russia in the civil war period after the withdrawal of former Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989.

⁷³ Ahmed Rashid, *Decent Into Chaos*, UK: Penguin Books, 2008, p: 221.

⁷⁴ Pervez Musharraf, op.cit, p: 275.

⁷⁵ Pakistan’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, M Sadiq, conversation with the group of academia, journalists and civil society activists (from Pakistan) which also included the author, 24 March 2010, Kabul.

Parallel to this, high profile visits remained a regular feature of the Pak-Afghan state-to-state relations despite the undercurrents of mutual distrust. The details of the high profile bilateral visits are given in Appendix-6. President Musharraf speaking on his second visit to Kabul in September 2006 alongside Afghan leader Hamid Karzai in a joint Press conference said:

Pakistan and Afghanistan have to fight the scourge of terror and extremism together. If we don't trust each other, there is no moving forward. The only course left is to have trust - kill mistrust, don't blame each other.⁷⁶

A Peace Jirga⁷⁷ between Pakistan and Afghanistan was held in Kabul from 9 to 12 August 2007 to discuss the bilateral issues. The four-day peace talks, the result of an initiative by President Hamid Karzai and his Pakistani counterpart, Pervez Musharraf on 27 September 2006, primarily focused on threats posed by Taliban, terrorism, and the narcotics trade in the region. This was the first historic event of its kind that opened a channel of people-to-people dialogue in which around 700 people including members of the parliaments, political parties, religious scholars, tribal elders, provincial councils, civil society and business community of both countries participated.⁷⁸ The main recommendations made by the first Joint Peace Jirga are summarized in Appendix-7.

⁷⁶Quoted on, *BBC News*, 6 September 2006.

Also See: Noor-ul-Haq, "Fact File: Pak-Afghan Relations (2005-07)", Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI). pp: 1-22.

⁷⁷Text of Pak-Afghan Peace Jirga, *Daily Times*, 13 August 2007.

Also see, Mariam Safi, "Afghan-Pak Peace Jirga: Possibilities and Improbabilities", IPCS Special Report, No.51, March 2008; Samuel Chan, "Breaking the Impasse in Afghanistan: Problems with Neighbors, Brothers and Guests", *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Volume 6, No. 4 (2008) pp: 103-128.

⁷⁸Text of Pak-Afghan Peace Jirga, *Daily Times*, 13 August 2007.

Here, it is pertinent to note that U.S. President Bush was also one of the critical forces in fostering positive momentum in the Kabul - Islamabad bilateral equation. President Bush hosted a meeting followed by a working dinner with President Hamid Karzai of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and President Pervez Musharraf of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan at the White House on 27 September, 2006 Washington, DC. However, a critical point to note is that despite the official cordiality and regular exchange of visits, the undercurrents of mutual suspicions and distrust have kept the Pak-Afghan relationship strained. The present research study argues that Musharraf regime's Afghanistan policy exhibited strategic realism in the changed geo-political environment. That is, maintaining regular contact with the Karzai government while overlooking the use of its territory as 'sanctuary' by the Afghan Taliban and their associates respectively.⁷⁹ The rationale for this so-called intelligent and pragmatic policy posture stemmed from the conviction that:

The post - Taliban regime with the domination of the Northern Front in the foreign office and the intelligence agencies has tilted Afghanistan heavily towards India in matters that impinge on Pakistan's national security...India with its outsized ambitions has not helped expedite the peace process with Pakistan or re-establish the stability of Afghanistan by using its territory to destabilize FATA and Baluchistan...This leaves Pakistan in a very difficult dilemma; while it wants Afghanistan to be stable and at peace, it cannot accept hostile use of its territory.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ For an account and analysis of Pakistan's involvement in Afghan affairs, see Amir Mir, 'Janus-faced counter-terrorism', *Asia Times Online*, 21 September 2005. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GI21Df02.html.

See also, Ahmed Rashid, 'Islamabad's lingering support for Islamic extremists threatens Pakistan-Afghanistan ties', 23 July 2003. Available at: www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav072303a.shtml.

⁸⁰ Rasool Bakhsh Rais, 'The Troubled States and Troubled Relations: Afghanistan and Pakistan After 9/11', Moonis Ahmar, edit., *Foreign Policy Making Process: A Case Study of Pakistan*, Karachi: Department of International Relations, 2009. pp: 135 – 155.

A senior official of the Musharraf regime on condition of anonymity confided to the author that:

We (Pakistan) have limited options in the changed scenario. We are in no position economically and militarily to be against US-led operations and later on occupation in Afghanistan...Influence in Kabul and Kashmir cause has been given up leading to internal problems...Tribals are extremely upset as their pride has been shattered. They feel incapable to challenge US onslaught...They support Pakistan government under pressure, otherwise - No.⁸¹

Here, mutual distrust and divergent strategic priorities of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States (including ISAF and NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan) governments also explain the contradictory policies of one actor against another. To begin with, Islamabad's threat perception vis-à-vis Kabul needs to be viewed as part of its national and international security perception. That is, historically successive governments in Kabul leaving aside the Taliban regime (1990s) have been hostile to Pakistan. The issue of "Durand Line"⁸² and "Pashtunistan"⁸³ plus Kabul's closeness to India and Russia cemented Islamabad's "enemy image" of Afghanistan. As a result,

⁸¹ Author's off-record conversation with the senior official of the Ministry of Information, Islamabad, 2006.

⁸² Note:

Durand Line Issue owes its origin to the Treaty establishing Durand Line as Boundary between British Imperial India and Afghanistan signed in 1893. Pakistan succeeded to that treaty in 1947. Successive Afghan governments claimed the treaty is no more valid. Pakistan establishment has long suspected Pashtun Nationalists on its side of Durand Line as agents of India and Kabul challenging its territorial integrity. Their demand for provincial autonomy was viewed negatively given their long-held relations with Indian National Congress.

⁸³ Note:

Afghan government after Pakistan creation (August 1947) raised the issue of Pashtun rights by objecting to the Durand Line and demanding that the Pashtun tribal regions be made into a separate state of Pashtunistan or be joined to Afghanistan on the basis of their right of self determination. Afghan backed fighters crossed the Durand Line from Afghanistan to openly combat the Pakistani military during 1950 to 1955, and diplomatic relations severed during this tense period. Relations were resumed in 1951, but the issue of control of Pashtun areas remained unresolved. Pakistan maintains that historically Afghan government intentionally or unintentionally was encouraging secessionist activities in Pakistan.

Prominent Pashtun leaders like Abdul Ghaffar Khan also favored the Afghan line of thinking. India and Soviet Union also extended support to the cause of Pashtunistan against Pakistan. For more details see:

S.M.M Qureshi, "Pashtunistan: The Frontier Dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 1-2 (Spring-Summer, 1966), pp: 99-114.

Islamabad adopted an “interventionist policy” aiming at installing pro-Pakistan elements in Kabul. According to political analyst, Dr Ijaz Khan:

Pakistan’s policy has been to keep India out of Afghanistan by supporting Taliban. Why? To counter Secular Nationalist Pashtun historically allied with Indian National Congress and an Afghanistan that refused to accept Durand Line and was friendly with India and Soviet Union...A Shia Iran could be countered by a Sunni Afghanistan...This was a continuation of Pakistan’s earlier Afghan Policy with increased effectiveness in the wake of western withdrawal from Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal and collapse...Religious Slogans (that is, Islam) and forces (Taliban) as tools of Pakistani State Policy, maturing into Partnership in decision making in 1980s.⁸⁴

At this point the comments of a seasoned journalist Saleem Safi regarding General Musharraf’s Afghan policy are worth noting:

Situation in Afghanistan in the post 9/11 phase is extremely complex. All regional players plus non-regional ones are pursuing contradictory policies in this theater. Islamabad has always framed its Afghan policy through the Indian lens. As Musharraf regime concerns versus India’s role in Afghanistan were not addressed by the Karzai and ISAF, Islamabad adopted ‘double-game’. That is, giving sanctuary to the neutral Afghan Taliban on our side of the Durand Line and not limiting the use of logistics, and men crossing from this side...Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are caught in the historical web of mutual distrust. Other players such as Russia, Iran, etc are also nerved at the long time presence of US in Afghanistan and probably see Taliban as a strategic asset there.⁸⁵

Efforts to counter the Indian influence in Afghanistan aside, strategic players in Islamabad during the Musharraf era also perceived “Coalition forces as part of the problem. Their presence attracts Jihadis on both sides of the Durand Line particularly on

⁸⁴ Ijaz Khan, Head of the International Relations Department, The University of Peshawar, interview with the author, 19 February 2007, Islamabad.

⁸⁵ Saleem Safi interview with the author, 12 March 2010.

Pakistan's side.”⁸⁶ Key policymaking elements believed that, “India wants to turn Pakistan tribal areas into Kashmir. That is, to tie Pakistan forces in FATA like they (Pakistanis) did in Indian held Kashmir.”⁸⁷ Reflecting on Islamabad's non-declared policy of providing shelter to Afghan Taliban as a matter of strategic necessity, former head of ISI Lt.General (retd) Asad Durrani remarked:

Afghanistan dependence on Pakistan is extra-ordinary. They (Afghans) supported Pakistan in wars with India...We exaggerate Indian influence in Afghanistan. Indians are definitely interested in Afghanistan. We need regional consensus, that is, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran...won't intervene in Afghanistan...We (Pakistan) need an indigenous policy on Afghanistan not the one dictated by US.⁸⁸

Here, the question arises: Why Islamabad turned a blind eye to the usage of its territory by the Afghan Taliban leaders such as Gulbuddin Hikmetyar, and Jalaluddin Haqqani? Gulbuddin Hikmatyar is the head of Hizb-e-Islami Party of Afghanistan. He has long-term relations with Pakistan's establishment since the days of Jihad (1979 onwards) in Afghanistan. His group is perceived as pro-Pakistan and he is regarded as a neutral Afghan leader by the Pakistani establishment. Likewise, Jalaluddin Haqqani is a former mujahidin leader and a close aide of Mullah Omar. He is currently the head of the "Haqqani network." Haqqani is an Afghan and his "network" is located near Miramshah,

⁸⁶ Former Governor of Baluchistan under Musharraf era and then Governor of NWFP Mr. Owais Ghani, interview with the author, 11 September 2009, Islamabad.

⁸⁷ Author's off-record conversation with the ex-official of Musharraf regime, Rawalpindi. 12 July, 2008,

⁸⁸ Lt General (retd) Asad Durrani, interview with the author, 12 May 2008, Islamabad.

North Waziristan.⁸⁹ Pakistan's establishment regards him as a "moderate" Taliban, who are seen as strategic asset for Islamabad.⁹⁰

According to Ijaz Khan, "Pakistan's policy (is) geared towards salvaging whatever is left of its Afghan Policy. That was to keep out every other regional State, but specially India out of Afghanistan by supporting Taliban".⁹¹ In addition, providing shelter to the Afghan "moderate and neutral" leadership was essentially a tactical maneuver to retain Pakistan's influence in the contemporary and future political landscape in Kabul.⁹² The key factor behind Islamabad's reliance on Pushtun elements in Afghanistan is the mutual history of suspicion. Imtiaz Gul observes:

The non-Pashtun Afghan population, led by Tajiks have always viewed Pakistan with suspicion, and since the Indians and the Russians traditionally remained closer to the non-Pashtoons, this unfavorable view served and serves as a permanent factor in Pakistan's threat perceptions as far as the western border is concerned. Musharraf's post 9/11 policy was a mix of cooperation and deceit, a combination of helping out on the one hand and maintaining close contact with assets inside Afghanistan and in the border regions on the other. Kayani did bring about a qualitative change as far as the tribal areas was concerned and did go after the TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban – Pakistan).⁹³

The question is: How did the Musharraf regime respond to persistent bilateral and international apprehensions regarding its "inaction" and tolerance of the Afghan Taliban

⁸⁹ For details see: Imtiaz Ali, "The Haqqani Network and Cross-Border Terrorism in Afghanistan," *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 6, No. 6 (March 24, 2008), pp. 1-3; Waliullah Rahmani, "Jalauddin Haqqani Challenges Mullah Omar's Leadership of the Taliban," *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 5, No. 25 (July 1, 2008), pp: 3-4.

⁹⁰ Authors off-record conversations with the Pakistani Intelligence sources, 2007 - 2008.

⁹¹ Ijaz Khan, Op.cit.pp:12-15.

⁹² Authors off-record conversations with the officials and experts focusing on strategic policy of Pakistan.

⁹³ Imtiaz Gul, Executive Director of CRSS (Center for Research and Security Studies) Islamabad, interview with the author, 4 April 2010. He is a senior Pakistani journalist and author of *The Unholy Nexus: Pak-Afghan relations under the Taliban*, 2002.

groups operating from its side against the Afghan and NATO troops on the other side of the Durand Line. To quote an American expert on South Asia, Rodney Jones:

In American policymaking circles, Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan is seen as Pakistan making. Taliban have safe haven in Pakistan. U.S government feels General Musharraf is not dishonest, but he may not be in control. ‘Do more’ implies more effective monitoring of Pak-Afghan border.⁹⁴

Another leading American expert on Afghanistan, Professor Barnett Rubin, deposing before a US Congressional Committee in early October 2006 maintained:

The universal consensus on the Afghan side of the border, among Americans, military and civilian, among Europeans, military and civilian, and Afghans, military and civilian is that the headquarters of the Taliban are in fact in Pakistan.⁹⁵

Similarly, Karzai government on numerous occasions leveled charges of “double-game” on Pakistan and held Islamabad responsible for the surge in Taliban operations in Afghanistan. President Karzai on a visit to Islamabad in April 2003 gave General Musharraf a list of Taliban commanders allegedly living openly in Quetta. This was strongly denied by President Musharraf and termed it “baseless”.⁹⁶ On 13 December 2006, Afghan President Hamid Karzai accused Pakistan of being the trouble maker, saying: “I tell Pakistan to stop its animosity towards the Afghans and the Pashtoons...In reality, these (suicide) attacks are a message from the Pakistan government to scare us.”

97

⁹⁴ Dr Rodney Jones, head of USIP South Asia program (in US), interview with the author, 12 May 2008, Islamabad.

⁹⁵ Quoted in, *The Friday Times*, Lahore issue, 6-12 October 2006.

⁹⁶ Ahmed Rashid, op.cit, p: 229.

⁹⁷ *The News*, December 14, 2006. Noor-ul-Haq, “Fact File: Pak-Afghan Relations (2005-07)”, Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI). pp: 1-22. Available at: <http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff83.pdf>.

Another leading expert on Afghanistan Ahmed Rashid in his work entitled, Descent into Chaos claims:

In post 9/11 phase it was impossible for ISI to both help the CIA and run the Taliban, whom the ISI had given sanctuary. This difficulty was resolved with the creation of a new clandestine organization that would operate outside the military and intelligence structure, in the civilian sphere. Former ISI trainers of the Taliban, retired Pashtun officers from the army and especially the Frontier Corps, were rehired on contract. They set up offices in private houses in Peshawar, Quetta, and other cities...Working under cover as coordinators for Afghan refugees, bureaucrats, researchers at universities, teachers at colleges, and even aid workers... There were no records, and logistics and expenses came through not the ISI but the less scrutinized offices of the Frontier Corps.⁹⁸

General Musharraf termed the above accusations against Pakistan as far removed from the realities on ground. In his memoir *In the Line of Fire* he maintains:

While it is unavoidable, because of the terrain and the length of the border, that some terrorists – members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban – must be sneaking across the Afghanistan from Pakistan side, it is mendacious to put the blame for all this on Pakistan...The reality is the most of the terrorist activity in Afghanistan is indigenous, even though some groups from Pakistan also sneak across.⁹⁹

Former Governor of the NWFP Lt. General (retd) Ali M Jan Orakzai in conversation with the author said:

The Afghan Taliban insurgency is essentially becoming a National Liberation War against the presence of the foreign troops... It is the joint responsibility of all, including Afghanistan, NATO, ISAF and Pakistan to check this movement. Pakistan has established 1000 check-posts along 2500 kilometer long border, whereas Afghanistan could only establish only 100. Peace and stability in

⁹⁸ Ahmed Rashid, op.cit, pp: 221 – 222.

⁹⁹ Pervez Musharraf, op.cit, pp: 271 – 272.

Afghanistan is in Pakistan's national interest and will foster regional stability.¹⁰⁰

The key point here is the resurgence of Taliban insurgency within and beyond Afghanistan which must be contextualized ethnically, religiously, politically and socially across the Durand Line. The threats to the internal and external security of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are co-related and inter-dependent. Musharraf's policy of treating Afghan and foreign militants operating in Afghanistan as separate entities from the Taliban and militants on the Pakistan side led to the institution of 'fire-wall' that never existed on ground. The fact is, there existed and continue to exist complex and multi-pronged linkages between the militants (no matter what you call them, Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda operatives, Pakistani Taliban or whatever) across the Durand Line on both sides that is, Pakistan and Afghanistan respectively. Parallel to this, Islamabad has been unable to convince and assure Afghanistan about its 'non-interfering and neutral' policy since 9/11. Here, remarks of a key security aide of President Karzai on General Musharraf's conduct of Afghan policy are worth mentioning. He said:

There is strong perception among the Afghan population that Pakistan has done more harm to the country by aiding Taliban regime in the late 1990s and providing them shelter later on...General Musharraf never treated Afghanistan as an equal and sovereign state. He looked down upon us... With the coming of elected civilian government in Pakistan that attitude seems to be changing.¹⁰¹

What all this seems to suggest and point to is the need to address the element of mutual distrust that negatively impinges upon the realization of Islamabad's stated goal of peaceful and stable Afghanistan in the past, present and future. For Islamabad, there is

¹⁰⁰ Governor NWFP, Lt General (retd) Ali M Jan Orakzai, interview with the author, 22 November 2006, Peshawar.

¹⁰¹ Afghan National Security Adviser, Dr Spaanta expressed these views in discussion with the Delegation (including the author) from Pakistan, 24 March, 2010, Kabul.

need to enlarge the ambit of Pak-Afghan relations moving beyond the ruling elites and investing in the people of Afghanistan irrespective of ethnic identity. That calls for ~~–~~sustained efforts on both sides for effective and joint intelligence sharing, effective border coordination, and isolation of hardcore militants from people at large through human development on both sides of the Durand Line.”¹⁰²

There is also the need to narrow down the divergence in security perceptions of all the regional and extra-regional actors involved in and around Afghanistan which remains an ongoing challenge, especially for Islamabad. A leading security expert Dr Rais notes:

Pakistan and Afghanistan are far away from overcoming the difficulties of the past and evolve a new strategic relationship to meet the challenges of the Taliban and al Qaeda...Pakistan believes Afghanistan's territory is being used by India, in connivance with Afghan leaders and intelligence agencies, to interfere in the Baluchistan Province of Pakistan and in other trouble spots. Afghanistan has not ceased accusing Pakistan of intervention and using the Afghan Taliban as an instrument of Pakistani regional policy.¹⁰³

The mistrust between the two neighbors persists despite reassuring messages from time to time that are often interspersed by accusations and recriminations. The Pakistani establishment is adamant on its perceived self interest and sees things from the perspective of an Afghanistan in the post WOT period. These perceptions inform the ensuing discussion about how Pakistan's contribution to the US-led ~~–~~War on Terror”

¹⁰² Major General Athar Abbas, DG – ISPR (Pakistan) made these remarks in the Track-two (RUSI – IPRI) Pak-Afghan Security Dialogue (in which Author also participated), 24 – 25 March 2009, Bahrain.

¹⁰³ Dr Rasul Baksh Rais, Head of Political Science Department, LUMS, interview with the author, 3 April 2007, Lahore.

focusing on Afghanistan and its implications on national, bilateral, regional and international levels are to be seen.

Part Three: Pakistan as Front-line US Partner in the WOT – Musharraf Regime

General Musharraf's decision to support the US led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in late 2001, focusing on Afghanistan placed Islamabad under the international spotlight given its geo-strategic location, ethnic and religious bonding and its history of close relationship with the Taliban regime in Kabul. To play the role of "US strategic ally" Islamabad provided support and cooperation in tangible terms involving the physical usage of its territory to the sharing of intelligence sources, data gathering and setting up joint surveillance centers within its territory. This critical role has earned Pakistan both appreciations as well as criticism. For instance, Central Command General Abizaid appreciating Islamabad observed: "Pakistan has done more for the United States in the direct fight against Al-Qaeda than any other country."¹⁰⁴ Similarly, General Musharraf brushing aside the Western, and Afghan strategic community pressure "to do more" as an ally in the War On Terror (WOT) said:

If Pakistan is not doing enough, the whole world is asleep; because I think we are doing the most. We are doing the maximum. I challenge any other country which is doing as much or thinking as much, executing as much as Pakistan.¹⁰⁵

Deliberating on the critical role of Pakistan in the "War on Terror" Director General ISPR, Major-General Shaukat Sultan Khan in conversation with the author maintained:

¹⁰⁴ Quoted in, Ron Laurenzo, "Abizaid: Pakistan Best Ally in War on Terror", *Defense Week*, February 2, 2004.

¹⁰⁵ General Pervez Musharraf's inaugural address in the international Seminar on *Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Countermeasures*, organized jointly by the Institute of Regional Studies (Islamabad) and Hanns Seidel Foundation (Munich), 29 – 31 August 2005, Islamabad.

Pakistan joined the international coalition against terrorism in its national interest based on principled stand to fight terrorism in all its guises and to rid the society of religious extremism... Since then, the country has paid a very heavy price in the political-economic and security fields. No other country has suffered more from Global War on Terror (GWOT) than Pakistan.¹⁰⁶

As mentioned in the earlier part of the chapter, United States officially conveyed to Islamabad to offer cooperation relating to air corridors, landing rights, sharing of intelligence, apprehending Al-Qaeda operatives entering or sheltering in its territory and cutting off diplomatic relations with Taliban. General Musharraf regime offered ‘unstinted’ cooperation in almost all these matters. The strategic aims of Pakistan’s high command as partner in GWOT revolved around the following aims:

Proactively pursue the end objective of elimination of terrorists and deny use of own territory as sanctuary for operations within Pakistan or across Pak – Afghan border through effective articulation of military, political and development measures...Our concept of operations aimed to prevent outflow of terrorists / miscreants and unwanted elements from entering into Pakistan and keep own internal dynamics stable. Preclude reason for Coalition forces to enter into Pakistan territory on the pretext of hot pursuit operations...Concept of Deployment aimed to seal the border effectively to check the cross border movement. Dominate the internal environment through saturation of troops in the area.¹⁰⁷

5.2.3 - A: Provision of Air Bases and Air fields

The official account (of Musharraf regime) of the air and land facilities given to US in the Operation Enduring Freedom and later on, sharply differs from the media accounts (local as well as international) as well as data published on the CENTCOM (US central command) official web portal. President Musharraf in his memoir *In the Line of*

¹⁰⁶ Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan, Director General ISPR, interview with the author, 6 February 2007. Rawalpindi.

¹⁰⁷ Off-record Briefing of Military High Command also attended by the author in 2007.

Fire forcefully rejected the widely held Pakistan's public impression that "blanket over flight plus landing rights and the use of naval posts, air bases, and strategic locations on borders"¹⁰⁸ were extended to the United States. Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi in conversation with the author also substantiates General Musharraf's line of argument observing:

It is not correct that we (that is, Pakistan government) gave in to all US demands. We negotiated on 'air corridor', made sure that 'no combat operation' be launched in Afghanistan from our territory... It is a myth that Pakistan was passive, we preserved our core National interests.¹⁰⁹

However, in contrast to the above mentioned assertions, Federal Secretary of Defense, General (retd) Tariq Waseem Ghazi told the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the National Assembly that:

Pakistan had provided four airports to the U.S. forces for logistic support including Pasni, Dalbadin, Shamsi (Kharan) and Jacobabad. Three of these airports, except Dalbadin, are still on the standby list for use by US in emergency situations.¹¹⁰

Reflecting on the negative public reaction about the use of 'Shalbaz Airbase' in Jacobabad for US operations in Afghanistan, another leading national news magazine, *Newsline* (January 2005) observes:

The Jacobabad base located about 480 kilometers north of Karachi and southeast of Kandahar, was one of four Pakistani bases used by US and allied forces to support the 'Operation Enduring Freedom' campaign in

¹⁰⁸ Pervez Musharraf, op.cit, pp: 204 – 205.

¹⁰⁹ Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi, interview with the author, 10 August 2008, Islamabad.

Note: Dr Maleeha Lodhi served as Pakistani Ambassador to the US, under two different Presidents from 1994-1997 and then during 1999-2002. From 2003 – 2008, Ambassador Lodhi served as Pakistan High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.

¹¹⁰ "3 Airports for standby for U.S: Secretary", *Daily Times*, July 19, 2006.

Afghanistan...In early December 2001, Pakistan agreed to a US request for a long-term presence at Jacobabad, and permitted US Marines to renovate the base and build a concrete hangar for 50 large planes and air-conditioned barracks for troops...During that phase, all but a few Pakistani liaison officers were withdrawn from the base...Jacobabad was the scene of several protests by opponents of the US airstrikes on Afghanistan. The Jamaat-e-Islami, a staunch opponent of supporting the US in its 'war against terror' tried to march to the Jacobabad airfield on October 14, 2001, one person was killed and 24 people injured in clashes with police. By late October 2001, roads to the city were blocked for days to prevent the entry of protestors. But on 23 October, around 200 JI activists appeared in the city, and at least 100 protesters were arrested. Subsequently, the protests subsided.¹¹¹

5.2.4 - B: Sharing of Intelligence and Joint Anti-Terrorism Cooperation

On the condition of anonymity a number of security officials confided to the author, "presence of US counter-terrorism experts engaged in joint search and military operations to capture Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban from time to time".¹¹² Feroz Hassan Khan maintains, "In 2004, 44 military operations, each involving 6000-7000 troops were launched based on US satellite information. About 650 terrorists were killed by Pakistani troops and estimated 100 or so ran into high mountains."¹¹³ According to the Inter Services Public Relations, Rawalpindi (ISPR) accounts, Pakistan deployed above, 140,000 regular and paramilitary troops and established 821 border posts along the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan and Iran in support of US-led efforts to capture Taliban and Al Qaeda fugitives.

¹¹¹ Naveed Ahmed, "Newsbeat: Bowing Out", *Newline (Karachi)*, January 2005.

¹¹² Author's off-record conversations with Pakistani intelligence sources, 2006 – 2008.

Also See, K. Alan Kronstadt, "Terrorism in South Asia", CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL32259. August 9, 2004.pp:9-15.

¹¹³ Brig (retd) Feroz Hassan Khan, "The United States, Pakistan and the War on Terrorism: Enduring Allies or Uncertain Partners?" *Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Countermeasures*, Institute of Regional Studies, edit., Islamabad, 2005, p: 377.

Pakistan's Minister of Interior, Moinuddin Haider, led the Pakistani delegation to the US for "US-Pakistan Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement" meeting held on 8 May, 2002. In the group deliberations both sides focused on: "bilateral law enforcement issues, encompassing counternarcotics, counterterrorism, extradition, money laundering, trafficking in persons, demand reduction and drug abuse control, alternative development and poppy eradication, police and legal system reform, plus the repatriation of Pakistani nationals held in the United States."¹¹⁴

Likewise, interception and tracing of satellite telephone transmissions became an effective tool in joint U.S.-Pakistani efforts to trace Taliban and Al Qaeda elements in Pakistan. Reportedly, Americans trained and equipped sensitive counter-terrorist organizations within Pakistan to monitor internet traffic to curb money laundering, online recruitment of would-be Al-Qaeda agents and so on. According to Pakistan's media reports in November 2001, an FBI post was set up at Karachi airport to monitor all out-going passengers. Pakistan allowed US and its ally's full operational facilities at Karachi airport for peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan.¹¹⁵ Acknowledging the critical role of Pakistan in undertaking actions versus US labeled terrorists, the Congressional Research Report (CRS) of 2003 maintained:

Islamabad has taken action against at least 185 of the 247 US-designated entities operating on Pakistani territory, and has taken its own initiative to detain operatives and designate active groups suspected of financing terrorist activities...US officials continue to encourage stricter oversight and regulation and the United States has agreed

¹¹⁴ General (ret'd) Moinuddin Haider, Pakistan's Federal Interior Minister (1999 – 2002), interview with author, 23 March, 2007, Karachi.

¹¹⁵ Najam Rafique, "Pakistan – US relations since 9/11: Chronology of Events" *Islamabad Institute of Strategic Studies* (IISS), 2004.

to provide technical assistance and training to Pakistani customs and finance officials as part of this effort.¹¹⁶

Similarly, the arrest in Pakistan of al-Qaeda operative Mohammad Naeem Noor Khan, which subsequently led to the arrest of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, revealed horrific facts about the kinds of attacks that al-Qaeda, was planning. Some extremely accurate information about targets in the United Kingdom and the United States was recovered from these individuals, and it is quite likely that an attack on the targets would have been carried out, had they not been arrested.¹¹⁷

Though both sides that is, US and Islamabad (specifically under Musharraf regime) remained engaged in sharing of intelligence plus sensitive data on Al-Qaeda, mutual tensions and suspicions were always there. Western media by mid 2002 reported of Pakistan's inaction against Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements actively grouping on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line.¹¹⁸ On the Pakistan side, media reported as early as July 2002 of US troops picking up 3 Pakistani tribesmen from Angoor Adda, and take them across the Durand Line in Afghanistan. In January 2003, Pakistan rejected US claim that it was allowed to pursue attackers of its forces in Afghanistan into Pakistan. Washington insisting that they reserve the right of "hot pursuit" said its military has refrained from cross border operations. Reports of Pakistan and US-Afghan forces exchanging heavy fire at the Pak-Afghan border also appeared.¹¹⁹

In the meantime, "distrust and double standards" of the US and other external forces based in Afghanistan in respect of Islamabad were often highlighted within the

¹¹⁶ K. Alan Kronstadt, "Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation", CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service) USA: Library of Congress, 28 March, 2003.

¹¹⁷ Burke, J., Harris, P. and Bright, M., "Suspect arrested in Pakistan may hold al-Qaeda's secrets", *The Observer*, 8 Aug. 2004.

¹¹⁸ Gretchen Peters, "Al-Qaeda-Pakistani Ties Deepen," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 6, 2003.

¹¹⁹ Najam Rafique, op.cit.p:7.

strategic circles in Pakistan. Syed Saleem Shahzad, editor of *Asia Times online* quoted a key security official:

Over the past few months U.S. had been engaged in espionage operations, including the use of spy planes, in South and North Waziristan, Chitral, the Hindu Kush mountain chain, Zhob, and the mountain belt between Kandahar in Afghanistan and Pakistani Baluchistan. Tracking devices have also been installed in number of places to monitor movements in border areas.¹²⁰

5.2.5 - C: Logistic Support to ISAF/NATO in Afghanistan

From the beginning of the Operation Enduring Freedom the US and ISAF /NATO forces operating in Afghanistan remained dependent on Pakistan for about 80 per cent or more of their logistic support. Logistic support involves a wide range of services and responsibilities involving storage, transport, distribution, transport of personnel; acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; acquisition or provision of services, and medical and health service support. Three-fourths of NATO supplies transited to Afghanistan through Pakistan's Khyber Pass, located west of the NWFP capital of Peshawar. Talat Masood, a security expert and retired general of the Pakistani Army remarks:

This is the most traditional, most used land route to connect Afghanistan and Pakistan. The same supply route was used to support the mujahedeen in their fight against the Soviet Union.¹²¹

Khyber Agency in FATA remains a critical route through which majority of U.S.- NATO supplies must move in order to resupply troops fighting in Afghanistan. Reportedly, supplies arrive in Pakistan's port city of Karachi, move north to Peshawar,

¹²⁰ Syed Saleem Shahzad, —Stage Set for Final Showdown”, *Asia Times Online*, July 21, 2004.

¹²¹ General (retd) Talat Masood, interview with the Author, 10 March, 2007, Islamabad.

and head west before crossing into Afghanistan and arriving in Kabul. The rest of the supplies arrive via air or through the Chaman border crossing point in Baluchistan.¹²² To quote General Musharraf's spokesperson Major General Shaukat Sultan:

In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan has played a role of front line state, in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). In this process of cooperation with the international community, it has provided critical support in the areas like: provision of logistics support through its territory from Arabian Sea to the Pak-Afghan border and sharing of intelligence with US and NATO forces operating in Afghanistan. In sum, Pakistan has gone all out to support the coalition partners in Afghanistan.¹²³

Pakistan as partner in the US-led War on Terror in Afghanistan pledged to ensure the safety and security of logistic supplies through its terrain. General Musharraf followed a twin track policy of pressure and conciliation to keep the inhabitants of the area away from attacking or blocking the logistic supplies transiting to Afghanistan. However, in early 2008, the militants inside Pakistan started attacking NATO convoys and transportation lines. The mile and a half long (strategic link to Afghanistan) Kohat tunnel was reclaimed by Pakistan's army after a fierce battle from the militants. This event placed Pakistan army in a challenging position, clearly reflected in the following statement of a senior security official:

Pakistan has conceded to many of the [Pakistani] Taliban's demands for peace, such as the release of fellow tribesmen. But if they demand something like the closure of NATO's supply lines from Pakistan, it is beyond Pakistan's orbit. The Americans sought Pakistan's cooperation [in the war on terror] in return they pledged billions of dollars in aid. But they wanted steady supply lines for NATO forces in Afghanistan...Pakistan has stretched itself to the limit for the sake of peace in the country, it has even struck deals

¹²² Candace Rondeaux and Walter Pincus, "U.S. Seeks New Supply Routes into Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, November 19, 2008.

¹²³ Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan, DG ISPR, interview with the author, 8 May 2007, Rawalpindi.

with al-Qaeda for it to stop attacking Pakistan. But if they [al-Qaeda and militants] don't appreciate Pakistan's interests and compulsions, then...defeat is not an option.¹²⁴

According to a number of investigative media reports from Pakistan, militants (that is combination of Afghan, foreign and Pakistani elements) were all set to attack the support infrastructure of the NATO supply lines through Pakistan. A number of times incidents of sabotaging, looting and confiscating of trucks on way to Kabul were reported but no serious action were taken and the threat was underestimated by military high command.

In 2008, militants' attacks left 25 fuel trucks destroyed and at least a dozen trucks carrying Humvees and other supplies were hijacked at the Khyber Pass. This was followed by a U.S. Special Forces raid in the FATA in early September 2008. Pakistan authorities temporarily closed Torkham highway illuminating the need for coordinating actions on both sides for sustaining multilateral military efforts to the west. According to some analysts this action of Pakistan government was in response to US strikes in Waziristan. However, officially it was dubbed as: —a security measure to ensure the protection of vulnerable vehicles. Nothing to do with the situation in Waziristan or the US attacks. This is purely a security issue and we want no untoward incident to take place as far as supplies for ISAF are concerned.”¹²⁵ Later on, oil and containers supply resumed to NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan via Khyber Agency. According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies report:

¹²⁴ Quoted in, Syed Saleem Shahzad, —US homes in on militants in Pakistan”, *Asia Times Online*, January 30, 2008.

¹²⁵ The political agent Khyber agency Tariq Hayat, quoted in Afridi, —Supply to NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan suspended via Khyber agency due to security concerns”, Sep 06, 2008, [Http: www.allvioces.com/contributed-news](http://www.allvioces.com/contributed-news).

The main supply route through Pakistan has been under serious threat since December 2008 when Taliban militants mounted sustained attacks on NATO supply lines passing through Pakistan. ...The Taliban have used multiple tactics to disrupt the main supply route through Pakistan. For instance, overnight raids and rocket attacks on the terminal, threatening and targeting the business outfits involved in the transportation of NATO's logistics, and blowing up bridges which connect Pakistan with Afghanistan have all been witnessed.¹²⁶

The key inference here is that there exists inter-connectivity between the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This has affected the internal as well as external security dynamics on both sides and gradually shifted and expanded the war frontiers from Afghanistan into Pakistan. The threat to NATO supply line through Pakistan also has political connotations. To quote Owais Ahmed Ghani, the Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province:

We are in a complex situation. Geopolitical compulsions cannot be ignored. Presence of Coalition forces in Afghanistan are part of problem. The majority public sentiment must be behind Pakistan's participation on war on terror. That cannot be compromised. If the people turn against it, it will be very difficult for the government to ensure this [supply] line.¹²⁷

Apprehending Al-Qaeda Terrorists

By all accounts the record of Pakistan's military; intelligence and security officials in capturing, killing and busting the Al-Qaeda elements remains a mix of both success and failure. President Pervez Musharraf claimed in his memoir *In the Line of Fire*:

¹²⁶ Ryan Clarke and Khuram Iqbal, *NATO Supply Lines in Central Asia: Expanding the Scope of Conflict?* PIPS, Islamabad, 2009.

¹²⁷ Owais Ahmed Ghani, Governor of the NWFP (North West Frontier Province), interview with the author, 11 September, 2009, Islamabad.

We have captured 689 and handed over 369 to the United States. We have earned bounties totaling millions of dollars. Those who habitually accuse us of “not doing enough” should simply ask the CIA how much prize money it has paid to the government of Pakistan.¹²⁸

Likewise, Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan, spokesman for Musharraf argues:

Pakistan has provided consistent support to the United States, assigning 70,000 Pakistani troops to the border region and assisting in the capture or killing of 700 members of Al Qaeda...The purpose behind moving security forces into the tribal area was to secure the western borders, to check the movement of people moving into Pakistan, to ensure that coalition operations in Afghanistan did not spill over into Pakistani territory, to nab the terrorists and to assist in development works in the FATA.¹²⁹

What is critical to note, there existed (and continue to do so) a nexus between Al-Qaeda and number of indigenous sectarian, ethnic, political, jihadi groups in Pakistan. According to the law enforcement agencies as well independent media accounts, Al-Qaeda’s operational, logistics and recruitment networks encompass, Jandolllah, Harkat ul Mujahedeen al Alami, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Al-Badar, Lashkar-e-Omar, Hartkat ul Islami, HUJI, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), Jamiat al-Ansar and Sipah-e-Sahaba, in Pakistan. These linkages go back to the period of Afghan Jihad followed by civil war and Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Reportedly, Fazl-ur-Rehman Khalil, the leader of Harkat-ul-Mujahedin (Movement of Mujahedin), co-signed the 1999 edict by Osama bin Laden which called it a duty of every Muslim to kill Americans and Jews. Jamaat-al-Dawa acquired its 77-

¹²⁸ Pervez Musharraf, op.cit, p: 237.

¹²⁹ Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan, Director General ISPR and President Spokesperson, interview with the author, 6 February , 2007, Rawalpindi.

hectare Muridke estate with the help of a donation from Abdul Rehman Sherahi, who was arrested because of connections with al-Qaeda.¹³⁰

The very arrests of high profile Al-Qaeda leaders from 2002 onwards testify to the reach of Al-Qaeda in the mainland plus FATA, NWFP and Baluchistan areas of Pakistan. For instance, Abu Zubaida (2002) was captured from a Lashkar-e-Taiba safe house in Faisalabad. Abu Omer and Abu Hamza (January 2003) were arrested from Sabiha Sharif's (a member of the Jamaat Islami) residence in Karachi. The number three in the al-Qaeda hierarchy, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad—along with Mustafa Hawsawi—was arrested at the home of Abdul Qudoos, a Jamaat Islami supporter, in March 2003. Similarly, Waleed Muhammad bin Attash, a suspect in the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, is reported to have claimed the recruitment of a dozen Lashkar-e-Taiba workers for suicide missions against US targets.¹³¹

Likewise, Musaad Aruchi, a nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed with a \$1 million bounty on his head, was arrested in Karachi in June 2004. Tanzanian Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani was arrested in the city of Gujarat in July 2004. Pakistani intelligence agencies and security forces arrested Abu Faraj al-Liby, mastermind of two failed attempts on President Pervez Musharraf's life, in Mardan (May 2005). Abu Hamza Rabia, an al Qaeda commander ranked the third most senior leader in the network, was killed in a tribal region of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan in December 2005. Mushin Musa Matwalli Atwah (also known as Abdul Rehman), an Egyptian al Qaeda member

¹³⁰ Aarish Ullah Khan, "The Terrorist Threat and the Policy Response in Pakistan" SIPRI Policy Paper No. 11, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, September 2005.

¹³¹ Details in, Kronstadt, K. A., *Terrorism in South Asia*, CRS Report for Congress, Washington DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS): 8 Mar. 2004, p. 4. Also see, Tohid, O., 'Prize catch', *Newsline* (Karachi), Mar. 2003; Hussain, Z., 'Closing in', *Newsline* (Karachi), Mar. 2003.

wanted for involvement in the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kenya, was killed by Pakistani forces close to the Afghan border in April 2006.¹³²

According to the study published by Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, from January 2002 to May 2006, more than 1,000 Al-Qaeda suspects had been arrested in Pakistan. The number of Al-Qaeda activists, killed in operations is above 1,000 in Pakistan. However, Pakistani media reported only 660 Al-Qaeda arrests.¹³³ The nationality of the Al-Qaeda activists arrested is as follows:

70 from Algeria, 86 from Saudi Arabia, 20 from Morocco, 22 from United Arab Emirates, 11 from Libya, 7 from Kuwait, 20 from Egypt, 28 from Indonesia, 18 from Malaysia and 36 from the Western Asian Countries. Al-Qaeda arrests also included western nationals: 5 from USA, 2 from Australia and 11 from Great Britain.¹³⁴

In March 2002, Pakistan deployed nearly 100,000 troops around Tora Bora to block fleeing Al-Qaeda fighters from crossing over into Pakistan territory.¹³⁵ According to official Pakistan figures, as of early 2003 more than 443 Al-Qaeda suspects belonging to 18 different nationalities have been handed over to the US authorities.¹³⁶ Why Musharraf regime handed over ‘Al-Qaeda fighters’ plus Pakistani militants to US and not to their respective countries of origin remains a matter of debate within and beyond Pakistan. A senior intelligence official on condition of anonymity in conversation with the author maintains:

It is a big misperception that we picked people (including Pakistani nationals) and handed them to USA without approaching their country of origin. We had people from 39 countries and we called their Ambassadors but most of

¹³² Data obtained from Ministry of Interior, Islamabad. 2007.

¹³³ Mohammad Amir Rana and Mubashir Bukhari, *Arabs in Afghan Jihad*, Islamabad: PIPS, 2007, p: 160.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ ‘Pakistan deployed over 100,000 troops’, *Dawn*, 2 August 2002.

¹³⁶ Qudssia Akhlaque, ‘443 Al-Qaeda suspects handed over to US’, *Dawn*, 6 January 2003.

them refused to take them back...We could not have interrogated and lodged them all as we lacked interpreters and infrastructure to house them. Most of the governments that we approached asked us to handover their nationals specifically ‘hard core Al-Qaeda operatives’ to the United States.¹³⁷

In addition to the Al-Qaeda arrests, Pakistan government banned and froze the bank accounts of the Al-Qaeda affiliated welfare organizations, such as Al-Rasheed Trust, Al-Rabeta Trust, and Al-Akhtar Trust – these decisions were later challenged in the provincial High Courts by the supporters of these organizations.¹³⁸ Pakistan government in its report to the United Nations mandated Al-Qaeda Counter Terrorism Committee maintained:

Pursuant to UNSC resolutions 1267, 1333 and 1373, Pakistan has frozen the assets and accounts of a number of entities found involved in terrorist activities. The State Bank has issued directives and advisories toward this end.¹³⁹

However, there is considerable anecdotal evidence suggesting, Al-Qaeda related welfare or humanitarian organizations continued to operate under new identities despite official clampdown in Pakistan.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ Author’s off-record interview with the former official of sensitive organization of Pakistan, October 2009, Islamabad.

¹³⁸ *Daily Times*, March 17, 2005.

¹³⁹ Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Islamic Republic Of Pakistan to the UNSC Counter Terrorism Committee on Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373*, January 2002.

Note: The Rabita Trust was established in Pakistan in 1988 ostensibly to repatriate and rehabilitate stranded Pakistanis from Bangladesh. Its stated aims included defense of Islamic causes and solve their problems plus refute false allegations against Islam. Funds from the trust were reportedly used for a number of al Qaeda related activities, including recruitment and training in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere. The Rabita Trust was run by Wael Hamza Julaidan, who the U.S. Treasury Department charged was an associate of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. He was designated by the U.S. and the UN as an al Qaeda associate in late 2002.

¹⁴⁰ Author’s off-record conversations with senior ex-officials and financial analysts of the Musharraf regime, 2007. Also see: Victor Comras, “Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups”, *Strategic Insights*, Volume IV, Issue 1, January 2005.

Conclusion

The key point to note is that the Al-Qaeda reach and influence has effectively eroded the firewall (from the government point of view) between the internal and external security dynamics of Pakistan. The military operations initially launched in FATA (discussed in detail in the next chapter) to apprehend the Al-Qaeda or Foreign elements uncovered the structural, ideological and political linkages with the indigenous militant infrastructure. Al-Qaeda and its affiliated militant organizations overtime emerged as direct threat to the state of Pakistan. Musharraf government deliberately boxed Al-Qaeda (Foreign militants) and local militants separately and denied the complexity of the terrorism threat facing the country.

To quote another eminent observer belonging to the Frontier region, Brigadier (retd) Mahmud Shah:

Al-Qaeda aim is to take over Kabul, Islamabad and Central Asia. Al-Qaeda is definitely a domestic threat for us and an indigenous policy to deal with it is missing...Musharraf policy is confused and lacks political will to assess the complexity on ground. It lacks focus and consistency.¹⁴¹

The foregoing discussion points to the complex linkage between the domestic and international strands of Pakistan's security policy under the Musharraf regime. General Musharraf's decision to join the US-led 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan set in motion a revision and rethinking of the earlier strands of Pakistan's security policy specifically related to nuclear security, Kashmir issue, and Afghanistan. This in turn affected Pakistan's domestic and external security dynamics in a decisive manner. The actions undertaken as response to terrorism, whether of political, institutional, or military nature, critically eroded the firewall between the so-called internal and external security challenges facing the country.

¹⁴¹ Brigadier (retd) Mahmud Shah, former Secretary FATA Secretariat, interview with Author, 12 November 2006, Islamabad.

CHAPTER SIX

MILITARY RESPONSE TOWARDS TERRORISM: HOME FRONT?

Introduction

The army, as directed by the government, has the Constitutional duty to defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and, subject to law, to act in aid of the civil power when called upon to do so.¹

This chapter charts the trajectory of events following Pakistan's deployment of more than eighty thousand troops for the first time in Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)², —where no soldier, even the British did not go in the colonial period over centuries.”³ The military operations were launched by Pakistani forces in support of United States-led ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan with the aim to apprehend Al-Qaeda operatives and their Afghan associates seeking a place to retreat in this region. These actions snowballed into a religiously defined militancy led by a mix of foreign (Arab, Uzbek, Afghan and Chechen) and local tribal groups against the Pakistani state, the Karzai- led government in Kabul and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) /NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan. Operations were simultaneously carried out in the adjoining areas of the NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or KP) and on mainland Pakistan to capture Al-Qaeda operatives and their facilitators. At time, these operations involved Pakistan's police, intelligence personnel and United States CIA agents.

¹ Text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Chapter 2, Paragraph 245 (1), National Assembly of Pakistan.

² Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) also known as the ‘Tribal Areas’ located in a narrow belt which runs along the 2,400 kilometers long Pak-Afghan border, named by the British as the Durand Line. FATA comprises of seven political agencies (Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Khurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan.) and six tribal areas known as ‘Frontier Regions’ (that is, Tribal Areas, adjoining districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts respectively).

³ President Pervez Musharraf, interview with the author, 6 February, London, 2010.

Pakistani intelligence agencies also picked up hundreds of its citizens on suspicion of being associated with the transnational terrorist networks. These nationals continue to be incarcerated quite often without due process of law.


The following key queries are raised: Have the military actions by the Pakistani forces yielded positive results? If so, why and if not, what factors rendered the military actions ineffective or counter-productive? The chapter brings out the limitations of military driven counter-terrorism approach adopted by the Musharraf regime characterized by insensitivity to the political, social, cultural, and ethnic dynamics of FATA. The first part of the chapter defines the contextual parameters of FATA that serves as an ideal springboard to the indigenous as well as foreign militants to hide, group and launch their so-called “just war” against the enemies of Islam, within and beyond Pakistan. The second part examines the military campaigns launched from time to time by Pakistani forces as well as joint or, at times, unilateral air and ground actions by the US and ISAF/NATO in this region. The last part of the chapter analyzes the impact of military actions on the people of the area and points out the missing links in the so-called ‘holistic approach’ of Musharraf regime towards terrorism.

Part One: FATA – A Unique Entity!

More than a century ago, Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India said: “No Man who has ever read a page of Indian history will prophesy about the Frontier.”⁴

⁴ Quoted in James W. Spain , —Pakistan's North West Frontier”, *Middle East Journal* Vol. 8, No. 1, Winter, 1954. pp: 27-40.

Map of Federally Administered Tribal Areas – FATA



Source: Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), Rawalpindi, 2008.

As per the Constitution of Pakistan, FATA is listed as the “territories” of Pakistan (Article 1), represented in the National Assembly and the Senate but remains under the direct executive authority of the President (Articles 51, 59 and 247).⁵ The President is empowered to issue regulations for the “peace and good government” of the tribal areas. FATA elects members to the federal legislature through adult franchise. The system of devolution introduced elsewhere in the country in 2001 by means of provincial Local Government Ordinances (LGOs) has not been extended to the tribal areas. A separate Local Government Ordinance (LGO) for FATA has been drafted and is awaiting promulgation. A system of partial local-level governance does, however, operate through

⁵ Text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, National Assembly of Pakistan.

councils in the tribal agencies and FRs (that is Frontier Regions). Elected councillors are involved in various aspects of development planning and decision making. FATA is divided into two administrative categories: “protected” areas are regions under the direct control of the government, while “non-protected” areas are administered indirectly through local tribes. In protected areas, criminal and civil cases are decided by political officers vested with judicial powers. In non-protected areas, cases are resolved through a local Jirga at the agency level.⁶ To quote an analyst, Iftikhar Durrani:

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is a political construct defined by its unique structure of governance and its demography. As with the British, the Government of Pakistan often viewed FATA as a buffer zone and part of Pakistan only in the sense that was not part of Afghanistan. For decades virtually no development activity was undertaken. The writ of the government in the area has never been strong and people of the area were seen as primitive, wild and fractious. Areas of the FATA close to Afghan border were considered “inaccessible” until several years ago.⁷

The Tribal Areas have a chequered history and a strategically important position. The British demarcated this region as a buffer zone against the threat of expansive Tsarist Russia and controlled the area indirectly through a special system of political and administrative structures. The Frontier Crimes Regulation Act (FCR, 1901) that the British enforced in FATA allowed local customary laws to prevail and *Jirga* (council of elders), Maliks, Sardars and political agents formed the system of governance.⁸ Later on, the Pakistan government retained and reinforced this system. Experts have called this an

⁶ Noor ul Haq, “Islamabad Policy Research Institute IPRI: Fact File, 13 January 2008. Available at: <http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff94.pdf>. Also See, FATA Secretariat, Peshawar, 2008. Available at: <http://www.fata.gov.pk>.

⁷ Iftikhar Durrani, “The country and the territory”, *The News*, 4 February 2007.

⁸ Mohammad Amir Rana, *The Seeds of Terrorism*, London: New Millennium, 2005. pp: 216 – 279.

oppressive arrangement”⁹ that empowers the few stakeholders like Political Agents (Pakistan government representatives), Maliks, and Tribal elders, at the expense of about six million tribal people. To quote a senior Peshawar- based journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai:

The real power in the tribal agencies has historically rested with the political agents, who represent the federal government and maintain control through the colonial-era FCR. The regulations allow the political agent to impose collective punishment for crimes committed by an individual and to deliver prison sentences without due process or right of appeal...Individual tribesmen have limited rights while the political agents wield vast administrative and funding powers and collect and distribute revenue.¹⁰

Most analysts argue that the lack of political reforms and continuation of the colonial era legal and administrative structures, such as FCR, are a source of resentment among the Tribal population. Only in 1997 was adult franchise extended to the area and FATA has representatives in the National Assembly and the Senate, but not in the Provincial Assembly of what is now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa KP (earlier known as North West Frontier Province – NWFP). Despite the presence of popularly elected tribal representatives, parliament can play no role in the affairs of the area. Article 247 of the constitution of Pakistan provides that no act of parliament applies to FATA, unless the President so desires. Only the President is authorized to amend laws and promulgate ordinances for the tribal areas. Although, the Federal Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) is technically responsible for FATA affairs, however, practically it

⁹ Imtiaz Gul, “Military operations in FATA Since 2004: Achievements and Backlash” in Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, et.al, edit, *Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia*, Islamabad: IPRI, 2006, pp: 29 – 36.

¹⁰ Rahimullah Yusufzai, Executive Editor of The News, interview with the author, 22 November 2006, Peshawar.

has only a nominal role in the utilization of the federal funds routed through it. In a parliamentary form of government, this whole gamut of things has created a diarchic state of affairs between the President and the Prime Minister at the Centre as well as between the Federal Ministry of SAFRON and the Governor KP at the Provincial level.

The FATA Reforms Committee proposed extensive political, administrative and socio-economic reforms to mainstream FATA with the rest of the country. It proposed: the creation of an Independent Tribal Province; getting representation in the KP Assembly; establish an elected FATA Council with women's representation; creating an independent FATA Secretariat; separate administrative and judicial powers; develop a formal system of retributive justice.¹¹ These recommendations were not implemented by the government and no local ordinance was issued. Reflecting on the situation FATA Reform Committee's member Muhammad Zaman Khan maintained:

We the people of FATA have always been deprived of our due rights as the citizens of Pakistan. Initially, government wanted FATA to be a part of North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) but we felt our people are not ready for this transition. Thus, we proposed introducing an elected FATA council so that people get accustomed to the new mode of governance. However, nothing has been delivered so far...Tribal people are die-hard Pakistanis and will always stand for the territorial integrity of the country. There is an urgent need to register them as equal citizens of the country and doing away of the "suspicion and mistrust" of us (Tribal people) by the Federal and provincial governments respectively.¹²

¹¹Note:

Federal Government in 2000 created FATA – Reforms Committee. It comprised of two/three representatives each from the seven Tribal Agencies, two members from the six Frontier Regions (FRs), two members from the Tribal Areas Development Foundation (TADF) and two technocrats (experts on the subject) with a mandate to finalize a draft proposal for FATA in collaboration with the NRB (National Reconstruction Bureau), the Governor NWFP, and other related government departments in designing a broader framework of the Local Government Plan 2000 for the Tribal Areas. The committee's report was submitted on December 7, 2000.

¹² Engineer Muhammad Zaman Khan, Member of FATA Reform Committee, telephonic conversation with the author, 30 March 2010.

FATA lags behind the rest of Pakistan in almost all socio-economic comparisons. Per capita income is half that of the very low national per capita income of \$500; some 60 per cent of the population lives below the national poverty line. Per capita public development expenditure is reportedly one third of the national average.¹³ The literacy rate in FATA is just 17 per cent, well below the 45 per cent in Pakistan as a whole. Only three per cent of females receive any education. There is one hospital bed for every 2,327 people, compared to one for 1,450 in Pakistan as a whole. Furthermore, there is only one doctor for every 8,189 people. Its total irrigated land is roughly 1,000 square kilometers. Natural resources, including minerals and coal, are nominally explored and exploited. Most locals depend on subsistence agriculture since there is little industrial development and few jobs. Only 43 per cent of its people have access to clean drinking water. 30 per cent of FATA's area is inaccessible both politically and administratively.¹⁴

FATA Secretariat in one of its publications concedes FATA's low level of development attributing it primarily to resource and capacity constraints, scarce economic activities and socio-cultural barriers and prevailing law and order situation. A number of projects were started under the FATA Annual Development Programmes (ADPs) over the years. However, meager financial allocations coupled with increased development cost have resulted in huge liabilities. FATA Annual Development Programmes (ADP) has thrown forward liabilities of more than Rs. 40 billion. With current level of funding by the federal government it would take at least four years to complete the ongoing projects of the FATA Annual Development Programmes (ADP).

¹³ Government of NWFP, "FATA Development Statistics 2005", Peshawar: Bureau of Statistics - Planning and Development Department, 2005.

¹⁴ Iftikhar Durrani, "The Country and the territory", *The News*, 4 February 2007.

Thus it leads to poor visibility and impact of development interventions. Even with increased allocation since 2002, the per capita government funded development investment in FATA (Rs. 905/- or US\$ 11.30) stands very low against the national per capita government funded development investment (Rs. 2044/- or US\$ 25.55). This issue is more compounded due to the fact that there is almost no private investment being made in FATA.¹⁵

Though state run schools are present in the area, the influence of the Islamic seminaries called Madrassas has substantially increased in the region. The backwardness of the FATA has been recognized in all economic plans including the country's sixth five-year plan as the least developed area of Pakistan.¹⁶ Spending for education has consistently been low in FATA, with less than 1.5 billion rupees allocated annually prior to 2001, increasing to 2.7 billion in 2004–05. The Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) carried out in 2007 notes:

FATA has remained one of the most insular and an isolated corner of the country, cut off from the mainstream of Pakistani society... Access to secondary education is low in FATA for males as well as females. The primary school (6-10 years of age) Net Enrolment Rate (NER) was found to be 28.3%. The 10+-literacy rate was 21.4% in FATA. The overall literacy of 15+ years of age was 22% in FATA. The Gender Parity Index (GPI) for the primary school Net Enrolment Rate was 0.45 in FATA. Child registration is rare in FATA, where only 1% of the children below 5 years of age are registered at birth. The registration process is growing in urban areas with the introduction of proper offices and facilities. Around 5.6% of births were registered in urban areas. Of all children aged 5-14 years, 3.6% were involved in either economic or domestic work, while 1.5%

¹⁵ Planning and Development Department, *Cost of Conflict in FATA*, Peshawar: FATA Secretariat, April 2009 .Available at: www.fata.gov.pk.

¹⁶ Mohammad Amir Rana, Director – Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, interview with the author, 3 April 2007, Lahore.

worked outside their households. Just 0.1% was paid for their labor...Increasingly impoverished and marginalized; they (People of FATA) have also become vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of criminal and extremist elements.¹⁷

Table of comparative social sector indicators Pakistan, NWFP and, FATA

Indicator	Pakistan	NWFP	FATA
Literacy rate	43.92	35.4	17.42
(Both sexes, %)			
Male literacy rate (%)	54.81	51.39	29.51
Female literacy rate (%)	32.02	18.82	3.00
Population per doctor	1,226	4,916	7,670
Population per bed in health institutions	1,341	1,594	2,179
Road (per sq km)	0.26	0.13	0.17

Source: Civil Secretariat FATA, *FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2007– 15*, Peshawar.

Holding the Federal government responsible for this situation, a former FATA member of the National Assembly, Latif Afridi comments:

FATA has been kept deliberately backward...By raising the bogus threat of Pashtun separatism; the central government has denied Pashtun their basic economic and political rights and kept a natural part of NWFP under federal control.¹⁸

¹⁷ UNESCO, WFP and Planning and Development Department, “Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) Federally Administered Tribal Areas – Pakistan”, Peshawar: FATA Secretariat, 2007.

¹⁸ Quoted in International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 125 , “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants”, 11 December 2006, p: 9.

Thus FATA is a unique political entity that is both a part of and apart from Pakistan. Tribal allegiance and Islamic brotherhood is a strong factor and national identity is very much secondary. The combination of “religious conservatism” and Pushtun honor code called “Pushtunwali”¹⁹ ingrained in the tribal psyche have enabled the tribal groups to survive the external influences while sustaining a governance mode largely based on, “Islamic Faith, Customs and Traditions.”²⁰

The area has been a base of militancy for decades.²¹ North and South Waziristan served as a launching pad and supply line of Mujahedeen operations during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, with the support of the West (particularly USA), Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Reportedly, North and South Waziristan agencies were Osama bin Laden’s base of operations versus the Soviets.²² Reflecting on the complexities that hindered Musharraf regime’s counter-insurgency military operations in Waziristan, Chief of Waziristan Agency Malik Haji Nasrullah Kahn in conversation with the author contended:

Musharraf’s policy versus this area was abnormal from the very beginning. He supported United States against the people of the area...How is it possible to chop down a tree that Islamabad watered for more than two decades? The support for Jihad is very deep and requires long-term educational, political, economic, constitutional and social reform in the area... People of the area continue to suffer and are in the cross-fire between militants and military.²³

¹⁹ Note: Pushtunwali is a more than based on logic of violent reaction: vendetta, provision of sanctuary to fugitives, honor and cohesion against external interference of any kind.

²⁰ Rahimullah Yusufzai, interview with the author, 22 November 2006, Peshawar.

²¹ Major General Shaukat Sultan - Pakistan Army Spokesman and Director General ISPR, interview with Author, 6 February 2007, Rawalpindi.

²² International Crises (ICG) Asia Report No 125, op.cit, p: 14.

Note: Osama bin Laden was with the American in the Afghan Jihad vis-à-vis the Soviets, and he turned against America when it sent its forces into Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

²³ Chief of Waziristan Agency Malik Haji Nasrullah Khan, telephonic interview with Author, 10 March, 2010, Islamabad.

In July 2006, Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa approved a highly ambitious plan for sustainable development to be implemented by the Civil Secretariat - FATA in partnership with International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Pakistan. The aim of the Sustainable Development Plan (SDP) – FATA 2007 – 2015 was to secure social, economic and ecological well-being of the people by promoting a just, peaceful and equitable society.²⁴ However, the successful implementation of FATA's Sustainable Development Plan (SDP) 2007 – 2015 continued to be hampered by the outdated governance mode; weak or non-existent writ of state in the areas concerned coupled with an unpopular repressive legal regime; conservative and rigid social order; low quality of social, economic, educational and health infrastructure, and increasing human deprivation in a fragile security atmosphere in the area.

Following the Soviet Union's retreat from Afghanistan in 1989, though the United States lost interest in the area, the regional players (particularly, Pakistan, India, Iran, and so on) continued to interfere in the Afghan civil war by aiding one group against another. With the coming of Taliban to power in Kabul (1996) Afghanistan became a haven for local, regional, and global "Jihadis". The International Crises Group (ICG)'s in one of its reports contends:

The roots of Islamic militancy lie in the regional and international patronage of religious extremists during the anti-Soviet jihad, during the (Afghan) civil war and Taliban rule which radicalized the area.²⁵

The negative impact of radicalization of the region was inevitable for Pakistan. With the 4 million Afghan refugees camped in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and

²⁴ Civil Secretariat FATA, *FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2007 – 2015*, Peshawar. Available at: <http://www.fata.gov.pk>

²⁵ International Crises Group - *ICG Asia Report*, No: 125, op.cit, p: 13.

Baluchistan, the Pak-Afghan border became a free zone for the activities of extremists, drug peddlers and smugglers that successive governments in Pakistan failed to check. Indeed Pakistan's reliance on non-state actors (particularly, the jihadis) and militant Islam as the informal tools of state security led to the brutalization of the society as a whole. With the popularity of the Taliban and by association al-Qaeda, anti-Americanism became the dominant sentiment in the Tribal areas, particularly in Waziristan. Tracing the present scenario of militancy to developments in the recent past an eminent analyst has observed:

Taliban heavily influenced the politics of the area and the people were influenced by their Islamic ideologies... donations were showered on the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, a Pakistan organization ideologically associated with the Taliban movement, which then established a network of Islamic schools and had funds to operate them.²⁶

Following the ousting of the Taliban in December 2001 by the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan's tribal areas particularly Waziristan agencies, became a retreating zone for the Afghan Taliban and scores of al-Qaeda members. According to Pakistani officials, some 500-600 foreign fighters (mostly Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens) sought shelter there following the US-led offensives against them in Spinghar (White Mountain) near Tora Bora in December 2001 and in Operation Anaconda in Shahikot valley, Paktika in March 2002.²⁷ Due to the close proximity of religious and ideological views, the Afghan Taliban along with their foreign allies and the local militants, continue to use Waziristan agencies as the base for recruitment, regrouping, training and carrying

²⁶ Amir Rana, *The Seeds of Terrorism*, London: New Millennium, 2005, p: 236.

²⁷ International Crises Group, *ICG Asia Report*, No.125, op.cit, p: 13.

out cross-border attacks against the International forces and Afghan security personnel and officials. To quote Imtiaz Gul, a close observer of the developments:

Most of these people, staunch believers in Islam with strong commitment to the tradition of shelter, and a propensity to side with all those who oppose the Americans, have been unable to reconcile with the new situation in which yesterday's *Mujahideen* and *Taliban* are being chased as terrorists. The hatred of the urban pragmatism (Pakistan's policy changes) and a dislike for America combined with an oppressive system all had combined to fuel anti-government and anti-military sentiment in the tribal areas and also provide ammunition to the militants. For them, al-Qaeda means being staunch Muslims and Pashtoonwali demands these brothers must be protected.²⁸

Sheltering the Taliban and al-Qaeda has not been without cost for tribal groups. Many have been reduced to hostages at the mercy of the various hard-line groups loosely labeled as the Taliban. These are a mixture of Afghan Taliban, foreign Jihadis (Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechen) and their local sympathizers. The weak writ of the Pakistan government and the role of the Political Agents have been greatly reduced. Reflecting on the sorry state of affairs, Zubair Mehsud a lawyer from FATA, in conversation with the author observed:

In Waziristan, the Taliban are in complete control and run their own judicial system, collect taxes, and execute people allegedly involved in offences like murders, extortion, liquor, and narcotics trade.²⁹

In this state of unremitting fear, "writing truth is equal to inviting your own death" maintains senior Peshawar journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai. "In Wana in South Waziristan 26 journalists used to work, but now only one journalist Ashfaq is left. All

²⁸ Imtiaz Gul, Chairman— Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), interview with Author, 27 August 2008, Islamabad.

²⁹ Zubair Mehsud, interview with author, 19 February 2007, Islamabad.

others left Wana area due to hostile environment. Out of 25 journalists in North Waziristan only five are now working. Others have migrated to safer places in the settled districts such as Bannu and Peshawar.”³⁰

It must also be noted that all tribal people do not voluntarily provide refuge to al-Qaeda and Afghan elements, and many of them do that only reluctantly, often out of fear. The Shia tribal people in the Para Chinara area, because of their differences with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, have been helpful to Pakistani forces in operations against the militants. Reportedly, at least five major operations in Waziristan area were conducted on the basis of information provided by the Shia tribals. —The tribes that have rendered help against the Taliban and al-Qaeda include sub-tribes of the Weirs known as the Zali Khel, the Kari Khel, the Yar Gul Khel, the Naziri Khel, and the Masood Zai and Ahmad Zai tribes. The tribes are spread through North and South Waziristan, Bajaur Agency, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan.”³¹

The preceding discussion sketches the contextual (that is, geo-strategic location, constitutional status, legal system, social, educational and economic deprivation) dynamics of the FATA region that has made this area a favorite retreating zone, hiding place, and transit ground for recruiting, training, and launching terrorist activities within and beyond Pakistan. Reportedly, by the end of 2001:

FATA became a shelter for offenders and drug-traffickers. No-one in the tribal areas is prevented from keeping modern and sophisticated weapons. Out of 16,988 registered proclaimed offenders in the NWFP, 99 per cent

³⁰ Rahimullah Yasufzai, “*National Hearing, of Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights*” 16 March 2007, Islamabad.

Note: This hearing was also attended by Author.

³¹ Amir Rana, op.cit, p: 253.

have taken shelter in Darra Adam Khel, Orakzai Agency, Kurram Agency and Khyber Agency.³²

The uniqueness of this area has been manipulated by the power brokers to deprive the people of the area to be full-fledged citizens of the country. That is, the state which has neglected its due role as the facilitator and provider of security for its people (one of the basic assumptions of this study) has often chosen a quick-fix approach to rectify an extremely complex situation – particularly in FATA. Ms Mossarat Qadeem, leading a community based empowerment initiative in FATA, vividly describes how the state has failed in its duty to the people of the region:

In spite of their love and sacrifices, Pakistan rarely tried to integrate them (Tribal Area's people) and maintained a 'closed door policy' – a heritage of the colonial rulers...Thirty percent of FATA is still inaccessible both politically and administratively...Due to instability in the region economic development is still an unanswered (sic) question. Such a dearth of economic opportunities and deplorable socio-economic indicators can warrant no quality of life. And tribal's can easily subscribe to extremist ideas, gun culture and trafficking.³³

This leads us into the analysis of the force-based approach adopted by the General Musharraf regime vis-à-vis FATA in its capacity as a major ally of the US- led 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan.

Part Two: Military Actions – 2002 - 2010

The stated aims of the military drive launched in FATA were: ~~to~~ eradicate terrorists and deny them sanctuaries; develop the area and integrate FATA into the national mainstream."³⁴ To what extent Islamabad achieved its stated goals through

³² Sultan Shahin, 'Islamabad's Plan To Tame Tribal Areas', *Asia Times Online*, 28 November 2001.

³³ Mossarat Qadeem, Executive Director of PAIMAN Alumni Trust, interview with Author, 20 December 2008, Islamabad.

³⁴ Major General Shaukat Sultan – DG ISPR, interview with Author, 6 February 2007, Rawalpindi.

military actions and what variables accounted for mixed results of military operations? Is the question answers to which is sought in this part of the chapter. The military campaign to evict foreign militants (primarily Al-Qaeda and its affiliates) and target anti-state elements comprised actions, counter-actions, verbal and written peace agreements, amnesty, economic embargo, development plans, and resort to the Political Agents-the traditional tools of governance.

According to the Inter Services Public Relations- (ISPR-Rawalpindi) data shared with the author, 27 Major Operations and 72 Minor Operations were conducted till April 2010 in FATA.³⁵ ISPR sources classify Major military operations as ‘pre-planned and extensive military campaign’ in an identified area and Minor military operations imply ‘limited and reactive measures’ in response to attacks on security check posts, ambushes and encounters.³⁶

OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IN FATA – UPTO 2010.

Year	Major Operations	Minor Operations
Up to 2004	11	35
2005	9	12
2006	1	17
2007	11	21

³⁵ Data obtained from ISPR, 8 April 2010, Rawalpindi.

³⁶ Author’s conversation with the ISPR official, 7 March 2010.

2008	41	49
2009	61	121
2010 (Till April)	27	72

Source: ISPR, 8 April 2010.

Pakistan's military actions were precipitated by developments following the Afghan jihad and the events of September 11, when many Taliban elements and foreign militants sought sanctuary in Pakistan's border regions. The region's difficult and treacherous terrain, cross-border ethnic complexion, porous and previously largely unmanned nature of Pak–Afghan border (approximately 2,750 kilometers) posed a daunting task for Pakistan's army. To quote former head of ISPR, Major General Shaukat Sultan:

Pakistan army achieved its objective of opening up the hitherto 'No Go Areas', without a shot being fired. For the first year and half, the focus of army's efforts was on sealing borders and undertaking development work. There was lack of information on presence of terrorists / unwanted foreign elements in the Tribal Areas, because of weak intelligence infrastructure, which was in process of being established.³⁷

In March 2002, Pakistan deployed nearly 100,000 troops around Tora Bora to block fleeing Al-Qaeda fighters from crossing over into the Pakistani territory.³⁸ The most important campaigns since 2001 include support for the US-led Operation Enduring

³⁷Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan, "Pakistan's Struggle against Domestic and Global Terrorism in the Security Realm", P I Cheema, et al, edit., *Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia*, Islamabad Policy Research Institute: Asia Printers, 2006, pp: 20 - 28.

³⁸"Pakistan deployed 100,000 troops", *Dawn*, 2 August 2002.

Freedom (2001–02); Operation Al Mizan (2002–06); Operation Zalzala (2008); and operations Sher Dil, Rah-e-Haq and Rah-e-Rast (2007–09).

Pakistan made two extremely important contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom. Firstly, it granted over-flight and landing rights for US military and intelligence units, allowed access to some Pakistani ports and bases, provided intelligence and immigration information, facilitated logistical supply to military forces in Afghanistan, and (temporarily) broke diplomatic relations with, and cut off most logistical support to the Taliban.³⁹ Secondly, Pakistan deployed units from the regular army, Special Services Group⁴⁰, Frontier Corps and Inter-Services Intelligence directorate to the Afghanistan–Pakistan border to conduct operations along infiltration routes from Afghanistan. The regular army employed two infantry brigades for border and internal-security operations for much of 2001 and 2002 and it established two quick-reaction forces from the Special Services Group in Kohat and Wana to provide local Pakistani commanders the ability to deploy troops quickly. In addition, approximately 4,000 Frontier Corps forces were used to conduct operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.⁴¹

In December 2001, Pakistan employed a mixture of forces in Khyber and Kurram tribal agencies to support US operations at Tora Bora. In March 2002, Pakistan increased force levels in North and South Waziristan to target militants during US-led *Operation Anaconda* in the Shah-i-Kot Valley of Paktia Province in Afghanistan.⁴² Throughout 2002, Frontier Corps forces raided weapons caches in South Waziristan; the regular army

³⁹ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, op.cit, pp: 201–7

⁴⁰ C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, ‘Pakistan’s War Within’, *Survival*, No: 6, Vol: 51, December 2009–January 2010. pp: 161–188.

⁴¹ C. Christine Fair, *The Counter terror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004. Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG141.pdf.

⁴² C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, ‘Pakistan’s War Within’, op.cit, p: 167.

assaulted al-Qaeda operatives during *Operation Kazha Punga* in South Waziristan; regular army troops entered areas in Khyber and Kurram Agencies to pursue al-Qaeda fighters fleeing Afghanistan; and Pakistani military, police and intelligence forces conducted operations against insurgents in Baluchistan Province.⁴³

Pakistan played a major role in capturing many senior al-Qaeda operatives and foreign fighters, including Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Sharib Ahmad.⁴⁴ It remanded many of these to the US government, which temporarily billeted them in secret prisons in Kandahar, Bagram and elsewhere. In most cases, Pakistan retained captured Afghans or Pakistanis.⁴⁵ US officials widely praised Pakistani contributions in this period. A critical point to be noted is that Washington did not ask Islamabad to target all, or even most, militant groups and leaders operating in and from Pakistan, including senior Afghan Taliban figures and allies such as Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Rather, Washington sought Pakistani assistance primarily in capturing or killing al-Qaeda and foreign fighters, which Pakistan saw as in its own interest.⁴⁶ Brian Cloughley while analyzing Pakistan's military operations in FATA points out the lack of planning and foresight on the part of US-led forces operating across the Durand Line in Afghanistan in underestimating the re-vitalizing capacity of Afghan and Al-Qaeda related militants. He observes:

Given the commitment of fewer than 100 American personnel, U.S. forces proved unable to block egress routes from Tora Bora south into Pakistan, the route that OBL [Osama bin Laden] most likely took. Regardless, the defeat

⁴³ International Crisis Group, "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants", 11 December 2006, p: 14. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4568&l=1&m=1>.

⁴⁴ Zafar Abbas, 'Operation Eyewash', *Herald*, August 2005, p: 64

⁴⁵ C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, 'Pakistan's War Within', op.cit, p: 168.

⁴⁶ Ashley J. Tellis, *Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance* Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008, p: 7

for AQ [Al Qaeda] at Tora Bora, coupled with the later defeat during operation *ANACONDA*, ensured that neither AQ, nor the Taliban would mass forces to challenge American troops in the field until 2006.⁴⁷

Operation Enduring Freedom was partially successful in its primary objectives of overthrowing the Taliban regime and capturing some al-Qaeda fighters crossing the border. But the United States and Pakistan failed to capture some key al-Qaeda figures, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, which reportedly crossed into Pakistan.

6.2 Operation Al Mizan 2002–06:

Operation Al Mizan comprised several smaller operations, such as Operation Kalosha II, which took place in South Waziristan. The March 2004 Kalusha operation concentrated on a 50 – square kilometer area near Wana, South Waziristan’s district headquarters, around the villages of Shin Warsak, Daza Gundai, Kalusha, Ghaw Khawa, and Kari Kot.⁴⁸ This area was under the control of five Islamist militants – Nek Mohammad, Noor-ul-Islam, Mohammad Sharif, Maulvi Abbas and Maulvi Abdul Aziz – suspected of harboring foreign terrorists and having links with the Afghan Taliban.

Operation Kalosha II was successful in that it eliminated several local and foreign fighters, disrupted a major al-Qaeda command and control centre, and captured a network of tunnels containing sophisticated electronic equipment and supplies. But it also triggered attacks against nearby Pakistan army and Frontier Corps bases. The operation backfired, as local and foreign militants ambushed troops, inflicting heavy losses and

⁴⁷ Brain Cloughley, *Insurrection, Terrorism, and the Pakistan Army*, Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Brief No: 53, 10 December 2009. p: 9.

⁴⁸ Owais Tohid, “The new frontier”, *Newsline*, April 2004.

took officials hostage.⁴⁹ Reflecting on the Kalusha operation, former director general of Inter Services Intelligence , Lt General (retd) Asad Durrani said:

Military action was taken in haste. Regular channels of conflict resolution and dialogue should have taken precedence over the use of military force, which undermined the capacity of the administration and local tribesmen to neutralize, contain and de-weaponise the militants through non-military means.⁵⁰

Another important operation took place in June 2004, when 10,000 army troops, along with US-trained Special Operations Task Force (a helicopter mobile battalion from Special Services Group) and Frontier Corps forces, attacked what was reported to be a force of more than 200 Chechens and Uzbeks, some Arabs and several hundred local supporters in the Shikai Valley, some 25km north of Wana. Nearly 3,000 soldiers established an outer cordon and the Pakistan Air Force struck at dawn, using precision weapons against nine compounds. Pakistan army forces used indirect artillery fire and precision rocket attacks by helicopter gunships. Helicopters dropped off Special Operations Task Force troops to search the compounds, and infantry initiated a simultaneous operation to clear the valley and link up with the task force. Later, an additional force of 3,000 troops was brought into the area to clear more of the valley.⁵¹

6.3: A- Shikai Agreement – April 2004

With public opinion running against military actions in South Waziristan, the army opted for an unwritten peace deal known as, Shikai Agreement with the pro-Taliban militants on 24 April 2004. The Shikai deal offered the local militants amnesty and

⁴⁹ Rahimullah Yusafzai and Sailab Mahsud, “Waziristan clashes death toll rises: 16 troops, 23 military vehicles lost”, *The News*, 18 March 2004.

⁵⁰ Quoted in, ICG Asia Report no 125, op.cit, p: 15.

⁵¹ Pervez Musharraf, *In the line of Fire*, op.cit, p: 165.

financial incentives in return for good behavior and pledges to renounce violence. They were also asked to surrender al-Qaeda and other foreign militants or register them with the authorities and ensure that they would not use Pakistani territory for cross-border attacks.⁵²

However, the Shikai agreement never fully materialized as foreign terrorists failed to register and surrender, aided by the local pro-Taliban militant support. In June 2004, Nek Mohammad who was said to be key link to al-Qaeda was killed in a suspected US missile attack.⁵³ This was followed by Haji Omar becoming the leader of the Wana Taliban in South Waziristan. Haji Omar continued to house and shelter Uzbeks and foreign militants who focused more on attacking Pakistani government and military than to attack U.S. and NATO targets across the border in Afghanistan. This put them in conflict with the Taliban commander Mullah Nazir, who expelled them and their supporters, Haji Omar and Haji Sharif, by April 2007. The Uzbeks then sought refuge in the Mehsud-dominated areas of South Waziristan, where Abdullah Mehsud and Baitullah Mehsud had organized their own anti-Pakistan, anti-Western Taliban movements.

As part of the force-based policy, economic sanctions were applied to the area under the collective responsibility clause of the FCR.⁵⁴ The administration closed shops impounded dozens of vehicles and arrested Zalikhel (sub-clan of Ahmedzai Wazir) tribesmen, including thirteen elders.⁵⁵ Along with this, military air strikes were renewed, targeting the militant sanctuaries in the Shikai area. Distributors of militant propaganda

⁵² —“Amnesty offer renewed for foreigners in tribal areas”, *Dawn*, 21 June 2004.

⁵³ Sailab Mahsud and Rahimullah Yusufzai, —Nek Muhammad, five others killed in missile attack”, *The News*, 19 June 2004.

⁵⁴ —Wana bazaar sealed, more tribesmen held”, *The News*, 31 May 2004.

⁵⁵ —6,000 shops in Wana closed down”, *Dawn*, 31 May 2004.

were also targeted in one of the operations. Along with this, air strikes were renewed, targeting the militant sanctuaries in the Shikai area. Army spokesman Major General Shaukat Sultan maintained, “During 2004-2005, foreign militants have been eliminated in South Waziristan, and the remaining small groups are on the run in North Waziristan.”⁵⁶

6.4 – B: Sra Rogah Peace Deal – February 2005

After the death of Nek Mohammed, Baitullah Mehsud emerged as a leader of the militants in South Waziristan. In February 2005, another six-point peace deal was inked between the defiant local pro-Taliban militant Baitullah Mehsud and the military through the mediation of the local Jirga. Baitullah Mehsud surrendered in Sra Rogah (February 2005), with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) playing a central role and was given amnesty by the government afterwards. According to the terms of the agreement, Baitullah Mehsud and his associates would not attack government functionaries and forces, would not shelter and assist al-Qaeda and other foreign terrorists and would aid the government’s war on terror. If they violated the accord, they would be punished in accordance with the local customs and existing laws. As with the Shakai deal, the army agreed to remove troops from Mehsud’s territory, compensate the militants for human and material losses, and deploy Frontier Corps personnel to the five forts there.⁵⁷

Despite the peace deals the situation remained quite unstable as cross-border infiltration, targeted killing of the pro-government tribal chiefs, plus attacks on the military check posts continued. The agreement of 2005 was more on paper than on ground. In fact, the pro-Taliban/Taliban commanders such as Baitullah Mehsud and Haji

⁵⁶ Quoted in, Imtiaz Gul, op.cit, p: 30.

⁵⁷ ‘Accord in Bajaur to Curb Terrorists’, *Dawn*, 31 May 2005; ‘The Bajaur Massacre’, *Dawn*, 1 November 2006; Mohammad Ali, ‘Peace Deal in Bajaur Soon, Says Aurakzai’, *Dawn*, 24 February 2007.

Omar, who concluded the peace deals with the government in South Waziristan in 2005, publicly stated that: “they will continue to wage their ~~–~~jihad” against the US-led coalition in Afghanistan.”⁵⁸ Reportedly, during 2005, in North and South Waziristan as many as 108 pro-Government tribal leaders including four chief maliks or elders, at least four Government officials, informers and two local journalists, were assassinated by the militants. In the North Waziristan agency, during the later half of 2005, 25 bomb blasts, 32 sniper and rocket attacks on FC (Frontier Constabulary) and Army camps were reported. Hundreds of houses were demolished for sheltering the militants in the military operations.⁵⁹

6.5 – C: Military Action and Peace Agreements in North Waziristan – 2006

The year 2006 witnessed the re-grouping of the militants in North Waziristan, enhanced cross border attacks, and hit and run attacks on Pakistan’s security forces. In March 2006, for instance, security forces targeted an alleged militant hideout in the border town of Danday Saidgi. The military claimed that 45 people, including 30 foreigners, mostly Chechens were killed in the attack. The militants retaliated with the attack on a Frontier Corps convoy near Mirali town, two days later. As a result heavy fighting spread to Miramshah, North Waziristan’s district headquarters. The cost of violence on the local population grew day by day. According to reports, “the growing influence of militants and resultant insecurity have forced tribesmen in the restive North and South Waziristan agencies to migrate to adjacent districts of the NWFP.”⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Putting out the fire in Waziristan,” *The News*, 19 January, 2007.

⁵⁹ Figures quoted in, Imtiaz Gul, op.cit, p: 34.

⁶⁰ *Dawn*, 18 January, 2006.

While this was going on, military planners in Islamabad began to revisit their strategy to handle the deteriorating situation in Waziristan. It was felt that the use of force was counter-productive and local youth were gravitating towards the Taliban.⁶¹ Thus, another peace initiative was launched by the newly appointed NWFP's Governor, Lt. General (ret'd) Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzai, in May 2006. Orakzai vowed:

The agreement aimed to put out the fire that engulfed the entire Waziristan and turn it into a land of peace. The army operation had weakened al-Qaeda and dispersed them and that it was time for political dialogue, the government put together a Grand Jirga to hold negotiations with the warring elements for a truce.⁶²

Though criticized by the Western governments, media and think tanks as a ~~policy~~ of appeasement", the deal was termed by Pakistan as ~~historic~~" and ~~unprecedented~~." ⁶³ JUI-F parliamentarian Maulana Syed Nek Zaman who was also involved in the mediation process said: ~~Misunderstandings~~ between the administration and Pakistan's Taliban led to unpleasant moments but we are happy that a new beginning starts today." ⁶⁴

According to the translated text of the North Waziristan Peace Agreement,⁶⁵ the Utmanzai Tribe of the North Waziristan (that also incorporated the militant's representatives, religious and local leaders) and the Government signed the peace deal on

⁶¹ Director General ISPR, Major General Shaukat Sultan Interview with Author, 6 February 2007, Rawalpindi.

⁶² Governor NWFP - Lt General (ret'd) Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzai, interview with Author, 22 November 2006, Peshawar.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ ~~Awelcome~~ move", *The Nation*, 6 September, 2006.

⁶⁵ Text of ~~North Waziristan Peace Agreement~~" obtained from, ISPR, 6 November, 2006, Rawalpindi.

5 September 2006 at Miranshah, in a move to establish enduring peace in the area. The critical elements of this deal are explained in Appendix No.18.

How successful these deals have been in terms of the aims of the Pakistan government, in particular with respect to the denial of safe haven to the Taliban and al-Qaeda can be gauged from this comment of senior journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai he made on the peace agreements and their aftermath:

Such accords were signed as a necessity to reduce losses to the military and our people by employing traditional peacemaking methods such as jirga...The peace agreements need to be implemented in letter and spirit and regularly monitored and reviewed. The involvement of Pakistani fighters in the fighting between the Afghan government and Taliban is drawing Islamabad into the conflict and jeopardizing the country's security. Any sanctuaries for Taliban must be removed.⁶⁶

According to national and international media reports and Pakistan government officials, the situation on the ground remained tense in the later part of 2006 and continues to be so. The militants, who are no longer fighting Pakistani troops, are instead using the region as a hub for cross-border attacks. "This is more than evident in the deaths of local militants during clashes in Afghanistan".⁶⁷ According to the people belonging to the area, "In North and South Waziristan, the writ of the government remains weak and most of the time it's absent. Excessive use of force by Pakistan Army has alienated the civilians."⁶⁸

The Peace Accord of September 2006 was heavily criticized in the Western media as an attempt to cut deals with the militants to protect Pakistan's troops while exposing forces operating in Afghanistan to harm. For instance, an international think tank

⁶⁶ Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Putting out the fire in Waziristan", *The News*, 19 January 2007.

⁶⁷ "Bodies of four militants brought from Afghanistan", *Dawn*, 17 October 2006.

⁶⁸ Peshawar based Lawyer Zuabair Mehsud, interview with Author, 19 February 2007, Islamabad.

observed: “The militants now hold sway in South and North Waziristan Agencies and have begun to expand their influence not just in other tribal agencies such as Khyber and Bajaur but also in NWFP’s settled districts.”⁶⁹ Similarly, within Pakistan some political parties and groups criticized North Waziristan peace agreement as empowering the militants at the expense of the security of the common man. In its editorial, a major national daily stressed:

On the face of it, the agreement reads as a breakthrough, but if one reads the finer print, it appears that the government has all but caved in to the demands of the militants. More ominously, the agreement seems to be a tacit acknowledgement by the government of the growing power and authority of the local Taliban.⁷⁰

6.6 – D: Military Actions, inactions, peace overtures and reactions in FATA; Swat, and; Mainland Pakistan: 2007-2008

In the first three months of 2007, Waziristan continued to see-saw between tension, violence and uneasy peace. The Pakistan military claimed to have carried out two air strikes in Gurwek (North Waziristan) and in Salamat village of Shak Toi (South Waziristan) in January, to destroy the militants (foreign) hideouts. This perception runs against the commonly held view “US military used its unmanned, CIA-operated Predators to fire the missiles that hit these targets inside Pakistani territory.”⁷¹ The strikes led to violent protests in “Tank” which serves as the gateway to South Waziristan and the protests spread to other areas as well. The air strikes were also widely condemned by the religious political stalwarts as well as secular and nationalist parties’ leadership.

⁶⁹ International Crisis Group Asia ICG Report No. 125, op.cit, p: 20.

⁷⁰ “Back to square one?” *The News*, 7 September 2006.

⁷¹ Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Putting out the fire in Waziristan”, *The News*, 19 January 2007.

In December 2007 indigenous Taliban militant groups formed the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)⁷², an umbrella organization of dozens of Taliban groups throughout Pakistan, under the initial leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a North Waziristan-based commander, was elected the first deputy chief, or Amir, of the TTP, while Maulana Fazlullah, head of the Taliban in the Swat region of North-West Frontier Province of NWFP (renamed Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa in 2010), was elected as secretary of TTP. Bahadur left TTP in 2008 and allied himself with the likeminded Mullah Nazir, primarily because he was against targeting Pakistani state and civilians as pursued by Baitullah Mehsud. The formation and composition of TTP demonstrated the overspill of militancy and violence into adjoining districts of NWFP. Most of the analysts testify, “TTP has strong presence in all seven agencies of the FATA and in the settled districts of the NWFP: Bannu, Karak, Hangu, Kulachi, Dera Ismail Khan (D.I. Khan), Lakki Marwat, Doaba, Kohat, Dir, Buner, and to some extent Mardan, the Swat Valley, and Shangla district.”⁷³

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema an expert on Pakistan’s security policy identifies three broad categories of militants from 2006 onwards in FATA:

Al Qaeda elements, who desire “regime change” in Pakistan, constitute the first type of militants. Those elements are primarily reacting to US Western policies perceived as anti-Muslim. The recent military occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan has fuelled this anti-U.S. sentiment; Afghan nationals in Pakistan—particularly those who are sympathetic to the former Taliban government and oppose Afghanistan’s occupation by foreign troops—constitute the

⁷² Note: The TTP is an amalgam of 40 groups. One of its aims is that if security forces attack one group of Taliban then all TTP components would open new fronts for the forces in their respective areas to ease pressure on their attacked comrades. Another aim is to engage the military on many fronts in the NWFP and FATA. For more details see: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), *Pakistan Security Report 2008*, Islamabad.

⁷³ Syed Saleem Shahzad, Bureau Chief *Asia Times online*, interview with Author, April 25 2010, Islamabad.

second type of militants; Pakistan nationals—especially some Pashtuns in the NWFP plus FATA and from Punjab province as well. These are sympathetic to and supportive of the former two categories —constitute the third type of militants.⁷⁴

Ironically, as militancy branched further into FATA, its adjacent areas and mainland of Pakistan, tactics used by terrorists also evolved and became more lethal. According to Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) terrorists adopted the use of landmines, improvised explosive devices, rocket attacks and beheadings as means to counter Pakistan military actions against them.

Table: Attack Tactics of the Terrorists - 2008

Tactic	Number of Incidents
Suicide attacks	63
Rocket attacks	381
Beheadings	46
Remote-controlled bombs	112
Landmines	110
Firing	451
Sabotage, burn, Fire	116
Improvised explosive devices	373
Target killings	26
Manually developed low intensity devices	298

⁷⁴ Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Challenges Facing a Counter-Militant Campaign in Pakistan’s FATA”, (*NBR Analysis*, Vol:9, No: 3, United States of America: National Bureau of Asian Research, August 2008. p: 22.

Hand grenades	82
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Source: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), *Pakistan Security Report 2008*, Islamabad.

Throughout 2007, militancy and extremism continued across all agencies of FATA and adjacent area. In Bajaur agency, Taliban ran the show. Abdul Ghani Marwat, who headed the government's vaccination campaign in Bajaur, was killed in a bomb attack in February amid the Taliban-sponsored rumor that the Pakistani government-run polio vaccination drive was a United States plot to sterilize Muslim children termed as Taliban *—aftwa*". According to government estimates which are always conservative, parents of around 24,000 children had refused to give them the polio vaccine.⁷⁵ Meanwhile, government tried to regain the trust of the local population by engaging the moderate elements and promising more development aid for the area.

Facilitating formation of *Lashkars* (group of Tribal people) rising against foreign and local militants in support of the Army's operation was adopted as part of the military strategy in the region. In the Tribal Areas, the first anti-Taliban Lashkar was formed in Salarzai tehsil of Bajaur Agency. According to media reports, the Lashkar was formed when the Taliban ambushed and killed tribal elders Malik Bakhtawar Khan, Malik Shah Zarin and religious scholar Maulvi Sher Wali who were on their way home after a meeting with government officials in Khar where they had pledged to raise a Lashkar and sought government support for the purpose. The local tribesmen held the Taliban responsible for the killings and formed a Lashkar led by Fazal Kareem Baro. However, the Lashkar kept away from flushing out militants from their strongholds in Mula Said

⁷⁵ Hassan Abbas, *—Pakistan's grip on Tribal areas is slipping*", *Jamestown Foundation*, 2007.

Banda and Darra areas of Salarzai tehsil. In Mamond tehsil of Bajaur Agency, Malik Rahmatullah Khan and Malik Shahpar Khan formed a Lashkar. In Charmang tehsil of Bajaur Agency Malik Sherdad and Malik Tari Gul set up a Lashkar to contain the local Taliban.”⁷⁶

In early 2007, clashes in the Azam Warsak area in South Waziristan between the foreign militants (mainly Uzbeks) and the local Tribesmen were characterized by the government as an attempt by the locals to evict the foreign militants from the area. The death toll recorded above 120, included 30 local tribesmen and the rest foreign, mostly Uzbekistani militants and their tribal supporters from the area and beyond.⁷⁷ There were reports that the army may be pounding the hideout of foreign elements on behalf of the local tribesmen, though this is denied by the government. To quote an Islamabad based analyst Farhan Bokhari:

A week of fighting between al-Qaeda loyalists and tribal militants in a remote Pakistani border region has almost completely destroyed camps used by a leading terrorist from Uzbekistan, Pakistani intelligence officials claimed on Thursday. There’s no way to confirm if Yuldashev himself may be dead. But what I know or certain is that his group has suffered heavy casualties, said one Pakistani intelligence official. It’s hard to imagine if the Uzbeks have any firepower remaining to carry on in the tribal areas.⁷⁸

The fact is the challenge of militancy in the tribal areas was too complex to be resolved quickly. The people of the tribal area though fed up of militants present militants have had a long-term presence in the tribal areas. Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s former foreign

⁷⁶ Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), *Pakistan Security Report 2008*, Islamabad, p: 16.

⁷⁷ “Foll 127 as clashes intensify in Waziristan”, *The News*, 22 March 2007.

⁷⁸ Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan al-Qaeda camps destroyed”, *Financial Times*, 22 March 2007.

minister said also acknowledged this fact observing: “You can’t get rid of them in one go.”⁷⁹

6.7 Swat: Operation Rah-e-Haq in late November 2007 and July 2008

The roots of contemporary religious militancy in Swat can be traced back to the formation of Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) in 1989. Sufi Muhammad founded TNSM with an aim to enforce ‘Sharia’ (Islamic Law) in Swat. Twice in the 1990s TNSM launched an armed rebellion demanding promulgation of Sharia in the region. On December 1, 1994, the Governor of NWFP enforced Nizam-e-Shariat Regulation. Under this framework, courts and names of judges were ‘Islamized’, a judge was a designated Qazi and an adviser was assigned to each Qazi to administer justice according to the Sharia. A new parallel judicial system was instituted where litigants had a choice in that they could opt for the ‘law of Pakistan’ or the Sharia. The Nizam-e-Adl Regulation for the area was a continuation of the semi-Shariah laws that were already in force at the time of their merger in Pakistan. Qazi Courts already existed in the whole of Malakand division as a result of the previous Shariah and Nizam-e-Adl ordinances. The Nizam-e-Adl Regulation was enforced in Swat and the rest of Malakand division and Kohistan in 1994 and then, with some amendments, in 1999. But neither brought change nor redressed the people’s grievances due to which TNSM’s activities and demands for a change in the judicial system and enforcement of Islamic laws continued. Reportedly, three years prior to 9/11, Tehreek-e-Tulba was founded in the neighboring Orakzai Agency. This was the beginning of restrictions on women. Taliban started executions and banned TV usage as well as cinemas.

⁷⁹ Ibid .

In April 2001, Sufi Muhammad leading TNSM activists again demanded the imposition of Shariah. Following the 9/11 WTC incidents and impending strikes on Afghanistan, Sufi Muhammad took an estimated 10,500 people to fight against the US forces in Afghanistan. On January 12, 2002, the government of Pakistan banned TNSM and he was arrested on his return from Afghanistan the same month. His son-in-law, Maulvi Fazlullah, replaced him as leader of TNSM and, was nicknamed “Maulana Radio” for using FM radio station preaching Islamic revolution against the state. Swatis, who were fed up with the inefficient Pakistani judicial system were attracted to his fiery sermons calling for justice, equality and calls to lead a “pure Islamic” life. While encouraging his listeners to pray five times a day and avoid sinning, Fazlullah also preached anti-Americanism, focusing on U.S. forces fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. People particularly women collected and donated cash and gold ornaments to build a two-storey madrassa complex.”⁸⁰ For example, Fazlullah collected about 35 million rupees (Around \$600,000) from supporters to build a two-storey madrassa complex; it was later destroyed by Pakistani security forces in the spring of 2009.⁸¹

Government initially adopted a policy of “wait and see” and failed to undertake preventative measures to check the extremist organization becoming violent and threatening innocent citizens to conduct their day to day life peacefully. Holding government responsible for letting Swat slide into war, Ziauddin Yousafzai, an educator heading ‘Aman - Swat Peace Council’ told the author:

Swat is a classic case of state failure to deliver good quality education and good governance to its people. Fazlullah was seen as a messiah by illiterate women, unemployed youth

⁸⁰ Author’s conversation with group of Women and Youth from Swat, 20 April 2007, Islamabad.

⁸¹ Musa Khankhel and Mushtaq Yusufzai, “30 FC Men Die in Swat Blast,” *The News*, 1 October, 2007.

and dejected males who will give them a better quality of life following Islamic injunctions of his narrow interpretation. But people in general suffered from all sides. They lived in fear under Fazlullah men and waited for state action.⁸²

Similarly, a number of media reports pointed out the growing affinity of TNSM with other anti-state and anti-western militant factions within and beyond Pakistan. Recalling his experience as a former ideologue of TNSM, a young man from Swat confessed to the author:

I was part of both the worlds. In the morning I attended College and in the evening I was Talib in one of TNSM madrassa. There, we learned to make bombs, and how to preach and convince others to follow an Islamic path... I left this course realizing the danger of slipping into violence and was de-radicalized by peace activists in my area... State never did anything to check why the youth is turning towards TNSM agenda... Now I am peace captain and operate in a challenging environment. I am engaged in bringing youth of my area back to peaceful and tolerant path of life... I am convinced that through engagement and dialogue we can create and foster peace and stability in our area.⁸³

Finally in early 2006, the authorities blocked at least five illegal FM stations run by Maulana Fazlullah. On November 8, 2006 an army base in Dargai was attacked; 42 soldiers were killed. On January 13, 2007, Malik Bakht Habibi of ANP (Awami National Party) was killed. People gathered in Mingora, Saidu Sahrif and Matta, and burnt the

⁸² Ziauddin Yousafzai, series of conversation on telephone and in person with Author, 2007- 2010, Islamabad.

⁸³ Adnan Shinwari, student of Masters in Economics (The University of Peshawar) belonging to Swat, interview with Author, 3 February, 2010.

Note: Author has interacted with number of Youth groups engaged in Peace building efforts in Swat and FATA from 2006 -2010, being a 'Peace Trainer' and volunteer of non-governmental organization called PAIMAN (meaning promise) engaged in de-radicalization, peace education , women empowerment and civic education across Pakistan.

electronic products. Girls schools were bombed and –At least 150 hotels were shut down in Mingora alone; and 300 others in Sadda and Kalam.”⁸⁴

The Musharraf regime pursued a policy of dialogue and engagement vis-à-vis TNSM as the best way to calm Swat. In May 2007 a nine-point –Peace Agreement” between the Pakistan government and TNSM leader Fazlullah was inked. Its terms required Fazlullah to support the polio vaccination campaign and education for girls, as well as government efforts to establish law and order. He also agreed to shut down training facilities for terrorists, stop manufacturing weapons, and support the district administration in any operation against anti-state elements. Fazlullah's followers were also to stop carrying weapons in the open. In return, Fazlullah was permitted to continue broadcasting his illegal FM radio programmes and the government dropped criminal cases lodged against him.

The Taliban promptly disobeyed the terms of the deal, and began to overrun police stations and enforce Sharia law in the district. The Taliban used the government's siege and assault on Islamabad's –Lal Masjid” in 3-10 July 2007 as their reason for violating the peace agreement. But Fazlullah and his fighters had begun violating the agreement long before the Lal Masjid incident. Fazlullah's forces overran much of Swat and neighboring Shangla.

In November 2007, military Operation Rah-e-Haq was launched. Pakistan sent about 2,500 paramilitary troops in October 2007 to re-establish its authority in the region. In the first phase of Operation Rah-e-Haq, local police led cordon-and-search operations to clear militants operating in the Swat Valley, but the militants gradually re-infiltrated

⁸⁴ Dr Farrukh Saleem, –Swat: Paradise Lost”, *Discussion Forum: Debate on Governance and Security*, CRSS (Center for Research and Security Studies), Issue No: 1, 2009, Islamabad.

into key cities. The Pakistani Army was engaged in pitched battles with heavily armed insurgents. More than 200 policemen and soldiers were killed during fighting in Swat in 2007. In December 2007 Fazlullah merged with Baitullah Mehsud's Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The stated aim of the Operation Rah-e-Haq to restore the writ of the state and dislodge the Taliban rule from Swat remained unfulfilled.

Once again a “Peace through dialogue” policy came to the forefront. On May 21, 2008 newly elected ANP-led provincial leadership concluded a “Peace Deal” with the senior members of TNSM. In the agreement with Sufi Mohammad, the government accepted the right of every Muslim to “peacefully” work for the enforcement of Shariat. TNSM dissociated itself from the elements attacking the security forces and a *Fatwa* was issued against attacks on security personnel as it was ruled to be against Islamic teachings. It also renewed its pledge to support the state institutions and enable the state to restore its writ in the region. The deal led to Sufi Mohammad’s release after spending more than six and a half years in prison, although the government claimed that Sufi Mohammad was released unconditionally and the two sides came to an agreement subsequently. Immediately after the accord was signed, Swat valley was filled with black turbaned supporters of Sufi Mohammad, who was carried in a huge procession to Swat. This put pressure on Fazlullah to come to the negotiating table and he initially agreed for a ceasefire and finally accepted the peace deal.

In the peace deal signed with Fazlullah on 21 May 2008, the militants agreed that they would accept and honour the writ of the Federal and Provincial governments and would not malign the religion of other citizens. They assured that government personnel and properties will not be attacked, vaccinations will not be opposed and all foreign

militants will be handed over to the government. They also agreed to a ban on display of illegal weapons and FM broadcasts without due permission from the government and to cooperate with the government to investigate murder, robbery and other crimes. They consented to dismantling the training facilities for suicide bombers as well as explosives manufacturing facilities. The government on its part agreed to implement Shariat in the entire erstwhile Malakand Division in letter and spirit, compensate all victims for loss of life and property and to review all cases against militants in prison. It agreed that the Army would be sent back to the barracks gradually and an Islamic University would be set up at TNSM headquarters to be run jointly by the government and TNSM. It also agreed to take action against oppressors, bribe-takers, adulterers, thieves, dacoits and kidnappers in order to rid society of such elements. Finally an 11-member joint committee was set up to ensure the implementation of the deal.

However, this situation could not last for long. The fragile peace punctuated with skirmishes between army troops and TNSM militants led to another phase of military operation in the area. In July 2008 the second phase of Operation Rah-e-Haq was launched and continued through the remainder of the year. Fighting was initially heavy in the northern part of the valley, and later spread to southern areas. Militants accused government of not withdrawing troops from the area as promised in the peace deal. Fierce clashes with militants made Swat a war zone.

Hundreds were reported killed in heavy clashes. Reports of atrocities by militants increased - including the killing of women who declined to stop work and public beheadings of those accused of spying. Human rights activists say 60 per cent of Swat's 1.8 million people fled Swat. Thousands of homes were reported damaged and 150

schools destroyed. Torching of girls schools grew as the Taliban banned girls' education altogether. Initially, the militants asked parents not to send their daughters to 'un-Islamic' schools for western education and later started attacking girls' schools, especially in Swat.

According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, in the five years preceding 2008, Taliban destroyed around 100 girls' schools in the NWFP and FATA. The year 2008 witnessed heightened attacks on schools as Taliban targeted 119 educational institutions, out of which 111 were girls' schools, mainly located in Swat. In the NWFP, the Taliban were reported to have attacked 95 shops in 2008, targeting 65 CD shops, 16 barbershops, six mobile phone shops, two drugs stores and seven garments and cosmetics shops. Most of the attacks were reported in Swat. FATA witnessed 10 incidents of shops being attacked during the year. Five CD shops, three barbershops, a drug store and a grocery shop were targeted. In these attacks, 61 shops were completely destroyed, including 44 CD shops and music centers.⁸⁵

The situation remained critical the activities of the militants which had multiplied in the shape of suicide bombings against the state agencies in retaliation against the Lal Masjid operation did not diminish.

6.8 - Operation Silence on Jamia Hafsa and Red Mosque, 3-10 July 2007, Islamabad

The siege of the Lal Masjid in Islamabad festered for over six months before President Musharraf decided to take the military action. Musharraf in a televised address to the nation following the 36-hour battle between militants and military commandos

⁸⁵ Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), *Pakistan Security Report 2008*, Islamabad.

said: “Unfortunately, we have been up against our own people ... They had strayed from the right path and become susceptible to terrorism.”⁸⁶

This fiasco was not the making of a few months and weeks. There is history to it. Lal Masjid was constructed by the Capital Development Authority (CDA) and funded by the Ministry of Finance in the 1960s. In 1966, Maulana Muhammad Abdullah was appointed its first Imam (prayer leader) by the then President Ayub Khan. During the Afghan Jihad period, Lal Masjid gradually came to serve as a major transmission belt for sending fighters to Afghanistan. There developed close links between Pakistan’s intelligence agency (ISI) and Lal Masjid leadership that continued for decades. Maulana Abdullah was a firebrand orator; from his pulpit he would preach the cause of jihad, and his sermons gained immense popularity among the military and civilian bureaucracy.⁸⁷

Maulana Abdullah was known for his hard-line views of Islam and had close association with the militant anti-Shia organization, Sipah-e-Sihaba (SSP). Reportedly, he was assassinated by extreme anti-Sunni operatives inside the Mosque in 1998. This led to his two sons, Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Abdul Rashid, taking over the administration of the Red Mosque. Abdul Aziz became the chief cleric of Lal Masjid and Abdul Rashid his deputy.⁸⁸ It must be noted here, that all heads of mosques in Islamabad are paid and appointed by the government. The ministry of religious affairs along with the administrative bureaucracy in the capital oversees the affairs of the mosques.

Lal Masjid leadership particularly Abdul Rashid Ghazi became a central figure of Pakistan's religious parties’ alliance against the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and

⁸⁶ Pervez Musharraf quoted in, *The News*, 13 July 2007.

⁸⁷ Syed Saleem Shahzad, “The Taliban’s brothers in alms”, *Asia Times*, 14 March 2007. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IC14Df01.html.

⁸⁸ Hassan Abbas, “The road to Lal Masjid and its aftermath”, *Terrorism Monitor*, Volume 5, Issue 14, 19 July 2007.

bitterly criticized Musharraf regime's decision to be key ally of the United States in this regard. In 2004, the mosque issued a Fatwa or religious edict which said: "soldiers dying in the campaign (that is military actions in Tribal areas) should be described as 'killed', while the militants' dead were to be called martyrs".⁸⁹ Regarding the suicide bombings in and beyond Pakistan the Lal Masjid clerics said:

We consider suicide attacks are right in Pakistan [sic] under a few circumstances while we consider them as absolutely justified in the context of Afghanistan and Iraq. We favored the Taliban not only in the past, we favor them even today.⁹⁰

This led to the dismissal of Maulana Abdul Aziz from service and government appointed another cleric who was to take over Aziz's role as Imam of Lal Masjid. But this was never followed in reality and Maulana Aziz continued to lead Friday prayers and run the mosque and its affiliated Madrassas. Ghazi family also continued to manage the mosque as well as Madrasa Faridia in the sector E-7 and 18 other madaris all built on encroached land in and around Islamabad. These include: Jamia Saida Samia G-7/3, Madrasa Fatima I 9/4, Madrasa Umme-Kulsum Bara Kahu, Madrasa Ruqayya Banni Gala, Madrasa Qabtia Chak Shehzad, Madrasa Khatija, Madrasa Hajra, Madrasa Khola, Golra for women and Jamia Faridia E/7, Madrasa Zaid Bin Sabit Lal Masjid, Madrasa Saidna Umer Masjid Muzzamil, St 94 G/11-3, Madrasa RehmatullilAalamin Loi Bhair PWD Islamabad, Madrasa Usman Bin Affan, Madrasa Syedna Talha Bin Abdulla, Siri Chowk Bara Kahu, Madrasa Muaaz bin Jabal Bara Kahu, Madrasa Syedna Saddiq Akbar

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ "Over one lakh suicide bombers in Pak: cleric", *Rediff News* 31 May 2007.

Available at: <http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/may/31pak1.htm> . Accessed on 3 August 2007.

Bani Gala for boys. These and some of the other affiliated madaris are built on state owned land worth billions of rupees.⁹¹

In 2004, Abdul Rashid Ghazi (younger brother of Abdul Aziz) was accused by the government of procuring weapons and assisting Islamic militant outfits planning to blow up the President's house, the Parliament building and Army headquarters on Pakistan's Independence Day. Abdul Rashid Ghazi went underground, and the government presented an explosive-filled truck owned by him as evidence of his involvement to the media. Some time later the Federal minister for Religious Affairs, Ejaz-ul-Haq, stated press conference saying that —Abdul Rashid Ghazi had not been involved in the plot and the real culprits had been arrested and charged. These were said to be men belonging to the tribal areas and included Uzbek militants. It had also been established, officials said, that they had regularly visited the Lal Masjid.”⁹² Independent sources in conversation with the author confirmed Rashid Ghazi’s close association with the high command of Al-Qaeda leadership, particularly Ayman Al-Zawahri as well as militants in Pakistan's tribal area of Waziristan, Swat and Punjab.⁹³

Ume- Hassan (Wife of Maulana Abdul Aziz) headed the adjacent girls madrassa, the Jamia Hafsa attached to the Lal Masjid. She was extremely critical about Musharraf’s policy of counter-terrorism and raised the issue of missing people in Pakistan. She led madrassa girls’ protests against the blasphemous Danish cartoons. Ume-Hassan spearheaded a campaign against the demolition of mosques in Islamabad by the capital

⁹¹ Data collected from *The News, Dawn, The Nation*, 3-10 July 2007.

⁹² Federal minister for Religious Affairs Ejaz-ul-Haq, Press statement quoted in, Amir Rana, —*Al Mosque’s terror links*”, *Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies* (PIPS) 25 May 2007. Islamabad.

⁹³ Syed Saleem Shahzad, interview with author, April 2010, Islamabad. Syed Saleem Shahzad recalls that while interviewing Late Abdul Rashid Ghazi, Maulana proudly showed the letters of appreciation written to him by the Al-Qaeda Stalwart Aymen Al-Zawari.

authority. On her provocation, girls of Jamia Hafsa occupied a nearby Children Library and vowed to "fight to death" after the government threatened to evict them. In one of the video clips of her speech before a large gathering of burqa-clad students she announced that ~~we~~ women have entered the *jihad* battle.”⁹⁴

From March 2007 till the beginning of ~~Operation~~ “Operation Silence” in July same year, the Masjid undertook a number of unlawful activities: kidnapped alleged prostitutes; publicly set alight ~~un-Islamic~~” videos and DVDs; set up Qazi courts based on the Sharia, abducted policemen in May 2007 who were to be released on condition that bail was granted to five Lal Masjid students being held in government detention at the time.”⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Ume- Hassan - head of Jamia Hafsa statement, Available at: <http://jamiahafsa.multiply.com/>.

⁹⁵ Syed Irfan Raza, —Hfisa clerics set up Qazi court in Lal Masjid,” *Dawn*, 6 April 2007.

Note: The following is a **Chronology of events** that took place at Lal Masjid Jan – July 2007:

January 22: Baton-wielding girl students took over the children’s library to protest against the demolition of mosques and madrassas in Islamabad.

March 25: The girl students picked up three women for allegedly running a brothel, who were later released when they promised to lead a pious life.

April 6: The Lal Masjid administration set up a Shariah court inside the mosque and the chief prayer leader, Maulana Abdul Aziz, threatened to launch suicide attacks if the government tried to use force against them.

April 9: The Lal Masjid Shariah court issued a decree against former tourism minister Nilofar Bakhtiar for hugging an instructor after a parachute jump in France.

April 10: The government blocked the mosque’s website and radio station in reaction to the Lal Masjid administration’s provocative attitude.

May 19: The Lal Masjid students kidnapped four policemen following the arrest of their dozen supporters. The students kidnapped another two policemen, but later set all of them free.

June 23: The Jamia Hafsa students kidnapped nine people, including seven Chinese nationals (six women and a man) from an acupuncture clinic, claiming it was an undercover brothel. All were freed following protests from Beijing.

July 3: The students snatched weapons from policemen deployed at a building facing the Jamia Hafsa. Troops and paramilitary forces cordoned off the Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa compound, leading to a tense standoff between the security forces and militants inside the Lal Masjid.

July 4: The government imposes a curfew around the mosque complex. It says anyone who wishes to may leave the premises, but any armed militants will be shot on sight. The first two days of fighting leave at least 16 people dead and some 140 injured. Among the hundreds of people holed up in the complex are women students and children.

Security forces capture Lal Masjid prayer leader Abdul Aziz while trying to leave disguised in a woman’s burqa. This sparks an exodus, with some 1,200 people leaving the complex.

July 5: New fighting breaks out around the mosque complex, with students inside throwing hand grenades and the army demolishing most of a surrounding wall. Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao accuses Abdul Rashid Ghazi of retaining women and children as human shields inside the mosque.

Around 50 more militants leave the building voluntarily, and security forces say they have captured eight more.

Army was mobilized, Cobra helicopters started reconnaissance flights, APCs The assault combat called ‘Operation Silence’ was aimed to restore the writ of the state and saving the lives of hostages who were trapped inside the mosque. As part of the Operation Silence, water, gas and power supply of the Masjid and seminary was cut off. Deadlines were announced for those present inside to come out and the students started exiting the mosque and seminary, more than 1000 male and female students exited and were offered safe passage to their homes. The head cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz was captured red handed while escaping disguised in a burqa (traditional long veil) attempting to leave the mosque along with a group of female students.

The commandos raided the outer perimeter of the complex at midnight setting off explosives blasting holes through the boundary walls of the compound. 164 commandos

July 6: Heavy explosions are heard around the mosque complex. From inside, Ghazi announces that he and his followers would rather die than surrender. Officials say that several hundred students remain inside the complex, along with some 60 armed militants, but the figures cannot be independently verified.

July 7: President General Pervez Musharraf said that all militants holed-up inside the mosque would be killed if they did not surrender.

The government puts the death toll from clashes at 19, while Ghazi says 70 have been killed.

Ghazi says he received a phone call from a man who claimed to have shot at Musharraf’s aircraft on Friday in revenge for the siege. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz accuses the militants of holding hostages. Ghazi denies the claim.

July 8: Security forces tighten the noose on the mosque complex, as a senior commando is killed in an operation to blast through the complex wall in a bid to allow women and children inside to flee.

Religious Affairs Minister Ejaz ul Haq says militants have stripped Ghazi of control of the mosque. Haq calls the militants “terrorists,” saying some of them are foreign. Another senior official says 15 militants have been given explosives-laden suicide jackets.

Musharraf, Aziz and top officials meet to assess the government’s options. The government puts the death toll at 24.

July 9: Musharraf meets with key officials to determine the next step. He appoints PML President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain to work with clerics to find a peaceful solution. Pro-Taliban militant commanders in Bajaur Agency tell 20,000 tribesmen that they must exact revenge for the siege. The tribesmen vow to wage “holy war” against Musharraf. A delegation of ministers and clerics hold last-ditch talks with Ghazi using loudspeakers. The government offers Ghazi house arrest. Negotiations break down.

July 10: The security forces launched a final operation against the Lal Masjid militants at 4am after all efforts to defuse the situation failed. Troops storm the mosque in a bid to free the women and children inside, sparking fierce gun battles with militants that leave at least 50 militants and eight soldiers dead, the army said. Ghazi is also killed in the operation.

Source: “From library occupation to Lal Masjid operation,” *Daily Times*, 11 July 2007, Available at: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C07%5C11%5Cstory_11-7-2007_pg7_24.

took part in the operation, 11 SSG commandos including Lt. Col Haroon ul Islam (who was leading the Operation), Captain Salman Farooq Lodhi was killed and 33 were wounded in battle with the militants. The cleric Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi leading the fight was reportedly killed when he came out to surrender with his companions and was caught in the crossfire with militants who did not let him surrender, his mother who was ill also died of suffocation. According to various reports, security forces during search inside the basement of Jamia Hafsa and Lal Masjid recovered 27 women including the wife of Abdul Aziz Ume-Hassan and his daughter Asma Aziz and 3 children. Following the military operation on Lal Masjid, as per ISPR media briefing:

The weapons which were recovered from the compound included AK-47 rifles. Russian made RPG and Chinese variant RPG-7 rockets, PK machine guns, anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, suicide bombing belts, three to five, 22 caliber rifles, RPD and RPK-74 light machine guns, Dragunov sniper rifles, SKS rifles, pistols, night vision equipment, over 50,000 rounds of various caliber ammunition. Three crates of petrol bombs prepared from green soft drinking bottles, gas masks, two-way radios, large plastic buckets held tennis-ball-size homemade bombs and knives were also displayed.⁹⁶

The aftermath of the Lal Masjid operation created an intense sense of insecurity in the country. The threats issued from the Mosque, –There will be suicide blasts in the nook and cranny of the country. We have weapons, grenades and we are expert in manufacturing bombs. We are not afraid of death”⁹⁷ - proved real to a great extent.

There were 15 suicide strikes between July 14 and 31 (an average of one a day) – a horrifying revenge by any calculation. This was in addition to numerous clashes,

⁹⁶ ISPR Press Release quoted in *The News*, 12 July 2007.

⁹⁷ Note: On April 12 2007, in an FM broadcast from the Lal Masjid’s illegal FM station, the clerics issued a threat. Quoted in, Editorial, *The News*, April 24 2007. Islamabad.

including ambushes, rocket and gun attacks, between militants and security forces in Tribal areas. The Interior Ministry report on suicide attacks released in September 2007 stated that the Lal Masjid military operation had caused an increase in suicide attacks on army and paramilitary forces, mostly in the North West Frontier Province and FATA.⁹⁸ On July 14 2007, a suicide bomber killed 26 soldiers in Miranshah; 13 died when a suicide bomber exploded outside a court in Islamabad on 18 July; in Hangu a police academy became the target of a suicide attack; and in Kohat a suicide bomber detonated inside a mosque on 19 July 2007.⁹⁹

Analysts and public perception to date remains divided in explaining the genesis of this crisis. Generally, it is seen as failure of effective intelligence, lack of preventative policy on the part of the Musharraf regime that treated the issue as ‘law and order’ problem, mixed with the domestic politics of the country. At times, government accused the media of creating an issue for public consumption only and an attempt to weaken General Musharraf’s government.”¹⁰⁰

Reflecting on the role of media vis-à-vis the Lal Masjid operation Maria Ahmed, GEO TV's correspondent, in conversation with the author maintains:

The media made it a sentimental soap-opera with missing connections of research, background, context and rationale. Most importantly, the media failed to pay attention to a growing phenomenon: Lal Masjid exploded on our screens suddenly in July. The ignorance fueled more misguided anger and hatred as Lal Masjid crew was never able to tell their side of the story. Reporting on site is only 25% of the

⁹⁸ Azaz Syed, “29 army, FC personnel killed in 9 months,” *The Daily Times*, 18 September 2007.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Talat Hussain - Director Current Affairs, Aaj TV (Private news media channel), interview with author, 10 April 2008, Islamabad.

job - without a history of connections, news does not make sense.¹⁰¹

The fact is General Musharraf soft-pedaled an issue that needed clear and comprehensive response to begin with. Devoid of pro-active approach, General Musharraf regime underestimated the fanatical conviction of their rightness (ideological uniformity with the Deobandi school of thought), the linkages with other indigenous sectarian groupings, and the Masjid stalwarts association with the Al-Qaeda top leadership. Most of the time when the crises was building up, Islamabad's bureaucratic administrators were tasked to resolve the issue amicably – that in fact meant giving in to its clerics and students' unlawful activities most of the time.

Pressure tactics were used in the form of bringing in 'Khateeb of Khana Kaaaba' to convince the Lal Masjid leadership to give up its militant posture and follow the path of peaceful Jihad. Similarly, Lal Masjid was publicly criticized by the 'Wafaqul Madaris'¹⁰² on behind the scene state insistence. Mufti Rafi Usmani of the Wafaqul Madaris' Majlis-e-Aamla in a press conference said:

Islam is not the religion of force...It was illegal to build a mosque on encroached land but prominent members of the government, including Gen Zia ul Haq, had themselves prayed in Islamabad's Hamza Masjid; this should be considered an No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the government...the government should be cognizant of the fact that as a result of its policies, the 1,400 km border with Afghanistan now has 80,000 soldiers while previously the tribal areas provided 'free' soldiers to guard the border.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Maria Ahmad, Geo TV journalist covered the Lal Masjid operation, interview with author, 22 May 2009, Islamabad.

¹⁰²Note: Wafaqul Madaris Al Arbia is a most important Deoband madrassa board in Pakistan, which controls 10,000 seminaries across the country with 1.6 million students.

¹⁰³ Quoted in *Daily Times*, 15 April 2007.

Qari Hanif Jalandhari, Secretary-General of the Wafaq-ul Madaris, in conversation with the author observed:

We are against a policy of taking on the government in a head-on fight; as such a policy can only lead to damage. The Wafaqul Madaris members hoped that the Jamia Hafsa issues were settled through negotiations and talks.¹⁰⁴

Though innumerable media reports pointed to the growing radicalization of the Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa, state officials treated these as merely ‘emotional and short lived outbursts’ and looked the other way. President Musharraf’s underestimation of the lethality of the threat and belief that the state can turn around these extremists is reflected in his following comments, early April 2007:

These few thousand girls are misguided. These misguided women wish to run the government though they know nothing... We don't want to kill them. We want to solve this issue with wisdom.¹⁰⁵

Syed Saleem Shahzad a noted journalist observed:

Al-Qaeda used Lal Masjid to defocus Pakistan army. According to the mole of Al-Qaeda, Bin Yameen, Al-Qaeda’s understanding was that when military strike is launched on Lal Masjid all Maddaris in Islamabad will rise against Musharraf regime... creating havoc against it.¹⁰⁶

Another leading journalist and TV anchor, Hamid Mir, believed that General Musharraf played politics with the Lal Masjid crises resulting in chaos. He said:

Jamia Hafsa case was projected to divert the public attention away from the judicial crisis in Pakistan. General Musharraf is slow in responding to the crises because it serves his political agenda (of seeking legitimacy and ensuring his credibility) to ensure to the outside world, he

¹⁰⁴ Wafaqul Madaris Al Arbia Pakistan’s Secretary-General Qari Mohammad Hanif Jhalandari, conversation with the author, April 2007, Islamabad.

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in, *Daily Times*, April 8, 2007

¹⁰⁶ Syed Saleem Shahzad, , “The Taliban’s brothers in alms”, *Asia Times*, 14 March 2007.

alone can tackle and wipe out extremism and militancy in the country.¹⁰⁷

Thus, Lal Masjid episode sparked a reactionary wave of sympathy that was particularly noticed in Swat. Reportedly, Maulana Fazlullah, the head of the banned militant group TNSM in Swat, led a large rally of armed people at his Imam Dheri madrassa, to protest against Operation silence and vowed to take revenge.¹⁰⁸

The preceding discussion testifies to the present research study proposition that military action must be accompanied by strong public support. The military action was a delayed call and lacked holistic understanding of the whole issue of radicalization in the country. The violent aftermath of the operation demonstrated the need to adopt a proactive and multi-dimensional counter-terrorism policy. The force based approach was essentially a short-term fix and post –operation policy on sustainable footing was never there. Instead of de-radicalizing and engaging the militants of Lal Masjid, government further cornered them. This has led to re-vitalizing the earlier spirit of the Lal Masjid’s cleric family and their followers. To quote Maria Ahmed, Geo TV correspondent:

State’s massive ~~–military~~” approach to the issue was too much and resulted in significant loss of public support in the end. I spoke to several female students when they were collected by their parents during the days of the military action. They declared that although their parents had come to collect them, they would come back until they either became martyrs or won the battle against the state.¹⁰⁹

On August 17, 2007, acting on a ~~–suo motu~~” notice, the Supreme Court of Pakistan took up the extrajudicial killings of the people at the Lal Masjid and Jamia

¹⁰⁷ Hamid Mir, Head of Geo TV News and Current Affairs, interview with Author, 25 September 2007, Islamabad.

¹⁰⁸ Safdar Sial, —Lal Masjid: aftermath and future repercussions”, Pakistan *Institute for Peace*, 16 July 2007.

¹⁰⁹ Maria Ahmed, Geo TV journalist covered the Lal Masjid operation, interview with author, 22 May 2009, Islamabad.

Hafsa complex. Performance of the Islamabad administration attracted the reprimand of the court for its slow pace. The court was informed that 61 students were in custody, of them 39 on bail- able offences. The Chief Justice of Pakistan directed immediate release of 22 innocent people as recommended by a joint investigation team. Mohammed Ahsan Bhoon, President of the Lahore High Court Bar Association said, “This issue could have been resolved through negotiations but General Musharraf intentionally spilled the blood of innocent people to please his foreign masters.”¹¹⁰ At this instance one must also note the growing rift between the executive (that is President Musharraf) and Supreme Court of Pakistan (under the Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry).

Thus, the Lal Masjid assault prompted the pro-Taliban rebels along the border with Afghanistan to scrap a 10 month old peace agreement with the Pakistani government. This event triggered the Third Waziristan War which killed over 3,000 people and marked another surge in militancy and violence in Pakistan.

6.9- Operation Zalzala in South Waziristan - 2008

In January 2008, Mehsud’s men captured Sararogha Fort in South Waziristan and killed many members of the Pakistani security forces. That same month the Pakistani army launched the three-part Operation Tri-Star against the Pakistan Taliban in FATA, with Operation Zalzala (‘Earthquake’) in South Waziristan as a principal component. Zalzala aimed to clear several areas held by forces loyal to Mehsud and capturing or killing key leaders of the Taliban faction, including Baitullah and the suicide bomb campaign chief, Qari Hussain.¹¹¹ The army dropped leaflets urging locals to vacate the

¹¹⁰ Nasir Iqbal, “Destruction of evidence annoys apex court: Lal Masjid-Jamia Hafsa case”, *Dawn*, 18 August 2007.

¹¹¹ Taliban Chief Ideologist Survives “Zalzala”, *Daily Times*, 26 May 2008.

area, and on 24 January launched attacks in several parts of South Waziristan. About 200,000 residents of South Waziristan were displaced during this conflict. After about six weeks of harsh fighting, talks began toward a peace agreement with conditions similar to those of previous arrangements and the Pakistani army started to withdraw in May. Operation Zalzalā cleared parts of South Waziristan, at least temporarily, and apparently disrupted some planned suicide attacks. –Across Pakistan, there were 2,148 terrorist, insurgent and sectarian attacks in 2008, a 746 per cent increase from 2005.”¹¹² Pakistan’s controversial use of collective punishment fostered deep animosity among locals who were loath to support the government’s efforts.

6.10 - Operation Sher Dil in Bajaur - 2008

Inter Services Public Relations in its Press release sketched the mixed outcome of the military action in Bajaur:

Operation –Sher Dil” which was started on 6 September 2008, after gaining success in various parts of Bajaur Agency including control of Loi Sam has now started advancing towards Nawagai. Miscreants’ strong holds have been destroyed and they have been mauled adequately. However, some pockets of resistance are still trying to fight it out.¹¹³

Operation Sher Dil was launched after insurgent forces led by Qari Zia Rahman forcibly pushing out government-armed local tribesmen (referred to as Lashkars or

Note:

Qari Hussain graduated from the Jamia Binoria madrassa in Karachi in 1994 and became an activist of anti-Shiite militant group, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), before joining the Taliban movement in 2004. He spearheaded a brutal campaign of suicide attacks across Pakistan, beginning around 2006. He trained hundreds of suicide bombers, some as young as 11 years old, to target Pakistani military and government installations as well as markets, funerals, hospitals, and other –soft” targets. In 2008 alone, 965 people were reported killed in 66 suicide bombings across Pakistan, including police and army officials along with many innocent civilians.

¹¹² Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, *Pakistan Security Report 2008*, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2009, p: 3.

¹¹³ Press Release, *ISPR*, 20 November 2008.

levies) out of their checkpoints at Loe Sam. By June, more than half of the 72 checkpoints in Bajaur had been destroyed, and the civilian government had been disrupted through a major bank robbery and suicide bombings against officials. The military action was in response to an ambush of security convoy by local militants in Loe Sam. The primary objective of Sher Dil was to target militant groups that threatened Pakistan and to clear and hold Bajaur's population centers and lines of communication. By early December, over 1,000 militants and 63 security personnel had been killed. Pakistani forces found tunnel complexes used for hiding people and storing material such as weapons, ammunition, and radiofrequency lists, guerrilla-warfare manuals, propaganda and bomb-making instructions.¹¹⁴

Major Gen Tariq Khan, the commander of military operations in five of Pakistan's seven tribal agencies, said his paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) had driven extremists out of Bajaur, where Pakistani forces have waged a six-month long campaign. He denied reports –and claims by a militant leader, Faqir Mohammad – that the military had struck a peace deal. He said that the Taliban had been defeated and that the Taliban's announcement of a ceasefire was propaganda.¹¹⁵

Ismail Khan, quoting his conversation with the military sources stressed the complexity of inter-linkages between the internal and external dimensions of conflict in Bajaur, contended:

Those who have been telling us to do more, we turn around and ask them to do more. Stop the reverse flow into Bajaur. It's coming. Heavy weapons are coming. The militants are coming and their travel starts from Central Asia; they cover the entire track of Afghanistan. You are not stopping them and they are coming into our country...We are in touch

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Isambard Wilkinson in Khar, "Pakistan claims victory in Taliban Fight", *Telegraph*, March 1, 2009.

with the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) to make sure that no movement takes place...People themselves saw 200 men, mostly carrying rocket launchers, coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan. We have no doubt that they are supporting the fighters in Bajaur.¹¹⁶

The fighting forced some 300,000 inhabitants to leave their homes, in what has been described as the greatest displacement in Pakistan's history.¹¹⁷ According to several sources, the 20 September 2008 Islamabad Marriott Hotel bombing may have been carried out in retaliation for the military offensive in Bajaur.¹¹⁸

Part Three: Impact of Military actions

And the litmus test of a military operation is when it ends [and] a credible governance authority is fostered. Inability to deliver on this can unravel the military gains and lose critical local support... Terrorism is both local and global. Pakistan's counter-terrorism is affected by instability in Afghanistan and global politics. It requires international, regional and national effort simultaneously...Biggest failure has been to enlist public support.¹¹⁹

The above mentioned views of former Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi explains the delicate balance between the 'hard' and 'soft' elements of counter-insurgency strategy – essential for sustainable and comprehensive approach towards terrorism. By the time, General Musharraf resigned from power (18 August 2008) the missing links in Pakistan's so-called comprehensive response to terrorism were quite obvious. According to 2008 FATA residents survey conducted by Islamabad based Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) roughly 90 per cent are opposed to the Taliban's worldview and

¹¹⁶ Ismail Khan, "No timeframe to call off operation", *Dawn*, 30 September 2008.

¹¹⁷ "Army suspends operation in Bajaur", *BBC*, September 1, 2008.

¹¹⁸ Ismail Khan, "Battle of Bajaur", *International Herald Tribune*, 27 September 2008.

¹¹⁹ Pakistan's former Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi, interview with Author, 10 August, 2008, Islamabad

activities. Twenty per cent acknowledge that foreign militants are present in the area and 75 per cent are against the army presence in FATA.¹²⁰

The critical factor aiding public alienation in FATA stems from the credibility deficit on account of Pakistani state often following short-term policies in the region and not investing in the human resource development on a sustainable basis. Musharraf's policy was dominated by force-based tactics and deliberate ambiguity and double-speak on part of the government added to the misery of ordinary people in this area. Most of the residents of FATA felt being treated as second-rate citizens, and their area used as strategic buffer zone separating Pakistan and Afghanistan

It is therefore essential to end the isolation of Fata by mainstreaming it and bringing it into the normal nation building process where the grievances of the citizens are dealt with in the ambit of human and fundamental rights. They must also be treated with justice under the rule of law. Though Pakistan received more than \$ 10 billion from the US for Pakistan's contribution to the War on Terror but the main beneficiaries of this bounty were not FATA and NWFP. Khalid Aziz, a former chief secretary of NWFP also pointed out this fact, the cost of such a policy is the sacrifice of the well being of the people of Fata and NWFP. No wonder they are up in arms.¹²¹

The critical need to gain public trust and confidence was also felt by the commanding officers engaged in the military operations within and beyond FATA. During conversations with the high command of the Swat operation, the author was told that ~~to~~ to enlist public support, army is investing in organizing sports activities, updating

¹²⁰ *CRSS Survey of FATA*, 2008, Islamabad.

¹²¹ Khalid Aziz, interview with Author, 11 July 2008, Islamabad.

community recreation facilities, distributing sports equipment and so on. The aim is to build an image of army as protector of not only of territory but of people (s) safety and security in all aspects of life”.¹²² However, initially the military actions there were seen by the people as “too late and too little”. Defense analyst Air Marshal (retd) Masood Akhtar pointing to the obliviousness of the military action to the human development side asked:

Why should the public support the government on this issue (that is military actions), if the public is not informed as to what is the purpose of the war, what is the mission assigned to the army, what are our national interests at stake, what are the political and military objectives.¹²³

Musharraf’s military based approach versus terrorism achieved a mixed record of sorts. The main success seems to lie Pakistan capturing and handing over more than 700 Al-Qaeda operatives to the United States, more than any other country. It deployed more than 70,000 troops in the tribal region all along the Durand Line. On the down side, the military suffered significant human and material losses in its campaign against the militants. Apart from the human cost in lives lost, the destruction of physical infrastructure and damage to the economy has been colossal. “The economic cost of the militancy in FATA is estimated at roughly \$119 million.”¹²⁴ The Non-governmental organizations, NGOs, especially in FATA and NWFP were specially targeted to stop their development work. This made the need for the military operation to be accompanied by reconstruction programmes even more acute and urgent.

¹²² Author’s conversation with the Commanding Officers in Swat, 2008, Rawalpindi.

¹²³ Air Marshall (retd) Masood Akhtar, “Swat Paradise Lost”, *CRSS Discussion Forum*, 31 Jan 2009, Islamabad.

¹²⁴ Planning and Development Department *Cost of Conflict in FATA*, Peshawar: Fata Secretariat 2009.

Meanwhile on the international plane, the United States and international community which had earlier praised Musharraf's accomplishments against Al Qaeda, disapproved the "Peace Deals" with the militants in FATA. The commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan accused "FATA region was providing recruits to the militants from where the attacks had increased by about 30 per cent."¹²⁵ This amounted to extending the war zone to the tribal belt of the country. The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen directed that maps of the Afghan "battle space" include the tribal areas of western Pakistan."¹²⁶

This led to the intensification of drone attacks into Pakistan's tribal areas. In the popular perception this was a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty though according to the United States research reports, "three Predators are said to be deployed at a secret Pakistani airbase and can be launched without specific permission from the Islamabad government (Pakistan officially denies the existence of any such bases)."¹²⁷ Though officially denied by the Musharraf regime, it is generally believed that some sort of silent understanding was there. The drone attacks are said to have killed more innocent people of the area than taking out hardened Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants. These strikes have added to the credibility deficit of the Pakistan government and inspired revenge based suicide attacks against Military and civil targets in Pakistan.

Likewise, Pakistan army as well as independent media sources maintains that drone attacks described by United States as an effective way to target militants have not been productive in reality. Because of the American insistence that Pakistan do more and

¹²⁵ Quoted in, K Alan Kronstadt, "Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy", *CRS Report for Congress*, 21 November, 2008, p: 6.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ K Alan Kronstadt, "Pak- U.S. Relations", *CRS Report for Congress*, February 6, 2009. p.6.

Pakistan holding it was already doing enough in addition to differences on drone attacks the trust deficit between the United States and Pakistan thus continued to widen. In the backdrop of the Pak-US trust deficit was also the non addressed Islamabad's concern with the Indian role in Afghanistan at times described as "strategic encirclement." In conversation with the author, General Musharraf stressed:

Who suffered more, Pakistan or the United States or Afghanistan? No country in the world has done more than what we did in the fight against terrorism...Problem lies in Afghanistan. Had Karzai government and NATO adopted comprehensive counter-terrorism policy including the engagement of moderate Taliban, the situation could have turned more stable for both Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹²⁸

General (ret'd) Ehsan Ul Haq – former Joint Chief of Pakistan Army in conversation with the author maintained the complex situation in FATA was a consequence of protracted strife in Afghanistan. He did not expect the situation in Pakistan to normalize as long as there was conflict and de-stabilization in Afghanistan. He thought it was unrealistic to seek separate solution to the problem in isolation from overall environment in the region. He exhorted "strategic patience and perseverance."¹²⁹

Conclusion

The preceding discussion mapped the military prong of the Musharraf regime's response to terrorism that treated the insurgency in FATA and its adjacent areas essentially as a "reaction" to the changed geo-strategic landscape of the region. Hence, a force-based approach was applied to clear the militants from the area. In doing so, political, ideological, social, cultural, religious and economic imperatives of militancy

¹²⁸General (ret'd) Pervez Musharraf, interview with Author, 6 January 2010, London.

¹²⁹General (ret'd) Ehsan Ul Haq – former Joint Chief of Staff, interview with Author, 22 October 2009, Islamabad.

were not addressed. Kinetic operations were seen as quick fixes and almost all operations ended in peace deals giving more oxygen to the militant factions.

The Musharraf regime deliberately divided Islamist militants into three separate categories: the Taliban as an “Afghan problem - labeled as neutral”; the Jihadis fighting in Kashmir as ‘freedom fighters’, and the international al-Qaida-type as ‘terrorists’; plus, it denied the lethality of the domestic sectarian terrorists. Such a conceptualization led to short-term, divided, reactive and often an incoherent counter-terrorism policy. As a result, while forcefully targeting Al-Qaeda elements, the ideological and logistical threads knitting the various categories of Islamist militants remained untouched.

Alongside, Musharraf’s marriage of convenience with the religious political parties against the mainstream political parties to lengthen his rule and bolster his “guided democracy”— constantly served to dilute the effectiveness of his measures against the militants. An eminent security analyst comments that this policy of appeasement of the religious groups to keep out the mainstream parties was preventing Musharraf from reforming the madrassas and defeating his own fight against the terrorist and extremist groups.

In order to maintain and expand his power, General Musharraf has made pacts with the devil in both camps of the war on terrorism. Support from the United States has facilitated his authoritarian rule...Support from religious parties like the MMA to achieve domestic goals comes at the expense of Musharraf’s anti-extremism campaign...The cause of defeating extremism will be best served by a Pakistan where the military is a professional institution, subservient to civilian rule, and not a preeminent political actor.¹³⁰

¹³⁰ Najum Mushtaq, "America: Musharraf Dilemma", Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in Focus, February 28, 2007.

In sum, military operations conducted in the Musharraf era yielded mixed results and reflected an urgent need to focus on the public support as key to successful campaign against terrorism on sustainable footings. That is, a holistic take on the security needs should involve human aspects as well. This in turn, calls for the adoption of reformatory measures addressing the root causes that give rise to militancy in the first place. Here, Late Dr Mahbub Ul Haq's reflection on Pakistan is worth recalling:

Investing in Human Development is likely to give us political and economic pay-off which no other investment can promise at present...We need to fashion today a new concept of human security that is reflected in the lives of people, not in the weapons of our country.¹³¹

This leads us to the final part of the present research study that analyzes the reform-based approach of Musharraf's government as the means to counter terrorism in the country.

¹³¹ Dr Mahbub Ul Haq (1934 – 1998), *Development with Justice*, Islamabad: Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Center, 2004.

PART III

CHAPTER SEVEN

MUSHARRAF’S REFORM BASED APPROACH TO TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN

In Islam, Jihad is not confined to armed struggles only. Have we ever thought of waging Jihad against illiteracy, poverty, backwardness and hunger? This is the larger Jihad. Pakistan, in my opinion, needs to wage Jihad against these evils.¹

This chapter critically analyzes the reforms instituted by the Musharraf regime to rein in the forces of terrorism in the country. These reforms cover steps taken at the educational, legal, social, political, economic and institutional levels. The success or failure of these measures has been seen in the perspective of human security. The discussion highlights the factors that widened the gap between policy objectives and actual achievements vis a vis their sustainability. The chapter stresses the critical need to reframe the “national security mind box” within the parameters of human security if a durable solution to the problem of terrorism in Pakistan is to be found.

Part one of the chapter looks into the pro-active strands of Musharraf’s educational reforms that were aimed at creating a “moderate and forward looking state.” While discussing these steps a number of human development initiatives are also highlighted.

The second part of the chapter traces the adoption and strengthening of legal measures to prevent people from financing, sponsoring and providing logistical support to the activities of the terrorists. Along with this, the efficacy of the police reforms act

¹Text of General Pervez Musharraf Speech, *Pakistan Information Department*: Islamabad. 7 January 2002.

and the training of sensitive “law and order” agencies in new skills and equipping them with modern technology to combat terrorism is examined. The later part of the discussion builds on the earlier parts and points out the missing links in Musharraf’s strategy in pursuing a pro-active counter-terrorism policy. The inability of the military dominated government of General Musharraf to bridge the gap between public perception of “national interest” and its official articulation is identified as the “critical missing piece” in the jig-saw of measures that were employed to counter terrorism.

Part One

7.1: Challenge of Reforming Education System in Pakistan

Pakistan has a “demographic dividend” or a “youth bulge” with 57 per cent of its population in the age group of between 15 and 64 years with 41 per cent under 15. Only four per cent of the population is over 64. According to the United Nations Population Division estimates, Pakistan would overtake Brazil and Indonesia by 2050 to rank fourth in world population, almost doubling to 335 million from its current 180 million.² The challenge is to make positive capital investments into this youth bulge and convert this as the critical mass of national power and a huge capital asset. On the other hand, if this “youth bulge” is not capitalized through sustainable investments in its educational, political, social and economic nourishment, it can turn into a “human liability” of a massive size that could lead to social chaos, instability and the country’s drift towards an insecure future. Already published data suggest that more than eighty per cent of the

² United Nations Population Division Report (2009), quoted in *Dawn*, 28 July 2009.

“suicide attacks”³ in Pakistan are the work of economically and educationally backward „youth’. In this trend no decline has been observed.

Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s extremely polarized education system divided along public and private and religious and what may loosely be called secular lines offers a grim future. Since the decade of 1979-1989 and thereafter, the quality of public education has been progressively deteriorating. Not only has the state failed in its constitutional duty to provide access to education to all children, but the quality of education also been declining significantly.⁴ Under General Zia’s „Islamization drive’ at home and his campaign in support of the Afghan Jihad across the Durand Line, the state promoted the concept of “Jihad”. Zia infused an “Islamic overdose in public school curricula including science and gave unchecked financial support to madrasas.”⁵ All this resulted in furthering an unbalanced public and private education system in which the “Madrasahs - traditional religious mosque-based schools”⁶ flourished and mushroomed. This has led to

³ Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, “Organizational Profiling of Suicide Terrorism: A Pakistani Case Study”, *Defence Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000. pp: 409-453.

⁴ According to the Text of 1973 constitution, obtained from Ministry of Education, Islamabad: “It is the primary duty of the government to remove illiteracy and provide free and compulsory secondary education within minimum possible period”.

Education Minister Zobiaida Jalal speaking at the Pakistan Development Forum, March 2004 noted: “There are 155,686 public schools, 36,460 schools in the private sector, and more than 10,000 madrasas”.

Source: Ministry of Education, *Archives*, 2004 – 2005.

On the decline of Pakistan’s education system see:

International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: Reforming the Education Sector*, Asia Report No. 84, Brussels: International Crisis Group, October 7, 2004.

⁵ General (retd) Javed Ashraf - Federal Education Minister, interview with Author, 11 November 2006, Islamabad.

⁶ Note: In the context of Islamic history, Madrasahs were the primary source of religious and scientific learning, especially between the seventh and eleventh centuries, producing luminaries such as Al-Biruni, ibn-Sina (Avicenna), Al-Khawarizmi, and Jabir ibn-Hayyan (Jaber). At the time of Pakistan’s birth, it had only 136 Madrasahs but today it is home to around thirty thousand (according to unofficial media and think-tank reports). Following the rise of conservative Taliban regime in Afghanistan, extremist outlook of Pakistan –based Madrasah network drew international focus (as many of the Afghan Taliban leadership had studied in this system). Similarly, after Sept. 11, 2001, the link between Pakistan’s religious education system and international terrorist organizations came under intense criticism.

For more detailed accounts of Madrasahs in Pakistan see:

a situation in which today the majority of government schools lack basic infrastructure.

Tariq Rahman, an educationist, observes:

The present education scenario is full of contradictions. On the one hand, there are dynamic, fast moving educational institutions charging exorbitant fees, while on the other there are almost free or very affordable government schools as well as religious seminaries, which are entirely free. The students of these institutions live in different worlds and operate in different languages.⁷

Most critically, what is being taught at educational institutions whether private or public, western based, religious, or the combination of both, needs to be revised to raise a generation of balanced human beings who have a moderate temperament and are able to think intelligently. An eminent professor, A. H. Nayyar, analyzing the content of compulsory subjects, Urdu, English and Pakistan Studies at secondary schools (public) observes:

In early 1980s, Curricula were redesigned and textbooks were rewritten to create a monolithic image of Pakistan as an Islamic state and Pakistani citizens as Muslims only...Four themes emerge most strongly as constituting the bulk of the curricula and textbooks of the three compulsory subjects: Pakistan is for Muslims alone; Islamiyat is to be forcibly taught to all the students, whatever their faith, including a compulsory reading of Qur'an; Ideology of Pakistan is to be internalized as faith, and hate be created against Hindus and India, and; students are to be urged to take the path of Jihad and Shahadat (martyrdom).⁸

Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*, Karachi: Vanguard Press, 2007. p: 81.

Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism, Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005. p: 203.

Samina Ahmed and Andrew Stroehlein, "Pakistan: Still Schooling Extremists", *The Washington Post*, 17 July 2005.


⁷ Tariq Rahman, *Education in Pakistan: A Survey*, Strengthening Participatory Organisation, Islamabad, 2003.

⁸ A. H. Nayyar, "Islamization of Curricula", *South Asian Journal*, October – December, 2003.

Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy⁹ in his path-breaking study on the roots of extremism in Pakistan pointed out the extreme choice of words and images being used (in 2008) by some regular schools, as well as madrassas, associated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), an Islamic political party that had allied itself with General Musharraf. The snapshots and nomenclature looks like this:



Alif” (A) for Allah



(B) for *bundooq* (gun)

⁹ Pervez Hoodbhoy, *Roots of Extremism in Pakistan: How Pakistan is being Saudized and what it means for our Future*, 2008.



“Tay” is for *takrao* (collision) and “topi” (cap).



“Jeem” is for jihad.

“Zal” is for *zunoob* (an unfamiliar word even for native Urdu speakers, means sins). Note that even traditional Muslim musical instruments are worthy of the fire.

Source: Pervez Hoodbhoy, *Roots of Extremism in Pakistan: How Pakistan is being Saudi-ized and what it means for our Future*, 2008.

However, the above cited evidence from Pervez Hoodbhoy does not imply that all religious institutions or seminaries are fanning extreme version of Jihad. The author has numerous times been engaged in conversation with the scholars and peers of seminaries belonging to Madrassas in Islamabad, Mardan, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Lahore and Multan. All of them strongly opposed the use of violence to foster Islamic way of life within and beyond Pakistan. The religious scholars were concerned about the „negative fallout on the religious schools in general because of the extreme behaviour of certain seminaries (like the one cited above) “viability of the reforms programme of the Musharraf regime”, and “demanded more transparency and flexibility in the policy.”¹⁰ This means there is need to understand the complex role that madrassas play in a segregated society like Pakistan’s. Masooda Bano who conducted an ethnographic study on a Deobandi madrasa argues: “a madrasa, even today, is primarily a social entity with a specific socio-economic role.”¹¹

The deplorable state of the education system has been identified in innumerable academic and public policy accounts time and again as a critical variable in political violence in Pakistan. Fayyaz Ahmed, Joint Education Adviser in the Ministry of Education in conversation with the author said:

An effective regulatory mechanism to monitor what is being taught in private and public education system including religious schools needs to be on ground...Because of political compulsions, divided political will and political compromises at the cost of

¹⁰ Observation is based on Authors’ conversation and interaction involving the reading of published material from these seminaries from 2006 – 2009.

¹¹ Masooda Bano, “Beyond Politics: the Reality of a Deobandi Madrasa in Pakistan”, *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 18, No.1, 2007. pp: 43-68. Also see: Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Tradition and Authority in Deobandi Madrasas in South Asia”, in Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds., *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. pp: 61-86.

national interest, an across the board accountability system is not pursued...We are a nation of ad-hoc reforms, to develop a sustainable, well coordinated and stable education system we must improve our standard of education, avoid duplication, and wastage of resources.¹²

Thus a key inference here is, „healthy society needs healthy minds’. That is, to counter militancy on sustainable footing the state needs to enlarge its basic ambit of security from state-centric focus to the well being of its people. To quote human development exponent, the late Mahbub Ul Haq:

Like the tale of two cities, Pakistan is a tale of two economies – one embarrassingly rich and the other desperately poor. The distance between the two economies is widening, not shrinking. What is more relevant than poverty of income is poverty of opportunity which means denial of access to education, credit, and other economic and political opportunities...In Pakistan, such poverty of opportunity has reached staggering proportions... Pakistan stands at the lowest rung of human development today, having invested so little in education and health of its people...Pakistan needs to spend at least 5 per cent of its GNP on education, and to spread basic education to all and to create relevant technical skills, if it is to prepare itself for the global competition of the 21st century.¹³

Unofficial sources place Pakistan as one of only 12 world countries that spend less than two per cent of its GDP on education.¹⁴ This is disputed by the Education Ministry’s statistical claim of 2.42 per cent of GNP recorded for 2007-08¹⁵. The United Nation Development Programme’s 2004 Human Development Report assigns Pakistan the lowest “education index” of any country outside Africa and it ranks 142 in terms of

¹²Dr Fayyaz Ahmed, Joint Education Adviser – Policy and Planning Wing, Ministry of Education, interview with Author, 13 November 2006, Islamabad.

¹³ Mahbub Ul Haq, *Development with Social Justice*, Islamabad: Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, 2007. pp: 8 – 11.

¹⁴ International Crisis Group, op.cit.

¹⁵ Economic Survey of Pakistan 2008-09, Finance Division, Government of Pakistan.

the UNDP's human development index.¹⁶ The fact is, the education sector in Pakistan has consistently suffered from neglect by all governments. Education indicators remain depressed, including those related to low public spending, literacy and enrolment levels, high drop-out levels, acute regional and gender inequalities, and budgetary inequities.¹⁷ Government policies and reform efforts have clearly failed to address the economic, social and political dimensions of the problems in the education system.¹⁸ And to put the house in order, the overall system of education (public as well as religious) needs re-orientation as the youth exhibiting violent tendencies is not confined to madrassas alone. To quote an eminent development expert, Shahid Javed Burki:

There is no doubt that madrasas need to be reformed but what is even more critical is the reform of public sector educational system. Due to the fact that vast majority of the students is enrolled in the public sector... This is the system that looks after the education of the large proportion of the school-going-age population. There are in all 155,000 schools in the public educational system, most of them are poorly managed; impart education of poor quality, use poorly written textbooks and use curricula that are not relevant for the needs of the 21st century. Reforming the entire system, therefore, is of critical importance.¹⁹

Promising to be a reformer, General Musharraf, well before 9/11, publicly disowned the “denial mode” regarding the indigenous religious radical trends spread

¹⁶ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2005*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

¹⁷ Social Planning and Development Centre, “*Social Development in Pakistan 2002-03: The State of Education*”, Karachi, 2003. p: 2.

¹⁸ Dr Samina Ahmed, Head of International Crises Group (ICG) – Asia Program, interview with Author, 27 April 2007, Islamabad.

For more details see: ICG Asia Report N073: *Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism*, 16 January 2004; and ICG Asia Report N°36: *Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military*, 29 July 2002.

¹⁹ Shahid Javed Burki, “Educating The Pakistani Masses” available at <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/FinalPDF.pdf>

across the country. Addressing the 25th National Seerat Conference 2001, General Musharraf noted:

How does the world judge our claim? It looks upon us as terrorists...Was Islam propagated like this? Did our Prophet do it that way? It is intolerance that holds our society in its grip. ...Religious and sectarian harmony is therefore an inescapable necessity in Pakistan...Do not sully our glorious faith. I say this to all those who are guilty of it...My particular appeal is to all those Ulema who are sitting here to promote harmony among all sects so that we achieve unity in our ranks and are able to devote our entire energies towards economic uplift.²⁰

Following this, „Pakistan Madrassa Education Board Ordinance 2001’ was promulgated on 18 June, the same year. According to this Ordinance, over 10,000 religious seminaries – Madrassas – were to be brought into the public education system through registration, curriculum reform and financial audit. And a network of “model madrassas” was to be set up.²¹ Lt.General (retd) Moinuddin Haider, former Federal Interior Minister (in the pre-9/11 phase) in conversation with the author maintained:

We were committed to reform both public school curriculum and mainstream religious seminaries as radical mindset are being produced from here.... We had limited success, given the stiff resistance from the religious schools... Education system in Pakistan must be overhauled to promote a just and stable society.²²

Following the 9/11 WTC incident, General Musharraf’s government launched Education Sector Reforms (ESR) in December 2001. One of the key objectives of the programme was to increase the national literacy rate; provide universal education; reduce

²⁰ Text of Address By General Pervez Musharraf , 25th National Seerat Conference, Islamabad June 5, 2001, Ministry of Information, Islamabad.

²¹Dr Fayyaz Ahmed, Joint Education Adviser Policy and Planning Wing, Ministry of Education, interview with Author, 13 November 2006, Islamabad.

²²General Moinuddin Haider, former Federal Interior Minister, interview with Author, 23 March 2007, Karachi.

gender disparity; improve education quality and initiate national curriculum reform. „English and Science subjects’ were to be introduced in the Madrassas to mainstream these institutions. Education Sector Reforms (ESR) linked with four concurrent macro level initiatives, which included the Devolution and Local Government Plan 2000, the Interim-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2001-2004, Social Action Plan-SAP II restructuring, and the National Commission on Human Development. In January 2002, government launched a five year \$113 million plan to bring the teaching of „formal’ (secular) subjects to 8,000 „willing’ madrassas. In November 2003, the government decided to allocate about \$50 million annually to provide assistance to registered seminaries, especially by paying the salaries of teachers hired to teach non-religious subjects.²³ In conversation with the author General (retd) Javed Ashraf - Federal Education Minister maintained:

Number of packages was announced from time to time to invest in religious and public education system to de-radicalize future generations. The Education Sector Reforms (ESR) envisioned measures to enlarge enrolment into public schools as a means to curtail recruitment in madrassas that at times served as supply line of young Jihadis to militant outfits. This move was based on the realization that due to lack of education facilities and economic deprivation most families do not send their children to the mainstream institutions and prefer Madrassas where in addition to education boarding and lodging was also provided. Under this plan it was decided that public- private partnership will be enhanced *to* deliver quality education through English medium.²⁴

²³ Ministry of Education, Islamabad.

²⁴ General (retd) Javed Ashraf - Federal Education Minister, interview with Author, 11 November 2006, Islamabad.

According to National Education Census which the ministry of education released in 2006, 1.5 million students were getting religious education in the 13,000 madrassas.²⁵ While independent sources put the number of Madrassas at between 18,000 and 22,000. President Musharraf in the face of increasing war threats from India and Washington pressure announced tough measures against extremists in an hour long speech on Jan 12, 2002. He said:

Sectarian terrorism has been going on for years...The day of reckoning has come. Do we want Pakistan to be a theocratic state? Do we believe that religious education alone is enough for governance or do we want Pakistan to emerge as a progressive and dynamic welfare state?...Today Pakistan is not facing any threat from outside. But the real threats are posed from within.²⁶

Following this speech it was announced that foreign students all Madrassas will be registered by March 23; speedy trial courts will be set up to punish terrorist acts; above all, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan and Tanzim Nifaz-i- Shari'ah-i-Mohammadi stood banned.²⁷ Of these six banned extremist Islamic groups, two, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, were also designated as terrorist groups by the US State Department.²⁸ Discussing the madrassa reform initiative Dr Masooda Bano in conversation with the author said:

²⁵“Punjab has 5,459 madrasas followed by NWFP with 2,843; Sind, 1,935; Federally Administrated Northern Areas (FANA),1,193;Baluchistan 769; AJK 586; Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (Fata), 135, and Islamabad capital territory 77”.

Source:“*National Education Census*”, Islamabad: Ministry of Education, 2006.

²⁶ Text of General Musharraf Speech, 12 January, 2002. Obtained from, Ministry of Information, Islamabad.

²⁷ Note: Following this announcement, militant members of these movements were immediately targeted. Pakistan's Interior Ministry maintained that 1,900 activists were arrested and 600 organizational headquarters were closed down in four days. However, most of them were freed thereafter.

²⁸Note: Following the attacks on the Indian Parliament and the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in 2001, the US banned the Lashkar-e-Tayiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was named as FTO by the US State department in January 2003. This group is believed to be responsible for the January 2002 abduction and murder of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Plus Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

The reforms have not won support from the religious elite. Six years on, the programme had failed to record noticeable success by 2007, only 250 out of the approximately 16,000 registered madrasas had accepted the reform programme. The main reasons for this are: weak credibility of Musharraf regime and its close association with the United States, lack of clarity and political will on part of the government and mutual distrust on both sides.²⁹

The madrasa system in Pakistan has a three-tier structure that parallels the secular education system, Primary (Abtadia/Amma), Secondary (Thatani/Khasa) Wustani/Aliya (bachelors degree), and Masters Degree (Fooqani/Almiya). It is organized by five education boards called Wafaqs, which represent the five main Islamic schools of thought in Pakistan. That is: Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Salafia (Ahl-e-Hadith); Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia (Deobandi); Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Shia (Shia); Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Ahle-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat (Barelvi); Rabita-ul-Madaris Al-Islamia (Jamaat-i-Islami). Nearly three quarters of the madrasas and nearly 90 per cent of all students come under the auspices of the Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia, which is part of the Sunni Deobandi tradition. The wafaqs' most important function is to develop a standardized curriculum, hold annual examinations for bachelors and masters' level degrees and issue degree certifications, but they also register all madrasas in a given school of thought and coordinate their activities.³⁰

However, in conversation with the senior representatives of the five madrasa education boards the author came across highly negative perceptions about the Madrassa reform package. They termed the measures as “discriminatory on behest of United States,

was also held responsible for the March 2002 Karachi bus bombing that killed 15 people, including 11 French technicians. The LJ is also reported to have links with the Al-Qaeda.

²⁹ Masooda Bano, Human Development expert, interview with Author, 12 October 2008, Rawalpindi.

³⁰ For more details see: Masooda Bano, “Contesting Ideologies and Struggle for Authority: State-Madrassa Engagement in Pakistan”, Birmingham: Religions and Development Research Programme, 2007.

and bent on destroying the only cohesive and successful education system left in the country.”³¹

What was the outcome of the above mentioned policy pronouncements and measures which remained a distant goal and the „radicalization trend’ continued its upward surge? Answering this question one must note the contextual factors -- ranging from credibility and political legitimacy deficit, Pakistan’s military actions within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), number of „Peace Deals’ (with the militants), and „instability in the neighborhood that is Afghanistan, plus US Drone attacks that killed innocent civilians all these elements added to further polarization of the public against state policy and institutions. Generally, a sense of pessimism prevailed among the silent majority while the ranks of „militants’ swelled resulting in increase in „suicide attacks’ across the country. An eminent analyst, Dr Hassan-Askari Rizvi, reflects on the Musharraf regime’s policies to curb extremism within the country in the following words:

Some half hearted efforts were made by General Pervez Musharraf’s government (1999-2008) to moderate religion oriented trends and check militancy. However, the imperative of staying in power led his government to accommodate the MMA (the coalition of six Islamic parties that sympathized with the Taliban and advocated religious orthodoxy and militancy) and not to push hard line all the way against religious hard liners and militant groups. They were given enough space to continue pursuing their religious-cum-political agendas.³²

But it is as if the government was not aware of these factors and believed in the success of these measures as reflected in the following words of General Musharraf:

³¹ Observation based on Author’s participation twice in roundtables with the Madrassa leaders, 2007- 2008, Islamabad.

³² Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Radicalization and the Political System of Pakistan”, National conference on “Youth” organized by Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), July 2009.

We pursued and were successful on five points. That is, misuse of mosque; proscribing militant and sectarian literature; reining in and banning extremist militant organizations; initiating dialogue with religious seminaries stalwarts, and, reviewing school curricula...Our success was 70 per cent versus militant literature, 50 per cent versus banned militant outfits, 80 per cent in curriculum revision, 60 – 70 per cent in registering Madrassas, and 95 per cent in deporting foreign students (without prior official approval) from religious seminaries...The situation was very complex and we operated against all odds.³³

Now we come to the legal measures that were adopted to check the rising tide of terrorism in Pakistan.

Part Two

7.2 - A: Legal and Institutional Measures to Counter Terrorism

Literally speaking, anti-terrorism (sometimes abbreviated as AT) generally refers to passive, defensive, protective, or legal measures against terrorism. Efforts to deter terrorism may take the form of severe penalties under anti-terrorism laws, such as circulating descriptions or photographs of terrorists in the media, offering rewards for information, or resort to putting pressure on the kin of terrorists. For more than three decades the government has been introducing “special” legal measures to deal with certain terrorist offences outside the regular criminal justice regime. The government since the 1970s has interpreted political and sectarian violence, nationalist movements, and certain criminal offences as acts of terrorism and thus instituted a parallel legal system to try those who commit these crimes. The regular criminal justice system was

³³ General (ret'd) Pervez Musharraf, interview with author, 6 January 2010, London.

deemed incapable of delivering justice swiftly.³⁴ Very often the laws under the garb of “anti-terrorist measures” that dealt with anti-state elements were in fact used for political purposes. Z A Bhutto government adopted Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Court) Act of 1975 wherein “special” laws and courts dealing with “terrorism” or “terrorist acts” became the norm.

Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997 was the brain child of the Nawaz Sharif government that sought to “impart timely and inexpensive justice by establishing a parallel legal system.”³⁵ ATA was preceded by many years of sectarian violence and terrorist incidents across the country. The law included “special” measures to expedite trials. It had the expanded objective of preventing “terrorism and sectarian violence” and providing “speedy trial of heinous offences.”³⁶

The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) law aimed at acting as a deterrent to would-be terrorists by incorporating the broader definition of terrorism and rigid deadlines to ensure speedy justice. The Act defined terrorism as:

Whoever, to strike terror in the people, or an any section of people, or to alienate any section of the people or to

³⁴ Note: Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan promulgated „Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, in 1949 aimed to curb political violence. Under General Ayub Khan’s military rule Public Offices (Disqualification) Order of 1959, PODO aimed to silence political activism against the military rule. Like wise, Electoral Bodies (Disqualification) Order of 1950, EBDO sought to eliminate and silence political dissent terming these elements as “anti-state” and consolidate military rule of the General Ayub Khan. Z A Bhutto introduced the words „terrorist activities’ in legislation for the first time and established special courts to try such offenses. For more details see: Mian Ghulam Hussain, *Manual of Anti-Terrorism Laws in Pakistan*, Lahore: Afsari Printers, 2006.

³⁵ Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif quoted in *DAWN*, 29 November 1997.

³⁶ Preamble - Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 1997.

adversely affect harmony among different sections of the people, does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive or inflammable substance, or firearms, or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or chemical or other substances of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause the death of, or injury to, any person or persons, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community or display firearms, or threaten with the use of force public servants in order to prevent them from discharging their lawful duties commits a terrorist act.³⁷

Concurrently in 1997, special “anti-terrorist courts” were created under the ATA - a departure from the existing judicial system and an attempt to create a parallel system directly staffed and monitored by the executive rather than the judiciary. Following Supreme Court intervention, ATA 1997 was amended, and on 24 October 1998 the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance was issued. Under this ordinance, anti-terrorism courts remained in place and the judges of such courts were granted tenure of office; special Appellate Tribunals were disbanded and appeals against the decision of the anti-terror courts would henceforth be submitted to the respective High Courts; and restrictions were placed on ATA 1997’s provisions regarding trials in absentia to accord with regular legal procedures.³⁸

Pakistan Armed Forces (acting in aid of civil power) Ordinance -34- (PAFO) was promulgated on November 20, 1998, following the spree of ethnic killings that gripped Karachi in October 1998. The targeted killing of Hakim Said, a well-known philanthropist and a former Governor of Sindh, on October 17, 1998, led to the imposition of

³⁷ Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (20 August 1997), *PLD 1997 Central Statutes (unreported)* 537.

³⁸ Charles Kennedy, “The Creation and Development of Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism 1997-2002” p: 397.

Governor's Emergency Rule in Sindh province. The military was called in to restore law and order in the province under PAFO's broad judicial powers. The Ordinance was criticized by human rights activists, media, and opposition parties. Opposition Senator Aitzaz Ahsan questioned the definition of "civil commotion" and observed:

Actions of publishing handbills or wall-chalking or going on strike for economic crises have nothing to do with Terrorism. Intent of law is to suppress all expressions of opposition to government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif...It betrays the real face of the government. They talk of democracy; they come to the Parliament talking of democracy but this is one of the most amazing documents of legislation they have produced. Obviously, [the new laws] are intended to strengthen the grip of the government of the political activity in the country.³⁹

The Supreme Court's unequivocal decision in the case of *Liaquat Hussain versus Federation of Pakistan 1999* wholly repudiates the impugned ordinance, declaring it to be "unconstitutional, without legal authority, and with no legal effect." The unanimous decision of the full nine-member bench also rejected the government's contention that the ordinance was expedient and defensible under the so-called "doctrine of necessity."⁴⁰ The Supreme Court recorded in its judgment that civilians cannot be tried by military courts; the special courts cannot perform parallel function to those assigned to regular courts, and the military powers with regard to "aid to civil authority" do not extend to the creation of courts or the exercise of judicial functions. On August 27 1999, the Nawaz Sharif government made yet another amendment to the ATA 1997 to allow for the creation of

³⁹ Senator Aitzaz Ahsan , *Dateline*, 5 March 1999.

⁴⁰ *Liaquat Hussain versus the Federation of Pakistan*, PLD 1999, SC 504.

anti-terrorism courts in any province of Pakistan.⁴¹ This was the last revision in the anti-terrorism legal regime by the Nawaz government before he was ousted by the military coup led by General Musharraf on 12 October of the same year.

In the pre-9/11 phase, the Musharraf regime had enacted two amendments in the anti-terrorism ordinance on 2 December, 1999 expanding the definition of the act of terrorism and enhanced the ambit of the anti-terrorism courts to include several other provisions of Pakistan's criminal code. Bypassing the regular court system that otherwise could have delayed the proceeding of Sharif's case enabled the anti-terrorism court (ATC – Karachi), on 6 April 2000, to convict Sharif of conspiracy to hijack the PIA flight and sentenced him to life imprisonment.⁴² That life imprisonment sentence imposed on Sharif under the amended ATA never fully materialized, as a deal was struck between the government and Sharif's family. In December 2000, Sharif and his family were allowed to leave the country for Saudi Arabia.⁴³

⁴¹ Anti Terrorism - Second Amendment 1999 Ordinance PLD 2000 Central Statutes 2.

⁴² Note: According to the first amendment, the courts' extended jurisdiction would now include: (1) Section 109 – abetment of offense; (2) Section 120 – concealing of a design to commit an offense; (3) Section 120 B – criminal conspiracy to commit a crime punishable by death or with the imprisonment greater than two years; (4) Section 121 – waging or attempting to wage war against Pakistan; (5) Section 121 A – conspiracy to commit certain offenses against the state; (6) Section 122 – collecting arms with the intent to wage war ; (7) Section 123 – concealment with the intent to facilitate waging of war; (8) Section 365 – kidnapping ; (9) Section 402 – being one of the five or more persons assembled for the purpose of committing dacoity ; (10) Section 402 B – conspiracy to commit hijacking.[42] The 2 December 1999, amendment set up two new special courts to be empowered to “transfer, claim, or readmit any case within that province.” These courts also served as Appellate Tribunals for the anti-terrorist courts. For details see: *The News*, 7 April 2000; *Dawn*, 7 April 2000.

⁴³ Note: under the terms of the deal, Sharif agreed to abstain from politics and remain outside Pakistan for 10 years or so. Additionally, the Sharif family was fined more than 20 million rupees (\$400,000) and agreed to the forfeiture of property worth in excess of 500 million rupees (\$10 million) as part of the deal. For details see: *Dawn*, 10 December 2000.

The remaining pre-9/11 phase was marked by further deterioration of law and order, and incidents of sectarian nature became a regular feature on the home front. Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act issued on 15 August 2001, expanded the purview of the anti-terrorism courts and instituted clauses to proscribe militant sectarian outfits and freeze their financial assets. The Amendment Act empowered the Federal government to ban an organization:

If it has a reason to believe that organization is concerned in terrorism defined as an organization that: commits or participates in the act of terrorism; prepares for terrorism; promotes or encourages terrorism; supports and assists any organization concerned with terrorism; patronizes or assists in the incitement of hatred or contempt on religious, sectarian or ethnic lines that stir up disorder; fails to expel from its ranks or ostracize those who commit acts of terrorism and presents them as heroic persons is otherwise concerned with terrorism.⁴⁴

Following the enactment of the amended ATA, the government banned two sectarian organizations, namely: Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) and Sipah-i- Mohammed (SMP), both militant off-shoots of the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqah-i-Jafferia and Sipah-i-Sahaba, respectively. Additionally, hundreds of activists belonging to these two militant organizations were also rounded up. In January 2002, Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance was promulgated. This enhanced the single bench to three members of the anti-terror courts and introduced “military personnel” as a third member. The government held that this step was taken “to speed up the lengthy adjudication process.”⁴⁵ In yet another bid to strengthen the legal regime and ensure rule of law, the government issued

⁴⁴ Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 15 August, 2001 , Section 11 A.

⁴⁵ “New anti-terror Courts in Pakistan”, *BBC News*, 1 February, 2002.

the Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance on November 16, 2002. This Act enhanced the powers of the police to deal with terrorism. By inserting the Fourth Schedule into the ATA of 1997, clauses were added regarding the “security of good behavior” to be fulfilled by the activists of the organization or person whose name is recorded in the Fourth schedule list. The Act also provided law enforcement agencies to hold a suspect for up to one year without challenge.⁴⁶

The ATA legislation that had been on the statute well before 9/11, but had never been vigorously enforced except by one governing political party against rivals, was put into effect. Following the ATA clauses, the government said it could take actions against banned organizations: their offices, if any would be sealed; their assets and accounts would be frozen; all literature and electronic media material would be seized; the publication, printing or dissemination of press statements, press conferences, or public utterances by or on behalf of, or in support of, a proscribed organization would be prohibited. The proscribed groups would also be required to submit accounts of their income and expenditure for their political and social activities and disclose all funding sources to those relevant authorities designated by the federal government.⁴⁷

Musharraf’s regime like its predecessors also extended the umbrella of anti-terrorism goals into the political arena seen by government opponents as political victimization.⁴⁸ Though the public fundraising, recruitment, and propaganda of the

⁴⁶ Anti Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, November 16, 2002.

⁴⁷ Mohammad Amir Rana, *The Seeds of Terrorism*, London : New Millennium, 2005. p: 66.

⁴⁸Note: The Political Parties Order of June 28, 2002, adversely affected the rules of politics in the country. Section 3 of the Order prohibits any political party from: (1) promoting sectarian, regional or provincial

banned outfits were supposed to be curtailed, organizations found innovative ways to survive and flourish such as adopting legitimate business covers like health, education and real estate. This placed government in a bind as no law (or effective procedure) exists that bans former members of a militant organization to engage in charity and humanitarian work.⁴⁹

Further amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 were added in November 2004. The maximum jail term for supporters of militants was increased from 14 years to life imprisonment. The aim was “to strike at the support network of the terrorism and deter those who are providing financial, logistical and infrastructure support to the terrorists and remove loopholes in the Anti-Terrorism Act.” Sub-sections 4-A and 4-B were added to Section 25 of the Act of 1997; victims and their heirs obtained the right to appeal against the acquittal of accused by an anti-terrorist court. Another amendment to the ATA authorizes the government officials to seize the passport of anyone charged under the law.

Along the same lines, government enacted the Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) Act on January 10, 2005. This Act provided for the constitution of Special Benches consisting of no less than two judges for disposal of appeals. The act allowed the transfer of cases of terrorism from one province to another. It also enhanced the jurisdiction of the courts -- dealing with abduction and kidnapping for ransom, finding

hatred or animosity; (2) bearing a name as a militant group; (3) imparting any military or paramilitary training to its members or other persons”. Section 4 also requires that every political party maintain an official manifesto. And Section 15 provides for dissolution of any political party that is “foreign-aided” or is found “indulging in terrorism.”

⁴⁹ Author’s off-record interviews with the officials of Interior Ministry as well as Law Ministry experts pointed out this aspect of Law. Officials recommended effective post-banning mechanism to be followed in letter and spirit to deter political violence in the country, 2006 – 2009.

and use of explosives in places of worship and court premises -- to be exclusively tried by Anti-terrorism Courts.⁵⁰

ATA is silent on the issue of extra-judicial detention of Pakistani citizens and deportation to the third country (primarily the United States) commonly referred to as “missing persons.”⁵¹ Most of the senior legal experts believe the state cannot violate the fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution of the country. Being picked by the intelligence agencies (that is establishment) and kept in ‘safe houses’ for interrogation (that often involves torture) purpose without due process of law amount to violation of basic human rights and conducting an act of illegal captivity. State agencies must be held accountable and principle of ‘rule of law’ should be observed in all circumstances.⁵² According to the 2007 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) report:

Approximately 1,600 persons were missing. Then-chief justice Chaudhry heard a petition filed earlier in 2007 by HRCP and 41 other petitions on behalf of 198 persons and in August ordered the government to find and release all the missing persons. They were picked up on suspicion of involvement in terrorism and released shortly thereafter. The rest were kept in different places in the country... Though law prohibits arbitrary arrest and

⁵⁰ Text of Anti-Terrorism Second Amendment Act- Provision 13, pp: 6 – 10, 2005.

⁵¹ Note: Missing Person implies ‘enforced disappearance’ by the Pakistani secret service (ISI) between 2001 - 2008 in the framework of US-Pakistani counter-terrorism policy. According to the Government, during this period around 1,600 people have “disappeared”, but some civil organizations place the number much higher.

⁵² Note: Article 9 of the Pakistan Constitution states: “no person shall be deprived of life or liberty, save in accordance with law.” Article 10 further guarantees: “no person shall be arrested and detained for a period of over 24 hours without being produced before a magistrate”.

detention; however, the authorities did not always comply with the law.⁵³

In response to the above mentioned situation, the Crises Management Cell officials at the Ministry of Interior maintained, following the judicial orders an active policy to locate the reported missing cases is underway. And “out of 2390 (total reported missing cases) 310 missing persons have been located and 1291 remain missing (cases are still pursued) as of 22 August 2009.”⁵⁴ The situation is certainly of a complex nature and the inability of investigative agencies to present credible evidence to the courts remains a strong reason for by-passing the due process of law. Babur Sattar, an interested lawyer suggests:

Parliament must introduce a legislative framework that defines the mandate of the intelligence agencies, identifies the limits of extraordinary powers that they are vested with (such as wire-tapping), specifies the processes they must follow to ensure that such power is not abused (such as prior approval by judicial officers), facilitates cooperation between intelligence agencies and civilian law-enforcement bodies, provides a mechanism for the civilian executive to give policy input, and for parliament to seek information and provide bipartisan oversight. And until that happens, the judiciary must not shirk its obligation to firmly clamp down on the excesses of the intelligence agencies.⁵⁵

Chairperson of Defense of Human Rights Ms Amina Masood Janjua in conversation with the author termed General Musharraf’s counter-terrorism policy a gross misconduct of fundamental human rights. She said:

My husband Masood Janjua was picked on 30 July 2005 by the intelligence agencies and has been kept in illegal

⁵³ HRCP, *Pakistan Human Rights Report 2007, 2008*.

⁵⁴ Data obtained from Government of Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior: Crises Management Cell (CMC), 5 September 2009, Islamabad.

⁵⁵ Babur Sattar – Legal Expert, interview with author, 30 May 2009, Islamabad.

detention to date. No warrant was issued and due process of law was not followed...We are still unaware of the charges framed against him...We have been running from post to pillar but no explanation by the state has been given to date. In 2007 Supreme Court issued directives to the interior ministry to produce the accused before the court but the ministry says it is trying to locate the suspect.⁵⁶

At this juncture it is pertinent to note that in the post-9/11 phase, Islamabad tried to fulfill the obligation of being a United Nations member and ensure the implementation of the UN Resolution 1373 (2001), UN Resolution 1624 (2005), and submit periodic reports to the U.N. Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) from time to time.⁵⁷ In other words, anti-terrorism ambit enlarged from a national enterprise and upgraded to be in line with guidelines formulated by the U.N. At first a Special Investigation Group (SIG) was established as a counter terrorism unit under the supervision of Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) during July 2003. The purpose of this group was to identify arrest, investigate and prosecute the most wanted terrorists. The group was meant to deal with cyber terrorism investigation, data collection about terrorists and money laundering cases and also provides training courses for police departments.⁵⁸ Further, the Prevention and Control of Human Trafficking Ordinance 2002 was promulgated to prevent and control human trafficking.

⁵⁶ Amina Masood Janjua – Defense of Human Rights, interview with author, 22 March 2010, Islamabad.

⁵⁷ UN Resolution 1373 (2001) was adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting on September 28, 2001. It called on States to “work together to prevent and suppress terrorism through all lawful means and obliges all states to criminalize assistance to terrorist activities, deny financial support and safe haven to terrorists and share information about groups planning terrorist attacks”. UN Resolution 1624 (2005) called on States to ensure prohibition of incitement to commit terrorist acts. For more details see, [Http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/resolutions.html](http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/resolutions.html).

⁵⁸ Government of Pakistan -Special Investigation Group (SIG) Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). More details available at: http://www.fia.gov.pk/prj_sig.htm.

Alongside these measures, in compliance with legislative requirements necessary to implement U.N. Resolutions 1373 and 1624, a draft of the Anti-Money Laundering Bill (2005) was approved by the Federal Cabinet but its enactment was delayed for a long time. The Anti-Money Laundering Bill aimed “to make the financing of terrorism a predicate offense for money laundering; extend the banking and financial laws and alternative money transfer systems; and, regulate charitable, religious, and other non-governmental organizations.”⁵⁹ The bill was finally approved in January 2010, by the Parliament of the country. Under the Anti-Money Laundering Bill, a punishment of rigorous imprisonment of not less than one year and up to 10 years, along with fine, will be awarded to anyone who acquires converts, possesses or transfers property, knowing or having reason to believe that such property is proceeds of crime.⁶⁰

In the same vain, Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act was enacted as an ordinance by President Musharraf in December 2007. This act aimed to prevent any action against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of electronic systems, networks and data as well as the misuse of such systems, networks and data by penalizing such actions and providing mechanism for investigation, prosecution and trial (sic) of such offenses.⁶¹ Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) was made center point to investigate, and prevent cyber crimes defined under the law. Before this ordinance, Electronic

⁵⁹“Pakistan Report to United Nations CTC Counter Terrorism Committee 2005”.[Http: //www.un.org/sc/ctc/country reports/report](http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/country_reports/report).

⁶⁰ Text of the Anti-Money Laundering Bill, *Dawn*, 28 January 2010.

⁶¹Ministry of Law, justice and Human Rights, *Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act – 31December 2007*, Ordinance L XXII of 2007. Available at: [Http: www.fia.gov.pk/electronic_prevention_orde.pdf](http://www.fia.gov.pk/electronic_prevention_orde.pdf).

For more discussion see:

Saba Noor, “Evolution of Counter-Terrorism Legislation in Pakistan”, *Conflict and Peace Studies*, No. 1, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2008. pp: 87 – 110.

Transaction Ordinance (ETO-2002) was being used by FIA to deal with Cyber Crimes. Keeping this in view the National Response Center for Cyber Crimes (NR3C) was established under Federal Investigation Agency to deal with such types of crimes. Former Director General FIA, Tariq Pervez in conversation with the author said:

This center aims to develop liaison with international organizations especially against online internet frauds, email threats, plastic money frauds and other financial crimes. NR3C is committed to build local capabilities in incident handling and security intelligence. When this capability is achieved it will be integrated internationally to monitor global security issues.⁶²

At this juncture, the Musharraf regime's efforts to reform the police as a preventative tool to counter terrorism on a sustainable footing need to be discussed.

7.2 - B: Police Reforms under Musharraf

Police and local governments are provincial issues but the former military ruler had made them federal subjects by promulgating two ordinances "The local Government Ordinance 2001 and the Police Order 2002."⁶³ During the Musharraf regime Police order 2002 was established to reconstruct and regulate the police. The law came into force in the whole country except the federal capital territory. Initially, Police reforms formed a part of the military government's devolution scheme and replaced the colonial-era legislation, the Police Act of 1861, which had governed the functioning of the police since independence, with the Police Order 2002.⁶⁴ It aimed at addressing public grievances vis-à-vis the police department by introducing a significant shift from a

⁶² Mr. Tariq Pervaiz former Director General FIA, heading NCTA (National Counter Terrorism Authority), interview with Author, 20 April 2009, Islamabad.

For more details on the achievement of National Response Center for Cyber Crimes see: [Http: www.nr3c.gov.pk/achievements.php](http://www.nr3c.gov.pk/achievements.php)

⁶³ *The News*, 24 February 2010.

⁶⁴ "Reforming Pakistan Police" ICG Asia Report 157, 14 July 2008, Available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5570>

coercive organ of the state to a public service organization, which envisaged establishment of effective mechanisms of public accountability and institutional checks and balances.⁶⁵ In the Police Order 2002, operational autonomy was emphasized by giving security of tenure to officers, by giving powers of ex-officio secretary to the PPO (provincial police officer), by getting panels of PSP officers forwarded by the NPSC (National Public Safety Commission) to the government for posting as PPO and by providing officers an opportunity of hearing and recourse both against illegal orders and pre-mature transfers.⁶⁶ Shoaib Suddle, one of the co-drafter of Police Act 2002 said:

This act aimed at depoliticizing police, improving police professionalism through a merit-oriented system of recruitment and career progression, and making police more accountable to citizens. If properly implemented, these radical reforms can bring about a fundamental transformation in the quality of policing, and make police a people-friendly public service, particularly for the poor and disadvantaged.⁶⁷

However, politics came in the way of successful implementation of the Police Reform Act.⁶⁸ To quote Afzal Shigri, an ex-Police official:

In the name of public interest Police Order 2002 was amended in 2004 even before its implementation. A check on unrestrained powers of the executive was unacceptable to elected political governments in the Provinces. As a result, Civilian oversight through a neutral body has been compromised by changing the composition of the district and provincial public safety commissions...Politicians, bureaucracy and police - all three collaborated to destroy this law for different reasons. Politicians without the option of misuse of police to deal with their political opponents felt weakened and therefore were averse to external oversight by civil society, bureaucracy feels that failure of

⁶⁵“Police Reforms: New Legal Framework and Issues in Implementation”, available at: http://www.crcp.org.pk/PDF%20Files/police_reforms.pdf

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Federal Tax Ombudsmen - Dr Shoaib Suddle, former Inspector General Police - Baluchistan, Ex Director General - Intelligence Bureau (IB) interview with Author, 26 November 2009. Islamabad.

⁶⁸ The Police Order 2002 (UP DATED VERSION) available at: http://www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/Police_order_2002_with_amendment_ordinance_2006.pdf .

the reforms will help in restoration of their all powerful DM and police just did not like the stringent provisions of swift and meaningful accountability of their misdeeds.⁶⁹

The positive outcome of the Police reforms became obvious as by August 2005 the government had converted 25 of Baluchistan's 27 districts from "B areas" controlled by local levy forces who obeyed local tribal chiefs to "A areas" controlled by the police. Nearly 3,000 of the 3,560 levy forces in 2006 were converted to police, and nearly 1,500 local youth were inducted into the newly formed police force.⁷⁰ General Musharraf's spokesperson recounting the regime's effective measures at the domestic end by 2006 stressed:

Police Reforms have been introduced to make Police force more effective and professional. Better training facilities are being initiated such a PISCES (Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System), a border control system designed to monitor the exit and entry of travelers at the ports of embarkation and disembarkation. Forensic laboratories, structuring of CIDs, establishment of Anti-Terrorist units, Machine Readable Passports, establishment of Help Line and E-mail facility, are all police related measures...Plus a fully equipped National Crises Management Cell has been set up in Ministry of Interior. The Provincial governments have also set up similar Crises Management Cells at the Provincial level. These centers are tasked round the clock collection and collation of information of all incidents occurring in any part of the country for reporting to higher authorities.⁷¹

However, all the institutional steps by the Musharraf government could not bring the desired improvement in the police force. The Transparency International's "Global Corruption Barometer" released on 6 December 2007, placed police as the most corrupt

⁶⁹ Afzal Ali Shigri – Former Inspector General Police, Sind, *The News*, 10 May 2009.

⁷⁰ HRCP, *Pakistan Human Rights Report 2007*, published in 2008.

⁷¹ Lt General M Shaukat Sultan, Director General ISPR interview with author, 6 February 2007, Rawalpindi.

public sector agency in Pakistan. It has only 350,000 police for a population of around 172 million, a ratio of 1:477.⁷² Hassan Abbas' in-depth analysis of the factors inhibiting the counter-terrorism role of police points out, lack of coordination between police, civilian-run Intelligence Bureau, and military-run intelligence agencies, poor data collection skills plus double standards in government policy versus militants as key factors responsible for limited success of police in pursuing terrorist and militant organizations in Pakistan.⁷³

According to the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative's research report, due to the backlash from the provinces, the bureaucracy and certain segments of the policing community, the reforms passed in 2002 were significantly curtailed by amendments that were introduced between 2004 and 2007. Over a period of four years, eight ordinances were promulgated to introduce scores of substantive and hundreds of minor amendments to the original Police Order. Most notably, the Police Order (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004, amended or replaced 73 of the 187 articles found in the original Police Order, 2002.⁷⁴ The report acknowledges that, even though the Police Order, 2002 was not perfect, its proper implementation would have shaken up a moribund system that is in desperate need of reform.

Thus making police effective and efficient in dealing with terrorism which has been the objective of these reforms remains to this day an elusive reality. The present study argues that given the indigenous nature of terrorism in Pakistan, a pro-active role of

⁷² "Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2007," Transparency International, 2007. p: 22. Available at: www.transparency.org/content/

⁷³ Hassan Abbas, "Police and Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan", *Institute of Social Policy and Understanding* (ISPU), April 2009.

⁷⁴ Sanjay Patil, Feudal Forces: Reform Delayed, A research study By Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Available at: http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/feudal_forces_reform_delayed_moving_from_force_to_service_in_south_asian_policing.pdf

police in collaboration with community mobilization can be a viable way out. That is, the police can pre-empt many of the terrorist activities with better resources and intelligence. Here, the missing link of public support to cushion an effective policing merits discussion.

Part Three

7.3 – A: Musharraf's Political and Social Measures in the name of counter Extremism in Pakistan

Musharraf's official rhetoric of introducing political reforms beginning with the Local Government Ordinance 2000 was to rectify a personalized and politicized state of decision-making and alarming levels of corruption resulting in low quality of governance and propagate sustainable democracy for the good of the people and state of Pakistan. In reality, political measures were meant to carve out a new political constituency to legitimize his extra-constitutional and dictatorial rule and give it the cover of a sham democracy.

Through holding a national referendum in early 2002 Musharraf secured a term of five years as President of the country thus creating a legitimate cover to perpetuate his power. This step made his presidency beyond the reach of the federal Parliament and Provincial assemblies, which were elected in October the same year and were constitutionally meant to select both the President and Prime Minister respectively. Musharraf justified his political maneuvering professing the national interest jargon "to

complete democratic reforms, combat corruption, address Pakistan's widespread poverty and quell religious extremism.”⁷⁵

Under his plan to reform the political system in Pakistan it was decided to lower the voting age to 18 years, increase the number of seats for women in the parliament and create a reserved quota of seats for the minorities. It was further decided that only university graduates could contest the national assembly and senate elections, Moreover no one could serve as prime minister or president more than two terms in office.⁷⁶ In reality, this last restriction was directed to bar Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto from returning to power through elections. The two major political parties of the country, PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz) and PPP (Pakistan Peoples Party) were sidelined by the military regime using “accountability matrix” and the PML –Q (Pakistan Muslim League – Quaid -i-Azam) largely composed of the PPP and PML-N splintered groups was propped up in the name of “sustainable democracy”. Along with this the creation of another group comprising an amalgamation of six religious parties called the MMA (Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal)⁷⁷ was facilitated which emerged as the third largest political force in the elections organized by Musharraf. The party position according to election results was as follows:

⁷⁵Quoted in Seth Mydans, “A Nation Challenged: Pakistan - Musharraf Plans a Referendum to Let Him Stay in Power” *New York Times*, 6April 2002.

⁷⁶ Pervez Musharraf, *In The Line of Fire*, New York: Free Press, 2006, pp. 164-180.

⁷⁷ Note: MMA emerged as the third largest political force after the election. Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) was a composition of six religious parties, Jamiat-ul Ulema-i- Islam (Fazlur Rahman Group) Jamiat-ul- Ulema-i- Islam (Sami-ul- Haq Group) Jamat-i- Islami, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i- Pakistan(JUP), Jamat Ahle-Hadith (JAAH) and Islami Tehrik-e-Pakistan (ITP). Six Religious groupings contested election under MMA name and emerged as the third largest political force in post 2002 election phase. MMA components were known for anti-American sentiments and pro-Taliban leanings. Most of the analysts also trace the genesis of Afghan Taliban movement to the madrasas set up by the JUI led by Maulana Fazlur Rahman in Pakistan.

Table 1. Breakdown, by Party, of Voting and Seats in the Pakistan General Election, 2002

Party	Votes (million)	Share of total vote (percent)	Number of seats won*
PPP	7.39	25.01	62
PML-Q	7.33	24.81	77
PML-N	3.32	11.23	14
MMA	3.19	11.10	53

Source: *Source: International Crisis Group, Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military*, ICG Asia Report 49 Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003. pp: 17–18.

According to the Election Commission of Pakistan, MMA got 11.3 per cent of the total polled votes at the national level, while it swept NWFP with 45.5 per cent of votes and 29 seats. In Baluchistan the MMA bagged 16.1 per cent of the polled votes and 6 seats. However, it fared poorly in Punjab with only 5.2 per cent of votes and 3 seats only. In Sind, it fared slightly better, by capturing 10.5 per cent of votes and 7 seats.⁷⁸

Mossarat Qadeem, a political and development expert from Peshawar, explains the rise of MMA as follows:

MMA gained high degree of political strength because of the major political engineering undertaken by the military. The negative campaign conducted by the military led regime against the secular PML-N and PPP provided opportunity to the MMA to fill the vacuum...The vote for the MMA was thus actually not a vote for a MMA but a vote against the US, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif ...The religious parties had been given a free hand. For more than a year since September 11 attacks on the US, the religious parties had had a field day in the name of Afghanistan Defense Council to mobilize their workers. They made use of the infrastructure provided by mosques and madrassas to gain votes. Therefore, when the elections were announced the MMA was the only alliance, which was ready for the electoral battle, while the other political parties looked around in desperation for partners and seat adjustment.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Election Commission of Pakistan, 2002.

⁷⁹ Mossarat Qadeem - Executive Director PAIMAN Alumni Trust interview with Author, 12 May 2007, Peshawar.

Thus, for the first time an alliance comprising religious parties formed a government on its own in the NWFP.⁸⁰ The only other time when a religious party ruled in the NWFP was in 1970 when Maulana Mufti Mahmud, father of the present JUI (F) leader, was the chief minister, heading a coalition government with the National Awami Party (NAP). Mufti Mahmood had resigned in protest when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto dismissed the NAP government in Baluchistan in 1973. In Baluchistan, Pakistan Muslim League – Quaid-I-Azam (PML-Q) and Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) formed a coalition government while at the center too the MMA became a major coalition partner of the PML-Q led government. Thus, Musharraf's ostensibly liberal regime to remain in power was willing to support and work with MMA which maintained ideological (and at times structural) linkages with the extreme militant outfits within and beyond Pakistan. Musharraf secured the MMA's support at the center to add Article 270-AA to the constitution on 24 December 2003, which validated all his actions since his 1999 coup in exchange for his willingness to shed his uniform by 31 December 2004. This meant giving legal stake to the armed forces in the government's formal decision-making process. Accordingly, the constitutional amendment ensured:

The Proclamation of Emergency of October 14, 1999, all President's Orders, Ordinances, Chief Executive's Orders... shall not be called in question in any court or forum on any ground whatsoever...General Musharraf will be president until 2008. President will have the authority to dismiss Pakistan's national and provincial assemblies without first consulting the Supreme Court. The President's decision to

⁸⁰ Note: No Islamic party in Pakistan ever received more than 5 percent of popular vote before the 2002 elections. Even in 2002, the 11 percent vote that the religious parties captured was a result of the pooling of the center-of-right vote, which was only natural given that the religious outfits were contesting under a united banner. The trend has reverted as in the February 2008 elections, the religious parties managed to win less than 2 percent of the seats in the national legislature in addition to losing badly in both provinces where they held a coalition government under the previous regime.

dissolve the National Assembly under Article 58 (2) (b) would be referred to the Supreme Court within 15 days; the President would seek vote of confidence from the electoral college; the President would consult the Prime Minister on the appointment of armed forces chiefs, although he would not be bound by the advice of the Prime Minister; A National Security Council to be set up under an act of the Parliament rather than as a constitutional body.⁸¹

To quote Samina Ahmed, head of International Crises Group – Asia programme:

President Musharraf's lack of domestic legitimacy has led him (that is, military) to rely on alliances of convenience with the religious right, based on the politics of patronage. In the absence of international support, moderate, secular and democratic parties will remain in the political cold. The choice that Pakistan faces is not between the military and the mullahs, as is generally believed in the West; it is between genuine democracy and a military-mullah alliance that is responsible for producing and sustaining religious extremism of many hues.⁸²

The fact is that political bargaining and partnership with the religious right (that is MMA) clouded Musharraf's stance against the terrorists goading him to backtrack on a number of decisions that could have firmed his hand against the extremist. Selective and often reactionary operations (military, administrative, legal, etc) were conducted with an element of designed ambiguity to fend off indigenous and western criticism of the grey areas in the regime's counter-terrorism policy. Musharraf justified his decision to sack Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Pakistan and proclaimed Emergency rule and issued Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO)⁸³ on 3 November 2007 stating:

⁸¹ Text of December 2003 Constitutional Amendment, *The News*, Islamabad.

⁸² "The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan" ICG Asia Report No 95, 18 April 2005. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3374&l=1>

⁸³ Under the PCO (November 3 2007) order, the Constitution was suspended, the federal cabinet ceased to exist, and the justices were ordered to take an oath to abide by it. Those who failed to do so would be dismissed. For more details see:

"The Text of Provisional Constitutional Order", *Dawn*, 4 November 2007.

There is visible ascendancy in the activities of extremists and incidents of terrorist attacks...posing a grave threat to the life and property of the citizens of Pakistan...Some members of the judiciary are working at cross purposes with the executive and legislature in the fight against terrorism and extremism, thereby weakening the government and the nation's resolve and diluting the efficacy of its actions to control this menace...Some hard-core militants, extremists, terrorists and suicide bombers, who were arrested and being investigated, were ordered to be released. The persons so released have subsequently been involved in heinous terrorist activities, resulting in loss of human life and property...I hereby, order and proclaim that the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall remain in abeyance. This Proclamation shall come into force at once.⁸⁴

This was essentially a move to gloss over the institutional and administrative differences between the Executive and Judiciary that culminated in the forcible removal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry from the office of the Chief Justice of Pakistan in November 2007 on charges of "misconduct and misuse" of authority. The real reason was the Executive's (that is, General Musharraf) fear that the Supreme Court would prevent President Musharraf from retaining his position as Chief of the Army and running for President in 2008. Further, the Musharraf regime was also uncomfortable with the „judicial activism' of Justice Chaudhry since taking over as Chief Justice in June 2005.⁸⁵ The Supreme Court judicial activism was evident with reference to its steps

⁸⁴ "Text of the Proclamation of Emergency", *Dawn*, 4 November 2007.

⁸⁵ The Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Preamble, and Annex (Article 2A), respectively, wherein it is provided: "[T]he independence of the Judiciary shall be fully secured." An up to date but unofficial copy of the Constitution is available at <http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/> Moeen Cheema, Lahore University of Management Sciences, *Safeguarding Judicial Independence in Pakistan*, *JURIST*, 2 April 2007, Available at <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/04/safeguarding-judicial-independence-in.php>.

against the issue of “forced disappearances”⁸⁶, “privatization of Pakistan Steel Mill”⁸⁷, and scrapping the unconstitutional parts of the “Hasba Bill”⁸⁸

In August 2006, the Supreme Court ruled against the government and prevented the sale of Pakistan Steel, to private investors, based on allegations of kickbacks. Chief Justice Chaudhry ruled *inter alia* that:

While exercising the power of judicial review, it is not the function of this Court, ordinarily, to interfere in the policy making domain of the Executive. However, the process of privatization of Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation stands vitiated by acts of omission and commission on the part of certain State functionaries reflecting violation of mandatory provisions of law and the rules framed there under which adversely affected the decisions qua prequalification of a member of the successful consortium, valuation of the project and the final terms offered to the consortium which were not in accord with the initial public offering given through advertisement.⁸⁹

Similarly on the Hasba Bill adoption, the Supreme Court declared a number of provisions concerning moral policing as unconstitutional and it asked the Governor of the province not to sign the bill and thus avoid making it into law.⁹⁰ Thus, Musharraf played politics with the issue of terrorism facing Pakistan and used the cover of this threat to

⁸⁶ Mohammad Kamran, “Government finds 20 missing people, sends 10 home: SC orders authorities to trace all missing persons”, *Daily Times*, 2 December 2006.

⁸⁷ Note: Pakistan Steel Karachi, the biggest industrial complex in Pakistan, provided 20,000 jobs for workers from all over Pakistan. For more details see: [Http: www.paksteel.com](http://www.paksteel.com). For details of issues raised in the sale of Steel Mill see:

“Privatization of Pakistan Steel termed biggest scam”, *Dawn*, 29 May 2006.

⁸⁸ Note: In 2005, the provincial North-West Frontier Assembly passed a controversial bill, known as the Hasba Bill that aimed to establish a sort of ombudsman not only to inquire into corruption and maladministration by provincial government departments, but also to carry out moral and religious policing to ensure the protection of Islamic values. For more details see:

“Text of Hasba bill”, *Dawn*, 16 July 2005.

⁸⁹ Constitutional Petition No 9 of 2006 & Civil Petition Nos. 345 & 394 of 2006 (Pakistan Steel Mills Case) Judgment of Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, para: 4. Available at <http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/hcjbd.htm>.

⁹⁰ Makhdoom Babar, “SC blocks Hisba Bill enactment”, *The Daily Mail*, 16 December 2006.

perpetuate his personal rule. The issues that were dubbed as „national challenges’ were most of the time „political challenges’ to his illegitimate rule.

This led to further polarization among the public and confusion within the government ranks. Refusing to recognize the gaps and failures of the regimes’ highly reactionary counter-terrorism strategy, Musharraf portrayed himself as the only credible savior to rein in militant and extreme forces in Pakistan. In fact, he along with his „inner club’ fabricated a scenario for the international and domestic consumption where the country can only be saved under Musharraf or it will fall into pieces or under extreme fundamentalist groupings. Musharraf’s ideological formula to reverse the tide of Islamic radicalism within the Muslim world was couched in the concept of Enlightened Moderation.

7.3: B - Concept of Enlightened Moderation

In 2002, President Musharraf chose the venue of OIC Conference held in Malaysia to unveil his “Strategy of Enlightened Moderation.” In his words:

The world has been going through a tumultuous period since the dawn of the 1990s, with no sign of relief in sight. The suffering of the innocents, particularly the Muslims at the hands of militants, extremists and terrorists has made it all the more urgent to bring order to this troubled scene. It is in this spirit that the “Strategy of Enlightened Moderation” is being put forward.⁹¹

Musharraf’s enlightened moderation narrative consisted of two prongs. First one concerned the Muslim world to break from the path of militancy, extremism and focus on socio-economic. The second one focused on the Western world specifically the United States to just role in the resolution of lingering Islamic world issues and also contribute

⁹¹ Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan quoted in, “A Plea for Enlightened Moderation” *The Washington Post*, 1 June 2004. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5081-2004May31.html>

towards the underdeveloped Muslim states. Plus this concept stressed unity among all member states of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in reclaiming true Islamic image as an ultimate way towards emancipation. This concept of “Enlightenment through moderation” was well received by the Muslim leaders and added to Musharraf’s international image building campaign. His former spokesperson, Lt.General (retd) Rashid Qureshi in conversation with the author said:

General Musharraf was a visionary leader. He was conscious of dilemmas facing us and the Muslim world. He came to the conclusion that issues such as Kashmir cannot be resolved through force. So, best way is to adopt a pragmatic, moderate and enlightened worldview and policy.⁹²

However, on home front to bolster the concept of enlightened moderation the tradition of Sufism in Islam was exploited and several programmes were started to publicise Sufism. The aim of these programmes was to counter the extremism of the religious clerics who use the mosques to spread ill-will against the West and invite people for militant jihad. The idea was to highlight “divine love, peace and tolerance” that is the core of Sufi teachings as the alternative to “militant ideology”. The National Sufi Council was launched by President Musharraf at a grand ceremony in the historical city of Lahore on the occasion of Iqbal’s birthday on 9 November 2006. In the same month, an International Sufi conference was organized by the Punjab Institute of Languages, Art and Culture (PILAC) under the direction of the Chief Minister of the province, Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi. The Sufi ideology of love and peace was promoted to combat the exclusivist slogans of the mullahs.

⁹² Lt. General (retd) former Official spokesperson and chief of President Musharraf Staff, interview with Author, 10 October 2009, Islamabad.

However, these actions were not well received by the majority of the Sufi and political community. Imran Khan, former cricketer turned politician, called these steps as: “sound-bites by military ruler to appease the Americans. Military rule under Musharraf nullifies the spirit of democracy that is essence of Enlightened Moderation in reality.”⁹³

The government’s move of relying on the “Sufi norms” of the country, further confused the public and gave another strong point to hard-line religious groupings that Musharraf was “against Islam”. There emerged a big gap between the stated “enlightenment drive” given the credibility and legitimacy deficit (discussed earlier) of the Musharraf regime primarily on the home front. Senator Mushahid Hussain former cabinet member under Musharraf rule reflecting on this contradiction observes:

Short-term decisions and short-cuts were adopted by the Musharraf government to reform education sector and madrassas (not all) that promote extremism...No long-term pro-active counter-terrorism policy was implemented in letter and spirit... President Pervaiz Musharraf’s concept of “enlightened moderation” is not alien to Islam or to the indigenous traditions of Sufism in the subcontinent. The essence of Islam, is against extremism...But the fight against repression, like in Iraq or Kashmir, has to be seen in the context of politics and not as something that’s linked to Islam...If the state gets involved in promoting this or that kind of Islam, as it did when it played footie with the extremists in the 1980s, it will make a mess of it.⁹⁴

7.4: C - Promoting the Soft Image of Pakistan

Innumerable media reports and research accounts indicate that government measures to re-direct youth and public from reading “militant literature” and project the “soft image” of Pakistan had mixed results. For instance, an international marathon rally

⁹³ Imran Khan is head of Tehreek Insaf (that means, Justice) – a political party in Pakistan.

⁹⁴ PML Secretary-General Senator Mushahid Hussain, interview with Author, 9 May 2008, Islamabad.

was organized in Lahore during January 2005. Religious organizations, mainly Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), vowed to disrupt the marathon, which it said will promote “nudity and obscenity”. Hundreds of MMA protesters were arrested. Again on 14 January 2007, an international marathon was held in Lahore. This time segregated races were organized in the face of strong criticism from the religious political parties. In this some 30,000 men and women athletes participated from Pakistan and 15 other countries. The marathon carried a cash prize of \$115,000. President Musharraf talking to newsmen after the marathon’s inauguration said:

The huge participation of people in the marathon has sent a message to the extremists that most Pakistanis do not see eye to eye with them on their hatred against healthy activities. This event has helped in creating a soft image of our country.⁹⁵

Musharraf tried to re-design Pakistan’s image as a modern and progressive society as against its growing reputation abroad as an extremist conservative country. Promotion of arts and cultural activities like Bassant (an old Indian festival featuring kite flying, celebrated to observe the arrival of spring) were promoted. These celebrations were opposed by civil society groups, and political parties on account of accidental deaths during kite flying contests and wastage of millions of rupees on the festivities. The celebration of the Bassant festival was exploited by religious political parties against Musharraf who was accused of promoting unIslamic activities and accepting cultural domination of India.

Musharraf further acknowledged and highlighted the role of women in society and encouraged their participation in public and political affairs. For that purpose his

⁹⁵ “President Musharraf statement quoted in Dawn, 15 January 2007.

government introduced the National Gender Reform Action Plan (GRAP). The overall aim of this project was to promote women's access to economic, political and social empowerment, at the national, provincial and district levels. GRAP aimed at developing and implementing a coherent gender reform agenda, to align policies, structures and procedures, for enabling the government to implement its national and international commitments on gender and equality issues.⁹⁶ During his tenure, women gained exceptional rights such as more representation in parliament, appointments in federal cabinet, public services and even in armed forces. In November 2006, Pakistani Military Academy at Kakul, admitted women for the first time in history.

7.5: D – Musharraf's Media Measures: Freedom versus Repression

The media industry grew at a fast pace and private television channels mushroomed. These were positive trends in Pakistan in the early years of Musharraf's regime. Musharraf is recognized by many for opening up the media and following a liberal news policy. However, in the last year of his rule, Gen Musharraf did take some undesirable steps accusing electronic media of non- objectivity. Government grew hostile towards the media. There were instances of intimidation, censorship, assaults on journalists and attacks on media properties. Journalists were arrested and kidnapped while media houses were warned they would be closed if they did not behave. During 2007, Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Pemra) Ordinance - 2007 was introduced to suppress the voice of dissent. The objective of the ordinance was to stifle private television channels which were told that under the ordinance violators of the rules

⁹⁶ Ministry of Women Development, *The Year Book 2006 – 2007*, Islamabad. Available at: [Http: //www.mowd.gov.pk/](http://www.mowd.gov.pk/)

could be prosecuted, sent to jail for three years and/ or fined Rs one million. Using the cover of „national interest’ Musharraf’s aim was to suppress the criticism of his policies and stop the discussion of unsavory facts. It was made compulsory for private channels to take permission from Pemra before airing live talk shows and current affairs programmes.⁹⁷

But while his government was trying to gag the independent media, the print and electronic media in control of extremist groups thrived unchecked. The persistent growth of „radical or militant media’ networks despite Musharraf’s clamp-down on militant organizations and their support structure could not be curbed.

One of the in-depth studies of the genesis of media growth in Pakistan notes:

Pakistan has always had religious media, but in the 1980s a new type of radical Islamist media came into existence that was established in order to support the call for Jihad in Afghanistan and building support for Islamist movements. This has now become a parallel media industry...The number of radical publications runs into hundreds. Six major jihadi outfits print more than 50 newspapers and magazines alone. The Urdu monthly, *Mujalla Al-Dawa*, has a circulation of approximately 100,000. It is published by the *Jamaat ud-Dawaa*, an organization run by *Lashkar-e-Taiba* which also publishes the weekly paper, *Ghazwa*, claiming a circulation of approximately 200,000. Glorification of the *Mujahedeen* and disparagement of the US and its allies are the dominant features of these publications. They criticize the government of Pakistan and encourage true believers to die for Islam. Militant activities are highlighted and

⁹⁷ Adnan Rehmat, “Annual State of Pakistan Media Report 2007-08 Murder and Mayhem: The Worst Year Ever for Pakistani Media”, *Intermedia*, 2008. Also see: “Media Restrictions Undermine election: Human Rights Watch” A report of *Teeth Maestro*, February 2008, Available at: <http://teeth.com.pk/blog/2008/02/18/media-restrictions-undermine-election-human-rights-watch>

glorified as are calls for the Umma to unite against the enemies of Islam.⁹⁸

To quote Amir Rana, why Musharraf government partially succeeded in rolling back militant media:

Following the ban on Jihad organizations and their publications, they have found new method to circulate their products. Banned publications are now sold outside mosques after Friday prayers or are available only designated points, such as madrassas and selected newsstands...When a banned publication reappears, the process to ban it again takes more than eight months....In August 2006, the federal Interior Ministry banned 90 books containing sectarian or hate material...A code of ethics for religious publications should focus on banning appeals soliciting donations and advertisements attracting youth towards jihad.⁹⁹

The jihadi and other radical organizations also actively used electronic media. The author's conversations with civil society activists, students, lawyers from Swat, and FATA areas point out that, hundreds of underground Jihadi radios in FATA and Swat were the most effective tool of radicalization. In Swat Mullah Fazlullah set up an illegal FM radio station, known as Fazlullah FM in the late 2001 and early 2002. Initially, he focused on reforming lives of the Muslims in accordance with Shariah laws and broadcasting recitation of the Qur'an and Hadith. Women were particularly impressed by his rhetoric and became the major fund raiser for his campaign to build religious seminaries. They donated their jewellery for this purpose. Overtime, Fazlullah became critical of President Musharraf's alliance with the United States and started attacking state institutions in a bid to enforce Islamic rule. People of the area nick-named him

⁹⁸ International Media Support, *Media in Pakistan*, July 2009. Available at: [Http: www.m-s-s.dk/files/publication](http://www.m-s-s.dk/files/publication).

⁹⁹ Amir Rana, Director Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), interview with Author, 10February 2008, Islamabad.

„Mullah Radio’. He also advised the destruction of television sets, CDs and VCRs, which he said were sources of immorality. “When this was happening the state either turned a blind eye or jammed his radio network off and on.”¹⁰⁰

No effective state clampdown on electronic means of radicalization like distribution of propaganda CDs, pamphlets, night posters, letters of warning, audio cassettes and even threatening phone calls by the radical Islamic networks was implemented.¹⁰¹ As a result of government efforts, the religious scholars led by Chairman Tanzimul Madaris Pakistan and chairman Ruet-e-Hilal Committee Mufti Munibur Rehman, issued a Fatwa (edict) on May 19, 2005 stating that Islam strictly forbade suicide attacks on Muslims and those committing such acts at places of worship and public congregations ceased to be Muslims. It was meant to discourage suicide bombings being carried out at places of worship in Pakistan; many believe the decree was part of the official campaign to sell a soft image of the country to the West. Some members of the civil society also opened a few radio stations with government’s tacit approval to counter the propaganda of the extremist broadcasts. But this did not produce any tangible result. Thus, whatever steps the government took and the policies it adopted were characterized by lack of firmness rooted in its confusion with regard to religious parties it had remained aligned with and the desire to soft pedal its policies with the aim not to annoy the religious sensibilities of the common people as well as keeping the War on Terror commanders satisfied.

¹⁰⁰ Author’s conversations with students, lawyers, community activists from these areas, 2007 – 2009.

¹⁰¹ Militants in the tribal areas have regularly beheaded alleged American spies. Video recordings of brutal beheadings are being made and distributed to intimidate the local population. The authors have viewed some of these tapes.

7.5: E- Human Resource Development as part of Enlightened Moderation under Musharraf

Civil society leaders working in Swat and Tribal areas in conversation with the author stress the need to enlarge the counter-terror prism of the government and invest in the „soft elements of national power’. That is, economic well being, politically representative system, accountable mode of governance and education plus social uplift of the area.¹⁰² A number of empirically tested studies and research carried out in FATA and Swat testifies to this view. To quote the CAMP (Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme) moving spirit, Naveed Shiwari:

Our polling of 1,050 FATA residents demonstrates a desire for change and continuity. Change in FATA should respect tribal culture and religious sentiment...39 per cent want the Frontier Crimes Regulations that enforce a collective approach to justice across the FATA amended, while 31 per cent want to abolish it...There is strong desire for elected politics in FATA...There are mixed views on the cause of “Talibanisation”, although nearly half consider illiteracy to be major factor, with the Afghan conflict, poor governance, poverty and unemployment also cited. People expressed a strong desire for more jobs...17 per cent of those polled support armed Jihad, while some 57 per cent of the population think Jihad is about learning the Quran, not fighting, and 24 per cent think it is about peaceful resistance. Only 3.6 per cent consider the Taliban to be terrorists...Over 50 per cent of those polled believe that Islamic Law, Sharia, brings peace in the FATA.¹⁰³

To quote General Musharraf: “The concept of Enlightened Moderation set the strategic direction of the Pakistan to concentrate on human security of the people of

¹⁰² Naveed Shinwari, Head of CAMP, interview with Author, April 2008, Islamabad.

¹⁰³ Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, *Understanding FATA: Attitudes towards Governance, Religion and Society in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas*, Peshawar: CAMP, 2008. Available at: [Http: www.camp.org.pk](http://www.camp.org.pk).

Pakistan.”¹⁰⁴ Though most of the independent sources point to the macro-economic turnaround of the Musharraf regime that salvaged Pakistan from being declared as bankrupt, the trickle down effect of this change to the lower strata of economy remained negligible. That is, the remarkable GDP growth failed to lessen income inequality. *Pakistan Economic Survey 2007 – 2008* notes: “The ratio of the highest to the lowest income quintiles has jumped from 3.76 in 2001 to 4.15 in 2005 and further to 4.2 in 2005-06.”¹⁰⁵

Recalling the economic turnaround of Pakistan, former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said:

We were the second fastest economically growing country in Asia. We launched comprehensive economic reforms following pro-active fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. Wide ranges of reforms were introduced focusing on taxation, trade and tariffs, banking and finance, industry and agriculture, deregulation and privatization, fiscal transparency and governance. Poverty Reduction Strategy was put into practice...All this resulted in broad-based economic recovery.¹⁰⁶

A number of economic initiatives to address the widening gap between the rich and poor were taken from time to time.¹⁰⁷ Khushal Pakistan Programme¹⁰⁸, food support programme, micro credit, zakat distribution and President’s Rozgar program¹⁰⁹ - all aimed

¹⁰⁴ General (ret'd) Pervez Musharraf, Ex-President of Pakistan, interview with Author, 6 January 2010, London.

¹⁰⁵ Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, *Pakistan Economic Survey 2007-08*, 2008, p: 218.

¹⁰⁶ Shaukat Aziz, Ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan under Musharraf rule, interview with Author, 9 September 2008, London.

¹⁰⁷ Moeed Yusuf, “A Poverty Targeting Strategy for Pakistan,” working paper, TA 4277, *Asian Development Bank*, 2007, pp.15-28.

¹⁰⁸ Khushal (meaning Prosperous) program aimed to spend 7.5 billion Rupees on projects for clean water, sewerage, electrification and construction of farms to market roads. For more details see: Highlight of Budget Speech 2005-2006, *Dawn*, 8 June 2005.

¹⁰⁹ The Rozgar Pakistan scheme was launched in 2006 by National Bank of Pakistan. For details see : [Http: www.nbp.com](http://www.nbp.com).

to put the „strategic direction’ of Musharraf’s Enlightened Moderation concept into reality.

Dr Ishrat Husain, former Governor of State Bank of Pakistan, in 2005 observed:

Khushal Pakistan Program has generated economic activity in the country through local public works. The provinces, in close collaboration with the local authorities and communities, completed almost half a billion dollars of small projects creating about 1 million job opportunities along with essential infrastructure in rural and low income urban areas. The program has resulted in the construction of farm-to-market roads, rehabilitation of water supply schemes, repair of existing schools, small rural roads, streets, drains, and storm channels in villages.¹¹⁰

The political mileage that President Musharraf aimed to gain out of the so-called pro-poor economic and human development initiatives was too apparent to miss the public eye. For instance, in case of Rozgar (meaning Employment) Programme launched in 2006, a renowned economist, S M Naseem remarked:

The much-trumpeted President’s Rozgar scheme is actually a misnomer, for it does little to alleviate poverty and unemployment and smacks strongly of an electioneering gimmick to distribute patronage among prospective voters and to improve the bottom lines of predatory commercial banks, especially the National Bank of Pakistan, which has been assigned a lead role in the implementation of the scheme.... Centralized decision-making which seems to revolve around Presidency, political expediency, rather than economic rationality seems to underline such decision making.¹¹¹

Moeed Yusuf in his analysis of Musharraf’s limited success of anti-poverty measures notes:

¹¹⁰ Ishrat Husain, “Key Issues in Managing Pakistan Economy”, *Lahore Journal of Economics*, Special Edition, 2005. Available at: [Http: www.lahoreschoolofeconomics.edu.pk](http://www.lahoreschoolofeconomics.edu.pk)

¹¹¹ S M Naseem, *The Unravelling of The 9/11 U-Turn*, Islamabad: Encore, 2007, p: 229.

Related to anti-poverty programs is the issue of poverty targeting. A large proportion of the actual recipients are the „non-poor’, ones who are not supposed to be targeted by these programs. This perverse targeting outcome is a result of leakages in the system. Specific programs for technical assistance could be a potential avenue for U.S. involvement. In addition, grants specifically designed to allow the development of poverty-targeting mechanisms could be tied to tangible outcomes in terms of streamlined methodologies for all programs within the country.¹¹²

Conclusion

The key inference here is, the pro-active elements of the counter-terrorism policy under Musharraf lacked coordination and followed a piece-meal pattern. The concept of enlightened moderation was no doubt a comprehensive response to the challenge of extremism within Pakistan and the Muslim world at large but missed the complexity of the situation on ground. The political imperatives took priority over its broad aim and short-term gestures became the normal substitute for policy implementation.

An important point here to take note of is that poverty itself does not necessarily result into terrorism. It is one of the contributing factors that in another mix of circumstances would not play such a role. There are poorer societies in the world which have other problems but not terrorism. What is critical for the state is to treat its citizens as viable referent of its security in an all-round manner. That is:

National security is still paramount, but its attainment is linked more and more with human security. It is widely recognized that national security cannot be achieved in a situation where people starve but arms accumulate; where social expenditure falls and military expenditure rises.¹¹³

¹¹² Moeed Yusuf, *Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan: Implications for U.S. Policy*, Brookings Analysis Paper, No. 14, October 2008.

¹¹³ Mahbub Ul Haq quoted in HDC, *human development in South Asia 2005*, Islamabad: Oxford University Press, 2006, p: 24.

The role of the state as facilitator and regulator of the people's aspirations needs to be re-defined on pro-active basis. Musharraf crafted this role under a one man dominated system and was unable to rein in the popular dissent against his lop-sided policies. The obvious failure of the Musharraf regime's counter-terrorism policy was visible in the swelling of ranks of the "would-be suicide bombers." One such attack claimed the life of one of the most celebrated pro-democratic leader and twice Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.¹¹⁴ The tragic state of affairs is aptly reflected in the following lines:

There is a virtually endless supply of extremist recruits. Any military fighting an insurgency must shut off the avenues by which new recruits join enemy ranks. In the tribal belt, poor socioeconomic conditions, youth unemployment, a pervasive gun culture, and most importantly the remarkable success of the mullahs in hijacking the popular discourse bolster extremist outfits.¹¹⁵

By the time Musharraf resigned from the office of President of Pakistan on 18 August 2008, he was extremely isolated (politically) and unpopular among the masses. The need for a coherent counter-terrorism policy embracing holistic vision of security as this study proposes was felt more acutely than ever before.

¹¹⁴ Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto escaped unhurt on October 18, 2007, when her convoy was attacked in Karachi upon her return from a long exile, but could not ride her luck the second time she was fatally targeted on December 27, 2007.

¹¹⁵ Moeed Yusuf and Anit Mukherjee, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: Learning from India*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Sep 2007.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

The conclusion summarizes the main findings of the thesis, offers reflections on the subject matter bringing out the possible gaps and suggestions for future research. The study offers a deconstructive reading of the government policy-making, highlighting the contextual imperatives and the complex linkages between the internal and external dimensions of security vis-à-vis the scourge of terrorism. In doing so, an integrated theoretical framework based on the works of Barry Buzan¹, Mahbub ul Haq² and M Ayoob³ is conceived and applied to critique the strategic mindset and discuss the missing links within General Musharraf's response to terrorism. The conceptual framework helps identify the fuzziness and absence of watertight boundaries in analyzing the strategic decisions taken on external front with implications for the internal front, thereby complicating the threat matrix of the country.

The central research contribution of this thesis is the very conception of security in the holistic terms, situating „state' as key player in line with the „people' as legitimate „referent' of national security. This runs in contrast with the numerous narratives both of western as well as non-western origin focusing on Pakistan

¹ Barry Buzan, *People States & Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, UK: Wheat sheaf Books Ltd, 1983.

² Late Dr Mahbub ul Haq (1934 – 1998) is an internationally regarded pioneer and advocate of the concept of Human Security that implies: “security of people and not just security of territory; security of individuals, not just security of their nation; security through development, not security through arms”. For details see: Mahbub ul Haq, *Development with Social Justice, Islamabad: Human Development Center*, 2005, p: 15.

³ Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*, Bolder, Colo: Lynne Reiner, 1995.

whereby comprehensive security framework is seldom employed and event-based analysis remains the preferred medium.

The primary question that this study has raised and attempted to address is how did Pakistan under Musharraf regime respond to the threat of terrorism in the aftermath of post-9/11, why did it respond the way it did, and whether such response was a continuation of Pakistan's traditional national security policy or a deviation from it. The secondary research questions, essential to unravel the primary question, included (i) why did Pakistan evolve as a national security state with religion playing a predominant part in the policy, (ii) what are the primary aims of Pakistan's national security doctrine and has the threat of terrorism over the last decade changed them, (iii) why did Pakistan become an ally in the US war on terror, and whether Pakistan's external security policy is a continuation of Pakistan's traditional national security doctrine and interests, (iv) what security, political, social, economic and cultural reforms were introduced by the Musharaf regime that constituted his internal security policy and reform agenda, and (v) Were the linkages between external security, internal security and the socio-political and economic realities of Pakistan recognized by the Musharraf regime in crafting his response to terrorism?

The approach has been to (i) delineate from a historical perspective Pakistan's national security sensibilities, policies and strategies rooted in realities surrounding Pakistan's creation and track how religion and national security informed the evolution of Pakistan into an ideologically motivated national security state, (ii) describe Pakistan response to terrorism in face of the changed geo-strategic environment in the region after 9/11 and US decision to attack and fight Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, (iii) identify the contours of the Musharaf regime's anti-terrorism policy and strategy that informed Pakistan foreign and defense policies

on the one hand and the internal security and socio-political reform policies on the other, and (iv) analyze how there has always remained a gulf between the state's concept of national security and related strategic objectives on the one hand and physical security of Pakistani citizens on the other, and how the Musharaf regime opted to pursue the former at the expense of the latter in an environment where it wished to appease its external benefactor while remaining focused on entrenching itself in power within Pakistan.

Pakistan is believed to be one of the two ideological nation-states in contemporary history (the other being Israel). The country was founded in the name of religion and there has raged a heated debate since its creation whether it was meant to be an Islamic state or a merely a state created for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. The proponents of the former view point out that Pakistan was created on the basis of the two-nation theory (i.e. the Hindus and Muslims of the Indian subcontinent are two separate nations), and Islam lies at the foundation of the two-nation theory as well as the demand for Pakistan. The advocates of the latter view quote Mohammad Ali's Jinnah's speech delivered to the Constituent Assembly on the eve of Pakistan's creation where he said that, "you are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan... You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state."⁴

While the debate on whether Pakistan was meant to be an Islamic State or a Muslim State continues, the Constitution declares Pakistan to be an Islamic Republic and Islam as the state religion. Given that Pakistan was created out of India with a

⁴ Mr. Jinnah's presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947. (Dawn. August 14, 1999).

view to ensure that the Muslims of India are not relegated to the status of a permanent minority in an independent India, and that the principal external security threat Pakistan has faced since its creation has been a Hindu-dominated India, religion has not only informed the state's identity but also its conception of national security. The second important historical reality that defined Pakistan's national security concept was the sense of insecurity the country was born with. When Pakistan won its independence it was widely believed that India wished to undo its sovereign existence, which made survival a challenge.⁵

The issue of accession of princely states, lingering territorial disputes and use of force in resolving them shaped Pakistan's threat perception, and underscored the need for strong armed forces to compete with India and find a favorable solution to the Kashmir dispute. The first Kashmir war between India and Pakistan in 1948 entrenched the view that India was Pakistan's archenemy and as the smaller country Pakistan needed to bolster its defense and security capabilities to protect itself against India. Pakistan also believed that the Radcliffe Award was unfair and the resulting inequitable division of assets, especially military hardware, between India and Pakistan was aimed at weakening Pakistan's defenses against external aggression. Consequently, a financially vulnerable Pakistan not only allocated a disproportionate part of its resources to develop its defense and security, but also came to depend on international alliances such as SEATO and CENTO and foreign military aid to compete with a larger, stronger and more resource-rich India.

This historical perspective highlights how religion, a perceived threat from India, the need to focus on defense capability at the expense of other aspect of national development, and reliance on financial and military assistance from

⁵ Muhammad Ali, 1967.pp: 276-315.

international allies, came to define the national security sensibilities of the state soon after Pakistan's creation. In response, starting with the first limited Kashmir war in 1948 and two full-scale war between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 – the latter resulting into the disintegration of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh – Pakistan national security policy was defined by two primary components during the first few decades of its existence: threat of aggression from India; and facilitating the liberation of Indian-held Kashmir. With the emergence of India's nuclear weapon program in the 1970's, Pakistan's developed its own nuclear weapon program aimed at creating credible deterrence against India and retain a strategic parity of sorts. Since the genesis of the nuclear weapons program, developing, sustaining and protecting this program has constituted an essential component of Pakistan's national security doctrine.

Then came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the first Afghan war, during which Pakistan emerged as the frontline state against Soviet-controlled Afghanistan, with US backing, material and financial support. Pakistan's national security interest at the time was to avoid being caught in the „nutcracker’: a hostile India on the eastern border and a hostile Afghanistan on the western border. Once the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan and a civil war had erupted there, Pakistan had a security interest in ensuring that the Soviets were ousted and the successor government was pro-Pakistan and not pro-India. Other than the alarming specter of protecting both the eastern and western borders against simultaneous threat of aggression, having a friendly government in Kabul was important for other reasons as well: Pakistan and Afghanistan share a long porous border which is difficult to man; the Durand line dividing the two countries since British times has never been formally accepted by Afghanistan as the international border; there are tribes that are spread

across the border territories belonging to Afghanistan and Pakistan and neither recognize the state boundary lines nor are subject to immigration controls of either country.

Thus since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, installation and retention of a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan came to constitute another vital component of Pakistan's national security doctrine, together with an India-centric defense policy, facilitating Kashmir's independence and continuing to develop and protect Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. As the basis of liberating Muslim-majority Kashmir from a Hindu-dominated India, religion continued to justify this pivotal national security objective and also provide inspiration for realization the same. Likewise, the indigenous struggle of Afghans against the Soviet invasion and Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan also came to be seen and known as the Afghan jihad. And both the US and Pakistan joined hands to attract ideologically inspired Muslim fighters from around the world, and then finance, train, equip and organize them to wage jihad in Afghanistan. This further entrenched the use of religion-inspired non-state actors within the national security thinking and strategy of the Pakistani state.

Pakistan's decision to support and patronize the Taliban once they emerged as the predominant political and military group after a prolonged civil war in Afghanistan was the natural outcome of a national security policy focused on backing a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul and limiting India's role within its western neighbor. The US interest in Afghanistan dissipated after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and so did its material and financial support for Pakistan-backed jihadi groups in Afghanistan. While Pakistan's national security interests linked to Afghanistan remained unchanged even after the ouster of the Soviets from

Afghanistan, the international support and financing for the pursuit of such interests vanished. While this transferred the financial burden of trying to engineer power play within Afghanistan from the US to Pakistan, the Pakistani state's view of having a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul and its approach to the non-state actors or jihadi groups as national security assets remained unfazed.

It is in this historical context that this study aims to describe and analyze General Musharraf's response to terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. In siding with the US once it decided to attack Al-Qaeda and Taliban within Afghanistan, the Pakistani state understood that terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors was the new form of antagonism that would inform and influence power play within the international nation-state system. In continuing to support and patronize the Taliban government in Kabul that had refused to submit to US demands of handing over Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda members operating out of Afghanistan, Pakistan would immediately attract a direct threat of aggression from the US and the expanding war theatre could have extended into Pakistani territories. In the event that Pakistan had stood on the wrong side of the US war on terror, especially as it was unfolding in Afghanistan, the possibility of the US undertaking preemptive operations to neutralize Pakistan's nuclear weapon program and assets would have become real.

Further, even if the doomsday scenarios about being directly attacked by the US were a little far fetched, the refusal of Pakistan to join the US war on terror as an ally would require the US to rely more heavily on other regional partners, especially India that already had a close relationship with the Northern Alliance – the US Afghan partner in ousting the Taliban. A partnership between the US, India and the anti-Taliban Afghan groups lead by the Northern Alliance controlling Afghanistan and developing its institutional, governance and power structures would not only

create an immediate security threat on Pakistan's western border, but also compromise its medium to long-term national security interest of ensuring a pro-Pakistan government within Afghanistan. Pakistan was therefore loath to provide India such window of strategic opportunity that would erase Pakistan's leverage and influence due its extensive engagement with Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion.

Thus, potentially all of Pakistan's traditional national security interests – strengthening itself against India; facilitating Kashmir's independence; developing and protecting its nuclear weapons program; and ensuring a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan – could potentially be compromised had it elected not to side with the US and withdraw its recognition of and support for the Taliban government in Kabul. Pakistan's support for the Taliban was not an end in itself, but a means to protect its traditional national security interests linked to having a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan that secured its western border against external aggression and strengthened its position as a regional power broker. Given the changed geo-strategic realities, open support for such government in its fight against a US-led international military and diplomatic alliance would have jeopardized Pakistan's defined national security interests as opposed to furthering them.

In view of the aforesaid it is a finding of this study that Pakistan's U-turn on Afghanistan in 2001 was neither a deviation nor a break from the past, but a continuation of the same national security policy goals that had previously dictated Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan, including its support for the Taliban. As a nation-state primarily interested in its national security and survival and bolstering its military capabilities against its arch-rival on the east, becoming an ally in the US war on terror provided Pakistan with an opportunity to remain a major player within Afghanistan, while also providing it with an opportunity to overhaul its military

capabilities due to the revived access to US military and financial assistance that had been turned off after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Protecting itself against immediate external military threats, acquisition of military and financial resources and remaining relevant in regional power play realistically explain the external security policies and choices vis-à-vis the US and Afghanistan that General Musharraf made after 9/11.

General Musharraf's approach to terrorism was a combination of realism, opportunism and confusion: the external security policy, strategy and tactics employed by the Musharraf regime in the post-9/11 milieu was a product of realism; and the internal security policy as well as political and socio-cultural reforms introduced within Pakistan in response to terrorism were an outcome of opportunism and confusion. Even after joining the US war on terror in Afghanistan, Pakistan continued to press the US-led coalition to ensure that the US-backed government was not dominated by the Northern Alliance, was reflective of the demographic realities of Afghanistan and representative of the power structures within the Afghan society with Pushtuns recognized as the predominant players. Once the US refuses to adhere to Pakistan's advice and did not induct powerful Pushtun groups within the US-backed Afghan government, the Musharraf regime elected to protect Pakistan's national security interests by relying on double-speak: Pakistan would remain a formal ally of the US in its fight against Al-Qaeda, but would not treat the Afghan Taliban as an enemy of Pakistani state.

As the US war on terror in Afghanistan continued, there emerged at least three distinguishable militant groups: Al-Qaeda, largely comprising non-Afghan and non-Pakistani militants, that had declared war on Afghanistan and General Musharraf's government; the Afghan Taliban, who were fighting against coalition forces in

Afghanistan that they viewed as occupation forces, and were likely to regain influence within Afghanistan, and especially the provinces bordering Pakistan, as soon as US-led ISAF forces withdrew; and Pakistan's home-grown Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that had declared war on Pakistani state and its armed forces and law enforcement agencies. Pakistan continued to pursue and fight Al-Qaeda, as the Pakistani state shared the US view of it being a terrorist organization and a foe that needed to be defeated. But when it came to the Taliban, Pakistan drew a distinction between the Afghan Taliban (who were fighting against the US forces in Afghanistan but not the Pakistani state) and the TTP that was challenging the writ of Pakistani state and had declared a war against it.

Pakistan's national security policymakers were not convinced that the US would succeed in routing the Taliban or remodeling the power relations between ethnic communities within Afghanistan. There was a sense that the Taliban and the Pushtoon militant groups that fell within their influence would remain relevant to the future of Afghanistan. Consequently, not only would Pakistan be forced to deal with them once the US-led coalition forces withdrew from Afghanistan, but being Pushtoon and distant from Indian influence, the Taliban still remained the best means of protecting Pakistan's traditional national security interests linked to the future of Afghanistan. Given General Musharraf's inability to influence the US policy toward the preferred composition of the Afghan government, together with the estimate of Pakistan's national security policymakers that (i) US was unlikely to outmaneuver the Taliban and extinguish their influence within Afghanistan, (ii) targeting Taliban sanctuaries within Pakistani territory would create a fresh external security threat for Pakistan if the Taliban regained control of Kabul or even the provinces bordering Pakistan, (iii) Taliban and linked Pushtoon militant groups remained Pakistan's best

bet of discharging the role of a pro-Pakistan government on Kabul, Pakistan opted for what came to be seen as its double-dealing with the US.

While it remained a US ally in its war on terror, it distinguished between „good’ and „bad’ Taliban: Afghan Taliban and others not fighting the Pakistan state being the former, and TTP and others having declared a war on Pakistan’s military and law enforcement agencies being the latter. Although such duplicitous external security policy pursued by the Musharaf regime has been severely criticized for being deceitful and unethical, it is understandable as the realistic response of a smaller and weaker nation-state unable to either defy or influence the policies of the world’s sole superpower, while trying to simultaneously protect its immediate term and medium-to-long term national security interests.

It was in the Musharaf regime’s failure to appreciate the integral link between Pakistan’s external security, internal security and defense and foreign policies toward Afghanistan and India that highlighted the confusion of his approach toward terrorism. And it was (i) General Musharraf’s refusal to enforce with conviction and seriousness of purpose the broad-based socio-cultural reform plan announced with much fanfare, and (ii) his eagerness to enter into political alliance with religious parties that defeated his much trumpeted reform agenda, that exposed his willingness of play politics with terrorism at home and abroad and plagued his anti-terrorism program with opportunism and personal ambition. As a consequence Pakistan’s response to terrorism was kneejerk instead of being comprehensive and holistic.

While the Musharaf regime undertook firefighting operations within Pakistan to fight militant groups within Pakistan when they flexed their muscle against the Pakistani state, there was no significant change in the policies, priorities and institutional structures of the Pakistani state aimed at confronting the scourge of

terrorism. General Musharaf did not carry through the policy initiatives meant to address the roots of terror for personal and political reasons. The view of non-state actors as strategic assets was not discarded. And thus without the required change in state policies that continued to allow intolerance and militancy to be nurtured within Pakistan and without revamping the state's national security mindset and strategic thinking that continued to consider more effective ways to control militant groups instead of eradicating them, all that the Musharaf Government was left with was short-term military approach to quell violence wherever it got out of control. The Lal Masjid episode in 2007 and the Swat Operation against militants in 2009 were evidence of this conundrum.

The Lal Masjid exposed the lack of General Musharraf's focus on the brewing militancy and terror outfits within Pakistan. With militants holed-up and carrying out vigilante actions in the heart of Pakistan's capital, General Musharaf continued to soft-peddle the issue and project himself internationally as the last obstacle preventing the Talibanization of Pakistan. In delaying the required security operation against the Lal Masjid mullahs and using the episode to gain political mileage, he allowed the situation to get out of hand and finally the operation was carried in a manner that claimed the lives of at least five soldiers and almost 100 other individuals holed up within the mosque, polarizing the country further and provoking sympathy and support for the Lal Masjid warriors. The manner in which the Lal Masjid crisis was handled reflected General Musharraf's lack of understanding of the deep and uncontrollable ideological conviction of the Lal Masjid mullahs and other militant groups who had taken up arms against the Pakistani state.

Similarly, the Musharaf regime allowed Mullah Fazlullah to build his militia in Swat and run a parallel government, tax collection and court system that undermined the writ of the state. It was only after the Taliban brutality in Swat extended beyond ordinary people and extended to personnel of the law enforcement agencies, and the political government that succeeded the Musharaf regime had tried all measures including failed peace treaties with Fazlullah and his father-in-law Sufi Mohammad, that Operation Rah-e-Rast was carried out by the military to reassert state control in Swat and oust Fazlullah and his faction of TTP. The examples of Lal Masjid and Swat and the need for the state to carry out violent and extensive military operations to assert control over areas taken over by the militant groups years after General Musharaf enlisted Pakistan as a US ally in its war on terror, establishes that Pakistan's response to the internal security challenge posed by terrorism that came to be seen as an existential threat for the state remained ill-considered, inadequate and negligently confused.

This study concludes that while Musharaf government's policy response to tackling the roots of terrorism within Pakistan seems comprehensive at first glance, General Musharaf lacked the will to implement the reforms announced and in fact used these reforms and compromises made in relation to them to forge political alliance at home and entrench himself in power. Three aspects of his policy response amongst many described in Part III of this study confirm such thesis: the Madrassa reform program; police reforms; and reform of the anti-terrorism legal framework. General Musharaf introduced the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board Ordinance 2001 as part of his education sector reforms. As Pakistan has a young population that if left uneducated or inculcated with radical intolerant views and ideologies become attractive recruitment targets for militant groups. While the object of the Madrassa

reform program was to subject the curriculum of religious madrassas to government oversight and ensure that madrassas did not become recruitment posts for militants, a majority of the madrassas refused to abide by the reform policy and General Musharaf decided to look the other way to keep MMA – the alliance of religious parties – in good humor.

Police reforms initiated by the introduction of the Police Order 2002 were confronted with similar fate. The long-felt need to transform the police force into an efficient and citizen-friendly law enforcement agency acquired a sense of urgency with the growing internal security threat confronting Pakistan. Police Order 2002 then sought to de-politicize the police by guaranteeing the security of tenure of police officers, separating the watch and ward function of police from investigation, and introducing checks and balances to prevent abuse of police power by subjecting them to the scrutiny of citizen-led boards. But then politics got in the way and under pressure from his political allies who wished to continue to use and abuse the law enforcement agencies as an instrument of politics, 73 out of the 187 articles of the Police Order 2002 were amended through amendments introduced into the Police Order in 2004, wiping out the most progressive aspects of the police reform and thus reverting to the status quo.

In 2002 amendments were also introduced to Pakistan Anti-Terrorism Act to bolster the legal framework to prosecute terrorists. While this law was used to persecute the political opponents of General Musharaf such as former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, it was never employed and enforced effectively to confront the threat of terrorism. Part III of this study traces the historical evolution of the anti-terrorism regime in Pakistan and how it remained driven by a desire to promote domestic political ends of the ruling regimes and produce instant judicial verdicts as opposed to

overhauling all components of the criminal justice system and clamping down on the militant groups that continue to subject the ordinary citizens of Pakistan to terror. General Musharraf continued in the stead and played politics with terrorism: while Al-Qaeda operatives were captured and handed over to the US, Pakistan's homebred militants were apprehended initially under international pressure but released later for want of evidence against them.

General Musharraf's lack of a comprehensive response to terrorism at the home front was also reflected by (i) his inability to introduce institutional structures that would enable civil and military law enforcement and intelligence agencies to work in tandem to address the threat posed by terrorism, and (ii) his refusal to reevaluate the national security mindset focused on state security as opposed to protection of citizens and revamp state policies to reduce the chasm between state security and citizen security. While the Musharraf government felt no need to introduce an institution that could coordinate the anti-terror operations being carried out by the police and IB on the one hand and the army, ISI and MI on the other, it was during the tenure of the successor government that efforts started to be made to establish National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) as a high-powered body to devise counterterrorism strategies and coordinate operations in Pakistan.

It is also a finding of this study that the traditional concept of state security in Pakistan has not translated into enhanced security for citizens, and the state has continued to pursue policies that seem to be defending the traditional notion of state security at the expense of citizen security. The decision of the Pakistani state to alter its Afghanistan policy and join the US war on terror as an ally while retaining an equivocal approach toward militant outfits it categorizes and targets foreign and home-bred militants within Pakistan not on the basis of their ideology, legitimacy or

tactics, but on the basis of whether or not they are hostile toward the Pakistani state and whether they can serve as assets in promoting Pakistan's traditional national security interests is understandable and justifiable within the domain of realism.

But the external security plank of the national security policy has also exposed the gap how the traditionally defined security interests of the state undermines internal security and is not necessarily in consonance with the interests of citizens. While Pakistan under General Musharraf's rule lost almost 30,000 soldiers and citizens to terrorism, the national security mindset did not undergo a change so as to start treating such loss as unacceptable. Likewise, the non-allocation of resources for education, health and social welfare of citizens under General Musharraf's rule and his refusal to implement reforms necessary to resuscitate a functional and effective system of governance established that there was no serious effort made to treat the causes of terrorism within Pakistan. It is a finding of this study that unless the very notion of security is revisited and the national security mindset is altered to embrace national security goals in such manner that maximize the security of individual citizens and devise state priorities and policies accordingly, Pakistan might succeed in securing its traditional national security interests while making its citizens more vulnerable to violence and terror emanating from within.

Following the empirical lens based on interviews with over a hundred and twenty stakeholders stretched across the strategic community in Pakistan this study concludes that Pakistan has moved away from the path of moderation, peace and tranquility as espoused by the founder of the country, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The critical challenge is to reclaim Jinnah's vision of Pakistan based on „peace within and beyond'. This implies security and insecurity of state and its people comes both from within and outside. The state role goes beyond ensuring the territorial sovereignty of

its frontiers and human element that composes the state deserves equal attention. „Human capital’ ought to form the basis of strategic foresight and planning accompanied by actions on sustainable footings. Unless, national security perception strikes a fine balance between pursuing „hard’ (that is, traditional military and defense) and „soft’ (that is, political stability, economic and social well being of citizens) elements of national power, sustainable peace within and beyond will remain elusive.

This study undertakes an analytical exploration of the contextual elements particularly geopolitical scenario as well as domestic realm that slide Pakistan into the complex web of religious extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism. In doing so, the indigenous variables promoting militancy within the country, the role of successive governments in using „human element’ as tool of security policy vis-à-vis its neighboring states, and the negative implications of adopting „hard core’ tunnel approach to national security is exposed. Further, the state manipulated the role of religion to achieve national integration, suppress dissent and dissident movements and used as regime survival formula. In doing so, the national identity discourse became „Islamic’ leaving a room for penalizing minority citizens primarily on the basis of religion. This in turn solidified the basis of religious, sectarian, ethnic political or grievance based groupings to be in race for political clout in the country. Thus, securing and perpetuating personal power of particular ruler (civilian or military) became the accepted mode of politics and policymaking. As a result, institutions became weak and liable to exploitation by the personally motivated or interest-based regimes. Though all military rulers who captured power unconstitutionally professed to „protect national honor and dignity’ and portrayed military as a „savior’, they ended up promoting factionalism and religious polarization in the country. Thus disconnect

308

between the „people’ and „state’ widened further fracturing the political and strategic fabric of the Pakistan.

Following the historical analysis of successive governments privatizing security and using „human capital’ as strategic tool vis-à-vis external security challenges resulted in following a shortsighted national security framework. Parallel to this, costs of unresolved Kashmir dispute and involvement in Afghan Jihad paired with failure to have an accountable and representative form of governance produced a force-based narrow national security conception. As a result sources of insecurity within state remain unchecked adding to the grievances-based national character. This study has examined the history of militancy in Pakistan to explain how the process of how security policymaking fell within the exclusive domain of military institutions. This trend continues to date and was most obvious during General Musharraf’s rule. The military-driven national security policy continually focused on adding hardware to bolster the traditional conception of security and refused to treat the mushrooming of militant infrastructure both in the physical and ideological sense within the country as a national security threat. This „denial mood’ permeated the strategic mindset and unwittingly transformed Pakistan into a transmission belt of men and material from across the world to staff Jihad-outlets in Pakistan’s neighborhood.

The key inference is that security ought to be approached as a multidimensional concept with equal focus on the citizen and the state. Thus apart from aiming to protect territorial integrity and sovereignty the state must ensure economic and educational uplift plus social and political stability within its frontiers. The analysis underscores an urgent need to reinvent the role of state as the regulator and facilitator of security not only in the traditional sphere but also in the non-

traditional realm. As military action forms only one component of the counter-terrorism initiatives, it must be augmented with the political, social, developmental and economic measures. In case of Pakistan, the need to adopt an integrated security paradigm with equal focus on the „hard’ (that is military) and „soft’ (that is, economic, political stability, social and cultural development) elements of national power cannot be overemphasized. Unless, the basis of social contract between the state and the citizens is upheld with an emphasis on the centrality of the interest of citizens, counterterrorism initiatives will neither address the root causes of violence and terrorism nor be sustainable.

Pakistan’s national security policy and mindset, which informed the country’s response to 9/11 and the US war on terror, is a product of its ideological origin, geography and historical experiences. Given its peculiarities Pakistan is a unique nation-state, and its responses to 9/11 and the external and internal security threats emanating from terrorism are of limited relevance to other states. Territorially, Pakistan shares borders with India, Afghanistan and Iran and its ethnic communities Punjabis, Kashmiris, Pathans and Baloch spill across territorial boundaries, which entwines its security and foreign policy with those of these neighboring countries as any security threats leading to redrawing of boundaries would have unpalatable consequences for these neighboring states. Historically, Pakistan is an ideological state created to accommodate and secure the religious identity of Muslims of the subcontinent. And Pakistan enjoys close affinity with not only the Arabic speaking Muslim states, but also Turkey and other Asian countries. On the one hand, it has the potential to function as a bridge between Islam and the West at a time of religious polarization around the world, and on the other the same polarization and a growing sense of being victimized due to lingering conflicts such as Palestine and Kashmir and

the US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan infuses renewed zeal within religion-inspired militants within Pakistan contributing to its national security challenges.

Pakistan's national security consciousness is driven by the incidence of its birth, when it was carved out of India, together with the continuing state of belligerence with India that resulted into multiple wars, inspired Pakistan to develop a nuclear weapons program to develop minimum deterrence capability and strategic parity with India. This makes India the driver of Pakistan's national security thinking and growing Indian influence in Afghanistan is seen as upsetting the delicate of balance of power in the region that Pakistan considers vital to protect its sovereignty and linked national security interests. Add to this the fact that Pakistan has actively reached out to the US, initially through its membership of CEATO and SENTO and later by becoming the front-line state against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, essentially to enable Pakistan to develop and expand its military capability to ward off the Indian threat.

During its involvement in the Afghan jihad against Soviet Union, Pakistan, backed by the US, not only nurtured, trained and sheltered jihadi groups then freedom fighters and now violent non-state militants comprising Afghans, but raised jihadis from within Pakistan and also facilitated Muslim fighters from the world over to join the Afghan jihad. While the Soviet Union crumbled and the US interest in Afghanistan dissipated, the civil war in Afghanistan did not end, the jihadis deliberately nurtured as part of the policy to defeat the Soviet Union continued to operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan's border areas and consequently Pakistan remained deeply embroiled in Afghanistan. The fact that the top Al-Qaeda leadership had been extended refuge by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan placed Pakistan in a

perilous position after 9/11, given that it was a neighbor of the country the US-led forces was going to attack, it was one of the few states to have recognized the Taliban government, and it continued to treat religion-inspired non-state militants as national security assets and any reversion of the country's foreign and security policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan would generate an internal security challenge for Pakistan.

Thus, caught between the immediate external security threat posed by the US if Pakistan refused to ally itself against the Al-Qaeda/Taliban duo in Afghanistan and the internal security challenge that would emanate from such alliance given Pakistan porous border with Afghanistan and presence of Islamic militants within its own territory, Pakistani state walked a tight rope to deflect the immediate security threats while crafting an equivocal policy vis-à-vis the Taliban and the future of Afghanistan that would create room to protect Pakistan's traditional national security interests. Given these unique ideological, historical and geographical realities of Pakistan, its response to 9/11 is neither comparable to any other state nor is the Pakistani experience relevant for other distant states in determining their own policies to address the evolving threat of terrorism being posed by violent non-state actors to the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and inter-state relations. While Pakistan's historical experience can be relevant for others to understand the nature of this evolving threat and how it can exacerbate the external and internal security challenges for a state caught in the eye of the storm, the choices that Pakistan has made might be of limited utility for other states in auditing their own policy choices.

As the research problem this study sets out to address is how General Musharraf's government responded to 9/11 and the US war on terror and whether or not that was a continuation of Pakistan traditional national security policy, the response to the question posed ought to be descriptive and not prescriptive. This study

doesn't seek to undertake a comparative policy analysis of how various nation-states responded to 9/11 or how they should have. As a single nation-state remains the unit of analysis, the responses of Pakistan have been described and analyzed within the realm of realism without challenging the view that Westphalian concept of nation-state continues to define and characterize global politics, inter-state relations and the power driven interests of individual states. And as only Pakistan and a comparison of its contemporary policy with its traditional policy is the object of research, and neither determining the promise of constructivism and its added focus on discursive power as opposed to the traditional focus on military and economic power in explaining international relations better nor questioning whether the traditional notion of nation-state embraced by the theories of realism remains a viable concept to understand and analyze inter-state relations amid the evolving security threats being posed by non-state actors.

It is out of the need to understand the response of the Pakistani state to the new external and internal threats of terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 to its perceived national security interest and compare it with the manner in which such national security interest had been defined and protected by Pakistan in the past, that the lens of realism has been used for descriptive purpose. And further an integrated framework comprising the theoretical models posited by Barry Buzan, Mahbub-ul Haq and Mohammed Ayoob has been proposed to critique Pakistan's national security paradigm and assert that the manner in which the Pakistani state perceives and defines its national security interest continues to expand the gulf between state security and citizen security in Pakistan. But in view of the content and findings of this thesis, the concept of failing state can be studied further to ascertain whether terrorism poses a challenge to traditional notions of sovereignty and whether the interests of responses

of states categorized as failing are inherently different from those assumed about states under the Westphalian notion of nation-state and sovereignty.

This study highlights how terrorism has posed multidimensional challenges to Pakistan: external security threats, internal security hazards, malfunction of governance system, breakdown of socio-cultural institutions of authority and radicalization of the society. But the evolving concept of terrorism doesn't fall within neat compartments. It can be a product of or be exacerbated by the policies of other states but a state's response to the threats of terrorism linked to other states cannot be fashioned under established disciplines within international relations and international law. Terrorism has serious internal security consequences for states and its citizens, yet given its transnational nature the traditional concept of crime within municipal law is inadequate to devise a response to such threat. Pakistan's experience shows that the threat of terrorism posed by non-state militants can neither be captured by concept of war as understood in inter-state relations nor the concept of crime as understood within the domestic legal system of a state. Thus, further research can be done to determine if confronting transnational terrorism ought to emerge as an exception to the traditional concept of state sovereignty and what international norms and institutions need to be developed to ensure that this doesn't become an instrument in the hands of the predominant states to justify intervention into the affairs of other states and establish their hegemony.

This research and its findings also highlight the need for further focused study using Pakistan as the unit of analysis. The thesis deliberates in length on the critical value of the public support for a comprehensive, proactive and sustained counter-terrorism response. The essential role of media in building public consensus against terrorism remained untapped during the Musharraf era. What factors contributed to

the failure of using media as a proactive tool of counter-terrorism is a subject that needs further enquiry and research. Additionally, the exploration of the factors that have led to the vibrant militant media networks should form a parallel analytical pursuit. This study has argued that Pakistan's failure to invest in its human resource has contributed to the lop-sided growth of the state and society. The elitist and state-centric view of security oblivious to public needs has expanded the gap between the state and society. While General Musharraf kept reminding the US and the west to understand the roots of terror as well as Muslim rage, his counter-terrorism approach failed to win the hearts and minds of the people at home. This descriptive thesis creates room for a prescriptive study aimed to drawing the contours of a national security policy that is driven by the object of securing the life, liberty and dignity of individual citizens and if Pakistan had evolved such national security outlook as opposed to the one it did, would it have induced a different response from Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11. There is need to prescribe ways to ensure that the mindset of Pakistan's strategic policymakers becomes sensitive to the factors compounding Pakistan's security challenges ranging from political and economic instability, and social and cultural exclusion to religious polarization and growing intolerance.

The description in this thesis of the security conceptions shaping Pakistani state's policies keeps alluding to the need for security sector reforms and a more focused study can squarely address all aspects of SSR that need to be addressed and reformed. Such research can question whether Pakistan's civil-military imbalance has resulted in a certain view of national security and what institutional and structural changes ought to be introduced within Pakistan to induce a people-focused conception of security.

Appendixes

Appendix 1

Musharraf timeline

12 October 1999: Karachi Airport under Pakistan army control

12 October 1999,Islamabad: Pakistan Army troops rush towards the Pakistani Television studios in Islamabad, Pakistan, The army, under the control of the armed forces commander Gen. Pervez Musharraf, ousted the administration of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

12 October, 1999-Gen Musharraf addresses the nation as chief executive of the country

12, October, 1999, Pakistani army launched a coup, and took control of the country. The coup was led by General Pervez Musharraf, who soon after appointed himself as the Chief Executive of the country. This change in status was brought about by a proclamation of emergency in the country and issuance of a number of orders by the Chief Executive.

12, May, 2000- Supreme Court validates coup ;On May 12, 2000, Pakistan's 12 member Supreme Court unanimously validated the October 1999 coup and granted Musharraf executive and legislative authority for 3 years from the coup date endorsing his governance.

20,June 2000 - Gen Musharraf compels President Rafiq Tarar to quit his office June ,20 ,2000 Musharraf declares himself President after the incumbent, Mohammad Rafiq Tarar, resigns

December 2000 -Ex-Prime minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif in Attock Jail December 2000 Sharif is freed from prison on hijacking and corruption charges, exiled to Saudi Arabia and banned from returning to Pakistan for 10 years.

14th August 2001 -Local Govt system; The provincial governments promulgated the Local Government Ordinance, 2001 in their respective provinces to install a new integrated Local Government System with effect from 14th August 2001 to function within the provincial framework and adhere to the Federal and Provincial laws. Direct elections on non-party basis were held in five phases for members of Union Councils, Union Nazims, and Naib Union Nazims during 2000 thru to 2001.

11, September, 2001- Musharraf drops support for Taliban and allies Pakistan with Washington after 9/11 attacks.

30, April, 2002- Musharraf wins controversial national referendum on his rule. And takes oath for next 5 years

10, October, 2002- Pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League-Q wins general elections.

December, 2003, Gen Musharraf Motorcade: December 2003 Musharraf escapes two assassination attempts, one by Islamist military officers and the other by al Qaeda.

January 1, 2004- Musharraf wins parliamentary vote of confidence affirming his unelected rule until 2007.

February 2004- Musharraf pardons nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan for leaking nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya.

30, December - Musharraf reneges on promise to quit as army chief.

9, March, 2007 -Musharraf sacks chief justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry over allegations of misconduct. Lawyers rally around the top judge and Musharraf's popularity plummets.

10, July, 2007- Pakistani troops storm the Red Mosque in Islamabad, killing scores. and Jamia Hafsa. Many political non political parties believe, he did it only to please America just to have President Bush support for his falling popularity government. At least 105 people are killed. Militant attacks and suicide bombings follow.

6, October, 2007- Parliament elects Musharraf to another five-year term as president in a vote boycotted by the opposition. This was before dissolution of parliament for the following general election to be held in 2008. The Pakistani legislature elected incumbent Pervez Musharraf by an overwhelming majority.

18, October, 2007 Benazir Bhutto returns from exile welcomed by unsuccessful assassination attempt. Bhutto returned to Pakistan on 18 October 2007, after reaching an understanding with President Pervez Musharraf by which she was granted amnesty and all corruption charges were withdrawn.

3, November, 2007 Musharraf imposes state of emergency, sacks chief justice, and suspends constitution.

22, November, 2007 - Commonwealth suspends Pakistan.

25, November, 2007- Sharif returns from exile.

28, November, 2007 Musharraf steps down as army chief and hands control of military to General Ashfaq Kayani.

15, December 2007 - Musharraf lifts state of emergency, restores constitution.

27, December 2007 Benazir last public appearance just before she was assailed. She was assassinated on 27 December 2007, after departing a PPP rally in the Pakistani city of Rawalpindi, two weeks before the scheduled Pakistani general election of 2008 where she was a leading opposition candidate.

18, February 2008: Parties of Bhutto and Sharif trounce Musharraf's allies in 2008 General Elections.

24, March, 2008: Parliament elects Bhutto aide Yousuf Raza Gilani as prime minister.

7, August 2008: Coalition says Musharraf to face impeachment.

18, August, 2008- Musharraf announced resignation on Aug 18th 2008 in address his last address to the nation.

Appendix 2

Chronology of Terrorist attacks in Pakistan since 2001-10

Date	Place	target	Casualties		Attack tactic
			Killed	Injured	
8 Feb 2001	Rawalpindi	Civilian	-	6	Explosive device went off near bus stop
24 March	Karachi	Civilian	1	9	Time bomb exploded in a mini bus
24 April	Islamabad	Civilian	-	30	Fruit market
8 May	Karachi	Civilian	1	9	Bomb exploded in a minibus
21 August	Lahore	Civilian	-	17	Bomb exploded in a crowded market
30 August	Parachinar	Civilian	4	3	explosion
6 Sep	Karachi	Civilian	-	13	2 separate bomb blasts
20 Sep	Sialkot	Civilian	6	44	Bomb blast
14 Dec	Karachi	Civilians	-	17	Explosive device went off in a residential compound

2002					
1 Jan	Karachi	Residential area	-	8	Time bomb explosion, planted in a car in a residential area
23 Jan	Karachi	Foreign journalist Daniel Pearl	1	-	Kidnapped and later murdered
24 Jan	Islamabad	British foreign staff	-	-	Time device exploded in a British staff van in the parking lot of British High Commission
1 April	South Waziristan	Passenger bus	2	12	Bomb exploded in the bus
25 April	Gujranwala	Civilians	12	20	Powerful bomb explosion
1 May	Karachi	Civilians	-	20	2 separate blasts at market places
8 May	Karachi	French Nationals	16	18	A suicide bomber drove to a Pak navy bus and exploded incendiary device in front of Sheraton Hotel
14 June	Karachi	US Consulate General	10	21	Car bomb explosion outside the

					building
25 Oct	Islamabad	Police SHO	-	SHO himself	Bomb explosion
4 Dec	Karachi	House of Macedonian Council General	-	-	A blast took place
2003					
16 May	Karachi	Patrol stations	-	5	Locally made explosive devices went off at 21 patrol stations
31 May	Hyderabad	Passenger bus	-	5	Time bomb
4 July	Quetta	Imambargah	44	65	Suicide attack
27 Sep	Karachi	minibus	-	11	Bomb went off in the bus
14 Dec	Rawalpindi	President Musharraf	-	-	A high intensity Bomb explosion on his way to Army House
2004					
10 Jan	Border region with Afghanistan	Pak Army soldiers	4 soldiers	7 soldiers	Suspected militants attacked army camp
16 Jan	Karachi	Civilians	-	15	Two explosions along the parking area of Holy

					Trinity Church
23 March	South Waziristan	Pak Army soldiers	12 soldiers	22 soldiers	Army convoy was ambushed
30 April	Sialkot	Market place	1	12	Bomb explosion in a congested market
27 July	Orakzai Agency	Paramilitary troops	2 paramilitary troops	-	Militants attacked a checkpoint
31 July	Attock	Finance minister Shaukat Aziz	-	-	Suicide attack
6 Aug	South Waziristan	Security forces	7 killed including 4 troops	3	Ambush on a convoy followed by heavy exchange of fire
13 Sep	South Waziristan	Security forces	13 including five soldiers	-	Clashes b/w security forces and militants
8 Oct	Multan	Religious gathering	39	70	Car bomb explosion
5 Nov	South Waziristan	Army soldiers	8 soldiers	9 soldiers	Land mine explosion activated by remote control
26 Dec	Turbat, close to Pak-Iran border	Frontier Corps	4 FC men	4 FC men	FC vehicle was ambushed

2005					
27 May	Islamabad	Religious shrine	20	82	Suicide bombing
2 Aug	Miranshah	Army vehicle	-	4	Remote control bomb
4 Aug	North Waziristan	Security forces	5	2	Army vehicle was hit by an explosive device
27 Aug	North Waziristan	Security forces	2	1	Army truck was blown up
22 Sep	Lahore	civilians	6	27	Two bomb blasts within an interval of one and a half hour
15 Nov	Karachi	Market place	3	8	Car bomb
8 Dec	South Waziristan	Jandola Town	12	30	Bomb explosion
2006					
9 Feb	Hangu	Muharram procession	35	100	Suicide attacker Blew himself in a procession
11 April	Karachi Nishtar Park	Religious gathering	54	200	Suicide bomb
26 June	Miranshah, North Waziristan	Security forces	7	9	Suicide car bomb blast
8 Nov	PRC fort Dargai, Malakand Agency	Army training camp of Punjab	42 troops	39 recruits	Suicide attacker blew himself in the camp

		Regiment Center			
16 Nov 2006	Peshawar	Police van	-	2 police men	Suicide bomb attack
2007					
22 Jan	Khajuri (check post) near Mir Ali, North Waziristan	Army convoy Moving from Bannu to Miram Shah	5 including 4 soldiers	23 including 20 soldiers	Suicide car bomb attack
25 Jan	Patt Bazar, Hangu	Civilians	One	5	SUICIDE CAR BOMB BLAST
27 Jan	Kisakhawani Bazar, Peshawar	Police and Muharram procession	15 including police chief Malik Saad and DSP Raziq	40	Unknown suicide attacker blew himself in a gathering
29 Jan	Liaqat Park, Dera Ismail Khan	Muharram procession	2	19	Suicide bomber blew himself
3 Feb	Barakhel Tank	Army convoy	2 soldiers	7 soldiers	Suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden jeep into a military convoy
28 Apr	Charsada	Interior minister Aftab Sherpao	31	35	Suicide attack

15 May	Marhaba restaurant, Peshawar	Afghan civilians	27	31	Suicide bomb blast
28 May	Boltanabad area, Tank	Frontier constabulary	3 including officer	2 FC men	Suicide attack
4 July	Gurbaz area Bannu	Military convoy	10 including 6 troops	9	A suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden car into a military convoy
12 July	Miranshah, North Waziristan	Political agent's office	4	3	Suicide bomber blew himself
12 July	Mingora (two attacks)	Policemen and military convoy	3 policemen	-	Two suicide bombers rammed an explosive laden car into a police vehicle and explosive device blast
14 July	Razmak town Miranshah, North Waziristan	FC convoy	24	29	Suicide bomber rammed an explosive-packed car into the convoy
15 July	Dera Ismail Khan	Police recruitment center	29	56	Suicide attack
15 July	Matta, Swat (two attacks)	Military convoy	21 including 16 soldiers	40	Two suicide attacks, two cars involved, one hit the convoy from the front and other from the back

17 July	Mir Ali, North Waziristan	Security check point	4 including 3 troops	2	A suicide bomber
19 July	Garrison town, Kohat Cant	Army mosque	19	22	A suicide bomber blew himself up in the mosque
19 July	Hangu	Police training center	8	30	A suicide bomber hit an explosive laden car to the main gate of the center
20 July	Miranshah, north Waziristan	Security check post	4 including one soldier	5	A suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden car into a check post
4 Aug	Parachinar, Kurram Agency	Civilians	10	42	Suicide attacker crashed his car into another car
17 Aug	Tank	Security force convoy	-	5 soldiers	A suicide attacker rammed his explosive laden car into a convoy
18 Aug	Bannu	Police and police check post	One policemen	5	Suicide attacker blew himself when the police tried to arrest a suspect person
18 Oct	Karachi	Benazir Bhutto's motorcade upon her return to Pakistan	139	400	Twin suicide bombings
27 Dec	Rawalpindi	Benazir Bhutto assassinated	20		Firing followed by suicide

					bomber
2008					
10 Jan	Lahore	Police	27 include 23 policemen	70 include 50 Policemen	Suicide attack
4 Feb	R.A.Bazar Rawalpindi	Army medical core vehicle	10 include 9 arm	36 include 2 Pol 21 Arm	Suicide attack
25 Feb	Rawalpindi	Army Surgeon	8 include 3Arm	20 include 7 Arm	Suicide attack
2 March	Kohat Dara Adam Khel	Tribal Peace Jirga	53	56	Suicide attack
4 March	Lahore	Navy War College	4 Arm	20 include 16 Arm	Suicide attack
11 March	Lahore 2 blasts	Regional headquarters of the Pakistani federal justice ministry, and an advertising agency	31 include 12 FIA	217 Civ	Suicide attacks
2 June	Islamabad	Danish Embassy	8 include 2 Pol	26 Civ	Car bomb
6 July	Islamabad	Policemen	24 include 16 Pol	54 include 30 Pol	Suicide attack
19 Aug	Dera Ismail Khan	Police and Shia gathering	33 include 7 Pol	54 include 15 Pol	Suicide bomber
21 Aug	Wah Cant taxila	Pakistan Ordinance Factory	85 Civ	109 Civ	3 suicide bomber exploded themselves outside the

					weapons factory
20 Sep	Islamabad	Marriot Hotel	80 Civ	230 Civ	A truck bombing in front of the hotel
9 Oct	Islamabad	Police lines	-	9 Pol	Suicide bombing
10 Oct	Orakzai Agency	Tribal Jirga	120 Civ	200 Civ	Suicide attack
6 Nov	Bajure Agency	Tribal Jirga	25 Civ	50 Civ	Suicide attack
28 Dec	NWFP Buner	Poling station and girls school	44 include 42 Civ 2 Pol	19 Civ	Suicide attack
2009					
5 Feb	Dera Ghazi Khan	Mosque	24	-	Suicide bombing
20 Feb	Dera Ismail Khan	Funeral procession	27	65	Suicide bombing
3 march	Lahore	Sri Lankan cricket team	7 including 6 Pol	6 including cricketers and a British coach	Gunmen attacked the bus carrying the team
27 March	Near Pak-Afg border	A mosque during prayer	48 including 14 Pol	80	Suicide bombing
30 March	Lahore	Police training center,	12	90	Militants armed with weapons

		Manawan			stormed the center and engaged the police for eight hours
18 April	Kohat	Military checkpoint	25	65	Suicide car bombing
11 May	Peshawar	Security check post	10	More than dozen	Suicide car bomb
27 May	Lahore	Police headquarter	24	-	Car bomb
9 June	Peshawar	Pearl Continental Hotel	18	52	Truck bomb
5 Oct	Islamabad	U.N world Food Program's office	5	4	Suicide bomber
9 Oct	Peshawar	Crowded market place	41	100	Bomb planted in a mini bus detonated in the market
10 Oct	Rawalpindi	GHQ attack	9	5	Militants clad in army uniform with sophisticated weapons
12 Oct	NWFP Shangla District(which borders Swat District)	Military convoy	41	45	Suicide bomber
15 Oct	Lahore	3 high profile targets: FIA building Manawa police training center Elite police academy	19	41	Terrorist used security forces' uniform, lobbed grenades, and indiscriminate firing followed by suicide bombers

16 Oct	Peshawar	CIA's Special Investigation Unit	15	19	Suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden vehicle into building
20 Oct	Islamabad	International Islamic University	6	29	Suicide bomber
28 Oct	Peshawar	Meena Bazar, a crowded market place	117	200	A remote-controlled car bomb
2 Nov	Rawalpindi	National Bank of Pakistan	35	63	Suicide bomber
10 Nov	Peshawar,	Charsada Bazar of Charsada district	34	100	Car bomb blast
13 Nov	Peshawar and Bannu Town	Regional headquarters of the ISI and police station of Bannu Town	23	82	Suicide bomber
19 Nov	Peshawar	Judicial Complex on Khyber Road in Peshawar	20	50	Suicide bomber
4 Dec	Rawalpindi	Parade Lanes mosque	40	86	Indiscriminate firing followed by suicide attack
7 Dec	Lahore	Moon Market, a crowded market place	45	100	Twin blasts—Suicide bomber

7 Dec	Peshawar	Civilians, out side court	17	50	Suicide bomber
2010					
1 Jan	NWFP, Bannu	A volley ball match	90	60	a suicide bomber detonated an explosives- laden pickup truck in the middle of a volleyball game
16 Jan	Pak controlled Kashmir	Military convoy	-	2	Suicide bombing
30 Jan	NWFP Khar	Check point	16	20	Suicide bomber
3 Feb	North Western region	Military convoy near a school	10 including 3 US soldiers	70	Bomb blast hit the convoy
5 Feb	Karachi	Mini bus and hospital	23	50+	Bomb planted in the mini bus, second planted bomb blasted at the emergency gate of the hospital
11 Feb	North West	Police compound	12	20	Two bomb explosion
24 Feb	Peshawar	Residential area	4	-	Rocket attack
8 March	Lahore	anti-terrorist wing of the federal investigative agency	13	60	bomber rammed his explosive- laden vehicle into the building

12 March	Lahore	military vehicles, as they were passing through a crowded area.	45	100	Two suicide bomb attacks
13 March	NWFP Mingora	Security checkpoint	10	37	Suicide bombing
31 March	Khyber Agency	Pak Army Camp	6 soldiers	15	Militants stormed into the camp after a car bomb explosion which blew a hole in one of the walls of the compound

Attack tactics used by the terrorists

Tactics
Suicide attacks
Rocket attacks
Beheadings
Remote-controlled bombs
Landmines
Firings
Sabotage, burn, fire
Improvised explosive devices
Target killings
Manually developed low intensity devices
Hand grenades

Sources:

Data compiled from public sources: ISPR (Inter Services Public Relations, Rawalpindi); Crises Management Cell (CMC) Ministry of Interior Islamabad; The News; Amir Rana and Rohan Gunaratna, *Al-Qaeda Fights Back inside Pakistani Tribal Areas*, Pak Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) 2007; Moonis Ahmar *Violence and Terrorism in South Asia: 1971-2004*, Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Department of IR, University of Karachi, Pakistan.

APPENDIX 3

Map of Kashmir: Musharraf seven region formula



Source: Dr Rifaat Hussain, *Proposals for Resolving the Kashmir Dispute*, PILDAT Briefing Paper, June 2005, Islamabad.

Appendix 4 - A

Militant sectarian Organizations in Pakistan

Jihadi Organizations	Leadership	Stated goals	status
Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HM)	Maulana Fazlurrehman Khalil Farooq Kashmiri	Deobandi Sunni school of thought; emerged as Harkat-ul Ansar in 1980s to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan; strongly supported Sipah-e- Sahaba move against Shiite community; moved to Kashmir in 1989.	Designated by US State Department as terrorist organization on Oct 1999
Jaish-e-Mohammad	Maulana Masood Azhar	Deobandi Sunni militant organization, a break-away from HM; launched in early 2000 with the goal of liberating Kashmir	Banned in Pakistan and declared by the US as a terrorist organization
Tehrikul Irfan	Maulana Abdullah Shah Mazhar	Successor to Jaish; launched after ban on militant organizations in January 2002	
Lashkar-e-Taiba(Let); renamed Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD) after ban on January 2002;Jud claims it has nothing to do with Lashkar any more	Hafiz Mohammad Saeed (ex-head and founder)	Salafi Sunni school of thought; draws spiritual inspiration from Saudi Arabia and was the armed wing of Pakistan based religious organization markaz-al-Daawatul Ershad; ideologically close to Al-Qaeda, created in late 1980s in Afghanistan; it is one of the three largest and best trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India	Banned in Pakistan since January 12 2002 and designated by US as foreign terrorist Organization on December 26, 2001

Jamat-ud-Dawa	Hafiz Saeed		Banned by UNSC on Dec 11 2008 as terrorist organization in the aftermath of Mumbai attacks
Sipahe Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) it is reported to have been renamed as Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan, again banned in 2003	Haq Nawaz Jhangvi (founder) assassinated on February 23 1990. Maulana Zia-ur Rahman Farooqi took over, later killed in a bomb explosion Maulana Azam Tariq (successor) Assassinated on October 6, 2003	Rabidly anti shia outfit, founded in 1984; espoused the goal of restoration of Khilafat; countered by shia organization Sipah Mohamammad	Banned in Pakistan on January 12 2002
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, offshoot of SSP	Riaz Basra, killed in police encounter in 2002	Rabidly anti shia outfit, founded in late 1980s by Riaz Basra, who was also formerly associated with HM and SSP; he believed in using force to further Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi's mission	Banned in August 2001 by Musharraf. In January 2003, the United States added LJ to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

Source: Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.

Appendix 4 - B

Banned militant organizations in Pakistan: 2001-09

Serial number	Names of Organizations	Proscription date
1	Al- Qaeda	14-08-2001
2	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	14-08-2001
3	Sipah-e-Muhammad	14-08-2001
4	Jaish-e- Muhammad	14-01-2002
5	Lashkar-i-Taiba	14-01-2002
6	Sipah-e-Sahaba	14-01-2002
7	Tehrik Nifaz-e-Fiqah Jafaria	14-01-2002
8	Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat Muhammadi	14-01-2002
9	Tehreek-e-Islami (ExTJP)	14-01-2002
10	Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (Ex SSP)	15-11-2003
11	Khuddam-ul –Islam (Ex JM)	15-11-2003
12	Islami Tehrik Pakistan	15-11-2003
13	Jamat-ud-Dawa	11-12-2008
14	Jamiat-ul Ansar	20-11-2003
15	Jamiat-ul- Furqan	20-11-2003
16	Hizb-ul-Tehrir	20-11-2003
17	Khair-un-Naas International Trust	27-10-2004
18	Balochistan Liberation Army	07-04-2006
19	Islamic Students Movements of Pakistan	21-08-2006
20	Al Akhtar Trust	07-06-2009

21	Al Rasheed Trust	07-06-2009
22	Lashkar-i-Islam	2008
23	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan	25-08-2008
24	Sunni Tehrik (Watch List)	14-01-2002

Source: Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.

Appendix 5 - A

Militant Outfits in FATA: 2001-10

Organization	Leadership	Stated goals	status
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) , an umbrella organization for other Taliban groups operating in FATA region	Baitullah Mehsud, Killed in a suspected drone attack in Aug 2009, successor Hakimullah Mehsud, conflicting reports about his death in January 2010 by a drone attack	Trans-agency outfit, wedded to anti-Americanism and determined to enforce sharia; also pursuing the goal of driving foreigners out of Afghanistan	Banned in Pakistan since August 25 2008. As of May 12, 2010, it was not declared as terrorist organization by the US State Department
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Bajur Agency	Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, also deputy to Baitullah Mehsud	Enforcement of sharia; drew spiritual inspiration from Baitullah Mehsud	<u>banned</u>
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Orakzai,	Hakkeemullah Mehsud, emerging successor apparent to Baitullah Mehsud; responsible for three agencies bordering Peshawar	Enforcement of sharia; drew spiritual inspiration from Baitullah Mehsud	banned

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan,	Maulvi Fazlullah, also deputy to Baitullah Mehsud	Enforcement of Sharia; drew spiritual inspiration from Baitullah Mehsud	banned
Tehreek-e-Taliban Mohmand (TTM)	Omar Khalid, also deputy to Baitullah Mehsud	Wanted mullah Omer-style of sharia justice through sharia court which would dispense justice according to the group's interpretation of Islamic law.	banned
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan south Waziristan	Mullah Nazir	Formed tribal Lashkar and mounted a vicious campaign against foreign militants, predominantly of Uzbek origins around Wana	banned
Tehreek-e-Nifaze Shariate Mohammadi (TNSM)	Sufi Mohammad	Deobandi Sunni school of thought, Enforcement of Sharia, opposed to the foreign troops in Afghanistan	Banned on January 12 2002
Lashkar-e- Islam	Founded by Mufti Munir Shakir in 2004. Mangal Bagh Afridi (current head)	close to the Egyptian Ikhwanul Muslimoon and Jamaate Islami(India and Pakistan)	Banned in Pakistan since 2008
Ansarul Islam	Pir saifurrehman (founder) Mehbubul Haq(successor)	Deobandi Sunni school of thought,	Banned in 2008
Amar bil Maroof wa Nahi Analmunkir	Haji Naamdar (founder) Maulvi Gul Niaz	Deobandi Sunni school of thought; inspired by the Afghan Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omer, Namdar espoused enforcement of Islamic sharia in Pakistan	Banned since June 2008

Sources: Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan 2010; The News International; Dawn International ; Imtiaz Gul, *The Al- Qaeda Connection: Taliban and Terror in Pakistan's Tribal Areas*, London: Penguin, 2009.

Appendix 5 - B

Militant Leaders in Fata

TTP (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan) Leaders

Name	Father's name	Tribe	Village	Known facts
Baitullah Mehsud	Muhammad Haroon	Baromi Khail Mehsud	Dawa Toy Ladha South Waziristan	Held to be among the most dangerous in FATA; known to be a diabetic
Qari Hussain Mehsud	Muhammad Ilyas	Eshangi Mehsud	Kotkai Sarogha, south Waziristan	Master of TTP suicide squad
Noor Said	-	Kakari	Khysorha Tarza, S.Waziristan	Leader of local Taliban
Mufti Niamat-ullah	-	-	-	Commander; affiliated with Baitullah Mehsud
Maulvi shamim	-	Shaman Khel	Langerkoot Ladha, S.Waziristan	Local commander; runs a madrasa
Hakeemullah Mehsud	-	Ashangi	Kotkai Sara Roga	Responsible for TTP operations in Khyber, Mohamand and Orakzai agencies
Asmatullah Shaheen	-	-	-	Aide to Baitullah Mehsud

Shah Faisal Berki	-	-	Saam in Kanigora, S. Waziristan	-
Mullah Asmatullah	-	-	Tank	A self proclaimed Taliban leader
Khan Gul Bhattani	-	Bhattani	Bubbakhel, S.Waziristan	Notorio0us as criminal but calls himself a Taliban leader
Wali-ur-Rehman	-	-	-	A key deputy of Baitullah Mehsud

Sources: Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan 2010; The News International; Dawn International ; Imtiaz Gul, *The Al- Qaeda Connection: Taliban and Terror in Pakistan's Tribal Areas*, London: Penguin, 2009.

Appendix 5 – B

Non- TTP (Tehreek-e- Taliban) Leaders in FATA

Name	Father's name	Tribe	Village	Known facts
Mullah Nazir	Abdul Salam	Kakakhel Wazir	Zayri Noor Wana, S.Waziristan	Fought against Uzbek militants in areas near Wana
<u>Khanan Wazir</u>	-	-	-	Supported Mullah Nazir against Uzbeks; was killed by Uzbeks in June 2008
<u>Haji Omar</u>	Paiendai	Yargulkhel Ahmedzai Wazir	Kaloosha Barmal, S.Waziristan	Cousin and successor to Nek Mohammad;

				sided with Uzbek militants
<u>Haji Sharif</u>	Paiendai	Yargulkhel Ahmedzai Wazir	Kaloosha Barmal, S.Waziristan	Brother of Haji Omer; backed Mullah Nazir
<u>Noorul Islam</u>	Paiendai	Yargulkhel Ahmedzai Wazir	Kaloosha Barmal, S.Waziristan	Another brother of Haji Omer; supported Uzbek militants
<u>Zawal Khan</u>	-	Zillikhel Wazir	Khanghi	A supporter of Uzbek militants
<u>Maulvi Abdul Aziz</u>	-	Yargulkhel Wazir	Ghwakha, S. Waziristan	A cousin of Haji Sharif
<u>Maulvi Abbas</u>		Malik Khel Wazir	Kaloosha S. Waziristan	A supporter of Haji Sharif
<u>Maulvi Javed Karamzkhel</u>		Ahmedzai Wazir		Supported Uzbeks and local militants in Marc- April 2007
<u>Mittha Khan</u>	-	-	-	Fought alongside Mullah Nazir
<u>Muhammad Wali Alias Malang</u>	Gul Nawaz	Gangi Khel Wazir	Sra Khawra Barmal, S. Waziristan	-
<u>Haleemullah</u>	-	Tojikkhel	-	A member of Mullah Nazir led shura
<u>Ghulam Khan</u>	-	Ahmedzai Wazir	-	Sided with Uzbek militants during clashes with locals

Militants in North Waziristan

Name	Father's name	Tribe	Village	Known facts
Mullah Sadiq Noor	-	Hamzoni Daur	Khati Kelay, Miranshah	Believed to be housing a number of foreigners in his compound
Maulvi Abdul Khaliq	-	Daur	Miranshah city	Mullah in a mosque, fond of delivering speeches against Musharraf, Bush
Haji Gul Bahadur	-	Madakhel Wazir	Tati Madakhel Miranshah	Made alliance with close- to- govt Mullah Nazir to isolate Baitullah Mehsud
Sangeen Khan Zardan	-	Jadran(Afghani)	Khost	-
Maulvi Saifullah	-	Kabelkhel	Saifali Kabulkhel, Mirali	-
Maulana Siddique Darpakhel	-	-	Barakhel	Prominent militant leader
Haleem Khan				A militant who has links with Arabs, Uzbeks etc; involved in target killings

Abu Okash/Abu Kashif		Iraqi	Has influence in Mirali and Miranshah	Injures in aerial bombardment in 2007
Khalifa Sirajuddin Haqqani	Jalaluddin Haqqani	Afghani	Danda Darpakhel Miranshah	-

Militants in Bajaur Agency

Name	Father's name	Village	Known facts
Maulvi Sufi Mohammad	-	Kumber (Bajaur)/Maidan (Dir)	Founder of defunct TNSM
Maulvi Faqir Mohammad		Chenagai Bala, Damadola	A TNSM leader
Maulana Fazullah	Beladar	Imam Deri	Son-in- law of Maulvi Sufi Mohammad; deputy of Baitullah Mehsud in Malakand and Swat
Maulana Saifullah	-	-	Ameer (head) of TNSM in Malakand

Militants in Khyber Agency

Name	Father's name	Village	Known facts
Mufti Munir Shakir	-	Originally belongs to Kurram Agency or Karak	Founder of Lashkar-e- Islam; arrested and sentenced to indefinite jail
Mangal Bagh Afridi	-	-	Successor to mufti Munir Shakir to lead LI

Pir Saifurehman	-	Khyber Agency	Founder of Ansarul Islam
Haji Namdar	-	Influence is restricted to Bara Kamberkhel tribe in Khyber Agency	Founder Amar bil Maroof wa Nahi Analmunkir, inspired by Mullah Omer, shot dead on 13 August 2008
Mehbubul Haq	-	Tirah Valley	Successor to Pir saifurrehman; keeps a very low profile
Maulana Hazrat Nabi		Landikotal	Prayer leader; organized local Taliban
Farmanullah	-	Landikotal	Brother of Maulana Hazrat Nabi; spokesman of local Taliban

Militants in Mohamand Agency

Name	Father's name	Village	Known facts
Abdul Wali Raghieb alias Umer Khalid	Haji sahib	Kared, Lukro	Formerly a journalist; affiliated with Harkatul Mujahideen
<u>Sangeen Khan Kandahari</u>	=	=	<u>Abducted 10 FC men, but later released them</u>
<u>Abu Nouman Sangari or Dr Asad Sangari</u>	-	-	<u>TTP strong man in Mohamand Agency</u>

Militants in Orakzai Agency

Name	Father's name	Village	Known facts
Hakeemullah Mehsud	-	-	One of Baitullah Mehsud's important commanders
Maulana Mohammad Nabi Orakzai	-	-	Local TTP representative; also responsible for TTP affairs in Kurram agency
Islam Gul and Hassamnddin	-	-	Local Taliban operatives
Maulana Fazal saeed	-	-	Local TTP operative in Lower and central Kurram area

Source: Imtiaz Gul, *The Al- Qaeda Connection: Taliban and Terror in Pakistan's Tribal Areas*, London: Penguin, 2009.

APPENDIX 6

Pakistan- Afghanistan Bilateral Visits: 2004-07

Timeline	Visits to Pakistan by Afghan President	Visits to Afghanistan by Pakistani President and PM
2004	President Karzai visited Pakistan in August 2004, focus was to seek Pakistan's help for holding of peaceful election in Afghanistan.	President Musharraf visited Afghanistan on November 6, 2004 to congratulate President Karzai for being elected as President .
2005	Karzai visited twice that year, in March as a special guest to attend Pakistan Day Parade on 23 rd March and on October 24 shortly after the Earthquake to convey his condolences.	Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz visited Afghanistan on July 24, 2005.
2006	A three day visit to Pakistan from 15-17 February, focus was to enhance security cooperation.	Musharraf visited on September 6 th and Prime Minister visited Afghanistan on September 14, 2006.
2007	Two day visit from December 26-27 to discuss bilateral issues.	Two visits of Shaukat Aziz that year. On January 4, 2007 and August 2007 to attend Peace Jirga. Similarly, President Musharraf attended the final session of the Jirga on August 12, 2007.

Source: Data tabulated from public sources, *The News, Dawn, The Nation, 2004 – 2007, Pakistan.*

APPENDIX 7

Pakistan- Afghanistan 1st Joint Peace Jirga: 9-12 August 2007

Main Recommendations:

1. The Joint Peace Jirga strongly recognizes the fact that terrorism is a common threat to both countries and the war on terror should continue to be an integral part of the national policies and security strategies of both countries. The participants of this jirga unanimously declare to an extended, tireless and persistent campaign against terrorism and further pledge that government and people of Afghanistan and Pakistan will not allow sanctuaries/training centers for terrorists in their respective countries.
2. The Joint Peace Jirga resolved to constitute a smaller Jirga consisting of 25 prominent members from each side that is mandated to strive to achieve the following objectives:
 - a) Expedite the ongoing process of dialogue for peace and reconciliation with opposition.
 - b) Holding of regular meetings in order to monitor and oversee the implementation of the decisions/recommendations of the Joint Peace Jirga.
 - c) Plan and facilitate convening of the next Joint Peace Jirgas.
 - d) Both countries will appoint 25 members each in the committee.
3. The Joint Peace Jirga once again emphasizes the vital importance of brotherly relations in pursuance of policies of mutual respect, non-interference and peaceful coexistence and recommends further expansion of economic, social, and cultural relations between the two countries.
4. Members of the Joint Peace Jirga in taking cognizance of the nexus between narcotics and terrorism condemn the cultivation, processing and trafficking of poppy and other illicit substances and call upon the two governments to wage an all out war against this menace. The Jirga takes note of the responsibilities of the international community in enabling Afghanistan to provide alternative livelihood to the farmers.
5. The governments of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Islamic Republic of Pakistan, with the support of the international community, should implement infrastructure, economic and social sector projects in the affected areas.
6. The comprehensive and important recommendations made by the five working committees of the Joint Peace Jirga for implementation are annexed and form part and parcel of this joint declaration.

Source: Text of Pak-Afghan Peace Jirga, *Daily Times*, 13 August 2007.

Appendix 8

Missing Persons from 3 March 2008 - 22 August 2009

S. #.	Lists	Total reported missing	After reconciling	Located			Remaining missing	Particulars obtained July/August 09	Referred to owners/complainers	Remarks	
				Till 03/08	From 03/08 till date	total				Passport Issued	Travel History
1	Lists from 29 x writ petitions in Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan	416	416	188	34	222	194	39	155	4	4
2	List provided by Chief Minister Balochistan	949	-	-	43	43	-	-	-	3	1
3	List provided by Mrs. Amna Janjua (Chairperson, Defense of Human Rights)	194	-	-	4	4	-	-	-	8	4
4	Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF)	831	1185	-	41	41	1097	59	1038	2	-
	Total	2390	1601	188	122	310	1291	98	1193	17	9

Source: Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.

Appendix 9

Terrorist Killed/Injured/Arrested in Pakistan 1 January 2006 - 13 September 2009

S. No	Year	Arrested	Killed	Injured
1	2006	121	224	69
2	2007	38	402	51
3	2008	830	2033	516
4	2009	6359	4009	938
	Total	7348	6668	1574

Source: Ministry of Interior, Crises Management Cell (CMC), Government of Pakistan Islamabad, 2009.

Appendix 10

Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan: 2003-2009

Year	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	total
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1534	597	1479	3599
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	1222	520	3938	5680

Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior, Crises Management Cell (CMC), 2009.

Appendix 11

Government of Pakistan: Lists of Publications Banned and their declarations cancelled Till 2010

S. No.	Name of Party/Author/Press	Name of Publications (Weekly, Monthly, Periodical etc.)
1.	Muhafiz-e-Asas-e-Islam Pakistan	Rehzan-ki-Pahchan (book)
2.	Al-Safee and Mehdi Kuwait	The True Furqan (book)
3.	A. Sami Khan/ Agha Saifullah	Al- Fazal (Daily)
4	Mr. Naseer Qamer	Al Fazal International (Weekly)
5	Mr. S Mubashir	Ansarullah (Monthly)
6	Mr. Mannan	Muslim Message of Tolerance (Book)
7	Mr. Matiullah Dard	Ander-Ki-Batain (Monthly)
8	Gohar Shahi Faction	Hatif-e- Mehdi (Monthly) The Voice of Mehdi (Monthly)
9	Mehdi Foundation Pakistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Jihad Kay Nam Par Tauhenn-e- Islam (Booklet/Pamphlet) ▪ Riaz Gohar Shahi Imam Mehdi (Booklet/Pamphlet) ▪ Mehdi Foundation Pakistan (Booklet/Pamphlet) ▪ Mehdi Foundation International Pakistan The Goharian Philosophy of Divine Love and global Peace (Booklet/Pamphlet)
10	Mr. M Hanif Raza	Journey through Flaming Frontier (Book)
11	Mr. Nadir Shah Khan & Mr. Farooq Shaikh	Zerb-e-Haq (Monthly)

12	Mr. Mufti Muhammad Abdul Hafeez Qadri of Hyderabad	Controversial Fatwa (Pamphlet)
13	Lachmandas Keshwani Bhopal India	Challenge (Weekly)
14	Mr. Mirza Hairat Dehlvi Majeeda Kutab Khana Loc Outside Bohar Gate Multan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Kitab-e- Shahadat (MIP) (Book/Booklet) ▪ Paigham Umat-e- Musliman Key Nam (MIP) (Book/Booklet)
15	Mr. Tahir Jhangvi/ Dehlvi Majeeda Kutab Khana Loc Outside Bohar Gate Multan	Naghmaat-e-Tahir Jhangvi (MIP) (Book/Booklet) Shiat Ahadees Nabvi Ki Roshni Main (MIP) (Book/Booklet)
16	Mr. Abu Rehan Mr. Allama Zia-ur- Rehman Farooqi (Ashaat-ul-Muaraf Loc Fly road Faisalabad	Sipah-e- Sahaba main har Muslim ki Shamuliat Kyun Zaroori Hay (Book/Booklet)
17	Mr. Mehmood Iqbal Ashaat-ul-Muaraf Loc Fly road Faisalabad	Shiat ke Sath Ommat-r- Muslima ka Asal Ikhtilaf (Book/Booklet)
18	Mr. Mehmood Iqbal Maqtaba khalafat-e- Rashida Vahari Road Hasilpur City Bhawalpur)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Shia Sunni Bhai Bhai (Book/Booklet) ▪ Shiyun ka Quran par Jarehana hamla (Book/Booklet) ▪ shia ki Islam say Baghawat (Book/Booklet) ▪ Shiyun ka Khulefa-e- Salasa per Jarehana Hamla (Book/Booklet) ▪ Shias ka Operation (Book/Booklet)
19	Mr. Mehmood Iqbal Maqtaba khalafat-e- Rashida Vahari Road Hasilpur City Bhawalpur)	Rishta Farooq-o- Ali_(Book/Booklet)
20	Mr. Maulana Abdul Shakoore Lakhanvi (Maqtaba khalafat-e- Rashida Vahari Road Hasilpur City Bhawalpur)	Batlan-e- shia Mazhib (Book/Booklet)

21	Mr. Maulana Zia-ur- Rehman Farooqi (Maqtaba khalafat-e-Rashida Vahari Road Hasilpur City Bhawalpur)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Khamini Islam Aur Islam (Book/Booklet) ▪ Syedana Ameer Moavia (Book/Booklet)
22	Mr. Maulana Habib-ur-Rehman Qasimi (Maqtaba khalafat-e- Rashida Vahari Road Hasilpur City Bhawalpur)	Khaminiyyat Asr-e-Hazir (Book/Booklet)
23	Qari Atta-ur-Rehman (Maqtaba khalafat-e- Rashida Vahari Road Hasilpur City Bhawalpur)	Shia ko chalees Kufarya Abbadat (Book/Booklet)
24	Mr. Syed Abu-ul-Hassan (Maqtaba khalafat-e- Rashida Vahari Road Hasilpur City Bhawalpur)	Naqab Kushai (Book/Booklet)
25	Mr. S.M Jawad Hadi (Haider Press railway Road Lahore)	Islami Nizami-e-Maliat (ITP) (Book/Booklet)
26	Mr. S.M Jawad Hadi Naqvi Brothers Press Noor Chamber Lahore)	Razakar (JUD) (Weekly)
27	Mr. m Yahya Aziz (Barez Ltd 41- Jail Road Lahore)	Nanhay Mujahid (JUD) (Weekly)
28	Mr. Zahoor-ul- Hassan (Barez Ltd 41- Jail Road Lahore)	Ali Waliullah (Tanzeem-e- Karwan-e- Abbas) (Book/Booklet)
29	Maulana Qazi Mazhar Hussain (late) (Ameer Tehrik Khuddam Ahl-e- Sunnat Pakistan)	Shia Kiyun Musliman Nahin (Khuddam Ahl-e-Sunnat) (Book/Booklet)
30	Dr. Shabbir Ahmed (Galazy Publications Florida USA &P.O Box # 81	Islam kay Mujrim (Book/Booklet)
31	Mr. Boston Raza (S-2 769 Saudabad KYC)	Al-Marroof (Monthly)
32	Al-Janat Printing Press Shah Faisal colony Karachi	Al-Hamd (Monthly)
33	Shah Turabul Haq Qadri (Hanfia Pakistan Publications)	Deobandi Shatir Apne moun Kafir (Book/Booklet)
34	Khilafat-e-Rashida Printing Press Multan	Al-Huda (Monthly)

35	Karachi Publication	Rohanni Digest (blasphemous Article)
36	Printed by ibn-e- Temiah Burewala Vehari	Bidat Quran-o- Hidayat ki Roshani main (Booklet)
37	Karachi publication of a blasphemous article	Rohanni Digest (Booklet)
38	Jamat ud-Dawa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Al- Dawa (Weekly) ▪ Tayyaba for Students (Weekly) ▪ Voice of Islam (Weekly) ▪ Tayyba for Women (Monthly) ▪ Zerb-e-Tayyba (monthly)for students ▪ Ghazwa (monthly)
39	Khuddam-ul- Islam	Al-Qaiam (Weekly) Jaish-e- Muhammad (Weekly)
40	Harrkat-ul- Jihad Islami	A-Irshad (Monthly)
41	Al-Rashid Trust	\Zerb-e-Momin (Weekly) Khawateen (Weekly) Bachoon ka Islam (Weekly)
42	Al-Akbar International	Al-Akbar (Weekly)
43	Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan	Khilafat-e-Rashida (Monthly)
44	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	Inteqam-e-Haq (Monthly)
45	Islami Tehreek Pakistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Al-Hadi (Monthly) ▪ Al-Muntazir (Weekly) ▪ Al-Arif (Weekly)
46	Bashir Ahmed	Hazraat Ulema-o- Mashaikh Deobandi Hazamaat-e-ithamaat ki Haqeeqat (Booklet)
47	Alama Kokab Noorani Okarvi	Haqaiq Nama Dar-ul-Uloom Deobandi (Booklet)
48	Jamat-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat Dinga Gujrat	Sucha koon (booklet)
49	Naujawana-e-Tauheed-o-Sunat Pakistan Dinga Gujrat	Juhta Khoon (booklet)
50	Haji Irfan Academy Karachi	Bidat Muharram or Tazia Dari (booklet)
51	John Me Arthur	Terrorism Jihad and Bible (booklet)

52	Ahmadia Anjuman Ishat-e-Islam USA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Paigham-e- Sullah (booklet) ▪ The soul of Salah and Duani Islam (booklet) ▪ Poems of Islam (booklet) ▪ The Arc of Noah (booklet) ▪ Necessary and benefits of Trials tribulations (booklet) ▪ Six Parallel stages of physical and Spiritual Purification in the light of the Holy Quran (booklet)
53	MZ Khalid	Aania Islamiyat (booklet)
54	Nusrat Khan Nasir	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Badar (Weekly) ▪ Minhaj-ul-Talbeen (booklet)
55	Mowlod Kaaba Publications Cum Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Haq Kis Kay Saath? (booklet) ▪ Mazloom-e-Karbala (booklet)
56	Khurram Printing Press G-112 Nazimabad Karachi	Rah-e-Wafa (booklet)
57	Published at 165- Doneaster Road Roehester NY 14623 USA	Islam a Tool of Domination (Article)
58	Qamar Ahmad	Tasheez-ul-Azhan (booklet)
59	Ismail Munir	Majlis-e-Khatam-e-Ahmadia(booklet)
60	Mirza Tahir	Revolution, Rationality, Knowledge& Truth (booklet)
61	www.prophetofdoom.com	Prophet of Doom tea with terrorist in the company of Good and Evil the future History (leaflet)

62	Manzoor Hussain Parwana	Such likhna Jurm Hay (Booklet)
63	Ibne-e Temiah Burewala	Challenge (Booklet)
64	Majeed Kutab Khana Multan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Kitab-e Shahadat (Booklet) ▪ Paigham Umat-e- Muslima key Nam(Booklet) ▪ Haqeeqat-e-Rafziat (Booklet) ▪ Naghmat Tahir Ghanjvi (Booklet)
65	Al-Janat Printing Karachi	Al-Hamad (Booklet)
66	Boston Raza Karachi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Al-Qalam (Newspaper) ▪ Adalat Ka Sawal Lafiz Musalman Kaon Lo Taareop (Booklet) ▪ Al-Khalid (Monthly)
67	Mirza Ghulam Ahmed Qadiani	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Philosophy of Teaching of Islam (Leaflet)
68	Ian Adamson	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A Man of God (book)Abdul Maali Syed ▪ Ahmed the Guided One (Booklet) ▪ Mirza Ghulam Ahmed of Qadian (Booklet)
69	Abdul Maali Syed	The Twin Era of Pakistan Democracy and Dictatorship
70	Darul Aftah wala Irshad DG Khan	Maudoodi sahib aur Lakhreeb-eIslam
71	Faqir Rustam Ali	Qiamat Ki khabar Imam Mehdi Ki Padish
72	Mktaba Moeen-ul-Adab DG Khan	Fawaaid-e- Fareedia (Booklet)
73	Sahibzada Muhammad Zafarul-Haq	Tableeghi Jamat Se Ikhtilaf Kiun (Booklet)

74	Farid Book Dept India	Jaa Al Haq (Booklet)
75	Qasr-e-eFarii-e-Azan Lahore	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Shiaiyyt Kee Haqeeqat (Booklet) ▪ Hum Shia ko Kafir Kayoon Kehtay Hain (Booklet)
76	Haq Brothers Gujrat	Asool-e-Kafi (Booklet)
77	Shamin Book Depot Karachi	Kitan –e-Mustatab Al Shafi (Booklet)
78	Shi general Book Agency Lahore	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Jila Al-Quim (Booklet) ▪ Bashir Al-Darajaat (Booklet) ▪ Tehreek-e-Islam (Booklet)
79	Syed Riaz ul Hassan	Riaz ul Masyab (Booklet)
80	Jafari Dar-ul- Tableegh Imam Brgah Afzal Road Lahore	Waseela-e- Ambia (Booklet)
81	Intikar Book Dept Lahore	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maftah-ul- Quran (Booklet)
82	Imamia Kutab Khana Lahore	Aasar-e-Haaideri (booklet)
83	Dost Associates Al-Karim market Lahore	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mafhoom –ul- Quran ▪ Man-wa Yazdan (Booklet) ▪ Tasawaf kee Haqeeqat (Booklet) ▪ Islam kia Hay (Booklet) ▪ Mastalab Al-Furqan (Booklet) ▪
84	Hizb-ul-Tahreer	Dunya ki bari Taqtain Apni Conference Main Baham Iktilaf Karti Hain Lakin Muslmanion Wo Tumhary Khalaf Muthid Hain (Handbill) (Booklet)
85	Prof Khursid Ahmad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Kaun sa Islam Bush ka Musharraf ka ya Muhammad (P.B.U.H) ▪ Ummat –e- Muslima- backhouses Ahle Quwwat ko Hizb ul Tehrir ki Purzor Pukar (Booklet) ▪ Misbah (Booklet)
86	Al- Shariah Academy Gujranwala	Al- Shariah (Booklet)
87	Khushwat Singh	Mohan Jumar ki Sarguzasht (Booklet)
88	APH Publishing New Delhi	Pakistan’s ISI Network of terror in India (Leaflet)
89	Souratn Publisher Mumbai	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sindh Rise (Booklet) ▪ Sindh Sujag(Booklet)

90	Nahroo Nagar Delhi	Sindhujmo Sansar (Booklet)
91	Qari Ahmad Ali	Haqeeqat Muharramat (Booklet)
92		Ghulam Tayyaba (Booklet)
93	Idara-ul- Safa Noor Bhakshi Trust Karachi	Secret-e-Masoomen (Booklet)
94	Royal electronic Center Mianwali	Mawazna (Booklet)
95	Lajna ama Ullah Lahore	Khatoot-e-Imam Banam Ghulam (booklet)
96	Kashmir advertise Mirpur	Mangla Dam Khatarnak Tausi Mansooba (Booklet)
97	Zahid Bashir Printing Lahore	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rama and Krishna (Booklet) ▪ Religious Un Touchables of Pakistan (Booklet)
98	Uzair Ahmad Siddique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ahle Bait-e-Rasool Aur Tehqeeq Aal-e-Muhammad (Booklet) ▪ Hindu Mazhab ki Tareekh Aur Hindi Musliman (Booklet)
99	Abu-ul-Hussain	Hayyat Syedana Yazeed (Booklet) Waqia-e-Karbala Aur Syedana Yazeed (Booklet)
100	Qazi Muhammad Ali	Shama-e- Haqeeqat (Booklet)
101	Barkat Ullaha Pani Patti	Mowazana (Monthly)
102	Mahmood Ahmad Abbasi	Rasoomaat-e-Muharram Aur Tazia Dari (Monthly)
103	Shahida Jabeen Nai Nafees Printers	Tabqati judojehad (monthly)
104	Dar-ul-Aloom Taleem-ul-Quran Raja Bazar Rawalpindi	Ai- Jamiat (Monthly)
105	Sindhi Abadi Board Jamshroo	Sartiyoon (Monthly)
106	Aziz Ahmad Siddique	Sabai Sabaz Bagh (Booklet)

107	Qazi Muhammad Ali	Shama-e- Haqiqat (Booklet)
108	Hussain Amir Faryad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Tasawaf ka Tareeq Tareen Ghar (Booklet)
109	Al- Rashid Trust Peshawar	Islam (Daily)
110	BLF/BLA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Shaoor Aagahi Paigham Baloch Koum Key Naam (Booklet) ▪ Aashob (Booklet)
111	Allama Waqar Naqvi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Dorling Kindersley Childrens Illustrated Encyclopedia (Booklet) ▪ Jaanat-ul- Baqee (Booklet)
112	Markaz-e- Tableegh-e- Islami Karachi	Tableegh (Booklet)
113	Moulana Ali Sher Rehmani	Masla-e- Imammat (Booklet)
114	Dar-ul-Tableegh Al- Jafri Islamabad	Shahadat-e-Salisa Dar Tashehhd key Mutaaliq Marajae Uzam ka Shari Faisla (Booklet)
115	Muktaba Nooria Rizvia Victoria Market Sukkar	Quran Sharif key Ghalat Tarjamon ki Nishandahi (Booklet)
116	Moulana Muhammad Manzoor Nomani	Al- Furqan (Booklet)
117		<p>La Nabi baadi aur Buzuran-e-Ummat (Booklet)</p> <p>Jamm'at ahmadiyya ka Taarruf (Booklet)</p> <p>Jamm'at key Aqaid (Booklet)</p> <p>Hazrat Ban-e- Jamm'at Ahmadiyya ka Ishq-e-Rasool(S.A.W)</p>
118	Maulana Kaleemullah Rabbani (Deoband) Published by Haq Nawaz Shaheed Library PAF, Liaqat Colony Sargodha	Shia aur Hazrat Ali (Book)
119	Maulana Muhammad Yousaf Lakhanvi (Deoband)Published by Maktaba Ludhianvi, Jama Masjid Falah, Fedrel B-Area, Karachi	Ikhtilaf-e-Ummat aur Siraat-e-Mustaqeem
120	Maulana Mehar Muhammad(deobamd) published by Tahaffuz namoos-e-Sahaba –o0Ahle Bait Pakistan	Mairaj-e-Sahabiat Bajawab Miyar Sahabiat

121	Maulana Hafiz Mehar Muhammad Mianwali (Deoband) published by Maktaba Usmania Bun Hafiz Gee Mianwali	Sunni Mazhab Sacha Hai
122	Allama Irfan Haider Abidi (Shia) published by Mahfooz Book Agency, Marton Road, Karachi	Al- Majalis-ul-Irfan Shariat and Shiyat
123	Muhammad Tajani Samaavi (Shia) published by Ansarian publications Qum/Iran	Shia Hi Ahle Sunnat Hain
124	Hafiz Mehar Muhammad Mianwali (Deoband) published by Maktaba Usmania Bun Hafiz Gee Mianwali	Tohfa Imamia
125	Allama Farooq Kazmi (Ahle Tashi) Published by Idara Tehzeeb-o-Adab, Maidan Elech Khan Lakhnow	Haqeeqat Tabarra
126	Sanaullah Saad Shuja Abadi (Deoband) Published by Maktaba Bukhari, Sabri Park, Gulistan colony. Liyari Town Karachi	Allama Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi Shaheed Hayat-o-Khidmat
127	General Secretary of Pakistan Bible Society Anarkali Lahore	Muqabala Musavri
128	By Workers Quaid-e-Millat Jafaria Pakistan	Maloomat-e- Ittela'at

Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior, Crises Management Cell (CMC), 2010.

Appendix 12 - A

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan 01 January 2001 - 13 September 2009

Years	Incidents	Killed			Injured		
		LEAs	Civilians	Total	LEAs	Civilians	Total
2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2002	4	0	29	29	0	99	99
2003	2	13	54	67	18	85	103
2004	5	3	52	55	1	311	312
2005	3	0	30	30	0	121	121
2006	8	50	91	141	69	204	273
2007	56	242	376	618	568	983	1551
2008	63	149	619	768	581	1315	1896
2009	48	144	1025	1169	830	2677	3507
Total	189	601	2276	2877	2067	5795	7862

Appendix 12 - B

Suicide Attacks- 01 January 2009 - 13 September 2009

Province wise

Province	Incidents	Killed			Injured		
		LEAs	Civilians	Total	LEAs	Civilians	Total
Islamabad	3	10	1	11	11	1	12
Punjab	5	19	391	410	-	132	132
Sindh	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NWFP/Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	30	71	114	185	115	549	664
Baluchistan	1	-	5	5	-	15	15
FATA	9	45	62	107	45	154	199
Total	48	145	573	718	171	851	1022

Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior, Crises Management Cell (CMC), 2009.

Appendix 13

Details of Actions against Militant Organizations by the Government of Pakistan till 2010

S.#.	Offence	Total Cases registered					
		ICT	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Total
1	Banned Organization(Persons detained under ATA	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	Misuse of Loudspeaker	46	7507	1196	118	223	9090
3	Hate Literature	20	156	45	7	20	248
4	Chanda Collection	0	114	4	3	2	123
5	Khateeb's Fanning sectarian Hatered	5	113	1	1	2	122
6	Un-authorized construction of Mosque/Madrassa	0	12	4	0	0	16
7	Display/Brandishing of Arms	0	436	230	7394	807	8867
	Total	71	8338	1480	7523	1054	18466

S.#.	Offence	Total Persons Arrested					
		ICT	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Total
1	Banned Organization(Persons detained under ATA	4	109	40	49	33	235
2	Misuse of Loudspeaker	61	7105	349	103	93	7711
3	Hate Literature	14	131	40	7	19	211
4	Chanda Collection	0	130	6	4	1	141
5	Khateeb's Fanning sectarian Hatered	4	153	0	0	1	158
6	Un-authorized construction of Mosque/Madrassa	0	13	4	0	0	17
7	Display/Brandishing of Arms	0	597	144	7370	802	8913
	Total	83	8238	583	7533	949	17386

S.#.	Offence	Total Persons Released					
		ICT	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Total
1	Banned Organization(Persons detained under ATA	4	106	40	40	25	215
2	Misuse of Loudspeaker	60	7105	142	75	92	7474
3	Hate Literature	13	123	1	6	0	143
4	Chanda Collection	0	128	0	2	0	130
5	Khateeb's Fanning sectarian Hatered	4	143	0	0	0	147
6	Un-authorized construction of Mosque/Madrassa	0	12	0	0	0	12
7	Display/Brandishing of Arms	0	549	0	7128	3	7680
	Total	81	8166	183	7251	120	15801

S.#.	Offence	Total Persons still in Custody/Arrested					
		ICT	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Total
1	Banned Organization(Persons detained under ATA	0	3	0	9	8	20
2	Misuse of Loudspeaker	1	0	207	28	1	237
3	Hate Literature	1	8	39	1	19	68
4	Chanda Collection	0	2	6	2	1	11
5	Khateeb's Fanning sectarian Hatered	0	10	0	0	1	11
6	Un-authorized construction of Mosque/Madrassa	0	1	4	0	0	5
7	Display/Brandishing of Arms	0	48	144	242	799	1233
	Total	2	72	400	282	829	1585

S.#.	Offence	Total persons Challenged					
		ICT	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Total
1	Banned Organization(Persons detained under ATA	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	Misuse of Loudspeaker	43	7102	505	103	93	7846
3	Hate Literature	14	131	16	7	19	187
4	Chanda Collection	0	130	2	4	1	137
5	Khateeb's Fanning sectarian Hatered	7	151	1	0	1	160
6	Un-authorized construction of Mosque/Madrassa	0	7	0	0	0	7
7	Display/Brandishing of Arms	0	593	162	7370	751	8876
	Total	64	8114	686	7484	865	17213


Activists detained under Anti Terrorism Act (ATA) : 20

Persons under arrest for other offences like hate material, misuse of loud speaker :1565.

Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior, Crises Management Cell (CMC), 2009-10.

Appendix 14



Annual Pakistan Defense Budget, in Total \$US and as % of GDP 1999-2009



Source: Ian S. Livingston and Michael O'Hanlon, *Pakistan Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security*, Brookings, 25 March 2010, p: 6.

Appendix 15


Journalists Killed in Pakistan Since 1992- 2009



Source: Committee to Protect Journalists, "Journalists Killed in Pakistan".
Available at: <http://www.cpj.org/killed/asia/pakistan/>

Appendix 16


Annual Pakistan Government Spending on Education, as % of GDP and Total Budget, 2000 - 01 to 2008 - 09



Source: Khawar Ghumman, "Education to be allocated seven percent of GDP", *Dawn*, September 10, 2009.

Appendix 17

Literacy Rate in Pakistan Age 10 Years and Above - Male, Female: Province wise



Source: Pakistan Ministry of Finance, "Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09", p. 159.
Available at: <http://www.finance.gov.pk/min/images/survey/chapters/10-Education09.pdf>

Appendix 18

The critical elements of North Waziristan Peace Agreement
5 September 2006

Clauses to be fulfilled by the Utmanzai Tribe:

- No attacks shall be launched against Law-enforcement personnel, Armed Forces, and Government institutions. Also there would be no “Target Killing”
- Parallel Administration shall be set up in NWA (North Waziristan Agency) and the writ of the Government of Pakistan would be accepted. The Political Administration would be approached for the solution of the local problems and all issues shall be solved under the “Riwaj” (Law of the land) and the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) with the cooperation of the Utmanzai Tribes and their Elders.
- Nobody shall be allowed to cross border to take part in military operations in neighboring Afghanistan. However, there will be no ban on traveling to Afghanistan in line with the existing traditions and law for trade purposes or meeting relatives.
- No interference shall be carried out in Settled Districts adjoining North Waziristan and no effort shall be made to establish parallel administration there.
- Foreigners shall leave North Waziristan. Those unable to do so will have to live peacefully in the area and respect the existing laws as well as the terms of the Peace Agreement.
- All Government assets including vehicles, weapons, wireless sets, etc captured during fighting shall be returned.

Commitments to be fulfilled by the Government of Pakistan

- All those persons arrested during the military operations shall be freed and will not be re-arrested under the same cases.
- All privileges and benefits allowed to the tribes in the past shall be restored.
- New check posts set up on roads by the Army shall be dismantled. While only “khassadras” and Levies shall man the old check posts as was the practice earlier.
- All confiscated vehicles, weapons, and other assets shall be returned to the tribesmen.
- Once the agreement is signed, the government shall halt all ground and aerial military operations and in future resolve all issues under the terms of tribal customs and traditions.

- All innocent victims of the military operations shall be compensated for human and material losses. Owners of properties that were damaged shall also be paid compensation.
- There shall be no ban on carrying arms in keeping with the existing tribal traditions and practices. However, the ban on heavy weapons shall continue.
- Implementation of the peace agreement shall begin with shifting of Pakistan Army troops from road check posts to their camps and bases.

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